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3ABSTRACT
The thesis aims to explain increasing accountability in the French nonprofit 
sector. The qualitative research investigates the hypothesis that engendering trust is the 
key rationale for increasing accountability. The research also explores inductively other 
potential rationales for increasing accountability (e.g. corporatisation, integration of 
international standards of accountability, donor pressure, and the media). US regulatory, 
self-regulatory, and voluntary models of accountability provide reference standards.
The study targets 45 renowned French NPOs. 33 are members of a national 
independent accountability accreditation organisation (Comite de la Charte de 
Deontologie), and 12 comprise a control group. The driving voice is the perspective of 
the most senior leaders of respondent organisations, almost all executive directors, 
board Presidents, or board members.
The theoretical framework centres on Henry Hansmann’s theory of trust 
(derived from legal restrictions on profit distribution or the “nondistribution constraint”) 
as an explanation for the origin and on-going efficacy of the nonprofit form. First 
establishing the relevance of Hansmann’s demand side theory in France, the analysis 
then bridges Hansmann’s rationale for the nonprofit organisational structure to analysis 
of how and why French NPOs supplement the intrinsic characteristics of that structure 
with accountability. Hansmann might call this organisational effort the “supply side.” 
Finally, the emerging spectrum from Hansmann’s trust to Lester Salamon’s suggestion 
that accountability is the modem foundation for tmst because the nondistribution 
constraint no longer suffices also frames the analysis.
The proposed definition of accountability combines a general definition and an 
operationalised definition (derived from scholarly literature and best practice, 
respectively). The analysis highlights organisations’ strategic assessment of 
quantitative/non-quantitative considerations in accountability-related decisions, 
including the impact of specified internal organisational variables and external 
contextual variables.
The most oft-cited rationale for increasing accountability is ethical, effective 
management, followed by donor tmst. Donor tmst proves essential and fragile -  
irrespective of cited rationale for increasing accountability.
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GLOSSARY OF FRENCH TERMS AND NAMES, 
OTHER DEFINED TERMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS
French Terms and Names
administrateur
PARC
ARUP
assemblee generate
association or 1901 Law 
association
benevole
bureau
censeur
Charte de Deontologie 
collectivite
Comite de la Charte de 
Deontologie or Comite
commissaire aux comptes
Commission dAgrement et 
de Controle
Commission Nationale de 
rinformatique et des 
Libertes or CNIL
conseil d ‘administration
Conseil d’Etat
Conseil de deontologie
Conseil national de la 
comptabilite
member of the conseil d ’administration (used for French 
NPOs)
Association pour la Recherche sur le Cancer (Association 
for Cancer Research)
public utility association (<association reconnue d'utilite 
publique)
annual meeting of a French NPO 
NPO created under the 1901 Law
volunteer donating time without remuneration
executive committee of conseil d ’administration with 
significant decision-making authority
Comite volunteer with professional accounting and 
finance background overseeing accreditation
Comite’s Code of Ethics and Good Conduct applicable to 
members
administrative/geographic area in France with 
independent legal status
independent national accountability accreditation 
organisation (case study organisation)
external auditors for statutory audit of NPO accounts
Approval and Control Commission (independent experts 
approving eligibility of new Comite members and 
Comite requirements)
French national data protection agency
governing body of association or foundation (equivalent 
to a US board of directors)
French state body vetting laws prior to ministerial 
approval
Comite’s ethics counsel (now dissolved into individual 
volunteers)
French national accounting organisation (equivalent to 
US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB))
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Cour des comptes
departement
FRUP
Ministere des Affaires 
Etrangeres et Europeennes
statuts
volontaires
Other Defined Terms
1901 Law 
Attorney General
board or board of directors 
Board Source 
Comite Charter
Comite Group
Comite Group interview 
questionnaire
Comite Group self­
completion questionnaire
Comite/Sofres Survey
Control Group 
Control Group A
Control Group B
French state administrative body overseeing NPO use of 
donor funds
administrative/geographic area in France with 
independent legal status
fondation reconnue d ’utilite publique (public utility 
foundation)
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
by-laws or other documents of legal organisation
intermediate position between volunteers and employees 
paid a stipend and benefits (used exclusively in French 
and distinguished from the English word “volunteers”)
French 1901 Law of July 1, 1901 authorising the creation 
of associations
highest ranking legal officer of state or federal 
government (with oversight of enforcement of many 
NPO matters)
governing body of US NPOs (used exclusively for US 
context)
US self-regulatory organisation addressing board 
governance issues serving over 600,000 NPO leaders
Comite’s Code of Ethics and Good Conduct {Charte de 
Deontologie)
respondent group of 33 members of the Comite
semi-structured questionnaire for in-person interviews of 
Comite Group senior management representatives
self-completion factual questionnaire (first data 
collection phase) -  Comite Group
2007 study called The Phenomenon o f  Trust {Le 
phenomene de la conflance) commissioned by the 
Comite to study donor trust in fund-raising NPOs
control group of 12 organisations outside the Comite
six larger Control Group organisations with many large 
donors similar to Comite Group profile
six smaller Control Group organisations with smaller 
number of larger donors
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Control Group interview 
questionnaire
Control Group self­
completion questionnaire
controlling persons
Director General
Foreign Affairs Commission 
Report
Form 990
Hopkins Study
Independent Sector
Independent Sector 
Code of Ethics
Internal Revenue Service 
Internal Revenue Code 
interview questionnaires
President
public utility association 
public utility foundation 
Report to Respondents
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
self-completion
questionnaires
social economy
Statement of Use of Funds
Zoe’s Ark
semi-structured questionnaire for in-person interviews of 
Control Group senior management representatives
self-completion factual questionnaire (first data 
collection phase) -  Control Group
persons with the power to influence policies and 
management via voting rights, board or management 
positions, contract, or otherwise
General Director of a NPO (Chief Executive Officer or 
Executive Director equivalent)
2007 Report of French National Assembly Foreign 
Affairs Commission addressing the 2004 Asian tsunami
US Internal Revenue Service required annual filing for 
NPOs with tax deduction privileges
Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project 
(defined in Section 1.3.2)
nonpartisan self-regulatory “coalition” of approximately 
550 NPOS and corporate giving programs
Statement of Values and Code of Ethics for Charitable 
and Philanthrophic Organsations published by 
Independent Sector
US Internal Revenue Service (tax authority)
US Internal Revenue Code (Title 26)
Comite Group and Control Group interview 
questionnaires collectively
President of a NPO (generally equivalent of Executive 
Chairman of the Board in the US)
see ARUP
see FRUP
February 19, 2008 French language report by author 
summarising research findings/recommendations
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Comite Group self-completion questionnaire and Control 
Group self-completion questionnaire together
economie sociale (defined in Section 1.3.1)
Compte d ’Emploi des Ressources
l'Arche de Zoe (1901 Law association founded in 2005)
Abbreviations
l’ADDES Association Pour le Developpement de la Documentation
sur l’Economie Sociale (Association for Development of 
Documentation on the Social Economy)
CNIA California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004
ECHO European Commission - Humanitarian Aid Office
EU European Union
EVP A European Venture Philanthropy Association
GDP gross domestic product
ICFO International Committee on Fundraising Organisations
FIGAS Inspection Generate des Affaires Sociales (General
Inspectorate of Social Affairs)
NGO nongovernmental organisation (used for any country)
NPO nonprofit organisation (used for any country)
PEAD Plan Europeen d'Aide aux Plus Demunis (European Aid
Plan for the Most In Need)
SEC United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the
primary federal securities regulatory body)
UK United Kingdom
US United States of America
VAMs voluntary accountability mechanisms defined in Section
2.2.2(b) (Other voluntary accountability mechanisms 
outside the specified list for the research are referred to 
as “voluntary accountability mechanisms.”)
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NOTES ON PRESENTATION OF DATA
1. References to Organisations and Comite Senior Management. Citations to 
specific organisations in parentheses throughout the thesis are numbered 1-33 
(the 33 Comite Group organisations) and lettered A through L (the 12 Control 
Group organisations) in a non-identifiable pattern to track data while 
protecting confidentiality. Occasionally organisation codes are omitted (as 
noted in footnotes) to protect confidentiality due to references in the text 
linking to information in the appendices that could jeopardise confidentiality. 
Occasionally Comite senior management representatives are referred to as 
“Comite senior management call/interview” to protect the confidentiality of 
the individual.
2. Percentages. Percentages are used throughout only where useful to 
communicate results. For example, percentages are added where the 
comparison of absolute numbers between the Comite Group and Control 
Group does not indicate the significance of the related difference in 
percentage between the two groups, to indicate the extent of change over time, 
or to convey extremes in responses.
3. Numerical Statements. Numerical statements are intended to support a 
qualitative panorama and not to offer quantitative statistical analysis. 
Numerical statements throughout the discussions of the empirical findings 
may not total to the total number of participants in the study as in certain 
cases respondents did not answer individual questions and/or answers were 
not usable for various reasons.
4. References to Regulations and Web Sites. Due to the frequency of references 
to the following regulations and web sites, an abbreviated form is used in the 
in-text citations for readability. These link directly to the sections in 
References noted:
Comite (Comite de la Charte: References Section III. Comite de la 
Charte References)
French Government (French government bodies enacting laws, 
decrees, and ordinances: References Section II. Regulatory 
References -  French Government Regulatory References)
US Government (United States Government: References Section II.
Regulatory References -  US Federal Regulatory References) 
USGDT (United States Government Department of the Treasury: 
References Section II. Regulatory References -  US Federal 
Regulatory References)
USGDTIRS (United States Government Department of the Treasury 
Internal Revenue Service: References Section II. Regulatory
References -  US Federal Regulatory References)
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5. Use of Translations. French terms are used (and defined in the glossary) for 
frequently used terms with specific legal meaning. Translations into French 
are provided in the text for less frequently used terms with a specific legal 
meaning or use in the French nonprofit sector context.
6. Conflicts of Interest. The author has been a member of the US Advisory 
Board of Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres for seven years 
(but not any governing or advisory body of the French organisation that 
participated in the study and not involved in any of the decisions or 
accountability matters cited). Fidesco has been a pro bono consulting client of 
the author periodically on governance matters for approximately four years. 
The author began pro bono consulting for Amnesty International France six 
months after completion of the interviews. Finally, in early February 2009, the 
nominating committee of the conseil d ’administration of the Comite de la 
Charte suggested the author’s candidacy as an independent expert 
administrateur. Election occurred March 26, 2009. Prior to this suggestion, 
there had been no other discussion of this topic or interaction with the conseil 
d ’administration of the Comite during the study. None of these arrangements 
had any effect on the research process or findings
19
Chapter 1 
Introduction
“This [increasing accountability] is part of the normal evolution of things, in particular in an era 
when accountability is on everybody’s mind” [author translation] (Organisation 29).
“...I have offered, in essence, a positive theory of consumer demand. That is, I have argued that 
nonprofits tend to produce particular services, those characterized by ‘contract failure,’ because 
consumers prefer to deal with nonprofits in purchasing those services...based upon a feeling that 
nonprofits can be trusted [italics added] not to exploit the advantage over the consumer resulting from 
contract failure. This trust derives its rational basis from the nondistribution constraint that characterizes 
the nonprofit form” (Hansmann 1980, 896).
“... it takes supply as well as demand [italics added] to make a market; to understand the 
nonprofit sector in full, one must know not only the circumstances under which patrons will seek the 
services of nonprofits, but also the factors that determine whether and how the nonprofit organizations 
will develop to meet that demand [italics added]...I have focused heavily on the demand side, primarily 
because this seems the best way to illuminate the general role served by the nonprofit form. Questions of 
supply response have been touched upon only briefly, and much remains to be said [italics added]” 
(Hansmann 1980, 897).
In the increasingly global and competitive nonprofit environment at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, nonprofit leaders struggle with how best to ensure 
financial sustainability, successful service delivery, and loyalty to the organisational 
culture. Increasing attention to accountability has emerged as a fundamental common 
concern among leaders and organisations across a range of sectors of activity, 
geographic reach, profile of leader, legal and financial structures, and cultural contexts 
(Salamon 2003, 5). Indeed, as several respondents in my survey began their respective 
interviews, “accountability is on everybody’s mind”... “it’s in the air i f ’air du 
temps)”... “just the way things are in today’s world” (Organisations 29, J, and H, 
respectively).
While accountability is often loosely defined as demonstrating how, and how 
effectively, a NPO has used resources available to it, the range of financial, cultural, 
regulatory, and ethical overtones, as well as more specific measures of accountability 
relevant to each NPO, vary widely. Nonetheless, NPO leaders’ reflection on the type of 
organisational behaviour necessary to succeed in the current environment may be traced 
back to the origins of the nonprofit form. In particular, key common intrinsic NPO 
characteristics -  most importantly, the restriction on distribution of profits -  underlie the 
analysis of accountability even in 2009 and even across national legal systems and the
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wide variety of NPOs.1 Seminal scholarship on the nonprofit sector, such as 
Hansmann’s 1980 article on trust, also focuses on the importance of the restrictions on 
profit distribution or “nondistribution constraint” as a basis for donor trust and, 
therefore, financial stability (Hansmann 1980, 838). Hansmann developed theories of 
the types of organisations best suited to donor behaviour, the types of services NPOs 
deliver, and the relationship between donors and beneficiaries as resting largely on trust 
derived from intrinsic NPO qualities (1980).
In the current nonprofit sector environment, the question has evolved as to 
whether a different kind of organisational behaviour, in addition to the intrinsic 
elements of the nonprofit form, is necessary for sustainability. Specifically, how does 
the broad concern with, and evidence of, increasing accountability at the time of this 
thesis relate to the common origins of the nonprofit form and an updated analysis of the 
characteristics and behaviour of NPOs essential for success in the early twenty-first 
century? How should accountability be defined for purposes of answering this question? 
How and why is accountability related to trust, again across legal systems, cultural 
contexts, and other organisation-specific and environmental variables?
Trust has been the centrepiece of the US nonprofit theoretical, regulatory, self- 
regulatory, and voluntary accountability framework (Hansmann 1980; United States 
Government 2002; Independent Sector 2002; Anheier and Kendall 2000, 2, 
respectively). Most recently, extensive fall-out from for-profit and nonprofit scandals 
called into question the role of trust and reinforced attention to accountability. A range 
of regulatory, self-regulatory, and voluntary accountability efforts aim to engender trust 
through both general and highly specific accountability policies and mechanisms. The 
adequacy or even on-going relevance to donors of trust based on intrinsic NPO 
characteristics in a newly complex, competitive nonprofit market is under increasing 
scrutiny (Salamon 2003, 25). Rather, accountability has become increasingly important 
to earning trust (Reiser 2004, 6; Salamon 2003, 24-6; Anheier and Kendall 2000, 5 (on 
other approaches to trust)). Moreover, accountability in the nonprofit sector has begun 
to parallel increasing attention in the for-profit world, including in response to scandal 
(Keating and Frumkin 2000, 1 and 5-6; Reiser 2005, 559-60).4 At the extreme,
1 See e.g. Hopkins Study definition of NPOs (Section 1.3.2).
2 See the discussion of Hansmann’s theory (Section 2.1.2).
3 See e.g. Section 3.1 on the Enron, WorldCom, and Red Cross scandals.
4 See also e.g. Light (2003, 6-7); United States Government 2002; Independent Sector 2004b; 
Independent Sector and Board Source 2006; Lloyd (2005, 2).
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increasing pressure to evaluate and improve performance shifts the burden further from 
intrinsic NPO qualities to accountability as the basis for trust (Lloyd 2005, 2; Salamon 
2003, 25).
Accountability is also increasingly a high priority in the French nonprofit sector 
and the focus of the present investigation -  generally and among leaders of major 
French NPOs more specifically. The evolving relationship between accountability and 
trust, and the role of trust as a central foundation for NPOs, has become important as a 
result of several parallel developments. First, a series of major nonprofit sector scandals 
in France, most importantly PARC (Association for Cancer Research) dating back to 
the late 1980s, focused attention on trust and the potential need to reinforce trust with 
accountability.5 Second, the French nonprofit sector looks increasingly to US models of 
nonprofit accountability targeting trust, including the influence of for-profit organisation 
practices. This calls into question the basis of trust and the need for accountability 
efforts (as defined in Section 2.2.2(b)) to support trust. Similarly, in France parallel 
increasing emphasis on accountability as a tool for ethical, effective management and to 
meet increasing competition and enhance strategy (hereinafter referred to as “ethical, 
effective management”) challenges the relevance of trust to accountability-related 
decisions.
This thesis investigates the reasons for recently increasing accountability in the 
French nonprofit sector in terms of both increased stated interest in accountability and 
actions taken to increase accountability.6 The focus of the study is a group of 45 
renowned French NPOs. 33 are members of a pioneering independent French 
accountability accreditation organisation called the Comite de la Charte de Deontologie 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Comite”).7 12 comprise a control group of equally 
renowned organisations outside the Comite. Against an empirically verified panorama 
of widely acknowledged increasing accountability in France, I examine how the 
respondent organisations individually, and the Comite as an independent organisation, 
demonstrate increasing interest in accountability and efforts to increase accountability. 
The thesis then analyses the primary rationales for this increasing accountability, 
including inductive assessment of the importance of trust within a mix of other possible
5 See Section 7.2.1 for a discussion of l’ARC.
6 Reflects Howell comments on thesis draft (e-mail September 17, 2008).
7 The Comity de la Charte de Deontologie is technically translated as the Ethics Charter Committee. 
However, a more functionally accurate translation would be Accountability Accreditation Committee. See 
Appendix 1-A for a complete list of respondent organisations and the legal status of each. See also 
Section 1.2.1 for case study structure.
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rationales. The analysis includes prioritising the rationales, explaining the major driving 
forces behind those rationales, and exposing the vehicles through which NPOs increase 
accountability within each. Finally, the discussion broadens to consider respondent 
leaders’ perceptions of, and reactions to, increasing accountability and potential 
challenges to accountability in the French nonprofit sector.
The analysis offers as a cross-national frame of reference the regulatory, self- 
regulatory, and voluntary accountability models that underlie the comparatively more 
successful US nonprofit sector in terms of giving to NPOs and advanced levels of
o
accountability. Accountability for purposes of this thesis includes both a general 
obligation to answer for one’s behaviour and an operationalised set of specific voluntary 
accountability mechanisms (hereinafter referred to as “VAMs”) that closely reflect US 
best practice as the sector models.9 VAMs facilitate comparison -  among French NPOs 
and with US regulations and best practices. VAMs also offer a range of organisational 
and financial approaches to the theoretical and practical aspects of accountability and 
trust. This in turn allows broader inductive insight into potential explanations for 
increasing accountability other than as a tool to enhance trust.
The analysis also considers the application of Hansmann’s trust theoretical 
framework in the French context. Hansmann suggests that the restrictions on NPOs’ 
distribution of profits (the so-called “nondistribution constraint” characteristic of NPOs) 
permit increased trust by minimising opportunity for management or the board to 
engage in inappropriate or illegal behaviour (e.g. misuse of funds) (Hansmann 1980, 
838). Similarly, the larger “contract” of the “organization’s legal commitment to devote 
its entire earnings to the production of services” offers a basis for trust (Hansmann 
1980, 844). Nonprofit trust, in turn, compensates for the intrinsic “information 
asymmetry” and “contract failure” in dealing with NPOs (Hansmann 1996, 252; 
Hansmann 1980, 845 and 896, respectively). Trust is also critical to aN PO ’s capacity to 
compete effectively in an increasingly demanding nonprofit environment (Hansmann 
call 2008; Salamon call 2008).
The driving focus of the thesis is the respondent leaders’ perception of, and 
words and actions relating to, the increasing accountability. First, the analysis
8 See Note 77, infra for examples o f comparisons in giving in France to the US and other European 
countries. See Sections 3.1 and 3.2 and Chapter 4 for a comparison of key elements of US and French 
accountability regulation and best practice.
9 See Section 2.2.2 for a two-pronged general and operationalised definition of accountability used 
throughout the thesis and related terms. Voluntary accountability mechanisms outside the specified list of 
VAMs are referred to as “voluntary accountability mechanisms.”
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establishes the relevance of Hansmann’s originally US-based trust theory as an 
explanation for the nonprofit form in France in the early twenty-first century and 
starting point for the research on increasing accountability (the demand side). The thesis 
then builds on this analysis to ask how organisations behave with respect to 
accountability matters in the current nonprofit sector environment. Hansmann might 
call this to some degree the “supply side”: “ ...one must know not only the
circumstances under which patrons will seek the services of nonprofits, but also the 
factors that determine whether and how [NPOs] will develop to meet that demand” 
(Hansmann 1980, 897). The thesis therefore bridges Hansmann’s analysis of why the 
nonprofit form is the likely attractive organisational structure to how and why NPO 
leaders question the need to supplement the intrinsic characteristics of that 
organisational form with increasing accountability to succeed in an era of rising 
competition and globalisation. The analysis takes as a given donor giving tendencies (as 
Hansmann assumed within his original theory). The thesis does not address actual or 
probable donor perception or actions except insofar as leaders’ perceptions of the issues 
integrate their views of donor perception, which would reflect individual perception and 
not proven data.10
Second, the analysis addresses theoretical extensions of Hansmann’s theory 
relevant to the analysis of increasing accountability. Susan Rose-Ackerman proposes 
the notion of investing in accountability to “signal” trustworthiness (Rose-Ackerman 
2001, 6).11 The related weighing up of the strategic choices linked to an investment in 
VAMs and other voluntary accountability mechanisms to strengthen that “signal” 
underlies the theoretical and empirical analysis.12 In addition, the analysis explores 
Lester Salamon’s suggestion that trust derived from the nondistribution constraint no 
longer suffices and that accountability (particularly performance evaluation) has 
become the prerequisite for earning trust (Salamon 2003, 25). These extensions and 
other criticisms of the theory addressed in the thesis establish a basis for understanding 
the relationship between the empirical findings and the theory as the theory has evolved 
since Hansmann’s seminal 1980 article (Hansmann 1980).
The thesis challenges the fundamental assumption in Hansmann’s work, and 
later Rose-Ackerman and Salamon’s work, that accountability reflects organisations’
10 See Section 1.2.5.
11 See Section 2.1.5 for an explanation of “signalling.”
12 The discussion of Rose-Ackerman’s cost-benefit analysis in terms of strategic choice emerged from a 
call with Bradshaw on contingency theory (Bradshaw call 2008).
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response to a demand for trustworthiness. The empirical research aims to understand 
how organisations think and why organisations act the way they do with respect to 
accountability -  i.e., how and why they supply accountability. Critically, the findings 
show this process to be more complex than a demand for trust (i.e., organisations 
positioning themselves within the spectrum from Hansmann’s nondistribution constraint 
based trust to Salamon’s accountability-based trust).
The analysis also explores inductively alternative explanations of increasing 
accountability (i.e., rationales for increasing accountability other than trust). Most 
importantly, accountability has emerged as necessary for ethical, effective management. 
Additional forces potentially expected to drive increasing accountability that fall within 
the larger donor trust or ethical, effective management objectives from respondents’ 
perspective add further depth to the analysis. In the case of ethical, effective 
management, these include corporatisation, the integration of international standards of 
accountability, and accountability requirements imposed by 
govemmental/corporate/institutional funders (each as defined in Chapter 5 
Introduction). In the case of donor trust, these include pressure from donors, 
membership in the Comite, and the media (each as addressed in Section 6.3.2). Finally, 
the analysis considers interrelationships among explanations.
As noted above, throughout the thesis, attention is given to the process of NPOs 
weighing up the strategic choices relating to accountability and the implementation of 
accountability mechanisms. This process involves evaluating the qualitative and 
quantitative costs (both financial and other resources such as senior management and 
volunteer time) and benefits (in terms of reputation, managerial efficiency, financial 
sustainability, strategic value, and development of an ethical culture). This process also 
includes how respondent leaders consider both key internal and external variables on 
accountability decisions. For purposes of the empirical research, the internal variables 
examined include organisational size, level of international engagement, and initiative
13and profile of leader (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “internal variables”). 
The external contextual variables examined include two regulatory variables 
(accountability regulation and the tax system) and two non-regulatory variables (the
13 The description of the size of organisations throughout this thesis, for example as “small” or “large,” 
refers to revenue level. Size based on revenue is also a common measure in other theories considering 
organisational variables such as classic contingency theory (Donaldson 2001, 119). See Appendix 
1-E for a breakdown of respondent organisations by revenue. Data on numbers of employees, another 
common measure of organisational size, did not directly correlate with revenue and was influenced by a 
range of factors unrelated to accountability.
25
welfare state environment and scandal (defined as mediatised failure of accountability 
within a NPO)) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “external variables” and, 
together with the internal variables, the “variables”). While the study investigates a 
finite group of organisations, certain trends regarding the importance of these variables 
emerge. This process of weighing up, qualitatively and quantitatively, the various 
organisational priorities, the driving forces behind increasing accountability, and the 
internal and external variables in making decisions relating to accountability matters is 
hereinafter referred to as “strategic assessment.” Strategic assessment underlies all 
respondents’ approach to increasing accountability -  irrespective of the cited rationale 
for increasing accountability. Finally, the organisation-driven process of increasing 
accountability, including through strategic assessment, is referred to interchangeably as 
“inside out” or “bottom up” (as opposed to top down imposed by regulation).
1.1 Additional Rationales for the Research
The research on accountability and the relationship to trust could further explain, 
and offer concrete vehicles for improving, accountability in the French nonprofit sector 
-  both nationally and within a changing global nonprofit accountability environment 
(Goetz and Jenkins 2005, 4-5). First, in distinguishing organisation-driven 
accountability efforts, weaknesses in national policy emerge. The analysis could offer 
new approaches to policy even within the existing explanations of increasing 
accountability. Second, VAMs are generally objectively assessable, and individual 
NPOs control the selection and implementation of VAMs and other voluntary 
accountability mechanisms. Therefore, the operationalised definition of accountability 
based on VAMs offers insight into practical applications of accountability. In addition, 
there is greater flexibility for affecting organisational and sector change in response to 
the findings through individual, organisation by organisation implementation of VAMs 
and possibly self-regulatory policy than exclusively through changes in national or local 
government policy relating to accountability matters. (The policy recommendations in 
Chapter 8 address elements of both.) Third, irrespective of the positioning of trust in 
the empirical findings, the analysis represents a step forward in understanding 
accountability in the French context given the importance of the trust theory and related
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accountability policies and practices to the most important international nonprofit 
accountability model in France: the US.
1.2 Case Study Structure. Hypothesis. Research Questions, and Comite 
Background
1.2.1 Case Study Structure: Comite de la Charte
The thesis explores a case study of the Comite as a stand-alone organisation, 
together with a group of 45 organisations individually. 33 are Comite member 
organisations (hereinafter referred to as the “Comite Group”). 12 are French NPOs 
outside the Comite functioning as a control group (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Control Group”).14
The Comite Group includes 60% of the 56 member associations and foundations 
(approximately one-half of the Comite’s target market of national non-religious 
associations and foundations with annual revenue in excess of €500,000) (Soublin 
meeting November 2006; Soublin e-mail January 2009; Comite 2008j).15 Comite 
Group members have in common both eligibility criteria and on-going compliance with 
the Comite requirements yet offer diversity of sector of activity, size (above the Comite 
eligibility threshold), international engagement, initiative and profile of leader, level and 
type of political affiliation, and approach to management.16 The sample size of 33 was 
considered adequate upon confirmation of representation of this range of characteristics.
The Control Group comprises 12 French associations and foundations with 
similar renown to the Comite Group organisations. Six are large organisations with 
broad funding from individuals and other sources (and a profile similar to the majority 
of the Comite Group organisations with respect to fund-raising) (hereinafter referred to
14 See Appendix 1-A for a complete list of the respondent organisations and legal status of each. See 
Appendix 1-B for a panorama of sector of activity between the Comite Group and Control Group.
15 See Section 1.3.1 for a definition of the terms “association” and “foundation” in the French legal 
context. By way of comparison, One World Trust’s 2007 Accountability Report (and earlier reports) 
survey a total of 30 organisations, ten international governmental organisations, ten international NGOs, 
and ten transnational corporations (Lloyd, Oatham et al. 2007, 7). Tchemonog notes that o f the 
approximately 1.1 million associations, only 2% (approximately 22,000) have an annual budget of 
€500,000 or more (2007b, 32). See also de Tricomot (Le Monde.fr) 2008.
16 See Appendix 1-F for revenue level by categories of revenue source within the Comitd Group and 
Control from self-completion questionnaire-derived data. See Appendix 1-G for a list o f respondent 
organisations in order of revenue level. Revenue level proved the most consistently important size-related 
influence on respondents’ decisions to implement accountability mechanisms. See Note 13, supra.
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as “Control Group A”). Six are smaller organisations, most with higher level donors at 
or above the €10,000 per year range and/or more significant corporate funding 
(hereinafter referred to as “Control Group B”). A list of potential Control Group 
members was chosen on the basis of variety in sector of activity, size, international 
engagement, initiative and profile of leader, level and type of political affiliation, and
1 7approach to management. The purpose of the Control Group was sampling 
organisations not subject to the Comite accountability requirements to compare to 
Comite-based findings. The Control group also samples smaller organisations with 
different donor profiles but still engaged in fund-raising from the general public. The 
sample size of 12 was considered adequate upon confirmation of representation of this 
range of characteristics and balance of funding.
Both the Comite Group and Control Group organisations represent a sample of 
the most well-known associations and foundations in France and in many cases 
internationally (e.g. the Red Cross France, Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans 
Frontieres, UNICEF France, Amnesty International France, Greenpeace France, World 
Wildlife Fund France, Action contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger), and Medecins du 
Monde). Among both groups there are three Nobel Peace Prize winners.
Most interviewees representing the organisations were Presidents or Directors 
General, with a few Treasurers, administrateurs, or other senior fund-raising positions.19 
The Presidents are almost all full-time volunteer positions combining classic US 
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive positions (Friedman 2000, 99 and 103, 
respectively). The Director General and Executive Director positions are generally 
classic Chief Executive and Chief Operating Officer combinations (Friedman 2000, 
103).
This is the first study of this level of French NPOs and the first study of the 
Comite directly that I am aware of and that Michel Soublin (President of the Comite), 
the Comite management team, the interviewees, and outside nonprofit sector experts 
consulted during the course of the study had heard of. In addition, none of the 
participants knew of any studies of sector leaders at the senior level and renown of the 
interviewees, particularly involving in-depth in-person interviews.
17 See Appendix 1-B for sectors of activity.
18 See Appendix 1-A for the Control Group participants. See Appendix 1-F for a breakdown of 2006 
revenue by sources.
19 See Appendix 1-C for a breakdown of interviewees’ positions within the respondent organisations.
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1.2.2 Hypothesis
The overriding objective of this thesis is to explain the evidence of increasing 
accountability in the French nonprofit sector. The key hypothesis is that increasing 
accountability is explained primarily by a growing recognition by French NPOs of the 
need to support trust in NPOs (as defined by Hansmann) through implementation of 
accountability mechanisms as the global nonprofit environment becomes increasingly 
competitive and focused on accountability. (This hypothesis is hereinafter referred to as 
the “trust hypothesis.”)
1.2.3 Research Questions
The core research question is how and why the French nonprofit sector is 
demonstrating increasing interest in, and organisational efforts to increase, its own 
accountability. The key corollary question related to the trust hypothesis is whether, 
how, and why Hansmann’s originally US-based trust theory, as updated with criticisms 
and extensions (the demand side), applies in the French context as a springboard for 
assessing the rationale(s) for NPOs’ increasing accountability (the supply side). This 
leads to questioning the relative importance of both donor trust and other potential 
“supply side” rationales unrelated to a demand for trust to explain the increasing 
accountability.
1.2.4 Comite Background
The Comite was founded in 1989 by 18 large social service and humanitarian
01associations and foundations (Comite 2006e and 2008d). One key incentive for 
founders of the Comite was an attempt to protect member organisations from a long- 
lasting, sector-wide crisis in trust in NPOs as a result of the scandal involving fraud by 
the founder and then President of the nationally famous PARC beginning in the late
20 Reflecting Le Grand’s advice and Howell comments (Le Grand meeting February 2007; Howell e- 
mails 2008).
21 See Appendix 1-D for a list of the founding Comity organisations, including a listing of those 
participating in this study.
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1980s.22 The Comite is a 1901 Law association (as defined in Section 1.3.1 below) 
independent from government and industry.
The Comite is first and foremost a control organisation. Its statutory mission is 
to promote donor trust or “giving with trust” {don en conjiance) through rigorous 
accountability requirements. Potential members include French associations or 
foundations that act in the interest of the general public (d ’interet general pour le grand 
public), fimd-raise from the public (many primarily soliciting individual donors), and 
collect a minimum of €500,000 per year in donor revenue (Soublin interview 2007).
The Comite accreditation process involves two parts. First, a stringent eligibility 
assessment by the Comite’s Commission d’agrement et de controle (independent 
commission) grants membership. Second, once the Comite grants the Comite seal of 
accreditation (hereinafter referred to as the “logo”) in recognition of an organisation’s 
compliance with eligibility requirements, the Comite verifies on-going compliance 
(including triennial audits) (Soublin interview 2007; Cohas-Bogey interview 2007).
The Comite’s mission specifies four areas of best practice: first, operations in 
accordance with the statuts (by-laws) and management without conflicts of interest; 
second, rigorous management; third, quality of communication and fund-raising 
activities; and fourth, financial transparency (Comite 2006d and 2008h). Any proposals 
for changes in Comite requirements must be approved by the Commission d’agrement 
et de controle and the conseil d ’administration. The Comite does not assess member 
organisations’ performance or appropriateness of activities to the organisation’s stated 
mission (Comite 2008k). The Comite does, however, require organisations to commit 
to implementing mechanisms for performance evaluation and to assess proper use of 
funds for activities within the statutory mission (Soublin e-mail April 2008; Comite 
2008k; Comite 2008n, No. 2).
22 See Sections 7.2.1 and Chapter 7 Introduction for details on the 1’ARC scandal and a more thorough 
definition of the term “scandal,” respectively. Technically the Comity was founded prior to the major 
legal events relating to l’ARC in anticipation of the consequences (Soublin call December 2008). See also 
ComitS 2008q for other advantages to member organisations that the Comity highlights.
23 The Comite does not publish the number on the web site. This number and lack o f public disclosure 
was reconfirmed with Soublin (Soublin call January 2007).
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1.3 Definitions Relating to French and US NPOs. Nonprofit Sector, and Donors
Definitions of the terms relating to the various forms of French NPOs and the 
French nonprofit sector are essential for contextualising the research both in France and 
in comparison with the US for international perspective. The definitions also establish a 
foundation for tracking throughout the thesis certain structural aspects of the French 
nonprofit sector that relate to policy recommendations. The membership structure of 
associations and the emphasis on freedom of association (liberte d ’association) that 
hinders independent oversight in accountability matters prove particularly important. 
With respect to the organisations, the definitions of the terms “association” 
(<association) and “foundation” (fondation) underlie the analysis and policy 
recommendations. With respect to the external environment, the definitions of the 
terms “civil society” and “nonprofit sector” provide the crucial understanding of the 
sector for positioning the organisation-based research and assessing the broader 
implications of largely internally-generated accountability efforts. Definitions used for 
the US and international context outside of France offer a basis of comparison. Finally, 
definitions of different types of donors clarify the donor trust analysis.
1.3.1 French Oreanisations and Sector: Associations (1901 Law and Public
Utility) and Associative Sector: Foundations
The Comite Group and Control Group respondents comprise associations and 
foundations.24 The primary rationale for including both associations and foundations in 
the research is that all Comite Group and Control Group associations and foundations 
solicit funds from the general public and, therefore, should have similar accountability 
priorities and at least one significant common basis for assessing the trust hypothesis 
and increasing accountability.25 Moreover, the inclusion of both in the case study was 
important to assess the Comite as an organisation.
Associations and Associative Sector. The two most important categories of 
“associations” are declared associations subject to the 1901 Law (hereinafter referred to 
as “1901 Law associations” or “associations”) and public utility associations granted
24 See Appendix 1-A for a complete list of respondent organisations and the legal status of each.
25This differs from many US foundations that function primarily through endowment. Respondents and 
Comity senior management widely concurred on this reasoning.
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special charitable status and tax/financial privileges through a complex approval process 
by the Conseil d’Etat (e.g. the French Red Cross) (hereinafter referred to as “ARUPs”) 
(French Government 1901b, Articles 1 and 10, respectively; Archambault 1997a, 112 
and 113, respectively; Binder 2005, 122-4 and 127-9).26 The Comite Group and the 
Control Group each include both types of associations.27 Associations are one of three 
types of French social economy (economie sociale) organisations -  along with 
cooperatives (which engage in commercial activities and distribute surplus to members 
through price reduction mechanisms -  hereinafter referred to as “cooperatives”) and 
mutual enterprises (which provide insurance services to complement French state health 
and welfare benefits -  hereinafter referred to as “mutuals”).
Of the two categories, 1901 Law associations are by far the most common form 
and the most closely resembling the Anglo-Saxon common usage of the terms “NPO” 
or “NGO” or fulfilling the Hopkins Study categories (defined in Section 1.3.2) 
(Archambault 1997a, 113, and 125; Salamon, Wojciech Sokolowski et al. 2004, 9-11). 
The 1901 Law defines associations as a contractual commitment through which two or 
more members (membres) share their knowledge or an activity with no legal 
prohibitions other than the legally unspecified “goal other than to share profits” they 
determine (French Government 1901b, Article 1). Members must be permanent, not 
subordinate to the organisation employees, and not paid. Members of an association 
generally pay a membership fee that varies greatly depending on the type and size of 
association. This definition incorporates both the notion of permanence in the Hopkins 
Study and the Hansmann nondistribution constraint. Like Hansmann, this definition 
does not specify charitable purposes as the US Internal Revenue Code does (French 
Government 1901b; Hansmann 1980, 839; USGDTIRS 2006a, Section 501(c)(3) and
26 I eliminate the third category of “association” -  the undeclared associations -  from the research 
analysis as they are impossible to identify, frequently sole-purpose offshoots of religious or neighborhood 
organisations, temporary, and/or so unstructured and irregularly governed that systematic research would 
prove inconclusive (Archambault 1997b, 5 and 36). Undeclared associations may exist without criminal 
or administrative penalties but do not have formal legal status (Binder 2005, 124). Edith Archambault was 
the Hopkins Study coordinator for France.
27 In 2001, a new form of NPO was added to the French social economy called cooperative interest 
associations (societes cooperatives d ’interet collectif (SCIC)) to bridge a gap in social entrepreneurial 
structures. These remain too few (approximately 109 as of July 2008) to contribute to valid research 
findings (Lindsay and Hems 2004, 265; Scic Inter-Reseaux Scic 2008).
28 See French Government 1901a for the decree of application setting out the administrative details of the 
application of the 1901 Law.
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2008(c)).29 The 1901 Law encompasses a wide range of sizes, operating, advocacy, 
religious, and secular organisations (unlike the Comite and US Internal Revenue Code 
501(c)(3) that limit religious organisations) (Comite 2008g, 9; USGDTIRS 2006a 
2008c, 25).30 1901 Law associations benefit from various tax exemptions and recently 
improved tax benefits to donors (Binder 2005, Part 7, 249-274).31
Key issues for purposes of the analysis of increasing accountability are the 
“relatively light” regulatory framework and emphasis on freedom of association [author 
translation] (Tchemonog 2007b, 1, 5, and 8, respectively). Founding members of 
associations need only complete simple forms and declare the association to obtain 
government status (Archambault 1997b, 60). The 1901 law does not address 
management requirements (French Government 1901b). Rather, the structure of 
President, treasurer, secretary and other such practices have developed solely 
incrementally through tradition. Politically the freedom of association and membership 
structure is fiercely defended, partly as a reaction to the prohibition on freedom of 
association during the century prior to the 1901 Law and to some extent on-going as a 
means of separation from the welfare state (Tchemonog 2007b, 8). Most importantly 
for purposes of accountability, the membership structure results in members’ controlling 
the election of administrateurs and having oversight of many accountability policies.
This broad legal definition of the terms “members” and “association” and 
limited legal constraints have exacerbated the establishment of an unwieldy number and 
variety of associations from the perspective of ensuring adequate accountability 
standards and regulatory oversight (Tchemonog 2007b, 5; KPMG-Observatoire 2007, 
7). There are currently more than 1.1 million 1901 Law associations in France with a 
range of objectives from bowling clubs and neighbourhood watch associations of low 
rent apartment buildings to national groups providing housing for the handicapped and 
the French Red Cross (Tchemonog 2007b, 31).33 In addition to the considerable 
number of non-charitable associations (e.g. sports clubs), the multiplicity of commercial
29 See also UK Charities Act 2006 requirements, which include a “charitable purpose” requirement 
(United Kingdom Government 2006, Part I, Section 2) and The Charity Commission for England and 
Wales 2008.
30 Borderline cases include work councils and housing associations (Archambault 1997a, 124).
31 See Section 3.2.2. Associations are taxed on profits deriving from commercial activities in order to 
prevent unfair competition with for-profit enterprises. See also French Government 2006c for a general 
overview of tax regulation applicable to the nonprofit sector.
32 See also Sections 2.3.1, 5.3.2, and 6.6.1 on freedom of association.
33 A high percentage of the 1.1 million comprises small associations: approximately 40% with fewer than 
50 members; only 16% with paid employees; and 24% sports based (compared to only 3.7% humanitarian 
focused)) (Tchemonog 2007b, 50, 32, and 33, respectively).
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NPOs (i.e., NPOs that earn a significant percentage of income from charging for 
services but still function as NPOs and do not distribute profits) creates confusion 
(Hansmann 1980, 846).34 The last 35 years has seen a significant growth in the number 
of associations (Tchemonog 2007b, 38). While admittedly this level of association 
activity suggests a thriving democracy, the differing incentives, experience, and 
available resources with respect to voluntary accountability mechanisms leads to uneven 
levels of accountability among similar organisations. Most importantly, particular 
weaknesses in the French accountability regulatory framework exacerbate the 
accountability concerns in France, for example compared to the more extensive
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accountability oversight for smaller NPOs in the US.
The term “associative sector” refers to all types of associations. “Association” 
and “associative sector” relate specifically to the French legal and social policy context 
(Archambault 1997a, 112-13).37 The term “French nonprofit sector” includes 
associations, ARUPs, foundations, and FRUPs. These terms include the broadest 
number of organisations comparable to US notions of NPO to facilitate comparison, 
while excluding the market economy components of the French social economy (i.e., 
cooperatives and mutuals) (Archambault 1997b, 4-5).39
Foundations. The Comite Group and Control Group also include foundations 
and public interest foundations (FRUPs). Foundations are significantly less common in 
France than elsewhere in Europe and in the US (Archambault 2003, 1 and 11; Fondation
34 As noted in Section 1.3.2, by comparison, the English word “charity” as used in Internal Revenue Code 
Section 501(c)(3) defines a goal, whereas the French 1901 Law term “association” defines a vastly 
inclusive legal form.
35 See Section 3.2.1 for the regulatory implications o f the multitude of 1901 Law associations.
36 See also Section 3.2.1 on the relationship between the multitude of associations and French 
accountability regulation. Note that in the US, the Form 990 (addressed in Section 3.1.2) must be 
publicly filed for organisations with $25,000 or more in revenue -  thus a much lower threshold of 
regulatory review than the commissaires awe comptes requirement of €153,000 in France (USGDTIRS 
2006b, Section 6033(a)(1); USGDTIRS 1983, Section 2.05; French Government 1987, Article 4-1; 
French Government 2006b; French Government 2005, Article 7).
37 The term “charity” is used only with respect to the US and UK.
38Archambault adds health and social establishments run by mutuals and school and housing cooperatives 
(Archambault 1997b, 9).
39 Economically French cooperatives and mutuals increasingly reflect commercial and for-profit 
characteristics and thereby fail to qualify for the Hopkins Study definition of civil society or NPO in 
Section 1.3.2. Accordingly, they are excluded from the research because the profit-making aspect alters 
the incentive structure sufficiently to skew potentially the accountability/trust analysis (particularly in 
Hansmann’s nondistribution framework) and comparison with US NPOs given the public purpose 
requirement in Internal Revenue Code 501(c)(3) (USGDTIRS 2006a). Associations and foundations 
reinvest income in excess of expenses in the organisation, whereas mutuals and cooperatives often 
distribute profits to members/clients and “have no public interest purpose” (Archambault 1997b, 8). See 
also Salamon and Anheier 1997, 19.
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de France 2006b, 2).40 Foundations must be “for the general interest and not for profit” 
(id ’inter et general et a but non lucratif) (French Government 1987, Article 18; French 
Government 1991b; Memento Pratique Francis Lefebvre 2006-07, Section 77255).41 A 
key difference with associations potentially for analysis of accountability is that 
foundations do not have members. The conseil d ‘administration of foundations is 
generally a self-perpetuating body and not democratically elected (Binder 2005, 143).42 
In terms of financial weight, most are operating foundations such as the Institut Pasteur. 
In terms of number of foundations, the large majority is grant-making foundations 
(Fondation de France 2006a, 3; Archambault 1997b, 182). French foundations are 
legally entitled to similar tax privileges as ARUPs.
1.3.2 US and International Organisations and Sector: NPO and Nonprofit 
Sector. and Civil Society -  The Hovkins Study Definitions
NPO and Nonprofit Sector. For comparability purposes, the Hopkins Study 
definitions of nonprofit sector and NPO are used when referring to the US and countries 
other than France. The Hopkins Study defines the terms “NPO” and “civil society 
organisations” through a “bottom up, inductive approach” or “structural-operational 
definition” -  empirically verified in the context of approximately 36 different countries 
rather than ideologically driven (Salamon, Wojciech Sokolowski et al. 2004, 9-11). The 
Hopkins Study’s analysis captures the range of institutions commonly considered within 
“civil society” or the “third sector,” excluding business and government but including 
government-funded NPOs (Salamon and Anheier 1998, 9; Salamon, Wojciech
40 Relative to other European countries, the European Foundation Center shows 2,109 foundations in 
France in 2001, compared with 8,800 in the UK in 2001 and 14,000 in Denmark in 1999, out of a 
European Union total of approximately 200,000 (European Foundation Centre 2005, 2). Prior to the 
1970s, there were only approximately 250 French foundations, compared to approximately 15, 000 in the 
US (Fondation de France 2006b).
41 The Fondation de France (a study participant) is a large charitable grant-making foundation in France, 
housing its own assets, corporate foundations, and individual and family foundations (Fondation de 
France 2007; Archambault, Boumendil, and Tsyboula 1999, 194). The Fondation de France was founded 
in 1965 with the goal of comparing with and potentially importing US philanthropic practices to the 
French philanthropic context (Fondation de France 2006b). The Fondation de France continues to play a 
pivotal role in the sector as a grantor, manager of foundations, and voice on issues (Archambault 2003, 8; 
Soublin interview October 2007; Charhon meeting 2005 and formal interview for thesis study 2007 
(Appendix 1-A)).
42 For FRUPs, the conseil d ’administration comprises representatives of founders, government 
representatives in the field, and occasionally independent directors with appropriate skill levels.
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Sokolowski et al. 2004, 9-10).43 The five required structural/operational characteristics 
within the definition of “civil society sector” include: “organizational permanence and 
regularity” (whether or not legally registered and/or formally structured); “private”; “not 
profit-distributing”; “self-governing”; and “voluntary” (Salamon, Wojciech Sokolowski 
et al. 2004, 9-10).44
Importantly for purposes of comparison with France, the Hopkins Study 
definition includes community-based, public purpose cooperatives (e.g. anti-poverty) 
but excludes private businesses and the French model of more commercially 
functioning banking and insurance cooperatives and mutuals (Salamon, Wojciech 
Sokolowski et al. 2004, 9).45 Critics consider the Hopkins Study’s exclusion of 
cooperatives and mutuals as reflecting the American nondistribution constraint 
approach (as opposed to the European “limits on private acquisition of profits”) (Evers 
and Laville 2004, 13).46
Civil Society. The relationship between NPO and civil society is important to 
understanding the potential impact of the French welfare state context on the nonprofit 
sector and analysis of increasing accountability.47 The Hopkins Study international 
view distinguishes civil society from family, business, and government but conflates it 
with the civil society institutions (Salamon, Wojciech Sokolowski et al. 2004, 9). In the
43 See also Institut Montaigne on the 1901 Law characteristics, many of which mirror the Hopkins Study 
definition (2004, 65).
44 The Hopkins Study’s internationally applicable definition of NPO deliberately avoids specifying 
“public purposes” to incorporate country-specific social, cultural and economic perspectives. In contrast, 
the most commonly used Anglo-Saxon definitions of NPO focus on public purposes (e.g. the IRS Code 
exemption of NPOs from federal income tax and tax benefits to donors if “organized and operated” for 
charitable, religious, educational, public safety and other related purposes (generally excluding political 
activity)) (USGDTIRS 2006a and 2008c). Similarly, the United Kingdom Charities Act of 2006 permits 
organisations with “charitable purposes only” (United Kingdom Government 2006, Part 1, Sections 1 and 
2).
45 The Hopkins Study statistics reaffirm the French government-dominated system (i.e., welfare state 
context explored in Chapters 2 and 7), even excluding cooperatives and mutuals (Salamon, Wojciech 
Sokolowski et al. 2004, 32).
46 Hansmann’s trust theory is based on the nondistribution constraint characteristic of NPOs. (See Section 
2.1.2) The other “somewhat distribution constrained” organisations in the French social economy -  
cooperatives and mutuals -  operate on more market-based mechanisms (including some which reduce the 
information asymmetry rendering the nondistribution constraint and resulting trust rationale for turning to 
NPOs less important). Hansmann concludes that cooperatives are economically closer to regulated firms 
(e.g. public utilities) than NPOs because the “consumer’s inability to judge the quality of service is 
generally unimportant in the formation o f cooperatives" -  in part because cooperatives often provide 
standardised services and goods (Hansmann 1980, 889-890). Hansmann analyses mutuals as likely when 
impersonal market mechanisms suggest greater control over management is desired. As a result, I am not 
concerned for purposes of this research that Evers’ and Laville’s criticism of the Hopkins Study definition 
hinges on the exclusion of cooperatives and mutuals because Hansmann globally separates these more 
market-based forms from donative NPOs in the basic trust theoretical framework (e.g. Hansmann 1980, 
842).
47 See Section 2.3.
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common Anglo-Saxon notion, civil society comprises a sort of “space” between the 
individual and the state -  often expanding beyond institutions to include individual
4 o
action. Finally, the French definition aligns more closely with the US in that the 
nonprofit sector comprises only a segment of the social economy, which, in turn is 
narrower than civil society.
1.3.3 Donors: Individual and Governmental/Corvorate/Institutional
The term “donors” refers to individual donors. The most common donor profile 
among respondent organisations in both groups is significant numbers of individual 
donors at a low giving level.49 The term “donor trust” refers to 
increasing/maintaining/engendering trust of donors in NPOs (including individual and 
govemmental/corporate/institutional donors (as defined below)). Donor trust does not 
include trust of volunteers or the general public (i.e., non-donors) (addressed in Section 
6.3.2).
The term “governmental donor” includes the French state, any French state 
entities (e.g. departements, collectivites, and city funders), Ministries such as the 
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, and the EU and EU donors such as ECHO 
and PE AD. The term “corporate donor” includes corporations and corporate 
foundations, whether or not specifically part of a corporate social responsibility 
program. The term “institutional donor” includes non-governmental, non-corporate 
private foundations, international aid agencies, and other institutional grantors other 
than family foundations.50
48 Note that Carothers and Putnam warn against equating civil society with NGOs as civil society 
encompasses entities from trade unions to professional associations (so-called “interest groups”) 
(Carothers 1999-2000, 3; Putnam 2000, 21).
49 See Appendix 1-E for self-completion questionnaire-derived data on sources of 2006 revenue 
informing donor profile of respondents. Even the Control Group B organisations soliciting larger gifts 
focused primarily on individual donors.
50See Appendix 1-F for a breakdown of importance of different revenue sources among respondent 
organisations. See Section 5.3.3 for a discussion of funder accountability requirements (as defined in 
Chapter 5 Introduction).
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1.4 Field Research and Methods: Overview. Case Study, and Rationale for
Profile of Respondent Organisations and Focus on NPO Perspective
The research began after formal approval by the Comite’s conseil 
d ’administration of my project proposal in December 2006 (Soublin meeting December 
2006). The core of the research was conducted between June 2007 and May 2008.
The research involved a qualitative empirical study to research the trust 
hypothesis and inductively investigate other possible explanations for the increasing 
accountability among French associations and foundations. An institutional case study 
involving an iterative process of two methods of data collection (written questionnaires 
for each group (hereinafter referred to as the “self-completion questionnaires”) and 
confidential interviews described in Section 1.5) was used with a focus on best practice 
(Hakim 2000, 68 and 69).51 Analysis and verification steps are addressed in Section 1.5 
and Appendix 1-1. The preliminary factual background information obtained through 
the self-completion questionnaires provided context for the interview design and some 
factual evidence for how accountability is increasing (e.g. VAMs adopted). The 
qualitative interviews, the core of the research, supplemented the “how.” The 
interviews also elicited each organisation’s views on the subjects covered with respect 
to the organisation, the Comite, and broader implications for the sector to untangle why 
accountability is increasing (“motivations and other connections between factors”) 
(Hakim 2000, 36).
The Comite itself is an effective case study of accountability “best practice,” 
both through the member organisations and as an object of interest itself as the pioneer 
in French nonprofit sector accountability efforts (i.e., not simply a background 
environment) (Hakim 2000, 68). Accordingly, the unit of analysis is the individual 
Comite Group/Control Group association or foundation, with the added perspective of 
both the Comite as an independent organisation and the senior executives of the 
respondents and the Comite interviewed (Hakim 2000, 159).
The question of increasing accountability and trust was approached from the 
perspective of the largest and most well-known associations and foundations to 
maximise research efficacy. First, the largest and most renowned French NPOs are more
511 adopt the definition of case study as a research “strategy” involving the “empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence” 
(Robson 2002, 178).
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likely to set standards for the industry. The respondent group has the sophistication, 
organisational structure, programmatic diversity, and resources to dedicate to 
accountability efforts and are more likely to be consulted as models. Similarly, possible 
alternative explanations for increasing accountability (e.g. government “trickle-down” 
accountability from government budgets to government-funded associations, media 
attention, or transfer of international standards) would be most likely to surface among 
large, well-known NPOs (Lambert 2003).
Smaller organisations are more likely to limit accountability efforts due to more 
limited resources and/or the belief that smaller structures protect trust with lower 
standards of accountability (Putnam 2000, 288-9 (“fellow bowlers”)).52 Organisation 
size also matters within Hansmann’s trust theoretical framework, in part because the 
smaller NPOs have less profit potentially to incite management misappropriation of
C ' i
funds or other such misbehaviour (Hansmann 1980, 870 and 876). Smaller 
organisations would also be too numerous and influenced by local variables to obtain a 
meaningful sample for a PhD thesis.54 Nonetheless, there is sufficient variation in size 
among even Comite Group respondents (and even above the specified Comite eligibility 
threshold), particularly with the smaller Control Group B organisations, to observe the 
importance of size as an internal variable within the study.
Finally, the thesis research deliberately focuses on the Comite as a case study 
and the individual Comite Group and Control Group organisations’ perspectives as 
opposed to donor perspective for several reasons.55 First, accountability derives from 
organisational decisions and actions on the basis of a much broader series of influences 
than donor response. The implementation of accountability mechanisms requires 
understanding and initiative of management and/or the conseil d ’administration. Hence 
an in-depth understanding of the nuances of senior level views from sector leaders is 
essential. The importance of leadership to increasing accountability was subsequently
52 See Section 2.1.3.
53 Both the Comity Group and the Control Group B include some smaller organisations for comparison. 
See Appendix 1-G for revenue levels of respondent organisations.
54 For example, there are approximately 48,160 associations with between €50,000 and €200,000 in 
revenue (all with paid employees) (Tchemonog 2007b, 32).
55 Even the large-scale surveys in France reviewed do not address extensively the importance to donors of 
implementation of voluntary accountability mechanisms (e.g. Fondation de France-Observatoire de la 
Fondation de France/TNS Soffes 2003, 2004 and 2008 ; Fondation de France-Observatoire de la 
Fondation de France/Wei Etudes qualitatives 2005a and 2005b; and Malet 2005). Organisational response 
to even well-respected donor surveys in the US, UK, and France is unclear (IPSOS Mori Social Research 
Institute 2008; Comity de la Charte/TNS Soffes 2007; Comit6 de la Charte Conference 2008).
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reinforced through the empirical findings.56 Second, VAMs and other voluntary 
accountability mechanisms reflecting best practice studied for this thesis generally 
incorporate at least the sector leaders’ perception of donor response. For example, US 
national self-regulatory organisations such as Independent Sector guide NPOs’ 
accountability choices with the belief that donors select NPOs based on trust in proper 
execution of mission and stewardship of resources (Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007, 
Preamble, 2). Finally, a range of diverse subjective factors colour donor response and 
risk interpretational inaccuracies. Examples include donors’ incentives and resources to 
investigate a NPO’s accountability practices; ability to understand complex disclosure 
and the relevant nonprofit sector context (e.g. the distinction between knowledgeable, 
incentivised large grant-makers and inexperienced smaller donors) (Reiser 2005, 605); 
and ties between a donor’s personal experience and the NPO’s work (e.g. illness and a 
medical services NPO) (Keating and Frumkin 2000, 2 and 7-8).58
This focus on NPOs’ perspective and the Comite also links to the theoretical 
framework.59 Hansmann did not address the reasons for donor reactions in his seminal 
1980 article (1980, 897-8). Rather, taking as a given the willingness of donors to give 
in a defined set of circumstances, he explored the attractive organisational structure to 
which donors would give (1980, 898).60 Considering the NPOs’ perspective extends the 
question of the appropriate type of organisation/organisational behaviour in the early 
twenty-first century as noted above.
56 See Sections 4.4.2, 5.4.3, and 6.5.
57 See Section 2.2.2(b).
58 See also KPMG study on transparency showing that few donors invest the effort to research actively 
accountability information even if they do generally wish to receive information (KPMG-Observatoire 
2007, 32). Moreover, the diversity and subjectivity of donor situation and response, together with the 
number of donors that would be necessary to generate adequate data, renders such data unmanageable in 
the PhD context. See also Pratten meeting 2006.
59 See Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.1.
60 Some such circumstances are predictable (e.g. separation of donor and beneficiary), and others are less 
so (e.g. “contribut[ing] voluntarily toward the financing of a public good”) (Hansmann 1980, 846 and 
897-8, respectively). See Section 2.1.2.
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1.5 Data Collection and Analysis61
The following summarises the data collection process within the case study and 
reasons for the choices.
Background, Data. Phase One involved a compilation of background data based 
on publicly available information and the French language self-completion 
questionnaires. All Comite members were invited to participate through a detailed e- 
mail explaining the purpose and benefits of the study, the research process, and the form 
of reporting results to participants. Control Group members were contacted “cold” 
through substantially the same e-mail as used for the Comite Group but tailored to the 
individual organisation. The confidential self-completion questionnaires were 
distributed on-line to all Comite Group and Control Group respondents following 
agreement to participate in the study in response to these preliminary unsolicited e-mail
ff)invitations. The Comite Group and Control Group self-completion questionnaires 
were identical except that the former focused on reasons for joining and current 
comments on the Comite, whereas the latter addressed the Comite’s reputation as 
perceived by non-members and potential membership. Zoomerang, a professional 
confidential on-line survey service, was used for the questionnaire process.63
The background data analysis allowed compilation of basic factual background 
and context for thorough preparation for the interviews (Robson 2002, 179). The data 
collected included information such as: sector of activity; size; international 
engagement; profile of leader; geographic scope; revenue amounts and sources; donor 
profile; management structure; VAMs and other, voluntary accountability mechanisms 
implemented; commitments and restrictions relating to funding; volunteer statistics; and 
other information that potentially influences the organisation’s accountability practices. 
The self-completion questionnaires also highlighted areas for verification during the 
interviews. This preparation demonstrated to the senior level respondents in-depth 
knowledge of their organisations, the Comite, and the sector and resulted greater 
willingness to explore candidly nuances in the responses and confidential matters.
61 See Appendix 1-1 for method of data analysis.
62 See Section 1.2.1 for a discussion of selection of respondents and Appendix 1-A for a list of respondent 
organisations.
63Zoomerang 2006-08. See Appendices 1-H-1A through 1-H-1D for the self-completion questionnaires 
and English translations.
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Senior Executive and Comite Interviews. Phase Two involved one-on-one 75-90 
minute confidential interviews with the Presidents, Executive Directors, Treasurers, 
engaged administrateurs, or in a few cases other representatives of senior management 
of the Comite Group and Control Group organisations particularly knowledgeable about 
accountability matters. In addition, this phase included similar interviews of the 
President, Executive Director, and representatives of Comite senior management. The 
interviews were designed using the semi-structured method (including open questions) 
in order to ensure coverage of specific topics while maintaining flexibility to encourage 
more detailed, subjective comments (Robson 2002, 270; Bryman 2004, 319-21).64
The interview comprised six major categories of questions: first, increasing 
accountability within the organisation (including the relationship to donor trust and a 
range of other possible explanations); second, increasing accountability within the 
French nonprofit sector generally (including the relationship to donor trust and a range 
of other possible explanations); third, the Comite (with different approaches for the 
Comite Group and the Control Group); fourth, the relationship between 
govemmental/corporate/institutional donors and increasing accountability and donor 
trust; fifth, external context -  in particular, various aspects of the welfare state, 
accountability regulation, and the French tax system; and sixth, social policy objectives 
and recommendations. Across these categories, the more specific questions covered 
issues including: organisation-specific practices and policies; pressures for, and benefits 
of, accountability; international models; importance of trust to different stakeholders 
(donors, beneficiaries of services, employees, volunteers, and the general public); the 
relevance of internal and external variables to the French nonprofit sector; the 
relationship between accountability and the French state; and value and practical 
considerations of VAMs and other voluntary accountability mechanisms. Respondents 
also shared a range of confidential unique organisational situations and nuances that 
potentially affected their perspective on, and practices relating to, accountability and 
trust.
Certain aspects of the interviews were standardised (e.g. length and type of 
location of interviews and general order of topics), but flexibility was maintained to 
allow for spontaneous comments, greater depth into areas of priority for the individual 
respondents, and questions outside of the interview topics. This flexible approach was
64 See Appendices 1-H-2A though 1-H-2D for senior management interview questionnaires and English 
translations.
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important to the inductive effort to assess alternatives to the trust hypothesis. In 
addition, allowing some freedom contributed to the understanding of where the 
authority to make and implement accountability decisions lies -  in particular, the 
importance of the philosophy and management style of the respondent organisation 
leaders.65
In the absence of a direct, formal translation of the word “accountability” it was 
important to establish common understanding for purposes of the interviews and 
identify potential areas of confusion.66 None of the professional translators consulted in 
the preparatory stages of the study or respondents could offer a translation into French 
of accountability other than the term “responsibility” (responsabilite), generally adding 
“such as governance structures/practices, accounting controls, ethics and transparency.” 
Soublin, the President of the Comite, simply declared that “the word does not exist” 
(Soublin interview 2007). One respondent and Comite management called the absence 
of a French word “symptomatic” of the lack of attention to accountability generally 
until recently (Organisation 25; Comite senior management calls/interviews 2007). 
However, none of the respondents questioned the meaning of the English word 
“accountability” together with the descriptive phrase above and an explanation of the 
definition for this thesis (Section 2.2.2). Nor did any respondents demonstrate difficulty 
understanding the concepts, or the overall intent of the research or individual questions 
-  either initially or as manifested in their responses to interview questions and 
additional comments. Certain respondents’ understanding was reconfirmed through 
their responses to the Report to Respondents (described below) (Liautaud 2008).
As noted in Section 1.2, all respondents said that they had never been involved 
in a study of this level (in terms of both calibre of organisations and level of seniority of 
interviewees). Everyone but one Comite Group member expressed interest in the 
interviews once commenced even in cases of difficulty scheduling the interviews. 
Many responded to my post-interview thank you e-mails that they found the experience 
interesting. Throughout the face to face interview process respondents were open,
65With respect to initial agreement to participate, approximately 55% of the Comity Group responded 
quickly to my request. Most of the others required intervention by Soublin (a phone call or e-mail 
resending my proposal). However, once Soublin made the introduction, all but a few participated readily 
despite the difficulty of scheduling senior level respondents.65 The Control Group was overall responsive 
and expressed immediate interest in the topic of accountability generally. For some I worked my way 
through chains of contacts.
66 See definition of accountability in Section 2.2.2.
67 See Section 1.4.
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including revealing confidential anecdotes and even politically sensitive information. 
Six sent personal hand-written notes in response to the Report to Respondents, almost 
all citing interest in specific recommendations (Liautaud 2008).69
Full interview notes were typed and maintained. Interviews were not recorded as 
preliminary test interviews and discussions with Comite senior management indicated 
that culturally recording would either be refused or severely hinder candid discussion. 
Research assistants were not used in relation to the interview process due to the need for 
personal contact before, during, and with follow-up given the senior level of
70  • •interviewees. A 24-page French language Report to Respondents detailing the 
empirical findings and related recommendations (both specific to the Comite and 
Comite members and more generally applicable) (hereinafter referred to as the “Report 
to Respondents”) was distributed to all respondents in February 2008 (Liautaud 2008). 
The Report to Respondents offered an additional opportunity for comment and 
verification.
Relationship o f  Data to Research Question. The data collected offered evidence 
as to how and why accountability is increasing (i.e., the validity of the trust hypothesis 
and inductive assessment of other explanations for the increasing accountability). The 
self-completion questionnaires and interview data were studied with a view to 
identifying possible common themes (e.g. with respect to relevance of the internal and 
external variables on decisions to implement accountability mechanisms). The data 
were also analysed to consider broader implications for the sector, including whether 
and how accountability and trust relate to the external variables welfare state and 
scandal.71 Finally, certain trends emerging from the data inform government policy and
77self-regulatory recommendations.
68 Only two interviews were telephonic, in both cases to accommodate interviewee travel. There was no 
difference in the quality of the interview.
69 See also Section 4.1 for relevance of response levels to interest in accountability.
70 Administrative assistants were only used to collect (e.g. to print, purchase, or locate alternative sources 
for) publicly available back-up data that I had already found myself and/or that was mentioned in 
interviews to double verify the sources.
71 See Chapter 7.
72 See Sections 8.2 and 8.3, respectively.
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1.6 Overview of the Thesis
The thesis comprises eight chapters, including this introduction. Each chapter 
links the analysis to the theoretical framework and from the outset highlights potential 
policy implications. The empirical, theoretical, and policy elements all support and 
reflect the over-arching themes: increasing accountability in the French nonprofit sector 
through internal, organisation by organisation inside out accountability; the individual, 
organisation-specific strategic assessment of accountability efforts, integrating the 
variables as individually appropriate; and the difficulty of linking organisation-specific 
accountability to the sector.
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework. Chapter 2 also derives from the 
literature foundational definitions of the key research terms “trust” and “accountability.” 
Finally, Chapter 2 explores the literature on the French welfare state relevant to the 
interpretation of the empirical findings on increasing accountability and trust. The 
combined theoretical analysis, definitions, and external context situate the research 
within the theoretical framework and reveal gaps in the literature that the empirical 
research and policy objectives and recommendations target.
Chapter 3 provides relevant background on both the US and French 
accountability environments essential to interpreting the empirical findings. The 
discussion of the US regulatory framework and best practice supports the theoretical 
framework established in Chapter 2 and provides a basis of comparison for the 
discussion of the French sector regulation (in Section 3.2) and the empirical findings (in 
Chapters 4 through 7). The analysis of the two regulatory external variables -  
accountability regulation and the tax system -  assesses gaps in the French system and 
analyses the empirical findings on the importance of regulation to respondents’ strategic 
assessment of accountability.
Chapter 4 explores the empirical evidence for the assumption of increasing 
accountability in France that underlies the research question and trust hypothesis. The 
chapter provides a nuanced understanding of how accountability is increasing. The 
focus is on the defined set of VAMs and the underlying cultural, legal, and 
organisational issues they raise in the French context that relate to organisations’
73 Chapter 7 explores the two key non-regulatory external variables, the welfare state environment and 
scandal, including the definition of scandal in the Introduction.
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strategic assessment of increasing accountability. In particular, the findings highlight the 
importance of the balance between regulatory and voluntary accountability in both the 
US and French systems that is fundamental to the strategic assessment process and to 
explaining increasing accountability and the trust theory.
Chapter 5 explores the most frequently cited rationale for increasing 
accountability: ethical, effective management. The chapter begins by defining the 
concepts underlying ethical, effective management and the relationship between ethical, 
effective management and donor trust. The chapter then analyses the empirical findings 
with a focus on the three most important vehicles of achieving accountability in 
furtherance of the ethical, effective management objective: corporatisation, the transfer 
of international standards, and funder accountability requirements (each as defined in 
Chapter 5). Finally, the chapter explores the theoretical implications of ethical, 
effective management.
Chapter 6 analyses the empirical findings on the trust hypothesis, the second 
most frequently cited rationale for increasing accountability. As with ethical, effective 
management, the chapter considers the potential driving forces behind increasing 
accountability in furtherance of the donor trust objective: donor pressure, the media, and 
Comite membership. The analysis of trust as a rationale for increasing accountability 
extends to volunteer trust and public trust (each as defined in Section 6.3.2). The 
chapter also assesses the importance of trust independent of accountability and the 
theoretical implications of the empirical findings.
Chapter 7 broadens the analysis to consider the relationship between the 
organisations’ perspective on increasing accountability and the two non-regulatory 
external variables: the welfare state environment and scandal arising from failure of 
accountability within an organisation. The focus is on the relevance of the welfare state 
environment and scandal to organisations’ strategic assessment of accountability and, 
conversely, the potential for increasing accountability within individual organisations to 
affect positively welfare state challenges and scandal. The analysis includes relevant 
aspects of the three most significant NPO scandals -  the l’ARC fraud scandal, the 
attention to accountability for use of funds following the 2004 Asian tsunami 
(hereinafter referred to as the “tsunami”), and, most recently, the Zoe’s Ark scandal 
involving the alleged trafficking of children by a small, previously unknown NGO 
under the guise of international adoption. The chapter brings the analysis full circle
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back to the key rationale for the founding of the Comite (first addressed in this 
introductory chapter).
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a critical distillation of the key empirical 
results, including both theoretical and practical implications. In addition, Chapter 8 
offers policy objectives and specific regulatory, self-regulatory, and NPO best practice 
recommendations based on the outcome of the empirical research. The overriding 
policy objectives are improvement of independent oversight of NPO accountability and 
accessibility of accountability-related information to the general public. The related 
recommendations address government policy, voluntary best practice, and specific 
suggestions for the Comite’s approach to eligibility and compliance requirements for 
members. All policy recommendations consider regulatory and cultural context.
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework 
Increasing Accountability and Trust: M odernising the Basis fo r  Trust?
“Thus, for a service of the type [NPOs such as CARE provide]..., it stands to reason that an 
individual would prefer to deal with a nonprofit firm, because in that case he has the additional protection 
provided by the nondistribution constraint; he needs an organization that he can trust [italics added], and 
the nonprofit, because of the legal constraints under which it must operate, is likely to serve that function 
better than its for-profit counterpart” (Hansmann 1980, 847).
“One consequence of the increased competition nonprofits are facing has been to intensify the 
pressure on [NPOs] to perform, and to demonstrate that performance. The result is a third challenge: the 
effectiveness challenge....This runs counter to long-standing theories in the nonprofit field that have 
emphasized this sector’s distinctive advantage precisely in fields where ‘information asymmetry’ makes it 
difficult to demonstrate performance, and where ‘trust’ is consequently needed instead...In the current 
climate, however, such theories have few remaining adherents, at least among those who control the 
sector’s purse strings” (Salamon 2003, 24-25).74
Introduction
This chapter establishes the theoretical framework for explaining increasing 
accountability and the relevance of the trust hypothesis in the French nonprofit sector.75 
The analysis aims to position the research question and hypothesis within the seminal 
literature on trust and accountability. This includes suggesting a starting point for the 
empirical research based on where the trust theory (a demand side theory) leaves off, 
proposing a framework for defining accountability, and establishing gaps in the 
literature. This juxtaposition of the largely US-derived trust theoretical framework and 
definition of accountability with the French nonprofit sector background establishes the 
necessary context for the empirical analysis. The literature review also informs the 
inductive data analysis of possible explanations for'increasing accountability other than 
donor trust (including mutual causality).
This chapter suggests a theoretical framework for analysing the empirical 
findings involving two “next steps.” The first step is to ask the relevance of the trust 
theory in the current nonprofit sector environment both in the French context generally 
and to increasing accountability in France specifically. In other words, does the US
74 See also Ryan on competition (1999, 128).
75 The literature includes both scholarly work and professional reports and analyses from nonprofit sector 
institutions and participants in the US, the UK, and France.
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model apply in France and in an environment increasingly focused on accountability as 
a starting point for the research? The second step is to develop a response to 
Hansmann’s demand side theory. What do the organisations think, say, and do with 
respect to increasing accountability and why? How does trust affect the analysis, and 
what are alternative non-trust based explanations for these efforts to improve the 
“supply side”? Are organisations responding to a demand for trust that is assumed in the 
Hansmann, Rose-Ackerman, and Salamon theories (i.e., situating themselves on a 
spectrum of increasing accountability to achieve trust)? The second step rests on a 
proposed two-part definition of accountability -  combining a general component and an 
operationalised component derived from scholarly perspectives and best practice, 
respectively. The second step also rests on the notion of organisations’ strategic 
assessment of accountability mechanisms framed by Rose-Ackerman’s work. Both parts 
beg the further question of the relevance of the welfare state environment in France to 
the application of a US-based trust theory and models for defining accountability. 
Finally, the approach from the outset considers potential policy implications.
First, Section 2.1 outlines Hansmann’s trust theoretical framework, including a 
critical evaluation of criticisms and extensions of the theory most relevant to the 
investigation of increasing accountability (Hansmann 1980, 845; Hansmann 1996, 252, 
respectively). Rose-Ackerman’s emphasis on the reputational importance of 
“signal[ling]” trustworthiness extends the theory to the strategic assessment of 
accountability underlying the empirical analysis of respondents’ decision-making 
(Rose-Ackerman 2001, 6).
Second, Section 2.2 exposes Salamon’s positioning of accountability 
(particularly performance evaluation) as the modem vehicle for generating tmst and a 
necessary complement to Hansmann’s tmst in an increasingly competitive, 
accountability-driven nonprofit environment. This section then derives from the 
literature a dual-pronged definition of the term “accountability.” An overarching general 
definition (critically extracting relevant elements of the scholarly literature) is then 
operationalised through a specific set of accountability mechanisms (selected from US 
best practice literature). The proposed definition bridges theory and practice, as well as 
the US and French models of accountability.
Third, Section 2.3 explores relevant literature positioning the French nonprofit 
sector within the French welfare state context. This discussion grounds respondents’ 
perspectives on the strategic assessment of accountability and the comparison to US
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models of accountability derived from a different political, economic, and historical 
nonprofit context.
Finally, the rationales for increasing accountability, including the relevance of 
the trust hypothesis and the more recent regulatory and voluntary accountability 
mechanisms fundamental to the US nonprofit sector, remain a gap in the literature with
7Arespect to the French context. Almost all of the literature on trust and accountability is 
focused on the more dynamic US nonprofit sector (in terms of giving and levels of
77accountability). The literature on the French nonprofit sector is far less extensive than 
the US literature and addresses primarily external variables such as the welfare state 
environment (but even there generally without attention to accountability or trust). A 
few scholars dominate: Archambault, Laville, and, for statistics, Tchemonog and
Kaminski. Little of the literature offers in-depth views of the French nonprofit sector 
other than works such as Tchemonog’s collection of statistics on associations, 
Archambault’s publications and overview work on the Hopkins Study, and the ADDES 
statistics on associations (Tchemonog 2007b; Archambault 1993; Kaminski 2006, 
respectively). There does not appear to be a comprehensive discussion of accountability 
or tmst in the France-focused literature or more analysis than occasional references (e.g. 
Laville and Nyssens 2000, 68).78 Moreover, even the extensive treatment of the welfare 
state in the literature addresses in only targeted ways implications of the welfare state
70environment for accountability. Finally, the statistical data is limited and difficult to
76 This thesis does not assess the collective impact on the sector of accountability efforts, for example in 
addressing sector-wide issues as weaknesses in the regulatory system and scandal, except with respect to 
respondents’ perspective.
77 For example, a recent report of the French Ministry o f Youth, Sports and Associative Life compared 
giving of €35 million per 1 million inhabitants in France, to €140 million in the UK and €90 million in 
Switzerland (Lamour 2007, 6). The BBB Wise Giving Alliance estimated 86% of respondents of a 2001 
survey give to charity in 2000, and nearly seven out of ten US households gave in 2005 (Princeton Survey 
Research Associates International 2001, 15; Independent Sector 2008c, 3). Within Europe, the UK leads 
with 67% regular donors, compared to 47% in France (Fondation de France-Observatoire de la Fondation 
de France/TNS Sofres 2003, 9). While such sample of statistics is not exhaustive, there were no examples 
found in the research (including the perspective of respondents and other sector participants interviewed 
for the study) of French giving or accountability practices exceeding US levels. See Sections 3.1.1 and 
3.2.1 for comparative levels of accountability regulation and best practice between the US and France, 
respectively.
780ne of Archambault’s main works has one sentence on the nondistribution constraint as a “label of 
trust” (Archambault 1997b, 233). However, this is a general statement rather than a consideration of trust 
in France.
79 See Section 2.3.
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assess (e.g. Kaminski 2006, 15; Kaminski 2005 (“Presentation generale” and 
“Conclusion”); Archambault 1997b, 1 and 3; Tchemonog 2007b, 15-16).80
The limited technical literature on the two potentially relevant external variables 
involving French regulation -  accountability regulation and the tax system -  is 
addressed in Chapter 3. The literature on French nonprofit sector scandal comprises 
largely media and government reports and is addressed in Chapter 7.
2.1 Trust Theoretical Framework: Hansmann’s Trust Theory: Relevant 
Criticisms and Extensions of the Theory; Rose-Ackerman and “Signalling” 
T rustworthiness
Trust has historically centrally informed a foundational US nonprofit 
organisational theory (Hansmann 1980; Salamon 2003, 25). Most recently, trust-related 
concerns have triggered both a wave of regulatory, self-regulatory, and voluntary efforts 
to improve accountability as a means of reinforcing trust and an intensive discussion of 
the importance of trust to NPOs and the nonprofit sector generally (e.g. Independent 
Sector 2004b; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007, 2-3; Light 2003). Anheier and 
Kendall introduce tmst as “one of the most topical issues in current social science” (as 
of 2000) but note that the literature does not address how NPOs “generate and preserve 
tmst” (Anheier and Kendall 2000, 2). Donor tmst appears throughout different types of 
literature (e.g. Reiser 2004, e.g. 5-6 and 27-8; Light 2003, 1-8; Jackson 2006, 10; 
Institut Montaigne 2004, 29; KPMG-Observatoire 2007, 32-33).
Section 2.1 traces developments from Hansmann’s original theory through 
criticisms of the theory particularly relevant to increasing accountability and Rose- 
Ackerman’s strategic assessment process. This growing attention in the scholarly and 
best practice literature to the balance between tmst based on characteristics intrinsic to 
the nonprofit form (whether or not as a primary rationale for increasing accountability) 
and accountability as the modem means of achieving tmst (addressed in Section 2.2.1) 
frames the interpretation of respondents’ views of increasing accountability. The
80 Despite accuracy issues with the French statistics, magnitude and trends are relatively clear and 
consistent among the sources available (Kaminski 2005, 2; Tchemonog 2007a, 3).
81 See Appendix 2 for a chart of the theoretical framework set out in this section.
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assumption that organisations respond to a demand for trust in Hansmann, Rose- 
Ackerman, and Salamon’s work also informs the empirical investigation.
2.1.1 Relevance and Overview o f the Trust Theory: Trust as an Explanation o f  
the Nonprofit Form and as Essential to Compete
Several of the most important recent efforts to regulate and improve voluntary 
and self-regulatory accountability initiatives in the US and France in the for-profit and 
nonprofit sectors appear to stem, at least in part, from the importance of trust. The key 
for-profit example, the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act enacted in 2002 in response to corporate 
scandals, was “intended to rebuild public trust in the corporate sector” (American Bar
O')
Association 2007; US Government 2002). One of the most widely respected 
extensions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into the nonprofit sector, the Independent Sector’s 
Accountability Overview, also highlights trust and the impact of NPO scandals resulting 
from fraud and other accountability failure:
[P]ublic trust is the charitable community’s single most important asset. Preserving it will 
ensure that donors continue to give and volunteers share their time and talents. In recent 
years, the actions by some in the charitable sector have endangered this trust, but the 
sector as a whole is developing methods that maintain the highest standards of 
accountability and transparency (Independent Sector 2008a).
Similarly, the Comite’s mission is to promote transparency and rigorous 
management to permit “giving with trust” (Comite 2006b and 2008n). The list of 
Comite membership benefits includes potential increase in the number of donors, 
reassuring public authorities and the press, and improvement of member organisations’ 
reputation and image (Comite 2008m). However, significantly there does not appear to 
be a comprehensive treatment of trust in the French nonprofit sector in the literature -  
whether or not linked to accountability.
82 See Section 3.1 for a discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and an overview of the relationship of 
nonprofit sector trust to the wave of US NPO and for-profit sector scandals in the 1990s and post- 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. See also US Government 2002, “Introduction” and “Purpose of the 
Legislation.”
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2.1.2 Hansmann’s Theoretical Framework
Hansmann’s “contract failure” theory has proven a foundation for both 
explanation of the nonprofit organisational form and the importance of trust to a NPO 
succeeding in an increasingly competitive global for-profit and nonprofit environment. 
Hansmann’s theory argues that NPOs offer a “reasonable response to a particular kind 
of ‘market failure,’ specifically the inability to police producers by ordinary contractual 
devices” or so-called “contract failure” (Hansmann 1980, 845). Hansmann’s theory 
relies on the “nondistribution constraint” characteristic of NPOs in order to ensure 
ethical management (Hansmann 1980, 838). While NPOs may earn a profit, the 
distribution of profits is prohibited -  in the US often by state law, occasionally by the 
NPO charter documents, and by US tax law Internal Revenue Code Section (501)(c)(3) 
limitations on organisational purpose (Hansmann 1980, 838-9; USGDTIRS 2006a and 
2008c, 25-6). Trust is the lynchpin of Hansmann’s “contract failure” theory. Consumers 
are more attracted to NPOs when purchasing “contract failure” services because they 
trust that NPOs provide “extra assurance that their funds will be used as the donors wish 
them to be” (i.e., that the consumer’s disadvantage resulting from contract failure will 
be not abused) (Hansmann 1980, 845; Hansmann 1985b, 7). This trust is largely the 
result of the nondistribution constraint that reduces management incentive to misuse or 
inefficiently allocate resources and effectively transforms management into fiduciaries.
Hansmann addresses a particular kind of contract failure -  not the type of goods 
or consumers like many market failure theorists such as Weisbrod (Weisbrod 1998, 48-
o i
49; Bryce 2005, 17). Most importantly, Hansmann addresses “asymmetric 
information” (Hansmann 1985a, 4; Hansmann 1980, 843). Linking efficiency in profit- 
seeking firms to a consumer’s ability to compare products and prices among firms and 
enter into clear enforceable contracts with the firm chosen, Hansmann suggests that 
consumers of nonprofit products are often poorly positioned to judge whether goods and 
services are provided as expected (Hansmann 1980, 843). One key reason involves the 
separation between the donor and the beneficiary (e.g. overseas aid organisations which
83 Hansmann distinguishes his contract failure from standard public goods market failure analysis (i.e., 
free-riding) -  the latter addressing the “lack of incentive” to fund public goods benefiting others and the 
former addressing the “inability to control” a NPO’s use o f a contribution (Hansmann 1980, 851 Note 
50).
84 Hansmann criticises corporate law as a poor model for regulating NPO fiduciary obligations because 
the purpose o f corporate law and charters is to protect shareholders from management and other 
shareholders, whereas the purpose of NPO charters is generally to protect the beneficiaries (Hansmann 
1980, 845).
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involve donors in the US paying for food consumed in India) (Hansmann 1980, 846). 
Hansmann summarises, “The issue is not whether poor people overseas can afford to 
pay for better food, but rather, given that Americans are going to pay for the food, what 
kind of organization will Americans patronize to perform the delivery?” (1980, 880). 
Similarly, in the case of NPOs privately producing “public goods (e.g. a radio show),” 
“public goods” diminish donors’ incentive and ability to contribute (Hansmann 1980, 
849-50). Voluntary price discrimination (e.g. at arts organisations such as a museum 
where some might voluntarily pay more than others) is a third example appearing 
throughout Hansmann’s major articles (Hansmann 1980, 856-9; Hansmann 1981a, 4; 
Bryce 2005, 18). The signal of a NPO’s trustworthy intentions and motives mitigates 
information asymmetry (without the “moral hazards” of shareholder value-driven for- 
profit corporations) (Anheier and Kendall 2000,4).
The intrinsic trust-based NPO form is not a perfect solution to protection of
O f
donors or even beneficiaries of services, the public, or other stakeholders. Hansmann 
acknowledges that the nondistribution constraint is a “rather crude consumer protection 
device” or “blunt instrument” reducing incentives for NPO managers to serve 
beneficiaries and donors (effectively their customers) badly rather than incentivising 
them to do well (1980, 871; 1987, 29; 1996, 247, respectively). Accordingly, Hansmann 
expects NPOs to be less efficient than for-profit firms (Hansmann 1980, 844). 
Hansmann also acknowledges the potential to distribute earnings through inflated
o /
salaries or other inappropriate payments to employees (1980, 844). Still, he insists that 
in situations where consumers are poor judges of services received, any alternative
on
organisational form is “second best” (1980, 844). While generally the protection of the 
nondistribution constraint outweighs the inefficiencies of NPOs, the argument is 
sometimes less compelling for commercial NPOs selling private goods and services for 
purchaser consumption (e.g. some patrons of nursing homes) because consumers have
85 Hansmann notes that even in the most compelling cases for choice of the NPO legal form (i.e., 
organisations where the separation of the donor and beneficiary is clear such as with overseas aid NPOs), 
the NPO form is generally not “necessary or even appropriate” in all cases (Hansmann 1980, 847).
86 Steinberg suggests that a “necessary corollary” of the nondistribution constraint would require a “fair 
compensation constraint” (Steinberg and Gray 1993, 302). Today this might be the equivalent of 
benchmarking salaries and non-cash compensation to other equivalent NPOs and part of board oversight 
responsibility suggested as a VAM. See Section 2.2.2 Table 2-1 item (vi).
87 Compare for-profit businesses, which are held accountable by consumers and the board of directors, 
and government agencies, which are held accountable by elected representatives and voters (Salamon, 
Hems et al. 2000, 9). Note that market disciplines are often “sufficiently weak” as to reduce the efficiency 
delta between for-profit and nonprofit producers (Hansmann 1980, 844-845).
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greater access to comparative information in such cases (Hansmann 1987, 30 and 31; 
Hansmann 1980, 871 -2).88
The advantage of the NPO resides in the “collective contract” between the NPO
•  •  SOand all of its patrons as a group mentioned above, in the US enforced by the state. 
Accordingly, one key question Hansmann’s theory frames is whether, how, and why 
additional voluntary and/or self-regulatory accountability mechanisms (with or without 
the legally imposed and structurally integrated nondistribution constraint Hansmann 
describes and possibly additional regulation) would increase trust to correct adequately 
the information asymmetry and address contract failure without the need for 
enforcement mechanisms (Hansmann 1980, 873-4). In other words, what happens when 
enforcement of the nondistribution constraint fails?90 Is accountability effective in 
increasing trust with or without enforcement of the nondistribution constraint? Is all 
accountability directed at supplementing trust? A related question is the relative 
importance of voluntary and self-regulatory initiatives in the French context. The 
comparison to the heavily regulatory-driven yet still advanced self-regulatory and 
voluntary environment in the US nonprofit sector underlies the analysis (Brody 2002, 
475; Jackson 2006,10-19).91
2.1.3 Criticisms and Extensions o f Hansmann’s Trust Theory Relevant to
Increasins Accountability
The criticisms and extensions of Hansmann’s theory most relevant to the 
analysis of increasing accountability target four areas. Two relate to the French 
context: the state law basis of Hansmann’s theory and the “relational goods” aspect of 
trust. Two relate to the theory: trust as a market mechanism for reducing transaction 
costs and the relationship between social capital and trust. This selection updates and
88 Increases in commercial activities in recent years are due partly to decreasing government support and 
an environment expecting increasing accountability (Young and Salamon 2002, 424-5 and 429, 
respectively). Nonetheless, commercial nonprofits tend to work in industries where the patron has 
incomplete information or must “yield some discretion” such as a hospital -  i.e., where there still is an 
information asymmetry (Hansmann 1980, 873).
89 See Section 3.1.1 on enforceability.
90 See Section 3.1.1.
91 See Section 3.1.
92Certain Hansmann critics suggest alternative means of addressing information asymmetries: 
governance, regulation, consumer protection mechanisms, or technology (Anheier and Kendall 2000, 5-6 
(citing e.g. Krashinsky 1986 and Hansmann 1996, 252); Salamon 1987, 36). While all such alternatives 
have become potential tools for correcting information asymmetries, accountability also addresses and/or 
supplements these strategies.
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refines the interpretation of Hansmann’s original theory as a baseline starting point for
• c n  •the research in the current French nonprofit environment. None refutes the continued 
relevance of Hansmann’s trust theory.94
First, the criticism of lack of universal equivalent to the state law imposed 
nondistribution constraint is not valid in the French context (Anheier and Kendall 2000, 
7). As noted in Section 1.3.1, French legal requirements also limit profit distribution for 
both foundations and associations (French Government 1901b, Article 1; French 
Government 2006b, respectively).95 Moreover, Hansmann’s theory should apply 
broadly even to unincorporated NPOs and outside of France given the widely 
understood basic NPO limitation on profit distribution. For example, the Hopkins Study 
definition includes the “not profit-distributing” characteristic despite absence of an 
incorporation requirement (Salamon, Wojciech Sokolowski et al. 2004, 9).96
Second, the argument that the NPO organisational form allows for greater 
“relational goods” and therefore may be best suited to attract “investments” from people 
with interpersonal relationship motives relates to the implications of the 1901 Law 
membership structure for accountability and trust (Ben-Ner and Gui 2003, 15). In the 
absence of true owners of equity capital, beneficiary stakeholders may feel more like 
“members,” and NPOs may benefit from a relational link to donors (Ben-Ner and Gui 
2003, 16 and 18, respectively).97 Nonetheless, the challenge of convincing donors to 
give suggests the importance of implementing accountability systems -  either 
independently or to support the trust required as part of the “relational goods” (Ben-Ner 
and Gui 2003, 15-16 and 19).
Third, the role of trust as a market vehicle for reducing transaction costs of 
“more formal coordination mechanisms” such as contracts and bureaucracy also extends
93 Note Chanial and Laville’s insistence on the difficulty of defining boundaries among the market, state, 
and social economy in France -  and in turn the nonprofit sector (Chanial and Laville 2004, 88-89 and 91). 
See Section 7.3 on sector-wide implications of the theory.
94 See also Steinberg and Gray (1993, 297 and 313).
95 See Section 1.3.1 “Associations and Associative Sector” and “Foundations”
96 See also Steinberg and Gray on the utility of the nondistribution constraint in various national and 
cultural traditions (e.g. Greek and Roman and Islamic) citing McGregor-Lowndes (Steinberg and Gray 
1993, 298; McGregor-Lowndes 1992). Constraint on distribution of profits remains a fundamental 
defining characteristic of NPOs across diverse international contexts -  perhaps in coordination with other 
theories but still valid standing alone -  despite suggestions that the asymmetric information theories are 
not “full-on” theories of the sector. (See e.g. Salamon, Wojciech Sokolowski et al. 2004, 9; Ben-Ner and 
Gui 2003, 4, respectively.)
97 See Section 3.1.1 “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Accountability” on rapidly developing venture 
philanthropy and other similar donor structures aiming to offer at least the monitoring benefits of 
shareholding even if without the economic ownership benefits.
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go
Hansmann’s theory and relates to strategic assessment (Fukuyama 1999, 4). 
Fukuyama highlights the importance of “reliable performance of duties” and honesty 
forming his “radius of trust” (1999, 2 and 2, respectively). People could function 
without trust-derived social capital, but the cost and reduced flexibility of entering into, 
“monitoring,” and enforcing contracts would be prohibitive -  even in modem 
economies with “formal coordination mechanisms” (Fukuyama 1999, 4)."
Fourth, while Hansmann’s model does not directly address social capital, the 
relationship among tmst, accountability, and Putnam’s social capital theory relates to 
increasing accountability within organisations individually and the potential for impact 
on the French nonprofit sector more broadly (Anheier and Kendall 2000, 11; Putnam 
2000, 19). Putnam suggests that NPOs rely on and engender tmst through “repeated 
interactions” among members. The extent to which increasing NPO accountability 
replaces the diminishing Putnam face-to-face interaction as a generator of, or 
reinforcement for, tmst raises the question of the importance of the internal variable 
organisation size to accountability efforts.100 Is scandal resulting from failure of 
accountability within an organisation less likely, and therefore accountability systems 
less necessary, in Putnam’s profile of organisations (i.e., smaller with more personal 
interaction)?101 If so, does this imply that policy decisions should be based on the
•  •  109 •assumption that smaller NPOs require less extensive accountability systems? Or is 
Rose-Ackerman correct that individually generated tmst does not necessarily generate 
collective tmst (as discussed in Section 2.1.5)?
98 The impact on monitoring and reduction of transaction costs of the types of accountability mechanisms 
proposed by the Comity, Independent Sector, and others is beyond the scope of this thesis and difficult to 
assess, particularly in light of the absence of empirical grounding (e.g. Howell meeting 2006).
99 Note also Fukuyama’s link between trust, volunteerism, and a “dense civil society” and Mayo’s 
comment on “friendship networks between social movement organizations” (Fukuyama 1999, 5; Mayo 
2005b, 142).
100 See Note 152, infra, on Putnam’s optimism that declining social capital can improve. The proposed 
framework and definitions designed for international comparability mitigate Anheier and Kendall’s valid 
critiques of the social capital approach as excessively local, portraying NPOs as “incubators” o f trust and 
values necessary to social capital with unclear links to the macro-level (Anheier and Kendall 2000, 14, 
14, and 14, respectively). Chapter 7 addresses respondents’ perspective on accountability and trust beyond 
individual organisations into the sector.
101 In addition, Anheier and Kendall’s questioning of social capital due to “undesirable phenomena” 
reminds that social capital is not necessarily positive if based on civil society as civil society also includes 
negativity (e.g. Ku Klux Klan) (Anheier and Kendall 2000, 13). See also Fukuyama (1999, 8). See Note 
48, supra.
102 See Sections 4.4.1 and 5.4.1 on size and Section 7.2.1 on the Zoe’s Ark scandal and implications for 
the sector.
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2.1.4 Scope o f Trust
The scope and application of the term “trust” requires explanation in three 
categories: first, the subject of the trust; second, in whom the trust is placed; and third, 
who is trusting (Howell meeting 2007; Brody 2002, 475-6). For purposes of this 
analysis the concept of trust focuses on NPOs behaving as expected (Rose-Ackerman 
2001, 1).
First, the proposed subject of trust for this thesis is how accountability policies 
and practices relate to trust. This includes the expectation that such policies and 
practices will require a NPO to implement mechanisms to evaluate performance and 
assure effective execution of the statutorily defined mission but does not include 
evaluation of performance effectiveness, specific performance objectives, or mission 
effectiveness per se. This approach to the subject of trust aligns with Hansmann’s 
approach to trust, the Comite’s approach to trust, and the proposed general and 
operationalised definitions of accountability in Section 2.2.2.
Second, the trust is placed in both the NPO as an organisation and in 
management and the conseil d ’administration or equivalent oversight body. 
Management and the conseil d ’administration have oversight responsibility over others 
related to the organisation based on legal obligations and norms regarding the authority 
of NPO leaders in accountability matters.103
Third, the beneficiaries of trust include donors (individual, governmental, 
corporate, and institutional), beneficiaries of NPO services, and employees and 
volunteers. Hansmann posits these all as combined “one and the same group” for this 
purpose (Hansmann 1980, 845; Howell e-mail 2009).104 As Hansmann notes, US NPO 
charters protect “patron” interests (as opposed to shareholders) and function as a 
“collective contract” between the NPO and its patrons replacing inefficient individual 
contracts. In the US, this contract is enforced by the state on behalf of patrons as a 
group (Hansmann 1980, 853).105 In addition, for purposes of the research beneficiaries 
of trust include volunteers of the NPO. Finally, the public is also a beneficiary of trust, 
both because the sector provides goods and services essential to modem society and the 
economy and because the public pays through tax benefits to NPOs and donors in the
103 See Sections 3.1.1 and 4.4.2, respectively.
104 See Section 6.3.2 on volunteer trust (as defined therein).
105 See Section 3.1.1.
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French and US systems (Bryce 2005, 15 and 17, and 75, respectively; Herzlinger 1996, 
16-17; Hansmann 1980, 883; Independent Sector 2002, 2; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 
2007, 2; Institut Montaigne 2004, 15 and 23).106 The public includes, although less 
directly, other NPOs (i.e., the sector) (Lloyd 2005, 3).
The decision not to exclude certain categories of beneficiaries in the definition 
of trust reflects the fact that policies and practices relating to accountability and trust do 
not change depending on the beneficiary. Moreover, the proposed definition of trust 
parallels the broad definition of accountability in Section 2.2.2.
2.1.5 Rose-Ackerman’s “Signalling” Trust and Strategic Assessment of
Accountability: A Bridee to Accountability
Rose-Ackerman’s notion of the importance of “signal[ling]” reliability extends 
Hansmann’s trust theory (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 6). This internal assessment of how 
best to “signal” shifts the focus from the intrinsic NPO characteristics to the supply side 
questions of how organisations evaluate accountability matters that send signals of 
trustworthiness. For example, organisations might implement a code of ethics with 
provisions addressing treatment of donor funds as a message to donors of attention to 
accountability. The strategic assessment of the relevant organisational factors, together 
with the internal and external variables potentially affecting reputations for 
trustworthiness, frames the interpretation of the empirical results. Most significantly, 
the analysis highlights the implementation of voluntary accountability mechanisms.
Two aspects of Rose-Ackerman’s complex treatment of trust are particularly 
relevant to Hansmann’s theory and the discussion of how and why accountability is 
increasing: her “one-sided reliability” and her distinction between “generalized tmst” 
and “social capital’” (particularly the critique of Putnam) (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 6, 4, 
and 4, respectively). Rose-Ackerman focuses largely on the democratic state and 
markets. Nonetheless, Rose-Ackerman’s reminder that “tmst implies confidence, but 
not certainty, that some person or institution will behave in an expected way” and that 
honesty and trustworthiness are not the same applies in the nonprofit sector (Rose- 
Ackerman call 2008, Rose-Ackerman 2001, 1). This suggests that accountability might 
increase the certainty and honesty (the latter through transparency efforts) that is 
fundamental to tmst (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 1). Moreover, her question of how
106 See Section 6.3.2 for a discussion of volunteer trust and general public trust (each as defined therein).
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institutional reform can be used to limit the need for trust given the difficulty of 
“producing trustworthiness” also potentially connects trust and accountability (Rose- 
Ackerman 2001, 2).107
First, certain aspects of Rose-Ackerman’s “one-sided” trust relate to 
accountability because the benefits of a reputation for reliability often factor into a 
NPO’s willingness to accept the effort and expense of implementing accountability
1 OSmechanisms (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 5-6; Rose-Ackerman call 2008). Like for-profit 
market-driven interest in appearing morally good and reliable (in Rose-Ackerman’s for- 
profit example, the value of integrity -  or “signalling]” integrity to a car salesman), 
NPOs are forced by competition for donors, for example, to address at least the signals 
of integrity to deserve trust (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 6; Keohane and Nye, Jr. 2003, 
390).109 This emphasis on reputation as integral to the strategic assessment of 
accountability -  particularly the strategic assessment of voluntary accountability 
mechanisms as a means of enhancing trust -  appears throughout recent US best practice 
guidelines and offers a lens for interpreting the empirical findings in France (e.g. 
Independent Sector 2005).110
Second, Rose-Ackerman concludes that evidence does not support linking trust 
in a particular organisation to generalised trust (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 4 and 5).111 The 
extent to which improved accountability within a NPO changes its capacity to generate 
generalised trust relates to the potential for creation of a context of accountability 
through the individual and collective effect of individual NPO accountability efforts. 
For example, Rose-Ackerman’s separation of trust in an individual organisation and 
generalised trust challenges the efficacy of one NPO’s accountability efforts, and/or the
107 See the discussion of accountability as producing trust (i.e., potentially one such institutional reform) 
in Section 2.2.1 (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 2; Salamon 2003, 24 and 25).
108 The rise of NPO rating services also exacerbates the attention to accountability efforts to protect 
reputation (Keating and Frumkin 2000, 15-16). See also Note 133, infra.
109 See also Sargeant and Lee on the relationship between levels of trust and total gifts to a charity in the 
UK (2001, 82). In addition, the self-completion questionnaires showed competition as an important 
factor in organisations’ capacity to attract donors for 24 (83%) Comity Group participants in the Comite 
Group self-completion questionnaire and five (50%) Control Group participants in the Control Group 
self-completion questionnaire), totaling 29 (74%) respondents from both respondent groups participating 
in the self-completion questionnaires and 64% of total respondents.
110 See Sections 2.2.2(b) and 3.1. Accountability is also seen as important to organisational legitimacy or 
civil society legitimacy (Anheier and Kendall 2000, 5; Keohane and Nye, Jr. 2003, 393). “One-sided 
trust” also suggests iterative game theory -  i.e., the importance of reputation to repeat interaction (e.g. 
Anheier and Kendall 2000, 5; Rose-Ackerman 2001, 6).
111 As noted above, in Rose-Ackerman’s case the “generalized trust” refers to democratic state institutions 
but could apply as well to the nonprofit sector (Rose-Ackerman call 2008; also citing Uslaner (2001, 4; 
Uslaner 2002, 219)). Note Rose-Ackerman’s more nuanced view of Putnam and separation of trust and 
social capital (2001, 4-5).
60
collective impact of individual NPO accountability efforts, in addressing the impact of
i p
scandal on the nonprofit sector. While Rose-Ackerman cautions against assuming 
participation in NPOs generates social capital and generalised trust, others consider 
trust-based cooperation “perhaps a necessary condition” for NPOs and potentially 
“reinforcement of social networks” beyond the NPO sector, for example into politics 
(Rose-Ackerman 2001, 4-5; Ben-Ner and Gui 2003, 19 and 23 (Note 28 (citing 
Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld (2003)); Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld 2003, 209).
Finally, Rose-Ackerman highlights criticisms of the nonprofit form that also 
relate to the analysis of increasing accountability and trust. VAMs mitigate many of
i n
these trust-related concerns and intrinsic NPO deficiencies. First, Rose-Ackerman 
cites the lack of financial incentive of nonprofit managers to perform because no one 
has legal claim to residual earnings (although for-profit managers have room for 
inefficiency as well). Other relevant criticisms include the prolonged existence of NPOs 
beyond utility as a result of absence of market discipline and diminishing donor 
incentives to monitor gifts due to tax deductions (Rose-Ackerman 1996, 717). VAMs 
facilitate donors’ monitoring of a NPO through financial transparency. VAMs also 
require effective governance to oversee on-going relevance of programs or the 
justification for the duration of the organisation itself.114 Moreover, Hansmann’s trust 
does not assume or enhance NPO management or market efficiency as noted above.115 
Therefore, these criticisms do not undermine the trust analysis.
112 See Section 7.2.2 on empirical findings on the relationship between accountability and scandal.
113 While the implementation of accountability mechanisms does not resolve intentional efforts to 
circumvent regulation or good practice, such behaviour should not call into question the validity o f the 
NPO form. Similarly, the potential deliberate circumvention of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act trust-related 
requirements applicable to for-profit corporations (or indeed the criticised inefficiency of the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act) does not call into question the utility of the for-profit corporate form. See Section 3.1.1 for a 
discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
114 Recent merger and acquisition practices in the nonprofit sector exemplify effective board oversight of 
the continued independent existence of an organisation, for example in the face o f competition (e.g. 
merger in 2006 of the Silicon Valley Community Foundation) (Silicon Valley Community Foundation 
2008a and b). See also Section 3.1.
115 The base assumption is that the value of the nonprofit form as protection outweighs any inefficiencies 
(Hansmann 1987,29).
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2.2 Accountability Theoretical Framework and Accountability Definitional
Framework
2.2.1 Accountability: A Supplement to Hansmann’s Theory?
The Modern Basis for Trust. Having explored Hansmann’s original theory and a 
selection of relevant criticisms and extensions since the seminal 1980 article on trust, 
this section advances further to the growing emphasis on accountability as an 
increasingly necessary supplement to the nondistribution constraint as a basis for trust. 
Accountability has emerged as the modem vehicle for cultivating/maintaining tmst 
through regulatory, self-regulatory, and voluntary approaches (Salamon 2003; 
Independent Sector 2005 and 2008a). The spectrum from tmst as based on intrinsic 
characteristics of the nonprofit form in Hansmann’s original theory to Salamon’s 
suggestion that accountability has become the modem means of engendering tmst, and 
the evolving relationship between the two in the literature, offers a framework for 
situating the findings on the rationales for increasing accountability.
Examples from Hansmann’s early work suggest this potential need to 
complement tmst based on the nondistribution constraint with accountability in certain 
circumstances. First, Hansmann compares as an example the international NPO CARE 
to for-profit enterprises. The latter would need greater accounting measures allowing 
verification of financial propriety in the absence of tmst based on the nondistribution 
constraint (Hansmann 1980, 847). In this example, Hansmann’s emphasis on 
information asymmetry relates to both the relationship among NPOs, donors, and 
beneficiaries (i.e., the separation of donors and beneficiaries that prevents donors from 
verifying use of funds) and, more specifically, accountability mechanisms focusing on 
disclosure of important financial information. Another perspective on this question is 
how the nonprofit and for-profit forms approach each other through accountability 
mechanisms. For example, Hansmann suggests that owners of for-profit enterprises 
could contractually commit to limiting their control over assets. Such contractual 
arrangements duplicate the legal restrictions on NPO distribution of profits -  i.e., 
effectively transform for-profit organisations into NPOs (1980, 852). However, the 
patrons would need regular detailed audited financial statements (once again voluntary 
accountability mechanisms) to confirm respect of the contractual obligations (1980, 
853). Finally, Hansmann suggests the importance of “social norms that reinforce the
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legal constraints” (defined as “conditioning individual behavior even when the legal 
restraints are unlikely to be enforced”) as a discipline on management from exceeding 
fiduciary obligations, therefore an additional influence on leaders’ strategic assessment 
of accountability (1980, 875).
More recently, Salamon raises the fundamental question of the continued 
relevance of Hansmann’s theory. Salamon posits accountability -  particularly 
performance evaluation -  as the means of engendering trust when the nondistribution 
constraint derived trust no longer suffices in the current environment (2003, 23-25). 
Salamon highlights the shift from an emphasis on NPO legal form and mission to a 
market that “rewards discipline and performance and emphasizes organizational 
capacity rather than for-profit or nonprofit status or mission” (Ryan 1999, 128; Salamon 
2003, 24). “Long-standing theories” such as Hansmann, he notes, have “few remaining 
adherents, at least among those who control the sector’s purse strings” in the current 
environment focused on accountability (Salamon 2003, 24 and 25, respectively). Large 
sophisticated donors are most likely to expect the shift to performance evaluation 
(Salamon 2003, 25). Salamon’s analysis reflects recent developments in accountability 
regulation and best practice. One key example is the US nonprofit sector leadership’s 
emphasis on the link between trust and accountability in advocating self-regulatory and 
voluntary practices such as the Independent Sector guidelines (Panel on the Nonprofit 
Sector 2007).116 The emphasis on performance evaluation takes accountability to the 
most sophisticated limits of best practice. The Independent Sector guidelines link 
accountability and trust but do not yet directly include performance evaluation 
(Independent Sector 2005 and 2008a).
Salamon’s portrait of the growing importance of performance evaluation to 
supplement the nondistribution constraint as a basis for trust highlights the increasing 
competitive challenges in the NPO world. Salamon still recognises that the nonprofit 
sector “ultimately depends” on public trust (2003, 79). However, he also considers the 
increasing pressure on NPOs to marketise or commercialise (2003, 75). The challenge 
has become reconciling the increasing discrepancy between public expectations of 
NPOs (more in line with, as Salamon says, the “Norman Rockwell stereotype of selfless 
volunteers”) and market, technology, funding, and accountability realities (Salamon
116 See discussion of regulation in Section 3.1 and best practice in the definition of accountability in 
Section 2.2.2. See also Jackson and Fogarty on trust in board recruiting (2005,25).
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2003, 79-80).117 This challenge influences respondents’ strategic assessment -  
particularly how they position themselves with respect to the relative importance of 
Hansmann’s trust and accountability-based trust. Thus one way of viewing 
accountability is as operationalising trust, for example by mitigating Hansmann’s 
information asymmetry.
Supporting Versus Replacing Hansmann’s Trust. A basic question is why it 
matters whether accountability is conceptualised as replacing the nondistribution 
constraint as a basis for trust or supplementing Hansmann’s trust (Howell meetings 
2007 and 2008). First, pushing the “replacement” view to the extreme would mean that 
donor trust based on the intrinsic nonprofit form no longer counts. That is, the nonprofit 
form no longer brings the value of trust as a competing organisational structure. This 
value might include such cost savings as avoiding the cost of verifying delivery of 
services to beneficiaries separate from the donor, “shop [ping] around,” or “enforce [ing] 
rigorously the contract” with the organisation (Hansmann 1980, 843 and 844,
liftrespectively). In Hansmann’s terms, the NPO is no longer the most apt organisational 
form to fit the behaviour of donors (1980, 898). This is because donors would consider 
only accountability as would, for example, shareholders in a for-profit setting or 
purchasers of goods from a store.119 In turn, a much more draconian approach to 
accountability might ensue because, while the nondistribution constraint still exists, 
organisations would be operating from the premise that the tmst derived from it is of 
diminished value.
Second, the question arises as to whether the types of accountability efforts 
implemented differ if targeting enhanced donor tmst versus other objectives (e.g. ethics 
or management strategy). Accountability mechanisms vary in their accessibility and/or 
importance to donors. For example, financial transparency is intended for donor 
pemsal, whereas a “dashboard” monthly summary of quantitative results for analysis by 
the board remains an internal matter.
Third, some might continue to consider tmst fundamental to NPO survival but 
not the rationale for accountability efforts -  i.e., two separate parallel tracks. In this
117 For example, the Fundraising Standards Board in the UK allows charities to make the “fundraising 
promise,” including accountability, clarity, honesty, and openness (Fundraising Standards Board 2006).
118 This also recalls Fukuyama’s transaction cost theory addressed in Section 2.1.3.
119 The purchase of goods from a store allows verification and comparison of products and therefore 
reduces the information asymmetry.
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case, it is important to understand both whether other strategies for maintaining trust are 
necessary and the purpose(s) of accountability other than trust.
Limitations o f  Performance Evaluation. More specifically, the view of
190performance evaluation as the new basis for trust fails to address a number of issues. 
First, the difficulty of assessing performance and the circular need for accountability 
and trust within the performance evaluation process itself limits the utility of
191performance evaluation (at least alone) in supplementing trust. Second, performance 
evaluation does not consider the ethics/finance/accounting/govemance/transparency
199issues that trust-focused accountability such as VAMs target. For example, it is 
possible to demonstrate effective distribution of food to the needy while 
misappropriating funds. Third, others critique NPO use of performance evaluation as 
still maturing and “not yet producing accountability,” as well as time and labour 
intensive (Brody 2002, 491; Hoefer 2000, 176). Finally, even other less complex 
accountability mechanisms (e.g. other US-derived VAMs) are still evolving, particularly 
in France. Excessive focus on performance evaluation distracts organisations from 
more fundamental accountability efforts and ignores the value of increasing 
accountability efforts other than performance evaluation (both in terms of enhancing 
trust and independent value).
In addition, performance evaluation must be reconciled with the reality that NPO 
results are often at least partly intangible. Performance evaluation does not balance the 
intrinsic yet accepted (if not expected) NPO inefficiency Hansmann acknowledges 
because NPOs are judged on more than financial results (1987, 38 and 1980, 844). In 
this light, the cost and effort of a level of performance evaluation sufficient to replace 
trust would never reach the justifiable benefits with NPOs.
120 See also Sections 5.3.1 and 5.5.1.
121 See e.g. Salamon on the lack of “meaningful bases for demonstrating the value o f what [NPOs] do” 
(1999, 13).
122 See definition of VAMs in Section 2.2.2(b).
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2,2.2 Definition o f Accountability: General (Based on the Scholarly
Literature) and Operationalised (Based on Best Practice Literature)
The definition of accountability used in this thesis comprises both a general 
definition and an operationalised definition. The former adopts a broad, internationally 
applicable perspective in terms of the range of stakeholders and types of accountability 
based on the scholarly literature. The latter comprises a detailed set of practical 
accountability mechanisms based on the Independent Sector guidelines. Organisations 
may voluntarily apply these largely independently of regulatory framework and national 
context. Therefore, the two prongs of the definition link scholarly and best practice 
literature, as well as the conceptual and practical aspects of accountability, respectively. 
This section also considers the importance in the literature of self-regulatory and 
voluntary efforts that exceed regulation as elements of the definition of 
accountability.123
Two related terms relevant to the definitions of accountability are 
“accountability efforts” and “increasing accountability.” The term “accountability 
efforts” refers to steps to increase accountability, such as the establishment of policies, 
the implementation of VAMs and other voluntary accountability mechanisms, and/or 
compliance with regulation or self-regulatory mandates. The term “increasing 
accountability” refers to increasing attention to accountability -  a continuum of 
expressions of interest in, and interventions around, accountability. These might range 
from general discussions and implementing the most fundamental accountability 
mechanisms (e.g. disclosing basic financial information to donors) at initial stages to 
joining the Comite and implementing complex corporate-derived accountability 
mechanisms (e.g. audit committees or senior executive evaluation procedures) at 
advanced stages (Howell meeting 2008). Increasing accountability potentially includes 
one or both of accountability efforts and plans or ideas relating to accountability. The 
benchmark for assessing increasing accountability within a French NPO or in the 
French nonprofit sector are the US standards (regulatory and VAMs and other voluntary 
accountability mechanisms). Due consideration is given to both alternative French 
regulations and best practice and cultural context. Throughout the thesis a distinction is 
made between “accountability” generally and “increasing accountability.”
123See Section 3.1 for relevant US accountability context and Chapter 8 for policy recommendations. 
Policy recommendations target self-regulatory policy in addition to govemmentally-imposed policy and 
regulation.
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(a) General Definition of Accountability. The general definition of 
accountability underlying the research is the classic definition of accountability as 
“having to answer for one ’s behavior” (e.g. Anheier 2005, 237; Simpson and Weiner 
1989, 10). For purposes of this thesis, I also use the operationalised definition outlined 
in Section 2.2.2 (b) below.
Accountability is defined and debated in a variety of ways in the literature -  with 
different foci on the beneficiaries, the behaviours in question, and the responsible 
parties (Brody 2002, 472; Anheier 2005; Lloyd 2005, 3; Hoefer 2000, 167). 
Accountability is also used without specific definition (e.g. Simpson and Weiner 1999, 
46). Definitions of accountability comprise three questions: To whom accountability is 
owed?; For what?; and How? (Brody 2002, 473). The discussion below adds “by 
whom?”
The main rationale for the broad general definition is to avoid limiting 
stakeholders and types of accountability, especially across national boundaries and 
different cultural and legal contexts (Goetz and Jenkins 2005, 14 (“accountability 
jurisdictions are also in flux”); Institute of Development Studies 2006, 2-3; Lloyd, 
Oatham et al. 2007, 6). Accountability varies in accordance with institutional and 
cultural context (Mulgan 2000, 557-8 (“territorial jousting” over definition); Brown and 
Moore 2001, 4; Lloyd 2005, 3; Chamovitz 2006, 35 (“age of international 
standards”)).124
Accountability is defined in this thesis as a dynamic concept (e.g. Lloyd’s notion 
of accountability as “pursued on an on-going basis” and a beneficial “agent for 
organisational change” and Mulgan’s as “chameleon-like”) (Lloyd 2005, 3; Mulgan 
2000, 55, respectively). Accordingly, the general definition of accountability as a 
baseline obligation of “answerability” provides a foundation for the evolving, 
organisation-appropriate strategic assessment of accountability (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 
6-7; Brown and Moore 2001, 3, 4 16, and 28).125
Multiplicity o f Stakeholders: To Whom Does Accountability Run? This broad 
general definition encompasses all related to the NPO as beneficiaries of accountability 
(e.g. funders, employees, volunteers, members of the boaid/conseil d ‘administration, 
and beneficiaries of services) in accordance with US best practice (Independent Sector
124 Also Soublin call October 2007.
125 See Section 2.2.2 (b). See also updated approaches relating to terrorism (Gibelman and Gelman 2004, 
357-8; Howell 2006, 132 and 121; Internal Revenue Service Form 990 (USGDTIRS 2007b, Part IV, 
Section 14, 15, and 16 (including Form TD F 90-22.1)).
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2004c).126 As with trust, the public is also included because of the public’s 
contributions to NPOs via tax benefits and the importance of social and other services 
NPOs provide (Brody 2002, 487; Bryce 2005,15; Lee 2004, 169).127 The definition does 
not formally include horizontal accountability to other NPOs or the French or US 
nonprofit sectors generally but encompasses these in accountability to the public. The 
approach parallels the indirect inclusion of other NPOs and the sector as beneficiaries of 
trust (Lloyd 2005, 3).
The challenge of prioritising multiple stakeholders and constituencies with 
cross-accountability expectations and responsibility appears throughout the literature 
(e.g. Blagescu, de Las Casas et al. 2007, 1; Lloyd 2005, 3; Brown and Moore 2001, 7; 
Keating and Frumkin 2000, 7). Moreover, failure in accountability in one area could 
trigger failure and the ensuing reputational consequences elsewhere (e.g. United Way 
embezzlement scandal trickling from senior management embezzlement through the 
board, employees, and outside consultants) (e.g. Jackson and Fogarty 2005, 12 and 113; 
Glaser 1994,103-4).128
Included Types o f Accountability: Accountability for What? The different types 
of accountability also complicate the development of a definition of accountability 
(Keohane and Nye, Jr. 2003, 3 88).129 Accountability for this study focuses on the 
traditional combination of ethics/finance/accounting/governance/transparency, 
adherence to donor specification, respect of statutory mission (as distinct from mission 
effectiveness), and public trust (as defined in Section 6.3.2). The Comite’s working
•  13 0definition of accountability largely reflects this traditional definition. The proposed 
operationalised definition based on the Independent Sector guidelines (outlined in 
Section 2.2.2(b) below) further focuses the type of accountability and connects the 
general definition to the research methods and empirical findings on strategic 
assessment.
126 However, the Independent Sector Code of Ethics, which encompasses staff, board members and 
volunteers, does not explicitly include the public or other NPOs (Independent Sector 2004c, Section 1). 
In addition, this approach contrasts with the more limiting so-called “principal-agent” model where the 
agent acts through only legal delegation of authority and economic incentives on behalf of the principle 
(Lloyd 2005, 3). The hierarchical oversight approach and record-keeping approaches are similarly narrow 
(Kearns 1994, 186 (citing Shafritz (1992, 187); Keohane and Nye, Jr. 2003, 390).
127 The public is excluded from Anheier’s list (2005, 237). See Sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2 for a discussion 
of tax systems. See also Lloyd, Oatham et al. on importance of affecting citizens (2007, 6 and 9).
128 See Section 7.2.
129 See e.g. financial accountability (Keating and Frumkin 2000, 6-16); financial, mission, and 
organisational accountability (Reiser 2004, 4-7); and combined legal, governance, ethics, and resource 
management (Anheier 2005, 239).
130 See Section 2.2.2(b).
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This fundamental “answerability” approach subsumes certain more specific
aspects of accountability in the literature relevant to unravelling the relationship
between accountability and trust and exploring rationales for accountability independent
of trust (Brody 2002, 475-6; e.g. answerability in financial matters (Keating and
1^1Frumkin 2000, 28-9)). In particular, Kearns’ combination of compliance with
regulation, proactive management, and dynamic adaptation of accountability efforts to
internal and external influences relates to a strategic assessment best aligned to the type
of NPO and stakeholders (Kearns 1994, 188). Brown and Moore’s two-part approach to
the ethical and moral components of accountability (i.e., an abstract ideal of moral good
and practical implications of moral behaviour) also relates to ethical, effective
1
management (Brown and Moore 2001, 2, 15, and 27).
Excluded Types o f  Accountability. Several types of accountability are explicitly 
excluded from my research. Mission effectiveness is excluded because the notion of 
“mission effectiveness” is conceptually confusing and not widely applicable across 
types of organisations and national contexts. (For example, does “mission effective” 
program development mean expected future results yielded? If so, is that effective 
program development with respect to donors at a particular time? If not, is that 
inappropriately short-term analysis?) Mission effectiveness is also a narrow concept, 
neglecting financial efficacy, governance, and organisational efficacy (Brown and 
Moore 2001, 15). Second, performance effectiveness is not directly included in the 
definition for the reasons cited in Section 2.2.1 (KPMG-Observatoire 2007, 52).134 
Rather, in line with US best practice and the Comite approach, the proposed definition 
treats performance evaluation as within the “board policy” duties of a well-functioning 
conseil d ‘administration to implement methods of evaluation of performance and 
mission effectiveness (Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007, No. 19, 19; US National
1 O <
Better Business Bureau 2003, No. 6 and No. 7). The definition does not specify 
evaluation methods or assessment of results of such evaluations. Therefore, Salamon’s
131 Traditional refers to the classic NPO with a governing board of directors and a prohibition on profit 
distribution (e.g. Anheier 2005, 231 and Hansmann 1980, 838).
132 See Section 5.1 on the concepts underlying ethical, effective management, which closely relates to 
Brown and Moore’s framework. See also Hosmer on moral duty and trust (Hosmer 1995, 381).
133 See also Section 5.3.1 on the impact o f the variation in how rating agencies rate NPOs, in particular 
how they define effective and whether they consider mission effectiveness (e.g. New Philanthropy Capital 
2008; GuideStar 2008; Charity Navigator 2006).
134 See Section 2.2.1 “Limitations o f Performance Evaluation.”
135 This approach does not diminish the importance of respecting statutory mission as part of the proposed 
definition. See e.g. Sections 1.2.4 on the Comit6 approach and 7.2.1 on the tsunami and mission “creep.”
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focus on performance evaluation is integrated into the definition of accountability 
through a board obligation to undertake performance evaluation. However, the 
performance evaluation process per se is not included in the definition of accountability 
in this thesis.
Several specific approaches to accountability unrelated to the trust hypothesis or
the ethics/finance/accounting/govemance/transparency focus cited above are also
excluded. The definition does not include democratic or electoral accountability (e.g. as
defined by Goetz and Jenkins) as both are further removed from the investigation of the
trust hypothesis (Goetz and Jenkins 2005, 11; e.g. Mayo 2005a, 183 and 2005b, 152).
While the broad stakeholder group includes beneficiaries of services, accountability to
beneficiaries regarding the quality of services or representative accountability is not
included as again too organisation-specific and triggering some of the same issues as
mission effectiveness and performance evaluation. Finally, the definition does not
include accountability of donors themselves (Kovach 2006, 111-113).
How? Accountability by Whom? How accountability is delivered is critically
analysed in the discussions of the empirical findings in Chapters 3 through 7. As with
trust, the organisations’ leaders (i.e., management and the conseil d ’administration)
under French and US law have primary responsibility for establishing policy and
implementing accountability practices supporting policy. This responsibility extends to
ensuring compliance by all associated with the organisation as appropriate in order to
1
ensure accountability to all beneficiaries.
(b) Operationalised Definition of Accountability. The operationalised 
definition of accountability framing the research includes a specified group of VAMs 
selected from the Independent Sector definition of accountability (Independent Sector 
and Board Source 2006; Independent Sector 2005). The Independent Sector defines 
accountability through a checklist of key aspects of accountability rather than a
1 ^ 7conceptual definition (Independent Sector 2005). This practical approach, together 
with the conceptual basis for the general definition in (a), links scholarly literature with 
best practice based on industry recommendations and provides the foundation for 
exploring the underlying purposes of the VAMs with respondents. In turn, this 
functional understanding contributes to identifying for policy recommendations
136 See discussion of leadership in Sections 4.4.2 and 5.4.3.
137 The list includes most of the Independent Sector Checklist for Accountability and some of the 
Independent Sector’s recommendations for the nonprofit sector based on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(Independent Sector 2004b and 2005, respectively).
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functionally effective substitutes for US-derived VAMs and other voluntary 
accountability mechanisms in the French nonprofit sector context.
The VAMs list addresses, directly and/or indirectly, virtually all of the types of 
accountability mentioned in Section 2.2.1. Transparency (a distinct concept from 
accountability referring to publication of adequate, accessible, and understandable 
information to stakeholders) is integrated into the proposed definition of accountability 
directly in item (v) of the VAMs list (Anheier 2005, 239; Keohane and Nye, Jr. 2003,
1 3Q404). Transparency is central to Comite requirements and US regulation and best 
practice and is indirectly ensured by other VAMs as well (e.g. the conflict of interest 
policy requirement to disclose conflicts of interest) (Comite 2008a; Independent Sector 
2004b, No.l; Anheier 2005, 239; Reiser 2005, 568-579). Independent Sector adds to the 
VAM list general practice such as ensuring a culture of accountability (by establishing 
expectations and educating staff, board of directors and volunteers), remaining current 
with legal requirements, and ensuring adequate board financial expertise (Independent 
Sector 2005 and 2008a).
138 Cultural implications of VAMs are addressed on a case by case basis throughout Chapter 4. The legal 
framework is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. See Section 3.1.
139 See also KPMG report on the difficulty of defining transparency in a pluralistic associative sector such 
as in France, including the importance of the perception of transparency (KPMG-Observatoire 2007, 7).
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Table 2-1
VAMs Included in Operationalised Definition of Accountability
VAM Definition
(0 Independent Directors excludes members of the bureau;l persons providing 
professional services (consulting, legal, accounting, etc.) to 
the NPO; and persons employed by, paid any salary, fees or 
other remuneration by, or engaged in any commercial 
operations with the NPO, any of its employees, or affiliates2
(ii) Audit Committee overseeing audit procedures and scope/relationship with 
auditors -  comprising independent directors (as defined in 
Section 4.2.1) and at least one “financial expert”
(iii) Whistleblower Policy enabling prompt reporting of all illegal acts or policy 
violations safely and confidentially3
(iv) Conflict of Interest 
Policy
written policy addressing both financial and non-financial 
conflicts (*fmancial conflicts of interest only)
(v) Transparency Policy 
and Practices
including disclosure by publishing on web sites the annual 
reports, evaluation procedures, financial statements, key 
policies, and appropriate donor information*
(vi) Senior Executive 
Compensation Policy 
and Oversight
outside Independent Sector checklist but a priority within 
their governance/ethics principles (Panel on the Nonprofit 
Sector 2007, No. 13, 15) (*limited)
(vii) Document Retention 
Policy
requiring archives and specifying prohibitions on document 
destruction
(viii) Code of Ethics general code -  deemed an “indispensable part” (* limited)
Source: Author’s selection of VAMs and definitions compiled for the study based on a variety of US law 
and Independent Sector sources noted in the table and footnotes and considerations outlined in this 
Section 2.2.2(b). See also Table 3-1.
1 I t e m s  t h a t  a l s o  a p p e a r  i n  t h e  C o m i t e ’ s  m a n d a t o r y  C h a r t e r  ( C h a r t e  d e  D d o n t o l o g i e )  a s  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  a c c r e d i t a t i o n  
a r e  m a r k e d  S e e  T a b l e  3 - 1  f o r  l e g a l  a n d  C o m i t e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  d e t a i l e d  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  I n d e p e n d e n t  S e c t o r  a n d  
C o m i t d  d o c u m e n t s .
2 U S  G o v e r n m e n t  2 0 0 2 ,  S e c t i o n  3 0 1 ;  J a c k s o n  2 0 0 6 ,  5 4 .
3 C e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  o f  U S - s t y l e  w h i s t l e b l o w e r  m e c h a n i s m s  a r e  i l l e g a l  i n  F r a n c e ,  b u t  a  m o d i f i e d  v e r s i o n  w i l l  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  p o l i c y  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  ( U S  G o v e r n m e n t  2 0 0 2 ,  S e c t i o n  8 0 6 ) .  S e e  S e c t i o n  4 . 2 . 1 .
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There are several rationales for this operationalised approach. First, the 
operationalised definition facilitates comparison (both among French NPOs and with 
the US). Second, VAMs permit application of the operationalised definition irrespective 
of national legal systems and cultural and organisational contexts. This list reflects the 
indicators of accountability prioritised within the US nonprofit sector yet adaptable to 
French associations and foundations. Even the more US-derived options such as the 
audit committee and extensive transparency of information relating to accountability 
mechanisms generally fall within the control of an association or foundation’s 
management and/or conseil d ’administration.UQ Third, VAMs generate more focused 
research results helpful in identifying patterns o f types of accountability (e.g. financial 
or programmatic). Fourth, this approach parallels the Comite’s internal unwritten 
working definition of accountability, which combines an obligation to account for 
(<devoir de rendre compte), ethical oversight, good governance, transparency, and 
accountability procedures with a level of specificity comparable to VAMs (Soublin call 
January 2007). Finally, VAMs contribute to operationalising the dynamic nature of the 
general definition of accountability as an “on-going” process as noted above (e.g. Lloyd 
2005, 3). For example, implementation of specific VAMs comprises a measurable 
component of medium- to long-term organisational strategic planning.
The two-pronged definition of accountability highlights the trend in the US and 
in the literature toward increasing emphasis on self-regulatory and voluntary efforts 
relative to regulation.141 Both practitioners and scholars emphasise the need to move 
beyond over-reliance on regulatory frameworks to “voluntarism” and “self-regulation” 
as key to the NPO form (Anheier and Kendall 2000, 20; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 
2007, introductory letter). Lloyd urges exceeding or complementing ineffective law as 
key explanations for accountability (Lloyd 2005, 5 and 6). Some argue that the lack of 
formal enforcement mechanisms hinders the efficacy of self-regulatory efforts, and 
some suggest enforceable codes of conduct (Lloyd 2005, 7; Edwards 2000, 5, 
respectively). However, the prevalence of voluntary codes suggests at a minimum their 
role in standard setting (e.g. Independent Sector 2004c; American Red Cross 2008; 
Soublin meeting November 2006). The relative lack of attention in French literature
140 Whether certain of these items would also require assemblee generate approval depends on the 
individual organisation’s statuts.
141 While Hansmann signals the need for additional regulation in service of NPO economic needs, he does 
not address voluntary accountability mechanisms. The latter is not surprising as his original theory dates 
to before the notion of voluntary mechanisms began to appear widely (Hansmann 1980, 898 and 1981b).
73
and best practice to self-regulation and voluntary approaches to accountability further 
refines the gap that the empirical research addresses.
Finally, each VAM in the operationalised definition underlying the research 
targets accountability as a complement to specific aspects of the trust theory. For 
example, information asymmetry is addressed through the transparency policy and 
practices and audit procedures. Management incentives to misdirect funds are addressed 
through the conflict of interest (both financial and non-financial), whistleblower, and 
senior management compensation policies and practices; the audit committee; and the 
code of ethics (particularly provisions addressing board governance and 
responsibilities). Therefore, VAMs reinforce monitoring of the key intrinsic governance 
weaknesses of NPOs: limitations on stakeholder rights to question management or the 
board of directors absent violation of law and limited incentive for individuals to 
monitor in the “absence of transferable residual claims” (Ben-Ner and Gui 2003, 18).142 
Finally, VAMs, therefore, also contribute to increasing the certainty of individual and 
institutional behaviour that trust implies (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 1).
2.3 France-Focused Literature: Relevance of the Welfare State Environment to
Increasing Accountability
Given the importance of the welfare state environment to the French nonprofit 
sector generally in the literature, any contribution to the research must consider 
respondents’ views of the influence of the welfare state on explanations for increasing 
accountability.143 This is important for ensuring empirical analysis of the theoretical 
framework and increasing accountability within the welfare state context. Perceptions of 
the welfare state influence also further understanding of France in comparison to the US
142 This is a fundamental point of distinction with shareholders of a for-profit company. Salamon, Hems 
et al. conclude that NPOs are more likely to have an “accountability gap,” which may be exacerbated by 
relatively limited board of directors’ incentive to monitor and the often incorrect societal assumption that 
the nondistribution constraint means managers will always act in the best interest of the organisation and 
its beneficiaries (2000, 9). See Section 3.1.1 on the relevance of enforcement of stakeholders’ rights to 
VAMs. See Note 97, supra on US and UK nonprofit sector monitoring developments such as venture 
philanthropy. French NPO stakeholders are, in general, similarly constrained (Joly e-mail 2008).
143Chapter 7 analyses respondents’ perception of the relationship between increasing accountability at the 
organisational level on the welfare state and scandal.
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for policy matters -  particularly given the comparison to US models based on a different 
relationship between the nonprofit sector and government.144
Second, as stated earlier, with limited exceptions the literature on the French 
nonprofit sector does not address accountability and trust. Nor does the literature 
address the relationship between the welfare state environment or the other external 
variables (i.e., accountability regulation, the tax system, and scandal) and accountability 
and trust. Rather, the French literature focuses primarily on the debate surrounding the 
impact of the welfare state and markets on the size and success of the French nonprofit 
sector. The empirical research aimed to address this gap by questioning the relevance of 
the welfare state to respondents’ strategic assessment of accountability and increasing 
accountability more generally. Finally, the separation between the welfare state 
environment and accountability in the France-focused literature sharpens the contrast 
with the close alignment in the US literature between the regulatory environment and 
the advanced US self-regulation and voluntary accountability best practices.
2.3.1 Importance o f the Welfare State Context to the French Nonprofit Sector
and Accountability
The literature on the importance of the welfare state context to the French 
nonprofit sector most relevant to respondents’ strategic assessment of accountability 
focuses primarily on four areas: the extensive and largely negative etatist influence; 
historical developments; the relationship to the social economy; and more recent and 
current economic and social policy challenges.145 Within these categories, the evolving 
balance between government versus NPO social service delivery and financial 
dependency (analysed in Section 2.3.2) are key sub-issues relating to French nonprofit 
sector accountability and potentially respondents’ strategic assessment.
144 Section 7.1 discusses the empirical analysis of the welfare state environment to respondents’ strategic 
assessment of accountability within their own organisations and view of accountability across the sector.
145 See Section 7.1 for empirical findings relating to the welfare state.
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Extensive literature categorises France as a welfare state or “government- 
dominant” state (e.g. Salamon, Wojciech Sokolowski et al. 2004, 33; Worms 2002,141; 
Cohen 2004, 4). Archambault concludes that “etatism is no doubt the most important 
feature in French history,” and even in the late 1990s France based the “structure of 
[France’s] civil society...on the dignity and power of the state” (Archambault 1997b, 
17; Worms 2002, 137). Worms summarises:
...today, the fact that France has based the foundations of its national identity, the 
structure of its civil society and the conditions of its sovereignty on the dignity and power 
of the state is undisputed by critics and supporters of the French republican model alike 
(Worms 2002, 137).
Freeman suggests that social policy in France is “statist in style, corporatist in form and 
pluralist in practice” (Freeman 1994, 190).
Certain statistics further reinforce the importance of the state. For example, the 
French social protection budget at 33% of GDP is second of 12 European countries after 
Sweden and exceeds considerably 17% in the US, 19% in Japan, 24% in the United 
Kingdom, and 31% in Germany (Archambault 2006, 2-3; OECD 2007, 42).146 
Moreover, the allocation of NPO income among commercial revenue, government 
funding, and philanthropy offers insight into both the sector’s landscape generally and 
identifying potential restrictions on NPOs’ independence to control funds related to the 
accountability research. In the broader category of the Hopkins Study definition of 
NPOs, for NPOs in France government funding, commercial fees, and philanthropy 
comprised 58%, 35%, and 8%, respectively -  in line with welfare partner countries but 
almost opposite the US breakdown of 31%, 57%, and 13%, respectively, and a 32- 
country average of 34%, 53%, and 12%, respectively (Salamon, Wojciech Sokolowski 
et al. 2004,44 and 41).147
Several renowned French nonprofit sector scholars portray the etatist welfare 
state as an overwhelmingly negative influence on the French nonprofit sector, 
responsible at least in part for the lag in the French nonprofit sector behind the US, the
146 Note that Eurostat statistics were within 2-3% of OECD figures but cover European countries only 
(Eurostat 2008, 1). Government support has been expanding in the US as well, including increasing state- 
nonprofit partnerships (Salamon 1999, 7 and 14, respectively).
147 See also Tchemonog 2007a, 13. Lindsay and Hems cite the funding of most associations as 
“predominately through membership fees” (approximately 34.6% of total sector funding) (2004, 268). 
However, this is not in line with Tchemonog’s selection of statistics (2007b, 76-7). (See also Tchemonog 
2007b, 59.)
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UK, and other European countries in terms of giving. Worms, for example, believes 
the state emerges as the frequently cited cause of the “relative weakness of France’s 
network of associations, compared to other European countries and the United States” 
(Worms 2002, 141). In sum, the church and state historically prevented citizen 
involvement and insertion of private initiatives between the central state authority and 
individuals, with independent voluntary associations “prime targets” (Worms 2002, 
141). Archambault contrasts the increasing importance of the French nonprofit sector to 
French citizens with its “relative official invisibility in the country’s institutional 
landscape” (Archambault 1997b, 3 and 1, respectively).
The literature broadly dissects the development of the welfare state most 
relevant to the French nonprofit sector generally, and accountability and trust more 
specifically, into several key phases. First, from the 1789 French Revolution until the
aL
late 19 century, the central government suppressed religious, charitable, and workers’ 
organisations. Second, the 1901 Law represented a “particularly liberal” breakthrough 
in freedom of association and management of associations [author translation] 
(Tchemonog 2007b, 1; French Government 1901b).149 Third, in 1945 the French state 
established a wide-ranging social security system addressing “illness, old age, 
unemployment, and family expansion” (followed by more rapid growth in the 
associative sector as compensation for French state incapacity to meet needs in those 
areas) (Archambault 1997a, 105; Worms 2002, 146-7; Archambault 1999a, l) .150 
Fourth, the fiscal crisis of the 1970s and 1980s further deepened the relationship 
between the French state and NPOs (including decentralisation) with “solidarity” 
policies engaging the French nonprofit sector as a “tool for” or partner in social policy 
(e.g. Nicholls 2006, 1785; Salamon 1995, 4 and 246; Archambault 1999b, 10 and 13; 
Salamon 1995, 4 and 246; Archambault 2005, 6). Fifth, thereafter societal tensions 
began to emerge (e.g. immigration diversifying a formerly homogeneous population) 
(Archambault 1997a, 103-105 and 118-120). Sixth, more recently some scholars 
recognise dynamism in the social economy, for example through statistics (Archambault
148 See Note 77, supra.
149 As compared to the requirement that NPOs further charitable purposes in US Internal Revenue Code 
Section 501(c)(3) (USGDTIRS 2006a).
150 Archambault emphasises the lack of empirical data (Archambault 1999a, 1).
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1997a, 125-6; Archambault 2005, 6; Tchemonog 200b).151 However, the implications 
for policy remain unclear (Archambault 1997b, 223-4; Worms 2002, 187-8).
One of the essential historical threads in the French nonprofit sector concerns the 
relationship between the French state and the social economy (Archambault 1997a, 
104). The “interdependence” of the French state and the religious and secular 
associative sector “crucial to understanding the very nature of European welfare 
regimes” reinforces the continuing, albeit negative, importance of the welfare state 
context in France (Lewis 2004, 170-171). In addition, the narrower notion of social 
economy as compared with the US notion of civil society discussed in Section 1.3.2 
appears to reflect the welfare state’s occupation of the “space” between government and 
the individual by providing social services and regulating the social economy sector. 
The literature suggests the French nonprofit sector may increasingly occupy this 
“space” but within a persistent welfare state environment (Archambault 1999b, 13). 
This contrasts with aspects of US governmental-nonprofit sector relationships that affect 
the context for accountability -  particularly the potential influences on interpretation of 
the transfer of accountability policies and mechanisms from the US to France. 
Fukuyama, for example, contrasts American civil society with greater “space” and 
passion for community service as a balance to democratic “excessive individualism” 
with France’s administrative and political inflexibility (Putnam 2000, 19 and 24; 
Fukuyama 1999, 4 and 5, respectively).152 US experts favour government’s deliberate 
avoidance of certain areas of the sector (as opposed to waiting for NPOs to address a 
government weakness) (Fleishman 1999, 177).153
2.3.2 Social Service Delivery and Financial Issues Relating to Accountability
The implications of allocation and financing of social services within the larger 
welfare state environment exemplify two elements of the welfare state environment 
potentially related to accountability. Both reflect the combination of
151 See also Laville’s “solidarity-based” NPOs as trust-based partners with local actors (Laville and 
Nyssens 2000, 67, 68 and 71). Lewis notes new EU partnerships among the state, the market, and NPOs, 
recognising the “economic and political importance of the third sector” (2004, 177). See also press reports 
on the active associative sector (e.g. Agence France Presse 2005 and de Tricomot (Le Monde.fr) 2008).
152 Notwithstanding Putnam’s caution that social capital in the US is declining, he appears optimistic that 
the trend can be reversed (2000,27 and 25, respectively). See Sections 1.3.2 and 2.1.3.
153 However, Carothers counters that many French citizens, among other countries, consider their own 
system with greater governmental control over resource allocation more effective (1999-2000, 4).
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“corporatist.. .form” and “pluralist...practice” referred to above (Freeman 1994, 190). 
In addition to informing respondents’ general perspective, these two sub-issues issues 
relate to Hansmann’s question of the type of organisation best suited to particular 
activities and donor behaviour (1980, 897-8).154
First, the welfare state breeds an attitude of dependence on government for 
social services and the view that social services are largely a governmental 
responsibility. Recent reports speak of the “strong belief’ in France that the French state 
rather than NPOs should provide social services -  as opposed to the importance of 
NPOs in delivering social services in the US and increasingly in the UK (Charities Aid 
Foundation 2006, 12). Archambault adds that “ ...the average citizen still considers that 
it is up to the government to deal with any civic, social or economic problem” and not to 
resort to self-help (Archambault 1997b, 17).155 This general notion that taking care of 
others is largely the French state’s responsibility is also reflected in the strong French 
individualist attitude.156 This individualism negatively influences the French nonprofit 
sector, seemingly accountability notwithstanding. Fukuyama contrasts de Tocqueville’s 
remark that “there were not ten Frenchmen who could come together for a common 
cause” with the US literature emphasising social capital (Fukuyama 1999, 4-5; de 
Tocqueville 2000, 577-8; Putnam 2000, 27).157 Thus the empirical analysis requires 
consideration of these welfare state influences on the French nonprofit sector generally.
Accountability in France is also influenced by the notion of a “widespread 
welfare partnership” developing particularly since the 1980s and involving the state 
financing welfare services but relying on “private civil society organisations” for 
service delivery -  rather than commonly assumed government provision of services 
(Salamon, Wojciech Sokolowski, and List 2003, 31; Archambault 1997b, 17). In this 
so-called “corporatist model,” the state (through the welfare budget) and the French
154 See Section 7.1.
155Note Hansmann’s warning of the potential bureaucracy and inefficiency of governmental 
accountability that requires a chain of accountability from “individual service organizations” to the 
governmental authorities (1980, 895). Hansmann notes that such additional costs would be difficult to 
justify, at least without economies of scale often not seen with the types of services NPOs provide (1980, 
895).
156 The cultural implications and impact thereof on accountability remain unclear but are considered a 
“serious political challenge” (Worms 2002, 153). See also Institut Montaigne 2004, 6-7; Worms 2002, 
159 and 186; Archambault 1999a, 2. Also the French emphasis on discretion in discussing money 
potentially could affect financial transparency (e.g. Fondation de France-Observatoire de la Fondation de 
France/TNS Sofres 2003, 9). See Note 432, infra.
157 Soublin and three business leaders and potential high-level donors candidly link the notion of the 
French state’s responsibility to care for the public to lower levels of giving, voluntarism, and generally 
associating for, or concerning oneself with, the benefit o f others (e.g. Soublin call September 2006; Oddo 
discussion 2007; David-Weill informal discussion 2006; and Bazin call 2005).
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nonprofit sector “cooperate” rather than functioning as “alternative providers” (Lewis 
12004, 172-3). This “partnership” includes contractual arrangements linking state 
bureaucracies and NPOs. Partnerships may result from a transfer of state responsibility 
to associations, new legislation circumscribing a new area for citizenship involvement, 
or growth in new areas of interest the state considers as in the associative domain 
(Worms 2002, 145 and 146). Freeman highlights the “decentralised structure” as key to 
the “corporatist form,” as well as the conflictual nature of the pluralist system in which 
officials have legally-based authority but social agencies, professional groups, and even 
beneficiaries of the social system all exert influence (Freeman 1994, 191).
One example of these “partnerships” particularly susceptible to accountability 
issues concerns outsourcing French state functions. Such outsourcing arrangements 
have been interpreted as administrative expansion “in the guise of associative legal 
status” and often involve creation of a sort of false association (i.e., an association in 
form but not function) (Worms 2002, 144; Archambault 1997b, 47). These joint 
arrangements may jeopardise accountability by compromising associative 
independence, particularly regarding control of use of funds. Such cases reflect 
partnerships functioning through top down authority (“associationalism from above” or 
“associative arms of the welfare state”) so that associations become de facto 
government agencies (Nicholls 2006, 1779, 1780, and 1785; Worms 2002, 147, 
respectively).159 Archambault calls nonprofit organisations “more or less quasi-public 
associations” with a high level of government funding (often through the social security 
scheme or by local department) and heavily regulated (Archambault 2006, 7).160
Second, the complex dependence of associations on government financial 
support also complicates accountability (e.g. Salamon 1995, 256; Archambault 2005, 
16; Archambault 1999b, 5-7, 13-14).161 Reductions in government support seriously 
affect NPOs in countries like France with long-standing public funding (Anheier 2002,
158 See also Alcock and Craig on voluntary sector organisations providing welfare services in the UK 
(2001, 130).
159 Note Carney and Ramia’s proposal that government should transfer to civil society some social service 
delivery, favoring a “republican citizenship” vision for reasons of fairness and greater transparency and 
accountability (2001, e.g. 28).
160 Soublin targets this “outsourcing” as a serious accountability issue allowing organisations that are not 
truly NPOs to benefit from the NPO legal status through various tax and other government advantages 
(Soublin interview 2007). See also Archambault 1997a, 121, Paris meeting 2005, and Charhon meeting
2005. One organisation specifically recognised some infringement on autonomy but considered 
themselves independent (Organisation 22). The literature on the French sector did not focus on Craig and 
Dowler’s point on the UK that the government can call NPOs raising social issues “patronizing” and 
“insulting” (Craig and Dowler 1997, 115).
161 See also Paris meeting 2005 and Organisation 22.
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4; Archambault 1997a, 120).162 Foundations are significantly less dependent on state 
funding, however (Archambault 2003, 12). In addition to the complexity and 
uncertainty of government funding, the French state involvement in the sector is so 
culturally engrained that even practices such as state representation on a foundations’s 
conseil d'administration (up to a maximum of one-third of the total number of 
members) are expected quid pro quo for tax benefits (Archambault 2003, 4).
2.4 Conclusion
The literature review established the theoretical framework for exploring 
empirically and explaining the increasing accountability and the relevance of the trust 
hypothesis in the French nonprofit sector. Hansmann’s demand side trust theory was 
posited as a starting point for the research. The origins of the theory were updated with 
a critical evaluation of criticisms and extensions of the theory relevant to accountability. 
None undermines the potential on-going relevance of Hansmann’s theory or application 
in the French context. Rose-Ackerman’s suggestion of the importance of “signal[ling]” 
trustworthiness provides a lens through which to evaluate respondents’ individual 
strategic assessment of accountability-related decisions, thereby linking the trust theory 
to the accountability research. In addition, Salamon’s argument that accountability 
(particularly performance evaluation) increasingly supplements Hansmann’s 
nondistribution constraint as the means of generating trust suggests a spectrum from 
trust based on the intrinsic characteristics of the nonprofit form toward trust derived 
from increasingly complex accountability efforts as a second frame for the evaluation of 
the empirical findings.
The definition of accountability is also grounded in the literature -  both 
scholarly work (the general definition) and best practice literature (the operationalised 
definition). The proposed definition bridges theory to practical application for the 
research. The definition also establishes a base for subsequent policy recommendations.
Finally, the literature review exposes gaps in the literature with respect to 
accountability and trust that the empirical research targets. The analysis of the French 
literature also explored aspects of the French welfare state environment essential to
162 See Section 5.3.3 on hinder accountability requirements (as defined in Section 5 Introduction).
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interpreting the empirical findings on increasing accountability and trust (particularly 
applications of Hansmann’s US-based theory and US models of accountability) in the 
French context. Social service delivery and financial dependency emerged as two key 
areas of the welfare state background relating to both the theory and empirical analysis 
to come.
The trust and accountability issues addressed in the US literature, combined with 
the potential welfare state issues addressed in the France-focused literature, frame the 
two “next steps” guiding the empirical analysis. First, the gap in the literature regarding 
increasing accountability and trust in the French nonprofit sector suggests the 
importance of an assessment of increasing accountability and the relevance of 
Hansmann’s theory as a starting point for the research. Second, the gap in “supply side” 
responses to Hansmann’s demand side theory invites empirical exploration of 
organisations’ perceptions and actions (strategic assessment) relating to trust and non­
trust based explanations for increasing accountability and Salamon’s challenge to 
Hansmann’s theory. Chapter 3 bridges the discussion of theory, definitions, and French 
nonprofit sector context in this chapter to the empirical analysis (in Chapters 4 through 
7) by establishing the regulatory and voluntary best practice frameworks in the US and 
France.
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Chapter 3 
Top Down and Bottom Up
US Regulatory and Voluntary Accountability Models 
French Accountability Regulation and the French Tax System
“To a large degree, the accountability movement within the [US nonprofit] sector is driven from 
the top down rather than the bottom up” (Brody 2002,479).
“The French state is like an octopus. It has too many tentacles -  it does too much [nonprofit 
sector regulation] and it does it badly” [author translation] (Organisation A).
“There is enough regulation but not much reflection on governance. The focus is always about 
democratic issues like members of an association, and this focus on the democratic prevents the 
imposition of standards of accountability” [author translation] (Organisation H).
“The problem is the many layers of regulation. No one understands it -  especially the public -  
and it has a negative impact on giving” [author translation] (Organisation 21).
Introduction
This chapter takes the final step toward establishing the foundation for the 
empirical analysis by linking the theoretical and definitional framework proposed in 
Chapter 2 to the evolving regulatory environment. Fundamental elements of French 
accountability regulation and the French tax system are essential context for analysing 
the strategic assessment process leading to increasing accountability that is emerging as 
a key theme in this thesis. Hansmann’s trust theory directly links to regulation for the 
roots and enforceability of the nondistribution constraint. Salamon’s position on 
accountability reflects an evolving US federal and state regulatory environment. Rose- 
Ackerman’s strategic assessment of “signalling” accountability through which 
organisations position themselves on the trust theoretical spectrum between Hansmann 
and Salamon necessarily includes regulation as an external variable requiring 
exploration.
Section 3.1 provides relevant historical and comparative background on 
accountability in the US nonprofit sector. As a more advanced accountability 
environment, US models of accountability and tax regulation (and the self-regulatory 
and voluntary fall-out from regulation) serve as a benchmark for assessing the strategic 
assessment process in France within the proposed theoretical framework and 
definitions.
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Section 3.2 then critically analyses the elements of French accountability 
regulation and the French tax system most relevant to increasing accountability and the 
trust hypothesis. This section also analyses the empirical findings relating to the limited 
importance of these two regulatory external variables to respondents’ strategic 
assessment of accountability. The comparison exposes weaknesses in the French system 
that will be traced through the empirical analyses in Chapters 4 through 7 and that 
underlie policy recommendations based on the findings in Chapter 8.
Finally, Section 3.3 relates the regulatory environment to the theoretical 
framework. Enforceability of the nondistribution constraint is the first link between 
regulation and theory. The increase in US nonprofit accountability regulation and best 
practice following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also calls into question the continued 
validity of Hansmann’s trust theoretical framework. This and subsequent chapters 
attempt to draw the line on the continuum between Hansmann’s trust based on intrinsic 
NPO attributes, on the one hand, and Salamon’s positioning of accountability as a 
necessary complement to Hansmann’s trust in an era focused on performance 
evaluation, on the other hand.
3.1 US Nonprofit Sector Accountability: Regulatory Framework (Federal and 
State) and Links to Self-Regulation and Voluntary Accountability 
Mechanisms
This section reviews the key elements of the US regulatory framework (state 
law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and relevant US nonprofit tax law provisions) influencing 
increasing accountability. The section then argues the importance of voluntary 
accountability mechanisms to balance regulation. In particular, these US regulatory 
models and related best practice aid understanding of the origins and relevance in the 
French context of the potential driving forces behind increasing accountability within 
the larger donor trust and ethical, effective management objectives: corporatisation, 
integration of international standards, and compliance with funder accountability 
requirements (as discussed in Chapter 5) and donor pressure, the media, and Comite 
membership (as discussed in Chapter 6).
While recognition of the importance of accountability in the US may be traced 
back to the earliest US cultural landmarks and the beginning of the US nonprofit sector,
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scholars have noted a particular rise in attention to accountability in the nonprofit sector 
in the early 1990s. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and related for-profit Enron/WorldCom 
scandals and nonprofit scandals prove a pivotal recent accountability development (US 
Government 2002; Beltran (CNNMoney.com) 2002; Washingtonpost.com 2004, 
respectively). Adopted less than a year after the Enron scandal broke, the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act is widely considered a swift, stem political and legislative response to the 
wave of corporate and accounting scandals (Hamilton and Trautmann 2002, Chapter 1, 
Section 101).164 This heavily regulatory-driven environment triggered, in turn, a self- 
regulatory and voluntary response throughout the sector (Brody 2002, 475, 479, and 
480).165 The almost immediate migration of Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirements and 
practices into the nonprofit sector via state law and self-regulatory best practice 
guidelines reflected a new increase in NPO implementation of accountability 
mechanisms in response to parallel NPO scandals. Two pivotal examples, the American 
Red Cross blood and September 11, 2001 Liberty Fund scandals, received particular 
public attention due to the size and renown of the organisation and the sensitivity and of 
the timing and subject (American Red Cross/Decker et al. 2001; Mitchell 2002; Jackson 
and Fogarty 2005, 71 and 69, respectively; Keating and Frumkin 2000, 1 (citing 
Murawski 1995); Murawski 1995).166 Trust was an urgent and fundamental concern. As
163 Kearns, for example, suggests that notions of accountability in the nonprofit sector dated back more 
than 200 years since the “third sector” emerged in the US and that scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s 
abounded (Kearns 1994, 185-187 (citing Hall 1987)). See also Bill of Rights preamble on preventing 
misuse or abuse of power (United States Congress 1791, Bill o f Rights preamble). See also Scott and 
Lyman referring to “excuses and justifications” of behaviour and “bridging the gap between action and 
expectation” (2005, 224 and 219, respectively).
164 See also Romano on “emergency legislation” (2005, 2, 3, and 8); Reiser 2005, 559; and e.g. Gertner 
2006, 1 from general press.
165 The Enron scandal, one of the most significant US corporate scandals at the time, involved irregular 
accounting practices by Enron and its accountants Arthur Anderson ending in criminal prosecution and 
near bankruptcy (e.g. Washingtonpost.com 2004). WorldCom was the biggest bankruptcy in terms of 
total dollar amount as of 2002 following business challenges and serious fraud (e.g. Beltran 
(CNNMoney.com) 2002). Neither company published information regarding the scandals that was 
available during the research period because neither company existed in the same corporate form. These 
press articles were consistent with all other reports read. See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduction 
addressing “failures of audit effectiveness and a breakdown in corporate financial...responsibility” 
(Hamilton and Trautmann 2002, Chapter 1, Section 101).
166 The Red Cross blood scandal involved large stocks of spoiled, unused blood donations following the 
September 11 attacks and using the September 11 event as an excuse to restock national supplies (e.g. 
Suarez 2001 (PBS Online NewsHour) 2001; New York Times 2001). The Liberty Fund scandal involved 
the Red Cross’ attempted allocation of a significant portion of the $543 million pledged post-September 
11, 2001 New York terrorist attacks (of which less than 1/3 had been spent on September 11 relief efforts) 
for other projects such as as preparation for future terrorist attacks. See also Keating and Frumkin on 
United Way (2000, 1); Murawski 1995. This article included commentary from a Red Cross spokesman, 
New York Attorney General at the time Elliot Spitzer, and Paul Light from the Brookings Institute. See 
also American Red Cross 2006.
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the Red Cross Vice President for Development insisted, “the premium for us is to 
maintain the trust...This is all about trust, and if it weren’t for the trust, then the 
American Red Cross” would not be there (Suarez (PBS Online NewsHour) 2001).167 In 
France, the l ’ARC scandal alone triggered wide-spread fear and the beginnings of 
serious attention to nonprofit sector accountability.
3.1,1 US Reeulatorv Framework: Accountability Regulation
The most important sources of US accountability regulation derive from state 
law and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The relationship of both to voluntary and self- 
regulatory accountability efforts is essential.
Basic US State Law Legal Principles Essential to Trust and the Nonprofit 
Model First, the most important legal principle relating to Hansmann’s trust and 
accountability concerns the authority to hold NPOs accountable. Legally donors (not 
serving as a trustee) do not have the authority to hold a NPO accountable (i.e., sue for 
misallocation of donations) after the gift is made (Brody 2002, 477). Rather, the state -  
generally via the Attorney General -  sues to enforce donor restrictions, solicitation, and 
trustee fiduciary duties (Brody 2002, 479; California Government 2006, Section 12598). 
In addition, the IRS regulates the tax exemption status through initial and on-going 
filings (particularly the Form 990).169
Second, the prohibition on distribution of profits rooted in state law does not 
necessarily guarantee the trustworthiness of a NPO or the fact that the state will enforce 
the prohibition (Brody 2002, 477; Hansmann 1980, 836, 838, 870, and 873; Hansmann 
1987, 32). Voluntary NPO boards charged with oversight of accountability are generally 
bound only by fiduciary duty of loyalty and care (Brody 2002, 477; California 
Department of Corporations 2007, Section 309). NPOs in the US frequently offer so- 
called “Director and Officer” (D&O) insurance that protects individual board members 
from financial liability in the event of legal action against the NPO (Nonprofit 
Coordinating Committee of New York, Inc. 2007; Grant e-mail March 2008). However,
167 See also Light regarding difficulty of healing after scandal (2003, 8) and Suarez (PBS Online 
NewsHour) 2001, 5).
168 The L’ARC scandal in France beginning in the late 1980s and investigated into the mid-1990s 
involved the fraud and misappropriation/mismanagement of funds by the Founder and President Jacques 
Crozemarie. L’ARC has been widely considered the landmark French nonprofit fraud case and influenced 
the founding of the Comity. See Section 7.2.1 for a detailed analysis of L’ARC.
169 See Section 3.1.2.
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enforcement is weak due, among other reasons, to regulators’ resource constraints and 
reticence to interfere in NPO management (Brody 2002, 479; Grant e-mail December 
2008; Reiser 2005, 598). Accordingly, director liability has not been a significant worry 
(Lucile Packard Foundation for Children’s Health 2005; Brody 2002, 478 and 479). 
This limited capacity of donors to enforce restrictions on wrong-doing reinforces the 
importance of Hansmann’s donor trust based on the nondistribution constraint and also 
begs the question how organisations behave in response to inadequate enforcement 
(Hansmann 1980, 838 and 853).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Accountability. The trends in the US nonprofit 
environment that preceded and followed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as well as the 
implications of the regulation itself, lay an important foundation for the analysis of 
accountability in the French nonprofit sector. Moreover, the trust-focused purpose of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act raises questions of the relationship between accountability and trust 
in the regulatory framework and fall-out from regulation in the US and France.
The pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act period (beginning roughly during early the 1990s) 
witnessed a combination of crises in the US beginning 2001, all of which affected the 
nonprofit sector. These crises culminated in the enactment of the law on July 30, 2002 
(US Government 2002, Section 101; Hamilton and Trautmann 2002, 3 and 13).170 The 
most important factors include the post-September 11, 2001 period of recovery from the 
terrorist attack and the biggest ever corporate and nonprofit scandals mentioned above. 
The era also witnessed intensification of numerous fundamental nonprofit sector trends 
emerging in the second half of the 20th century: overall growth in the US nonprofit 
sector in terms of revenue (Salamon 2003, 50); rising numbers of charitable 
organisations (between 1987 and 2006 IRS charity registration growing at double the 
rate of the business sector) (Amsburger et al. 2008); greater philanthropic sophistication 
(e.g. Stanford University “think again” campaign) (Meier meeting 2008); increasing 
commercialisation and competition with for-profit world (e.g. in health care) (Salamon 
2003, 68); and the establishment of nonprofit research centres and increased scholarly 
attention to the field (e.g. Yale University Yale School of Management The MacMillan
171Center 2007; Salamon 2003, 67). This in turn triggered pressure for corporate social 
responsibility, even within newer corporate forms such as private equity and venture
170 See also United States Senate 2002.
171 The Stanford University “think again” campaign’s fund-raising strategy involved a large-scale, 
nationally performed production of mini-courses by renowned Stanford faculty sampling the University’s 
most innovative curriculum.
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capital, that have begun to affect nonprofit accountability practices (Salamon 2003, 38- 
39). Finally, the end of the 1990s witnessed growing concerns about nonprofit 
organisations, including “accountability and legitimacy of NGO actors” (Howell and 
Lind 2009, Chapter 2).
The corporate-focused Sarbanes-Oxley Act proved a fundamental impetus for 
legislation to regulate nonprofit accountability and influence voluntary best practice 
standards. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act focuses on “rebuild[ing] public trust in the 
corporate sector” through a range of requirements, most importantly legislating 
independent oversight (US Government 2002, Section 2001 No. 107-205 “Purpose of
1 7 ")the Bill”; Hamilton and Trautmann 2002, 159). This independent oversight requires 
independent directors (as defined in Table 2-1) to provide unbiased governance free of 
conflicts of interest and is the core of accountability in the US in both the for-profit and
11'Xnonprofit sectors. The audit committee of the board, comprising independent 
directors and at least one financial expert, is the primary vehicle for on-going assurance 
of independent oversight of accountability matters (US Government 2002, Section 
301((3)(A)and (B)). The audit committee assures board oversight of both accounting 
and accountability policies and practices, including the relationship with the auditors, 
determination of the scope and budget of the audit without management interference, 
and oversight and investigation of complaints on accountability matters (e.g. National 
Council of Nonprofits 2002, “Financial Accountability and Audit Committees”).174
At present, the only two provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that apply to 
NPOs are the whistleblower provision and the document retention requirements (US 
Government 2002, Sections 806 and 802, respectively; Jackson 2006, 9). The 
whistleblower mechanism provides employees, volunteers, and board members a formal 
confidential procedure for reporting inappropriate financial behaviour without risking 
retaliation on careers. The document retention provisions institute criminal penalties for
172 See also The United Kingdom Charities Act (defining the Charity Commission as an organisation with 
an objective of “public confidence” to “increase public trust and confidence in charities”) (United 
Kingdom Government 2006, Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 7).
173 The absence of requirements for such independent oversight, a key weakness in France exacerbated by 
the membership structure of 1901 Law associations, is addressed in the policy recommendations from this 
thesis (Section 8.2.2).
174 Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act strengthens enforcement standards for financial transactions and 
internal accounting controls and requires certification by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial 
Officer of financial information (omitted from VAMs as too new, lacking evaluation, and culturally 
sensitive for the French nonprofit sector) (US Government 2002, Title IV, Section 404 and Title III, 
Section 302, respectively). Auditor independence (e.g. prohibitions on audit firms serving as both auditor 
and consultant for the same entity) is also required (US Government 2002, Section 301: Hamilton and 
Trautmann 2002, 48).
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NPOs that “knowingly [alter] or [destroy]” a document to interfere with investigations 
within US jurisdiction or in certain other circumstances (US Government 2002, Section 
802(a)).175
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has critics in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. 
Executives criticise the lack of efficacy in achieving the desired result and cost of the 
onerous requirements (e.g. William Zollars of Yellow Roadway claiming 200 
employees had to work on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act matters in the fourth fiscal quarter) 
(Powell 2005). Some believe the politically driven emergency legislative process failed 
to consider the empirical evidence properly and legislated reforms that had little relation 
to the failure of firms such as Enron (Romano 2005, 2). Nonprofit experts criticise 
efficacy of disclosure-based reforms for accountability (as mentioned with respect to the 
Form 990) (Reiser 2005, 568-572). The combination of the duplicative nature of many 
proposed reforms, overly optimistic assumptions about compliance (and over-regulating 
compliant organisations while still failing to regulate intentional fraud), limitations on 
enforcement, and the cost of compliance diminishes the efficacy of these reforms 
(Reiser 2005, 561). In particular, disclosure to regulators cannot be the only means of 
enforcement as state Attorneys General and the IRS lack the resources and capacity 
even to assess the information they already have (e.g. Bograd 1994, 8-10). In addition, 
as noted above, public disclosure fails because constituencies are frequently 
insufficiently motivated or experienced to analyse NPO disclosures (Reiser 2005, 605; 
Keating and Frumkin 2000, 7 and 8).
These criticisms, nonetheless, fail to reflect the mitigating factors and the 
intrinsically positive benefit of greatly improved independent oversight for the nonprofit 
sector. First, each organisation manages the strategic assessment of voluntary
17Aaccountability mechanisms with a view to efficiency for donors as well. Second, 
many donors do have the resources to investigate NPOs, particularly the larger and 
institutional donors. The weighing up of influences on, and costs and benefits of, 
accountability applies to donors as well. For some lower level donors the effort to 
assess accountability may not be worth the cost given the size of the gift and other 
factors. Some may benefit indirectly by relying on the fact that larger donors do verify 
accountability (so-called “free-riding”) (Hansmann 1980, 848-9). Third, efforts 
regarding readability and consistent presentation, for example the new Form 990
175 See also Section 4.2.3.
176 See Section 3.3.
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revisions, also aim to assist understanding and comparison (USGDTIRS 2007a, 2). 
Finally, several organisations and experts argue that implementing accountability 
mechanisms brings value by improving organisational discipline (Organisations 18, 19, 
B, C, and D: Frotiee and Chartier teleconference January 2008; Charhon meeting 2005; 
Soublin interview 2007).177
The post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act period from late 2002 to the present reflects 
developments related to the analysis of increasing accountability and trust in France. 
First, a rapid state legislative response (e.g. the CNIA addressed in Section 3.1.4 below) 
reinforced the nonprofit regulatory framework and the topdown approach to self- 
regulatory and voluntary accountability efforts. Salamon also notes the environment of 
reduced public trust and reliance on traditional NPO reputation and regulations on 
which he believes “the entire edifice of the nonprofit sector rests” (2003, 29). The 
intensification of the transfer of market practices and regulation to the nonprofit sector, 
including a new focus on performance measurement and monitoring, calls into question
1 78the role of donor trust and traditional NPO roles and values (Salamon 2003, 29).
Follow-On to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in State Law. Several states and their 
Attorneys General have taken the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as the “wake up call” the 
nonprofit sector widely believes it is and launched efforts to protect donors through 
state legislation (Independent Sector and Board Source 2006, 2; United Way 2008a; 
California State Senate 2004). The extensive intervention of state legislation contributes 
greatly to the top down US approach to accountability. Critics argue that the reactions 
of the state Attorneys General focus excessively on financial accountability, ignoring 
organisational accountability and mission accountability for a range of political, 
practical, financial and other reasons (Reiser 2004,13).
California’s response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act exemplifies the rapid and 
thorough response of state legislatures. California signed the CNIA September 29, 2004 
for effectiveness only four months thereafter as of January 1, 2005 (California State
1 70Senate 2004). The key provisions of the CNIA include an independent audit of
177 See Section 7.2.3 on the potential benefit o f accountability mechanisms independent of donor 
response.
178 See Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 on corporatisation and the transfer of international accountability 
standards to France, respectively.
179 See also Gertner 2006, 1 (re hospital lobbying for CNIA exclusion); California Registry of Charitable 
Trusts 2005; Reiser 2005, 564. See also New York and Massachusetts as models for other states (New 
York State, Office of the Attorney General 2003, State of New York 2003, and State of New York 2004; 
Massachusetts (Office of Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly) 2007, respectively).
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financial statements and audit committee for charities with gross revenues of $2 million 
or more and authorised board committee or full board oversight of executive 
compensation (Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer) to ensure 
compensation is “just and reasonable.” The CNIA also addresses a range of 
requirements relating to fund-raising (California State Senate 2004, Sections 
12586(e)(1), (e)(2), and (g), and 12599, respectively). Despite the seemingly onerous 
provisions, the CNIA steps up requirements with organisation size, particularly audit 
committees (Ostrower and Bobowick 2006, 5).
Relationship Between Accountability Regulation and Voluntary Accountability 
Mechanisms. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and state law requirements trickled down to self- 
regulatory initiatives and voluntary best practice. Nonprofit sector leaders such as the 
self-regulatory organisations Independent Sector and Board Source strongly recommend 
the voluntary adoption of a number of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other provisions related 
to good governance (Independent Sector and Board Source 2006). The US nonprofit 
sector has witnessed the rise of a wide range of venture philanthropy firms, consulting 
firms, and other service providers borrowing optional for-profit accountability expertise 
for nonprofit challenges (SV2 group meetings 2002-04; Arrillaga e-mail 2008; Social 
Ventures Partners International (SVPI) 2006).180
VAMs and other voluntary accountability mechanisms increasingly prevalent in 
the US are generally evaluated through the individual strategic assessment, including 
the impact of internal and external variables on accountability. Some accounting and 
other internal controls may be complex and costly to implement, requiring significant 
outside expertise, particularly for smaller NPOs that do not have salaried positions to 
handle such matters (KPMG-Observatoire 2007, 35 and 37). Most of the other optional 
items do not involve significant cost (e.g. the conflict of interest policy described in 
Table 2-1 and Section 4.2.1).
3.1.2 US Resulatorv Framework: Tax System and Accountability -  Internal
Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) and Form 990
The US tax system is heavily focused on accountability and accessibility of 
information disclosing accountability matters to the public. The Internal Revenue 
Service functions as the gatekeeper for charitable organisations through the Internal
180 See Section 5.3.1 on corporatisation.
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Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) application process that pre-approves charities based 
on structure, activities (which must be limited to a “charitable purpose”), and
1 ft 1commitment to comply with on-going reporting requirements (USGTDIRS 2008b).
In addition, the Internal Revenue Service’s Form 990 (dating in large part back 
to 1979) is the basic disclosure document through which NPOs in the US report to the 
Internal Revenue Service annually in order to maintain tax-exempt status and privileges 
(USGDTIRS 2008a, l) .182 The Form 990 targets a number of the key accountability 
issues such as conflicts of interest, independent voting directors, executive 
compensation, financial disclosure, and control of flow of hands as an anti-terrorism 
measure (USGDTIRS 2008a, VIB12a-c and Part IV28a-c (Schedules); Part VIA1 and 2; 
Part VII and VIB 15a and b; Parts I, VIII, and IX; Part IV 14a and b and 15,
1 ft^respectively). The Form 990s are on file publicly and available on-line. This 
regulatory approach enhances comparability. In particular, the Internal Revenue 
Service’s specially designed web site facilitates searching a master file of approximately
1.3 million individual organisations (including private foundations) (USGDTIRS 2007a, 
1; Urban Institute 2006, 1).
Hansmann suggests that early on the Internal Revenue Service may not have 
been consistent in sanctioning self-dealing (particularly misappropriation of 
organisation assets for the benefit of controlling persons such as senior management) 
and other such behaviour. This is in part because the only available sanction -  
withdrawing charitable tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) -  seemed too 
draconian (Hansmann 1980, 874). The Form 990 offers greater oversight, opportunities 
for correction, and more moderate sanctioning. Moreover, the Form 990 allows the 
public to judge the NPO in question, either generally or on specific points of interest.
Some commentators consider the Form 990 the main, but an unsatisfactory, 
nonprofit sector response to the flurry of NPO scandals in the 1990s (Keating and 
Frumkin 2000, 1; USGDTIRS 2008a). Recent requirements to publish the Form 990 on 
the IRS web site for organisations of a certain size, and recent efforts to prepare 
collective information, do not solve the weaknesses in many NPO accounting systems, 
or the number of users unmotivated or unable to access the Form 990 and/or unable to
181 See also USGDTIRS 2008d for a general overview of information on charities and other NPOs.
182 The Form 990 underwent a significant revision starting in 2007 and implemented in 2009 (relative to 
fiscal year 2008) primarily targeting increased transparency (i.e., a full picture of the organisation for 
comparability purposes), promoting compliance for Internal Revenue Service compliance verification, 
and minimising the burden on organisations (USGDTIRS 2008a, 2).
183 See also Howell’s discussion of anti-terrorism measures (Howell 2006).
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read and interpret financial information (Keating and Frumkin 2000, 2 and 3; Reiser 
2005, 602).184 Rating agencies also fault the number of errors (Nelson 2004, 4). 
Nonetheless, the common format among organisations and easy, no-charge availability 
to the public represents considerable progress in transparency, consistency, and
1RSavailability and comparability of information.
3.2 French Nonprofit Sector Accountability: Regulatory Framework and 
Empirical Findings Relating to the Impact of Regulation on Strategic 
Assessment of Increasing Accountability
The French regulation most relevant to increasing accountability in the French
nonprofit sector comprises primarily two parts: accountability regulation and the tax 
1 86system. First, the key elements of the accountability regulatory framework are 
critically assessed: the requirements of audited accounts; more substantive financial 
statement requirements; and the Statement of Use of Funds (Compte d ’Emploi des 
Ressources). Key comparisons to the US are indicated where relevant to interpretation 
of the empirical findings and policy recommendations. Second, the analysis dissects 
relevant elements of the French tax system with a view to assessing the impact of the 
tax system in driving accountability. Most importantly, while overall the tax system has 
improved financial incentives for donations to NPOs, unlike the US system the French 
tax system does not impose or reinforce requirements related to accountability.
The second part of the analysis of French regulation bridges the regulatory 
framework to the empirical findings. It explores respondents’ perception of the limited 
relevance of accountability regulation and the tax system to the strategic assessment of 
accountability and the views of the importance of donor trust. In particular, respondents’ 
perceive a separation between these regulatory external variables and their own strategic 
assessment and accountability efforts -  irrespective of de facto increases in 
accountability through regulatory requirements. Finally, it assesses the empirical
184 Donors are using accountability for financial leverage, but the demands for special accountability are 
limited given the low ratio of institutional donors to less informed, demanding individuals (Keating and 
Frumkin 2000, 7).
185 See also Section 8.2.3 on related policy recommendations for France.
186 The other two non-regulatory external variables -  the welfare state environment and scandal -  
complete the analysis of external variables in Chapter 7.
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findings on self-regulation generally and the Comite as a model of a self-regulatory 
organisation specifically.
3.2.1 French Regulatory Framework: Accountability Regulation
Key Provisions o f  Accountability Regulation. French NPO accountability 
regulation is less coordinated than the US system. According to several experts and the 
commonly cited texts, the system comprises the 1901 Law (in the case of associations), 
the law on giving (mecenat) (in the case of foundations), and occasional additional laws 
and regulations addressing specific subjects enacted from time to time without a 
coherent structure or guiding strategy (Chartier and Frotiee teleconference January 
2008; Berthet call 2008; Binder meeting 2007; Binder 2005, 118; French Government 
1901b; French Government 1987). Moreover, unlike in the US where accountability is 
addressed in both accountability regulation and the tax system, in France the tax system 
remains separate and does not impose accountability-related obligations or disclosure of 
accountability mechanisms. Thus a core problem is that the highly inclusive 1901 Law 
still exists 108 years after implementation with the government adding new laws to 
address emerging issues in an unstructured, issue by issue fashion (Organisations 20 
“haphazardly multiplying controls” and 21 “many layers”). This compares to a 
coherent system with an overarching goal like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act focus on 
independent oversight of accountability or the Form 990 emphasis on public disclosure.
First, with respect to enforceability of claims against a NPO, legal experts say 
that generally the equivalent of a chief prosecutor (procureur general) as representative 
of the French state pursues criminal actions. The important similarity with the US 
system described in Section 3.1 is the fact that donors would not directly pursue action 
against a NPO (e.g. for fraud or other violation of accountability regulations) (Berthet, 
Frotiee, and Chartier teleconference 2008; Joly e-mail 2008). Therefore, with respect to 
the enforcement considerations relevant to Hansmann’s nondistribution constraint the 
French system reflects similar processes.
More specifically, there are three primary accountability regulations: audited 
accounts; financial statements; and the Statement of Use of Funds (counted within the
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1 87financial statements but of such significance recently that addressed separately here). 
Table 3-1 sets out a comparison of the most significant US and French regulations 
relating to these requirements and other VAMs.
,87See French Government 2005, Articles 5 and 7; French Government 2005, Article 8; and French 
Government 1991a, Article 4, respectively (all explored as relevant in this chapter).
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Table 3-1
Regulatory Requirements and Comite Requirements Relating to Key VAMs:
US and France
VAMs RegulationsUS France
Independent Directors 
Financial / Accounting Expert 
Directors
• State Law (derived from 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act)
• Independent Sector
• Not legally required
• Not required by the Comity
Audit Committee (US-style)1 • State Law (derived from 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act)2
• Independent Sector
• Not legally required
• Not required by the Comity
• Most common practice is 
some form of finance 
committee
Whistleblower Mechanism • Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(applicable directly to 
NPOs)
• Independent Sector3
• Not legally required
• Permitted only in 
compliance with Data 
Protection Act4
Conflict of Interest Policy 
(financial and non-financial)
• Written
• Unwritten
• Form9905
• Independent Sector 
Checklist
• Only financial conflicts of 
interest
• Comity requirements6
Financial Statements:
• Balance Sheet
• Statement of Use of Funds
• Income Statement
• Annual Report of Activities
• Form 990 (publicly 
available on-line)
• Independent Sector
• Required: a 4-part financial 
statement package certified 
by commissaires aux 
comptes (filed with 
authorities but not widely 
publicly available)7
Disclosure of Senior Executive 
Compensation
• Form 990
• Independent Sector
• Legally required (top 3 
salaries in aggregate)
• Required by Comity (top 5 
salaries in aggregate)
Document Retention Policy • Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(applicable directly to 
NPOs)
• Required but through non­
accountability regulation8
Code of Ethics • Independent Sector • Not legally required
• Comity has Charter 
applicable to members9
Source: Author’s research and specific sources noted in footnotes.
1 C l o s e l y  r e s e m b l i n g  U S - s t y l e  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  p r a c t i c e  w i t h  i n d e p e n d e n t  administrateurs.
2 E . g .  C N I A  ( C a l i f o r n i a  S t a t e  S e n a t e  2 0 0 4 ,  S e c t i o n  1 2 5 8 6 ( e ) ( 2 ) ) .
3 T h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  f r o m  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  S e c t o r  A c c o u n t a b i l i t y  C h e c k l i s t  ( A C )  a n d  C h e c k l i s t  f o r  C h a r i t i e s  
( C F C )  ( b a s e d  o n  t h e  S a r b a n e s - O x l e y  A c t )  r e l a t e  t o  t h e  V A M s  c i t e d :  w h i s t l e b l o w e r  ( A C  N o .  8  a n d  C F C  N o .  6 ) ;  C o d e  
o f  E t h i c s  ( A C  N o . 2 ) ;  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  ( A C  N o . 5 ) ;  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  ( A C  N o .  5  a n d  C F C  N o .  3 ) ;  c o n f l i c t  o f  
i n t e r e s t  p o l i c y  ( A C  N o .  3  &  C F C  N o . l ) ;  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  ( A C  N o .  3  a n d  C F C  N o .  1 ) ;  a n d  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  e x e c u t i v e  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  ( A C  N o .  6  a n d  C F C  N o . 5 ) .
4 S e e  S e c t i o n  4 . 2 . 1  “  Whistleblower Mechanism”  o n  c u l t u r a l  a n d  l e g a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  w h i s t l e b l o w e r  m e c h a n i s m s  i n  
F r a n c e .
5 R e f e r e n c e s  t o  F o r m  9 9 0  a r e  t o  t h e  2 0 0 7  v e r s i o n  c u r r e n t l y  i n  e f f e c t .  A p p l i c a b l e  p r o v i s i o n s  i n c l u d e  P a r t s  V - A ;  P a r t s  I ,  
I I ,  I V ,  a n d  V I I .  T h e  r e v i s e d  d r a f t  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  e x t e n d s  g o v e r n a n c e  d i s c l o s u r e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  ( U S G D T I R S  
2 0 0 8 a ,  P a r t  V I ) .
6 C o m i t y  2 0 0 8 a .
7 F r e n c h  G o v e r n m e n t  2 0 0 5 ,  A r t i c l e s  5  a n d  7 ;  C o n s e i l  N a t i o n a l  d e  l a  C o m p t a b i l i t e  2 0 0 8 .
8 C h a r t i e r  a n d  F r o t i e e  t e l e c o n f e r e n c e  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 8 .
9 C o m i t S  r e q u i r e m e n t s  m a y  b e  f o u n d  a s  f o l l o w s :  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t  p o l i c y  ( C o m i t d  2 0 0 8 a ) ;  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
( C o m i t y  2 0 0 6 a ,  S e c t i o n  I V  a n d  C o m i t y  2 0 0 8 a ) ;  a n d  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  s a l a r i e s  ( C o m i t 6  2 0 0 8 a ) .
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The first key requirement is appointment of independent auditors (commissaires
aux comptes) for all associations and foundations in excess of €153,000 in donor
revenue (French Government 1987, Article 4-1; French Government 2006b, Articles 1
and 2; French Government 2005, Article 5, Paragraph II). The primary purposes of the
audit requirement are to verify the accounting documents, to compare the practices with
applicable accounting regulation, and to certify that the accounts give a valid portrait of
the financial reality (Durand call 2007). Under French law, commissaires awe comptes
are not simply certified accountants but rather also have obligations to report wrong-
188doing or non-complying accounts to specified state-appointed authorities.
Second, as noted in Table 3-1, financial statements are required. Overall, the 
financial statements themselves approach US standards except with respect to isolated 
issues (e.g. disclosure of aggregate versus individual management compensation). 
However, most significantly NPOs are only required to file financial statements with the 
local administrative office and not in most cases to make them publicly available as in 
the US through the Form 990 system (French Government 2005, Article 8).
Third, the Statement of Use of Funds (subject to review by the commissaires aux 
comptes) offers more specific transparency to donors regarding the use of their gift (i.e., 
sources and uses of revenue from the general public). Recently the Conseil National de 
la Comptabilite (national accounting authority) implemented requirements to delineate 
all revenue from fund-raising from the public linked to the financial statements (Conseil 
National de la Comptabilite 2008). The Comite disagrees with recent changes to the 
regulation requiring publication of certain ratios (e.g. operating expenses to revenue) on 
the grounds that different sectors are not comparable (Comite senior management 
call/interview 2008). These are addressed in subsequent discussions as relevant.
Fourth, it is expected that a decree will be issued within several months of the 
date of this thesis requiring NPOs to publish basic financial information in the Journal 
Officiel, the official publication of laws and regulations in France. Soublin believes that 
donors will not consult the Journal Officiel (as they might, for example, a NPO’s web 
site). However, Soublin speculates that various intermediaries such as the media or 
rating agencies might (Soublin call December 2008). Moreover, the financial 
information is limited and unexplained (i.e., numbers without verbal commentary
188 The Comit£ reinforces independence at the level of review of on-going compliance with Comitd 
requirements by prohibiting a censeur from acting as commissaire aux comptes and censeur for the same 
organisation (Comite 2008o, Part I Section 1.3).
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1 8Qexplaining issues not obvious from the accounts). Until the decree is published the 
value of the requirements for improving accountability (particularly transparency) 
remains unclear.
The most important regulatory differences with the US and weaknesses in the 
French system relate to mechanisms for independent oversight of accountability and 
accessibility of accountability-related information noted above. There is no legal or 
Comite obligation to have a US-style audit committee, whistleblower mechanism, 
document retention policy, or independent or financial/accounting expert 
administrateurs. Among the organisations that have some version of a 
finance/audit/investment committee there is wide variety in responsibility and skill set 
of the participants and quality and focus of such committee (Chartier and Frotiee 
teleconference January 2008). In rare cases, organisations’ statuts do exceed the 
regulation and provide for independent directors and/or a US-style audit committee 
(Organisation 11).
Empirical Findings: Confusion and Criticism Surrounding French
Accountability Regulation.190 The French accountability regulation generates significant 
confusion and criticism. A range of issues, including the source of the regulation, the 
relationship with government, the amount of regulation, and criticisms of efficacy and 
enforcement, plague the system. Evidence to be presented indicates that respondents do 
not perceive accountability regulation as an important influence on the strategic 
assessment of individual organisations. Within this overriding conclusion, respondents 
from both the Comite Group and the Control Group commented on specific aspects of 
the regulatory environment most important to their organisations. These comments 
collectively contribute to an overall qualitative panorama but are not intended to imply 
that only a small number agree with each of the various elements as interview time did 
not permit all respondents to comment on all details.
First, unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Internal Revenue Service Form 
990, the sources of the French regulations are often unclear. 16 (36%) respondents (14 
(42%) Comite Group and two (17%) Control Group) harshly criticised the range of 
sources from the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of the Economy, the Minister of 
Foreign and European Affairs, and the local authorities, as well as 1’IGAS, the Cour des
189 See Section 8.4 for a recommendation to the Comity regarding requiring verbal explanations of 
accounts.
190 See 5.3.3 for a related discussion of duplication of requirements for French state funding.
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comptes, and other authorities, resulting in a lack of understanding of the overall 
regulatory framework and objectives (Organisations 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 14, 17, 19, 21 (“no 
one understands the various layers”), 23, 28, 30, 32, A, and B).191 12 (27%) respondents 
(nine (28%) Comite Group and three (25%) Control Group) criticised overlap among 
various accountability regulatory requirements, as did Professor Edith Archambault and 
Soublin (Organisations 7, 11, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 33, A, D, and E; Archambault 
discussion 2008; Soublin call December 2008, respectively). Three respondents 
specifically noted the absence of one publication outlining all of the applicable laws and 
regulations (Organisations 7, 25, and 27). Moreover, three of the most well-known and 
heavily regulated organisations commented on “not seeing” the regulation -  meaning 
that they did not see the accountability regulation in the morass of rules and regulatory 
“holes” between the nonprofit and commercial sectors (Organisations 25, 33, and G).
In addition, the relationship with government authorities is inconsistent. Prior to 
President Sarkozy, there was a Ministry of Youth, Sports and Associative Life 
(Ministere de la Jeunesse, des Sports, et de la Vie Associative) and a Ministry of Health 
(Ministere de la Sante). The Sarkozy government combined these into Health, Youth, 
Sports and Associative Life (Ministere de la Sante, de la Jeunesse, des Sports et de la 
Vie Associative 2008a). In addition, the Ministry of the Interior (Ministere de 
rinterieur) has an office regrouping associations and foundations, for example the 
ARUP/FRUP status. Comite management also observes confusion at the state level with 
respect to structure as ministries change titles (Comite senior management 
call/interview 2007). In addition, eight respondents criticised both the failure of the state 
to consult sector experts prior to legislating and the legislators’ lack of experience and 
“poor knowledge” of the sector (Organisations 4, 11, 17, 32, A, E, and G, and 
Organisation 30). Seven respondents (two Comite Group and two Control Group) also 
complained specifically of government legislation without follow-up evaluation 
(Organisations 2 and 30 (citing poor process and follow-up with the Foreign Affairs 
Commission Report of February 2007 and the Cour des comptes reports on the tsunami, 
respectively); Organisations 4, 11 (“young parliamentarians run off and declare 
accountability insufficient”), 31, A, and I). Two renowned respondents seeking 
feedback from the Ministry of the Interior (in one case a voluntary external audit) report 
lack of responsiveness for accountability-related requests (Organisations 32 and B).
191 Almost every respondent indicated less directly the problem of lack of understanding on the part of 
regulatory authorities and among organisations.
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While the Foreign Affairs Commission Report of February 2007 assessing the tsunami 
indicates the need to listen to the organisations, no respondents had experienced this 
new attitude (National Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission 2007, 37).
Second, as a general matter, respondents believe that there is a significant 
amount of regulation and that increasing the amount of regulation would not improve 
accountability. 14 (64%) Comite Group and four (34%) Control Group respondents 
from a broad range of sector, size, level of international engagement, and initiative and 
profile of leader emphatically summarised that there are “enough” regulations -  even 
those agreeing that regulation is important (Organisations 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, D, F, G, and H). (This compares to only seven that could imagine 
a need for more regulation (Organisations 1, 7, 22, 25, 31, B, and E).) Twelve 
respondents felt they were “crumbling” under the various regulations and controls, 
particularly the large organisations subject to Cour des comptes and FIG AS review as 
well (Organisations 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 24, 25, 31, 33, A, C and D). One insisted that the 
French state is everywhere but “getting it wrong” (Organisation A). No respondent in 
either group believed that the French state was “getting it right.” Two summarised, “The 
less I see of the French state the better I feel,” and “if we are stricter [with regulation] 
we die” (Organisations 17 and 4, respectively). While no one mentioned specific 
regulation, at least five expressed exasperation that French NPOs are “getting to a stage 
of more regulation than listed companies” and that the trend continues (Organisations 
15 and Organisations 11, 23, 27, and 33, respectively). A small Control Group 
organisation and expert commissaires aux comptes both urged a “big house cleaning” 
and improved regulatory coherence (Organisation E; Chartier and Frotiee 
teleconference January 2008).
Third, a range of respondents from both groups and Comite management felt 
that the regulation is poorly adapted to the needs of the sector and protection against 
failure of accountability. Soublin considers that regulation is “not at all well-suited to 
the [French] nonprofit sector requirements and issues” -  and needs to improve rather 
than increase (Soublin interview 2007; Organisations 25, 30, and B). 14 (42%) Comite 
Group and three (25%) Control Group organisations criticised the pertinence and 
efficacy of the regulations (Organisations 3, 4, 5, 8, 20, 21, 22, 23 (“empty 
administration...formulaic”), 28 (“no notion of efficacy”), 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 (“heavy 
and useless”), A, D, and E). The failure to target key areas (e.g. the “fake” associations 
that are de facto extensions of state agencies) is also criticised (Organisation 22; Comite
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1QOsenior management call 2008). The disparate architecture of the regulation noted 
above (i.e., occasional additions to address isolated issues as deemed necessary) results 
in “confusion and duplication” (Organisation 23).
Fourth, respondents also expressed concern with the relationship between the 
number of 1901 Law associations and the efficacy of accountability regulation. In 
particular, the failure of regulation to target fund-raising organisations (treating 
“football players and fund-raisers the same way”) and the relationship between freedom 
of association and the imposition of accountability measures surfaced as key concerns 
(Organisation 22; Organisations 6, 7, 11, 21, 22, 25, 30, 33, A, B, D, E, and H; 
Organisations 32 and E, respectively; Soublin and Cohas-Bogey interviews 2007). The 
unwieldy number and variety of 1901 Law associations from the standpoint of 
accountability oversight exacerbates the issue, but the “huge melting pot” problem also
1 Q -J
applies to fund-raising foundations (Organisation 21). Soublin suggests that the 
diversity of NPOs that the freedom of association has engendered may necessitate 
greater diversity in the types of controls (Soublin 2007, 245; Tchemonog 2007b, 5.)
Eleven respondents (three (9%) Comite Group and two (17%) Control Group) 
spontaneously cited the multitude of small associations as the key obstacle to French 
nonprofit sector progress, including the lack of accountability controls (Organisations 5, 
7, 9, 21, 22, 26, 29, 32, 33, I, and E).194 Approximately 80% of respondents in both 
groups mentioned more generally the link between poor accountability oversight and 
the excessively broad 1901 Law coverage. Seven respondents specifically cited the 
uncontrollable mix and number of associations as the most important factor in delaying 
French nonprofit sector success (Organisations 6, 9, 25, 29 (“hard to estimate the huge 
lag in the sector behind other countries because of the uncontrollable quagmire of 
associations”), 30, B, and I). Given the high percentage of sports, cultural, and social 
associations (approximately 60% of the total 1.1 million), the separation of these from 
humanitarian and social service NPOs alone might better focus regulatory authorities on 
the NPOs most in need of accountability oversight, allocating resources related to 
accountability measures effectively, and educating the giving public (Tchemonog 
2007b, 33).
192 See Section 2.3.2.
193 See Section 1.3.1 “Associations and Associative Sector.”
194 Note that this number includes only respondents affirmatively emphasising the issue of smaller 
organisations. All respondents indirectly addressed the importance of size during the interviews.
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While these numbers may appear limited, they must be interpreted among the 
array of other comments. Most importantly, respondents noted the failure to apply 
regulation given the number of associations, the lack of oversight of member-elected 
administrateurs (further developed in Section 4.2.1), and the greater potential for 
contagious scandal with so many NPOs in such an opaque, poorly regulated 
environment (as exemplified by the small, recently founded Zoe’s Ark relatively 
unknown pre-scandal) (Organisations 6 and 9; Organisations 20 and B; Organisation I, 
respectively). Soublin believes that the number of associations affects accountability, 
but as part of a mixture of reasons, including especially the welfare state environment 
(Soublin interview 2007). Finally, the lack of comparable and publicly available Form 
990 type of disclosure exacerbates confusion and misinformation for the public and 
donors. Respondents feel that regulation does not adequately consider size, resulting in 
impossibility of uniform application and unfair regulatory constraints (Organisations 5, 
7 (“danger” of unregulated small associations), 9 (“total confusion for the public”), 21, 
22,32,33, and E).195
Fifth, uneven compliance and enforcement persists (Organisations 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 
11, 28, and 33; Soublin and Cohas-Bogey interviews 2007). The state is criticised for 
lacking the resources and interest in evaluating programs, particularly outside of France 
(Organisations 5, 11, 28, and B; Perouse de Montclos 2005, 613). The Cour des 
comptes does not have the time or resources to control more than a few organisations 
per year and controls only the largest organisations (Leo Jegard & Associes Conference 
2008; Durand call 2007). Other than in exceptional investigations such as the tsunami, 
this generally means a Cour des comptes audit every six to eight years, according to 
Philippe Durand, a tax partner/commissaire aux comptes at Landwell & 
Associes/PricewaterhouseCoopers Paris and Fondation de France board and audit 
committee member (Perouse de Montclos 2005, 613; Durand call 2007; Leo Jegard & 
Associes Conference 2008).196 The Comite recently rejected four potentially eligible 
organisations’ membership applications due to failure to comply with the most basic 
legally mandated commissaires aux comptes audit requirements that remained 
undetected by the regulatory authorities for years (Comite senior management
195 See Sections 4.4.1 and 5.4.1 on the importance of organisational size. See Section 3.1.1 for an example 
of a US law linking regulatory requirements to organisational size: the CNLA. (California State Senate 
2004, Sections 12586 (e)(1) and (e)(2)). Compare the US Form 990 sliding scale approach.
196 The resource issue occurs in the US and UK as well (Howell e-mail 2009).
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107  • •calls/interviews October 2007 and 2008). The Comite and four organisations 
complain that reports submitted relating to state subsidies often go unread
1 0 R(Organisations 19, 28, 32, and I). No respondents spontaneously mentioned useful 
feedback from the French state. Even the rarely granted public utility (“RUP”) status is 
infrequently sanctioned.199
Sixth, the interviews revealed that the details of the regulation are less important 
than this overwhelming sense of onerous but unclear regulation that does not inspire 
self-regulatory or voluntary accountability efforts. No respondents cited regulatory 
requirements as a rationale for increasing accountability within their own organisations 
or across the sector, even when prodded in the interviews and even if de facto 
organisations do implement accountability improvements in compliance with 
regulation. Nor is regulation believed to increase trust. Thus while regulation is 
perceived as burdensome and increasing (e.g. recent additions to the Statement of Use 
of Funds law), respondents do not link regulation to their own accountability efforts.200
Finally, no respondents discussed a link between regulatory initiatives and 
protection against scandal as is so pervasive in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act literature and 
discussion (e.g. Romano 2005, 2). There was no sweeping, directly linked and publicly
701clear regulatory response to PARC or FARC-type scandals. The Cour des comptes 
involvement in FARC was criticised as late and insufficiently thorough to mitigate
707damage to other organisations and the sector generally (Organisations 2, 4, and B). 
Even the tsunami reports, although significantly more thorough and the focus of 
considerable French nonprofit sector attention, had mixed reviews among respondents 
with respect to longer-term utility as there has been little follow-up after publication 
(Organisations 2, 30, and B especially critical). Still, experts suggest that the judicial,
197 The Comity rejected two others on failure to meet eligibility requirements in 2008 as well (Cohas- 
Bogey e-mails September 1,2008).
198 Note that a limited number of respondents link funder accountability requirements (as defined in 
Chapter 5 Introduction) with accountability, so a total of four is a significant sample within this group.
199 As of December 2008, there were 1,967 ARUPs and 556 FRUPs (Lottier e-mail 2009). See also 
Minist£re de l'lnt&ieur 2008; La revue Associations 2008. Since 2000, only 89 ARUPs and 11 FRUPs 
have lost the public utility status as the Ministdre de l’Int6rieur has insufficiently applied the limited 
sanction procedures, for example to ARUPs no longer active (Ministdre de la Sant6, de la Jeunesse, des 
Sports et de la Vie Associative 2008b, 26; Pdrouse de Montclos 2005, 613; Lottier e-mail 2009). See 
Section 8.2.3 for policy recommendations on universal disclosure.
200 See “Relationship Between Accountability and Self-Regulatory Initiatives” below in this Section.
201 There were calls for French state control of public money because PARC (like other charitable 
organisations) benefited from the French state-granted tax deductions, reinforcing the French state’s 
position as the top donor in France through the tax system (e.g. Coquidd (L’Expansion) 1996; 
Organisation 31).
202 See Section 7.2.1.
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financial, and image-related impact any Cour des comptes report can be felt within the 
organisation(s) controlled and more generally across the sector (Durand call 2007; 
Berthet call 2008).203
As a result of this perception of ineffective regulation, the balance of sources of 
increasing accountability remains heavily weighted toward organisation up initiatives in 
terms of the respondents’ priorities and views of the source of the most effective, 
innovative accountability mechanisms. The regulatory discussion was, in every case, 
short and not an area of interest even to respondents accepting onerous regulation as 
necessary. This contrasts greatly with the enthusiastic and lengthy discussions of 
organisations’ own voluntary accountability initiatives, interest in learning more about 
various topics from the author/interviewer, and, in the case of Comite Group 
respondents, supporting the Comite requirements as useful. This also contrasts with the 
strong US regulatory framework and the significant top down influence on self- 
regulatory and voluntary accountability efforts. French accountability regulation has 
become background, present as part of “/ 'air du temps” but not a direct influence on the 
strategic assessment of accountability.204
Relationship Between Accountability Regulation and Self-Resulatorv Initiatives 
(including the Comite). In general, there was only anecdotal and moderate enthusiasm 
for industry-wide self-regulatory initiatives such as Independent Sector and Board 
Source in the US (Organisations 1 and D). No respondents in either group mentioned 
self-regulation spontaneously 205 According to respondents, the Comite remains the 
most important self-regulatory initiative, although with the noted limitations in member 
organisations and scope of activities.206 There has not been a sector-wide standard- 
setting, lobbying or other such group (Soublin call January 2007). Only four 
respondents mentioned the need to increase self-regulation to be good “sector citizens” 
for moral and strategic reasons (Organisations 5, 20, B, and D).
The lack of interest in sector-wide self-regulation may reflect the likelihood that 
regulation perceived as extensive, confusing, and ineffective also trickles down weakly 
beyond mandatory application -  whether due to the disorganisation and lack of
203 See also Section 5.3.3.
204 See Section 5.1 “Normal Practice” on “normal” practice.
205 Four Comity Group and five Control Group respondents affirmatively spoke out as “against” self- 
regulatory efforts, one identifying notaries (notaires) as an example of failed self-regulation 
(Organisations 4, 26, 27, 31, B C, G, K, and L). Three respondents said self-regulatory efforts were “ok” 
but not at the expense of French state controls or the Comitd (Organisations H, J, and L).
206 See e.g. Section 6.4.2.
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comprehension, the “enough is enough” factor, or both. This absence of middle level of 
self-regulation/educative organisation contributes to the organisation upward dynamic. 
There was no evidence of self-regulatory recommendations based on aspects of the 
regulation that did not technically apply in certain cases. For example, there were no 
sector-wide best practice dictates for voluntary compliance with the commissaires aux
707comptes audit for smaller organisations not technically subject to the requirement. 
This contrasts with the reaction in the US from such sector leaders as Independent 
Sector to advocate voluntary adoption of certain corporate mechanisms on an 
organisation-appropriate basis in order to achieve a “balanced system of law and self- 
governance” and to deter government initiatives to expand regulation (e.g. the audit 
committee and audited financial statements) (Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007, 
Preamble and Introductory Letter, 3, 11; US Government 2002, Section 302, 
respectively). Only two respondents noted the importance of self-regulatory efforts as a 
defensive strategy to forestall additional regulation echoing the Independent Sector 
policy, one publicly post-Zoe’s Ark (Organisations 3 and 11)
Nine Comite Group respondents raised the issue of the Comite adopting a more 
formal government-backed (but still self-regulatory) certification process that had been 
discussed internally at the Comite (Organisations 1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 14, 20, 23, and 32).208 
Such certification would require governmental approval and function like some of the 
commercial competitors in the quality control business such as Bureau Veritas Quality 
International, AFNOR, and, although somewhat different, the ISO system (AFNOR 
Groupe 2008; Bureau Veritas Quality International 2008; ISO 2008, respectively). 
Almost all felt the Comite lacks the resources to compete effectively and/or has 
sufficient challenge with current objectives in France.209
Approximately four Comite Group respondents suggested that the Comite focus 
on a rapprochement with the state, while a few repeated the “further away from 
government they were the better” mantra noted above (Organisations 1, 2, 5, and 25; 
Organisations 17 and 21, respectively). Government links could include: formal 
recognition of the Comite as part of the group of control agencies; government
207 However, commissaires aux comptes from Landwell & Associds/PricewaterhouseCoopers Paris 
reported recently increasing requests for non-mandatory audits themselves and across the profession 
(Chartier and Frottee teleconference January 2008).
208 “Government-backed” refers to official government approval of the Comity as a national certification 
organisation but does not imply government involvement in the Comity’s activities (Soublin interview 
2007).
209 See also Section 6.3.1.
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representation on the Comite conseil d ‘administration', joint efforts with the Cour des 
comptes; or recognition by the tax authorities in the form of the higher tax deduction on 
gifts to nonprofit organisations (75%) for Comite members (Organisations 5, 1,2,  and
9 i  n25, respectively). The disadvantages would include potential infringement on 
independence and the administrative inefficiency.
3.2.2 French Regulatory Framework: Tax System and Increasing
Accountability
The French tax system, particularly as compared to the US tax system, also 
offers perspective on the rationales for increasing accountability and the organisations’ 
perspective on donor trust. As a regulatory matter, the tax system does not contribute to 
accountability to donors or the public. In practice, no respondents felt that the tax 
system affected their strategic assessment of accountability directly or even indirectly 
via impact on donors through improvements in the tax deduction system.
Most generally, unlike the Internal Revenue Service “gatekeeper” function and 
on-going reporting system in the US that are heavily focused on accountability and play 
a pivotal role in ensuring financial transparency and implementation of VAMs, France 
does not have an entity like the Internal Revenue Service that pre-clears charitable tax- 
exempt status based on activities and accountability requirements (Perouse de Montclos 
2005, 613; confidential government interview 2006). Moreover, the tax system does 
not include disclosure requirements or requirements to make publicly available
919documents required under other regulations (e.g. USGDTIRS 2008a). Therefore, 
France has no publicly available access to information about NPOs and their 
accountability systems -  other than the occasional, non-systematic, non-objective, and
91*3
less comparable media coverage. The Comite does not publish data on individual 
member organisations to compensate for this regulatory weakness in assuring public
210 This would match the higher level deduction for limited categories of NPOs, compared to 66% for the 
majority. See Section 3.2.2.
211 The author interviewed in person in 2007 two senior representatives of one of the key ministries. 
However, the conditions of the interview required confidentiality of the name of the ministries and 
interviewees.
212 UK regulations also require registration to obtain charity status (including “charitable purpose” 
requirement) (United Kingdom Government 2006, Part 2, Chapter 3 -  Paragraph 9, Section 3A and Part 
1, Sections 1 and 2, respectively).
213 Moreover, the French law and Comity’s disclosure requirements are less onerous, for example with 
respect to disclosure of financial and non-financial compensation of senior management and unusual 
financial transactions such as foreign transfers of funds (Comitd 2006a and 2006c).
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access to information because a number of Comite members specifically wished to 
avoid the comparability (Comite senior management calls/interviews 2006 and 2007). 
The extent to which organisation-specific strategic assessment of accountability 
includes benefits of publicising accountability-related information to the public 
(guaranteed by the US top down approach) remains variable.214
Three aspects of the tax deductibility of gifts to NPOs provide context against 
which organisations consider the relevance of accountability to donor priorities and 
more generally. All relate to the welfare state. All also show that while deductibility 
opportunities have evolved to improve attractiveness of giving to NPOs, the tax system 
still does not address accountability to donors or more generally (as does the Form 990 
in the US). The high level of social security contribution (SSC) (defined as “actual or 
imputed payments to social insurance schemes to make provision for social insurance 
benefits to be paid”), the permitted level of deductions for donations to NPOs, and the 
so-called “wealth tax” of a fixed percentage of worldwide assets (impot sur la fortune) 
are the most relevant factors (Clegg e-mail 2008; OECD 2001).
First, overall tax rate overrides even tax deductions on donations, particularly in 
a welfare state country with high SSCs such as France. One recent UK Charities Aid 
Foundation report concludes that SSC as a percentage of labour costs was found to be 
inversely proportional to giving (and even more important than income tax levels) as the 
following figures support: France SSC of 9.6% for 0.14% GDP of giving, compared to 
UK SSC of 8.2% for 0.73% GDP of giving and US SSC of 7.3% for 1.67% GDP of 
giving (Charities Aid Foundation 2006, 2, 6, 8, and 9). Only three respondents 
mentioned high personal tax rates specifically (Organisations 2, 18, and 26). However, 
this number does not reflect the broader views in the sector (as expressed through the 
interviews with experts) and may be the result of a number of respondents’ belief that 
the tax system is not a priority beyond perhaps the level of deduction (Berthet call 2008; 
Durand call 2007).215
Second, the tax system does not address accountability or protection of donors 
through disclosure. Recent improvements in tax deductibility of gifts since 2003 are not
214 See Section 8.2.3 for related policy recommendations.
215 This is due to a range of reasons, including the belief that Americans pay more attention to taxes than 
the French when giving (Organisation 4), lack of in-depth understanding of the tax system, and the belief 
that it is impossible to measure the impact of the tax system. See Note 216, infra.
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91  f\motivated by, or otherwise related to, accountability. The deduction of 66% of gifts 
to NPOs up to a maximum of 20% of taxable income was reconfirmed in August 2007, 
along with the higher 75% deduction for certain NPOs providing food and shelter to the 
needy (Fondation de France 2005, 2; French Government 2008a, Article 200, Section
9171(g)Iter). No respondents in either group or the experts consulted connected 
accountability efforts to the improved tax deduction scheme -  either as an impetus for 
the improvement in the tax system or, conversely, as positively affected by tax changes. 
Moreover, the process of obtaining tax deductions does not involve the kind of public, 
thorough disclosure of accountability practices like the Form 990. Rather, donors to 
eligible NPOs (i.e., officially recognised as of public utility or for the general public 
interest) obtain tax receipts (regus fiscaux) from the organisation upon making a gift. 
Donors then send the receipts on to the tax authorities and wait for approval to claim the 
deduction (French Government 2008a, Article 200, Sections 1 and 5; Berthet call 2008). 
This exclusively a posteriori process of obtaining tax deductions both fails to improve 
accountability and exacerbates the concerns relating to smaller NPOs because they are 
less likely to be known by tax authorities assessing the donor receipts for eligibility 
(Berthet call 2008).
Finally, most recently in 2007 the third key fiscal change -  a deduction from the 
wealth tax of 75% for gifts to FRUPs within a €50,000 annual limit -  demonstrates the 
absence of attention to accountability in the tax system (French Government 2007, 
Article 16, Section III. Article 885-0 V bis A; National Assembly 2007, Article 6).218 
The French state’s objective was to prioritise specified sectors to compensate for areas 
of state weakness or budget insufficiency (e.g. higher education, research, or projects 
involving reinsertion of individuals into the mainstream economy) by only granting the
216 19 Comit6 Group and six Control Group respondents and Comity management reported positive but 
unmeasured benefits to giving from improved tax deductions (Cohas-Bogey interview 2007). Five 
Comity Group and one Control Group respondents consider the improved deduction scheme irrelevant. 
Moreover, respondents widely noted that a significant percentage of donors do not pay taxes and 
therefore do not benefit from deductions (affecting particularly Comity Group and Control Group A 
respondents relying on a large number of small gifts) (Organisations 3, 5, and 22; Toullec 2007). See 
Appendix 6-A for a breakdown of donor profile (size of gift) among respondents.
217 This 75% exception to the general rate o f 66% is the so-called “Coluche Amendment” after the famed 
comedian’s Les Restos du Coeur’s (a Comity Group respondent) nationally adored program to distribute 
food to the hungry (www.loil901.com 1999). The previous law of January 1, 2006 allowed a 66% tax 
credit up to 20% of taxable income (French Government 2003; Fondation de France 2005, 1). See Section 
8.2.4 for policy recommendations relating to the wealth tax deduction. By comparison, US rates 
generally permit, with exceptions, deduction of charitable gifts from income tax up to 50% of adjusted 
gross income (as calculated according to the Internal Revenue Code) (USGDTIRS 2007d and 2007e).
218 A more detailed economic analysis that supports the argument of French state priorities being the 
deciding factor may be found in the report o f the General Assembly (National Assembly 2007).
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deduction to foundations allocating funds to those specific areas. This again reflects the 
welfare state influence on social service delivery without concern for rewarding 
accountability or even generally supporting the French nonprofit sector (Berthet call
91Q2008). As a result, the law excludes associations -  even ARUPs with the same high 
level of government pre-approval and on-going conseil d ’administration oversight as 
foundations (Organisation B; Teissier 2008; French Government 2007, Article 16, 
Section III. Article 885-0 V bis A).220
3.3 Relationship Between US and French Regulatory Environment and
Theoretical Framework
The juxtaposition of the US and French accountability regulatory and self- 
regulatory contexts provides a foundation for explaining the applicability of
Hansmann’s trust theory in the French nonprofit sector as a starting point for the 
research. The legal basis of the nondistribution constraint and mechanisms of
enforceability directly links theory and regulation (Hansmann 1980, 853). The US 
regulation also targets the “information asymmetry” problem within the trust theory. In 
addition, Salamon’s suggestion that in the current era accountability increasingly 
complements or replaces trust also underlies the analysis of the regulatory environment 
(Salamon 2003, 24).
To Hansmann, the state law structure functions like a “collective contract” 
through which the state Attorney General brings suit to enforce the nondistribution
991constraint on behalf of donors and potentially other stakeholders (1980, 853). 
Moreover, the severe limitations on the ability of donors legally to enforce the 
nondistribution constraint increases demand for trust. Suggestions of rules governing 
board composition, for example, foreshadow accountability mechanisms as a
complement to state law enforcement of the nondistribution constraint (also relevant in 
France) (e.g. Steinberg and Gray 1993, 302).222 As noted in Section 3.2.1, the
219 See Section 2.3.2.
220 See policy recommendation Section 8.2.4.
221 See Sections 2.1.2 and 3.1.1.
222 However, Steinberg and Gray cite Ben-Ner’s suggestion of patrons as board members could be 
interpreted as similar to the French association practice of electing members to the conseil 
d ’administration but does not support the currently emphasised independence of boards (Steinberg and 
Gray 1993, 302; Ben-Ner 1986, 110). See Section 4.2.1 “Independent Directors ”
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enforceability aspects of the nondistribution constraint find an equivalent in the French 
regulatory framework. Therefore, the question of “supply side” in France -  i.e., how 
organisations perceive and act through the strategic assessment process to increase 
accountability -  begins from similar assumptions and foundation with respect to the 
nondistribution constraint as Hansmann’s US-based theory (including enforceability). 
Moreover, a key question then becomes, as Hansmann notes, why organisations act as 
they do with respect to accountability given weaknesses in enforceability of the 
nondistribution constraint (Hansmann call 2008). Are they positioning themselves 
within this theoretical spectrum, or are there reasons unrelated to demand for trust?
Regulation also relates to the trust theory by requiring accountability measures 
to ensure trustworthiness. In particular, regulatory authorities have made the permission 
to fund-raise from the general public contingent on adopting a range of accountability 
mechanisms and respecting on-going reporting requirements and audits. Arguably the 
state is intervening to ensure that individual donors have a basis for trust, in particular 
financial transparency mitigating the information asymmetry.223 In other words, in the 
current era the state no longer considers the nonprofit form alone a sufficient basis for 
trust. The applicable provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as well as the related state 
law legislative extensions and the Form 990, all support trust of stakeholders in NPOs. 
In France, the financial statement regulations (particularly the Statement of Use of 
Funds) function similarly.
This regulatory analysis underlies Salamon’s focus on increasing pressure to 
prove accountability (including performance), particularly beginning in the post- 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act period.224 The suggestion that Hansmann’s trust theory is outdated 
establishes the spectrum from trust rooted in the nondistribution constraint to trust based 
on accountability (or both) to be unravelled in subsequent chapters. As seen in the 
examples in the first section of this chapter (e.g. the Red Cross and Sarbanes Oxley Act 
focus on trust), in the US trust remains an important focus even within an environment 
increasingly focused on accountability regulation and best practice.
223 Steinberg and Gray emphasise the utility of the nondistribution constraint concept notwithstanding the 
impossibility of “easy remedies to the problem of asymmetrical information” (1993, 302).
224 The United Way’s performance evaluation methods exemplify this trend (2008b).
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter established the heavily regulatory, top down US accountability 
environment as a benchmark and key gaps in the French regulatory and tax framework 
in comparison In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and related state law, self- 
regulatory, and voluntary best practice derivations reflect an emphasis on the 
relationship between accountability and trust. However, the French accountability 
regulatory requirements lag behind the US, particularly with respect to independent 
oversight. Moreover, French tax regulation does not address accountability matters.
The empirical findings highlighted the limited importance to respondents in both 
groups of the regulatory external variables to the strategic assessment of accountability. 
This is the first stage of the conclusion of bottom up, as opposed to top down, 
accountability in France. Neither accountability regulation -  widely viewed as sufficient 
in terms of amount but inefficient, ineffective, poorly adapted, and poorly enforced -  
nor tax regulation influenced respondents’ strategic assessment in either respondent 
group. The common response levels between the two respondent groups will follow 
through much of the key findings from the empirical analysis to come.
Finally, the theoretical analysis confirmed the relevance of Hansmann’s theory 
as a basis for the research in France, in particular the similar approach to enforcing the 
French equivalent of the nondistribution constraint. The chapter also established the 
theoretical basis for the Hansmann-Salamon trust spectrum that underlies the analysis in 
subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 extends this first part of the empirical panorama of how 
accountability is increasing and the theoretical implications with a more detailed 
overview of respondents’ views of increasing accountability within individual 
organisations, across the sector more broadly, and within the Comite.
225 See Section 5.3.1.
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Chapter 4 
L ’Air du Temps 
Increasing Accountability Is in the A ir
“There is some link [of accountability] to outside funding but no pressure...mostly just staying 
with the times” [author translation] (Organisation H).
“There has been a serious evolution in accountability and controls in recent years [in 
Organisation 11], including a complete reorganisation of information and risk analysis systems and the 
addition of finance and compensation committees. The main reason is to ‘follow the world”’ [author 
translation] (Organisation 11).
One World Trust recognizes that “...a one-size-fits-all approach to accountability is not 
possible” (Blagescu, de Las Casas et al. 2007, 8).
Introduction
This chapter examines the empirical basis for the assumption of increasing 
accountability that underlies the research question and trust hypothesis. It draws on the 
findings from the interviews to demonstrate the individual, organisation outward 
strategic assessment of accountability that leads to increasing accountability. This 
strategic assessment process underlies the empirical analysis of why accountability is 
increasing, including the relevance of the trust hypothesis, and/or other explanations 
unrelated to a demand for trust, in subsequent chapters.
The research revealed evidence of continually increasing accountability within 
the sample of French organisations interviewed and concerning respondents’ perception 
of the French nonprofit sector. Nonetheless, as the evidence will show, overall the level 
of accountability among respondent organisations and across respondents’ perceptions 
of the sector still lags behind the US in many respects. The over-arching trend reflects 
an effort on the part of organisations to assess and promote accountability mechanisms 
individually from the inside out that contrasts with the US heavily regulated top down 
approach (Brody 2002, 475). Specific VAMs are explored to provide a more nuanced 
view of weaknesses in organisations’ accountability and respondents’ reasoning with 
respect to larger issues the individual VAMs raise. The most significant overarching 
gaps concern the lack of independent oversight of accountability matters by the conseil
226 Revised in accordance with comments from Howell (e-mail 2009).
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d ’administration and the limited accessibility of accountability-related information to 
the public already evident in the regulatory analysis in Chapter 3.
The analysis of the empirical findings supports the argument of inside out 
increasing accountability from two perspectives. First, the interviewees’ own 
perspective and perception of their organisations’ perspective confirm individual 
approaches to increasing interest in accountability and accountability efforts across both 
the Comite Group and the Control Group. Second, notwithstanding respondents’ 
recognition of sector-wide accountability “in the air” (/ 'air du temps), the extent to 
which the highest levels of accountability mechanisms appear on an organisation by 
organisation basis also shows this “air” emerging largely from individually internally- 
driven efforts. Thus the most relevant “air” reflects the collective effect of individual 
accountability efforts more than an external, universally applicable phenomenon -  
particularly compared to the US with the much more extensive and widely applied 
regulation, self-regulation, and best practices.
The analysis of the most sophisticated voluntary accountability mechanisms
provides further evidence of individual priorities within both respondent groups and
0 0 0organisation-driven energy to aim for the highest standards of accountability. Key 
areas assessed include the relationship to US best practice, priorities for the future 
implementation of VAMs, and individual accountability mechanisms that exceed 
regulation, the Comite requirements, and the defined set of VAMs.
Finally, the chapter links the empirical findings of increasing accountability to 
the trust theoretical framework. Rose-Ackerman’s positioning of strategic assessment as 
the process for determining the appropriate level of “signals” of trustworthiness proves 
relevant to organisational decision-making in both US and French contexts despite the 
systemic and cultural differences. The internal variables relate to the strategic 
assessment of accountability and Hansmann’s trust theory. At this stage organisational 
size and initiative and profile of leader prove most relevant, while international 
engagement is most important to the discussion of ethical, effective management in 
Chapter 5. As noted in Chapter 3, the external regulatory variables -  accountability 
regulation and the tax system -  prove a much less important direct influence on 
respondents’ strategic assessment of accountability.
227 External controls the French state and other governmental agencies impose in their capacity as donors 
are addressed in the analysis of funder accountability requirements in Section 5.3.3.
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4.1 Respondents’ Perspective on Increasing Accountability: the Organisations.
the Sector, and the Comite
This section addresses how, and the extent to which, accountability is increasing 
as indicated by VAMs and other accountability mechanisms implemented, as well as 
those prioritised for future implementation and those implemented exceeding legal, 
Comite, and VAMs requirements. Respondents were asked to comment on whether and, 
if  so, why and how, there had been increasing accountability in their organisations in the 
past three to ten years. Respondents were reminded of the definition of accountability 
(as set out in Section 2.2.2), including various close French translations and examples of 
VAMs. In sum, overwhelmingly respondents in both groups describe increasing 
accountability as “in the air” -  internally within their own organisations and across the 
sector.
First, all respondents but one agreed that interest in accountability was without a 
doubt increasing within their organisations -  a “given” as one respondent summarized 
-  irrespective of organisation size, international engagement, initiative and profile of 
leader, or sector of activity (Organisation 1). There was consistent response type and 
levels between the Comite Group and the Control Group. Phrases such as “without 
question,” “no doubt,” “very heavy tendency...on everyone’s mind,” “ever since 
l’ARC,” “of course,” “highest priority,” a “serious evolution,” and “no longer amateur” 
were heard throughout the interviews (Organisations 7 and 8; Organisations 8, K, 29, 
31, 13, and 11; Organisations E and 10, respectively). Approximately 50% of 
respondents in both groups said accountability was among their highest priorities. Two 
specified their efforts to be “beyond reproach” (on Comite themes (Organisation 20) 
and generally “whiter than white after l’ARC” (Organisation 17)). One expressed a 
responsibility to justify expenditures “from the first donor euro” (Organisation 4). Even 
interviewees who had not held their current position within the organisation for more 
than a year or two specifically mentioned the efforts and opinions of their predecessors 
as evidencing increasing accountability (Organisations 19 and 30).
The interest in the subject of accountability generally also surfaced during the
00  51interview process. Five Comite Group and four Control Group organisations noted 
their particular interest in the subject when answering the request for an interview
228 See also Section 1.5.
114
(Organisations 4, 7, 17, 18, 19, B, C, D, and E). Two well-known Control Group 
respondents quickly answered the unsolicited request for their participation in the study 
with a note on how important the subject was (with no previous contact with these 
organisations) (Organisations B and D). Almost everyone in both groups commented 
that they found the project and subject matter useful and a high priority and the 
selection of questions the relevant combination. None felt that any important issues
'J 'J Q
were omitted when asked specifically at the close of the interview.
The only exception to this level of interest was one Comite Group organisation 
with a five-person team and volunteer Director General who felt his organisation was so 
small that they did not have the resources to implement further accountability 
mechanisms. Still, joining the Comite as a founding member in 1989 and remaining a 
member offers further evidence of a significant accountability effort, particularly as the 
Comite does not modify standards for smaller organisations. One Control Group 
organisation similarly cautioned that resource limitations, but “definitely not lack of 
interest,” prevented prioritising certain new accountability mechanisms (Organisation 
H).231
In addition, all respondents in both groups recognised that accountability 
increasingly appears “everywhere” across all sectors (politics, corporate, medical, etc.) 
and that there was a need to “follow the world” (Organisations J and E; Organisation 11, 
respectively). However, a crucial distinction is that this general environment does not 
directly drive the strategic assessment in most cases.
The “sign of the times” discussion included the general sense of an 
indispensable role of NPO implementation of accountability mechanisms for ethical, 
effective management in an increasingly challenging nonprofit world. Management 
changes contributed to the accountability environment -  both an evolving profile of 
nonprofit leader and a growing recognition of the inefficacy of the 1901 Law 
association member-driven structure in the early twenty-first century.234 Patrick Frotiee, 
a partner at Landwell & Associes/PricewaterhouseCoopers Paris specialising in the 
French nonprofit sector, confirmed that across the sector there are “new waves” of
229 Approximately 75% of respondents in both groups requested further discussions about various 
voluntary accountability strategies at the end of the interview. Almost all the interviews exceeded the 
allotted 75-90 minutes without complaint to explore further accountability issues either specifically raised 
in the interviews or otherwise of concern to respondents.
230 Organisation code is omitted to protect confidentiality.
231 See discussion of organisation size in Sections 4.4.1 and 5.4.1.
232 See Chapter 5 through 7 on the rationales for increasing accountability.
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accountability. Evidence includes reinforcement of governance, improved conseil 
d'administration functioning, audit committees (even if not as independent as in the 
US), and acceptance of for-profit level fees to hire outside legal and accounting 
professionals even beyond the legal minimum (Frotiee teleconference January 2008).
The “air” also included a range of evidence of increasing French nonprofit sector 
accountability outside respondents’ organisations that surfaced during the interviews. 
Comite respondents offered examples such as the use of Bureau Veritas Quality 
International, an external for-profit certifying agent, at organisations such as the 
Salvation Army (neither a survey participant nor a member of the Comite) 
(Organisation 9). Two recognised the number of organisations outside the Comite that 
voluntarily publish the Statement of Use of Funds on the internet (Organisations 7 and 
G; Soublin call June 2008). Business schools increasingly focus on the French 
nonprofit sector, with approximately 120 associations at the top French business school 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Paris (HEC Paris) (Organisation 4; Ecole des 
Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Paris (HEC Paris) 2007). Other examples offered 
include receiving increasingly detailed pie charts and tables in unsolicited NPO 
mailings, the emergence of groups such as jeveuxaider.com that offers pro bono 
marketing and communications services to associations, and the strong interest in an 
accountability group called the CLONG (Comite de Liaison des ONGs de Voluntariat) 
(Volunteer-Based NGO Liaison Committee) by a range of well-known organisations 
(Organisations G and E, respectively; jeveuxaider.com 2008; CLONG (Comite de 
Liaison des ONGs de Volontariat) 2008, respectively). Finally, the Comite/Sofres 
Survey showed a “general and unanimous demand” for publicly available verification of 
accounts (at a level of commissaires aux comptes approval) -  an external control 
emerging as an “indispensable gauge of trust” [author translation] (Comite de la 
Charte/TNS Sofres 2007, 5).
No one suggested that this era of increasing focus on accountability in many 
areas such as politics and government, the corporate world, and medical research 
accountability was a separate issue or somehow a choice they could make to join or 
reject. Similarly, every respondent in both groups spontaneously mentioned the sector-
233 See also Section 5.1.1 “Normal Practice.”
234 See Sections 4.4.2 and 5.4.3.
235 Jeveuxaider.com is translated literally as “I want to help.com.”
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wide impact of the l’ARC scandal in the late 1980s/early 1990s.236 None of the 
respondents felt safe from the impact of l’ARC or a 1’ARC-type scandal -  even if  in an 
entirely different sector of activity, organisation size, management approach, and/or 
funding sources from I’ARC.
Finally, despite widespread recognition that everyone breathes the same 
accountability “air” within the French nonprofit sector and beyond, the relevance of the 
external variables and environment more generally to respondents’ strategic assessment 
process remains surprisingly limited. The evidence explored in this and subsequent 
chapters shows that this notion of widespread increasing accountability, particularly at 
the more sophisticated end of the spectrum, is largely generated internally by the 
organisations’ and the organisations’ leaders individual efforts to increase 
accountability in accordance with their own strategic assessment of accountability. The 
highest level VAMs and other voluntary accountability mechanisms were implemented 
on an organisation by organisation basis with almost exclusive focus on the needs of the 
individual organisation according to 23 (70%) Comite Group and seven (58%) Control 
Group organisations (Organisations 7, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 
B, C, D, E, G, I, and J).237 Accountability is not inspired by, or fall-out from, regulatory 
oversight, mid-level self-regulatory or educational organisations, or other external 
influences.
Increasing Accountability Within the Comite. The Comite has also strengthened 
its own accountability standards, as well as accountability standards applicable to 
members, during recent years. All Comite Group members mentioned increasing 
accountability within the Comite itself, although one perceived such changes as “more 
form than substance” (Organisation 4). Soublin said, “definitely an increase in 
accountability!” (Soublin interview 2007). Soublin measures the increase largely by the 
type and intensity of the subjects discussed at the Comite conseil d ’administration 
meetings that has affected the whole evolution of the Comite. In addition, for years 
Comite member organisations chose their own censeurs. Now the Comite selects and 
appoints censeurs to ensure objectivity. The Comite has also become more focused on 
the details of reporting obligations. The Comite offers a leading sector model for the 
Statement of Use of Funds (even for non-Comite members) and was invited to
236 See the discussion of scandal in Section 7.2.
237 Further evidence includes the variety of voluntary accountability mechanisms that exceed the law, 
VAMs, and Comite requirements listed in Appendix 4.
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participate in the on-going intensive government debates involving reforms to 
commissaires aux comptes certification of the Statement of Use of Funds (Soublin call 
April 2008). Cohas-Bogey, the Executive Director of the Comite, concurs that the 
“definite” increase in accountability appears in such matters as growing working groups 
on accountability-related subjects like the role of censeurs and requirements for 
effective disclosure of financial ratios (Cohas-Bogey interview 2007; Comite 2008f).
Most importantly, the Comite shifted in early 2008 from a conseil 
d ’administration comprising solely representatives of member organisations to a 
balance between organisation representatives and independent administrateurs expert in 
accountability matters (Comite de la Charte Conference 2008). Almost all respondents 
in both groups considered this move to independence essential to the Comite. Four 
Comite Group members urged “going as far as possible” -  even beyond the majority 
seven out of 13 total administrateurs elected (Organisations 7, 21, 23, and 25). This 
modification places the Comite ahead of many of its members on this point and at the 
forefront of one of the key areas of progress in introducing accountability measures still 
lagging behind US practice in most French NPOs. Moreover, the prior lack of 
independence of administrateurs surfaced as an insurmountable reason why three of the 
most well-known Control Group respondents resolutely refused to consider Comite 
membership (Organisations B, C, and D).
Finally, the censeur review has become increasingly intensive in some cases. 
However, relatively few respondents criticised the increasingly picayune inspections by 
censeurs, for example censeur visits to an organisation’s small remote sites and in one 
case requests for detailed information potentially resulting in sanctions or expulsion in 
the event of failure to comply (Organisations 1, 8, 21, 22, 24, and 28; Organisations 27 
and 32, respectively; Comite 2008n, 2).
4.2 Empirical Findings: VAMs Implemented by Respondents
This section analyses some of the most globally relevant VAMs as more specific 
empirical evidence supporting the assumption of increasing accountability. The 
selection offers insight into the variety of VAMs, key concerns relating to the strategic
238 See also Section 4.2.2 “Financial Transparency.”
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assessment, and the extent of respondents’ individual voluntary accountability efforts. 
While the individual nature of the strategic assessment process prevents one-to-one 
matches of respondents between the groups, overall, there was no significant difference 
between the Comite Group and Control Group in terms of general implementation of 
VAMs, ideas as to priorities for the future, or the importance of the variables. Finally, 
gaps between the US models and current French practice inform the development of 
policy recommendations.
Respondents were asked to comment on the defined set of VAMs. Many of these 
are considered the most important in the US, but only a few of these appear in France. 
Respondents were asked whether they had each VAM, if not why not (e.g. an 
affirmative decision not to adopt them, a lack of resources, inappropriateness for the 
organisation’s context, conseil d ’administration or senior management objection, 
political objection, or another reason). Comments were also solicited on the efficacy, 
utility, required resources, and cultural issues of both those VAMs already in place and 
others they had not adopted. Many VAMS that are voluntary in the US are tied to the 
regulatory framework, but not necessarily regulation addressing accountability matters, 
in France. However, few addressed in this section are Comite requirements. Table 4-1 
below sets out the VAMs respondents and the Comite have implemented. Explanations 
follow in the text.
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Table 4-1
Key VAMs Implemented by Respondents and/or Comite (as an Organisation)
VAMs
Respondents/Comit6 Implementation
Comit6 Group Control Group Comit6
Independent Directors
Financial / Accounting Expert Directors none formally none formally yes
Audit Committee (US-style)1 6 (18%) 1 (8%) no
Alternative to Audit Committee (finance- 
type committee)2 22 (67%) 6 (50%) yes
Whistleblower Mechanism 2 (6%) 
considering3
1 (8%) has US-type 
version4 
1 (8%) considering
no
Conflict of Interest Policy (financial)
• Written
• Unwritten5
9 (27%) 
15 (45%)
3 (25%) 
5 (42%)
no
Financial Statements:
•  Balance Sheet
• Statement of Use of Funds
• Income Statement
• Annual Report of Activities
as required by law
Evaluation of Director General and 
Senior Management (formal 
procedures)6
19 (58%) do 
13 (39%) do not
11 (92%) do 
1 (8%) does not no
Disclosure of Senior Executive 
Compensation7
1 (3%) 
(individual 
salaries)/others as 
required by 
Comitd
1 (8%) (individual 
salaries)/others as 
required by law
as
required
by
Comity8
Document Retention Policy 25 (76%) 109 (83%) no
Code of Ethics 0 2 10 (17%) ComityCharter
Documents functioning in part as an 
alternative to a Code of Ethics 
(operations manuals, internal guidelines, 
and charters governing field work)
10 (30%) only 
Comity Charter 
21 (64%) related 
documents
4 (33%) none 
8 (67%) related 
documents
N/A
Source: Author's research data. See also notes to Table 3-1.
1 S e e  N o t e  1 t o  T a b l e  3 - 1 .
2 C l o s e l y  r e s e m b l i n g  U S - s t y l e  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  p r a c t i c e  w i t h  i n d e p e n d e n t  administrateurs. ( O r g a n i s a t i o n s  7 ,  3 2 ,  1 9 , 2 7 ,  
2 5 ,  a n d  1 1 ;  O r g a n i s a t i o n  D ) .  T h e  s e l f - c o m p l e t i o n  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  s h o w e d  t h a t  1 7  ( 5 9 % )  C o m i t 6  G r o u p  r e s p o n d e n t s  
a n d  s e v e n  ( 6 0 % )  C o n t r o l  G r o u p  r e s p o n d e n t s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  h a d  s o m e  f o r m  o f  a u d i t ,  f i n a n c e ,  o r  i n v e s t m e n t  c o m m i t t e e  
t h u s  r e l a t i v e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  l i v e  i n t e r v i e w s .
3 O r g a n i s a t i o n s  2 5  a n d  3 1 .
4 O r g a n i s a t i o n  C .  A  t h i r d  h a s  a  c o n f i d e n t i a l  m e c h a n i s m  b u t  o n l y  a t  t h e  r e g i o n a l  ( departement)  l e v e l  ( O r g a n i s a t i o n  
1 4 ) .
5 V i g i l a n c e  v a r i e s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  a m o n g  u n w r i t t e n  p o l i c i e s  i n  t e r m s  o f  c o n t e n t  a n d  e n f o r c e m e n t .
6A  f e w  a r e  i n f o r m a l  a n d  l a c k i n g  s p e c i f i c  p r o c e d u r e s .  T h e  e x c e p t i o n  i s  a  g o v e r n m e n t a l  s e c o n d m e n t  a r r a n g e m e n t  p a i d  
b y  t h e  F r e n c h  s t a t e  ( O r g a n i s a t i o n  J ) .
7 O r g a n i s a t i o n s  1 8  a n d  C .
8 C o m i t d  2 0 0 8 a .  S e e  T a b l e  3 - 1 .
9 O n e  o t h e r  o r g a n i s a t i o n  l a b e l l e d  d o c u m e n t  r e t e n t i o n  a  “ t o p  p r i o r i t y ”  ( O r g a n i s a t i o n  D ) .
10 O n e  b a s e d  o n  I n d e p e n d e n t  S e c t o r  C o d e  o f  E t h i c s  ( o r g a n i s a t i o n  c o d e  o m i t t e d  t o  p r o t e c t  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y )  a n d  o n e  a  
m u c h  s h o r t e r  v e r s i o n  ( O r g a n i s a t i o n  C )  ( I n d e p e n d e n t  S e c t o r  2 0 0 4 c ) .  S e e  S e c t i o n  4 . 2 . 3  “ Code o f  Ethics.”  O r g a n i s a t i o n  
E  i m p l e m e n t e d  t h e  C o d e  o f  E t h i c s  a s  w h i l e  w o r k i n g  w i t h  t h e  a u t h o r  a s  a  p r o  b o n o  c o n s u l t i n g  c l i e n t  p r i o r  t o  
c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  t h e  s t u d y .
4.2.1 VAMs Focused on Independent Oversight o f Accountability
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The following VAMs target independent oversight of accountability issues: 
independent directors, audit committees, the whistleblower mechanism, and 
management of conflicts of interest. These reflect both the core of the US model and 
key aspects of the policy recommendations (addressed in Chapter 8).
Independent Directors. Independent oversight of accountability matters, 
particularly through independent directors, is the lynchpin of the US accountability 
system. Independent directors (as defined in Table 2-1) provide the basis for the audit 
process and audit committee, the whistleblower mechanism, and financial transparency 
more generally. The notion of independent administrateurs does not exist in the 
member-driven 1901 Law association context (Soublin interview 2007). None of the 
foundation interviewees in either group mentioned independent administrateurs either, 
however, even though de facto some of them have administrateurs who are to some 
extent independent.
The member-driven election strategies in 1901 Law associations for selecting 
the conseil d ’administration may compromise governance and independent oversight of 
accountability. Most generally, member-elected administrateurs often represent their 
own interests or the interests of small groups and/or lack the experience and sense of 
responsibility for independent oversight. Examples include members electing 
unqualified friends or beneficiaries of services of the organisation (e.g. the parents of a 
sick child for a health services association). Another example is members using a NPO 
to further a political agenda by electing members of a political party so that the party 
exerts influence within a powerful, international NPO potentially able to influence 
politics (such as health legislation or an environmental agenda). The most notable, but 
often negative, exception is the requirement that ARUPs and FRUPs appoint at least one 
French state (Conseil d’Etat) representative as administrates.240 Complaints relating to 
this requirement include lack of experience with the “realities” of the French nonprofit 
sector, biased government intervention, and failure to participate actively or provide 
serious oversight beyond the “rubber stamp” role (Organisations 12, 13, and L, 
respectively).
239 I n d e p e n d e n t  o v e r s i g h t  i s  a l s o  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  p o l i c y  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s .  S e e  S e c t i o n  
8 .2 .2 .
240 S e e  S e c t i o n  1 . 3 . 1  “A ssocia tion s a n d  A sso c ia tive  S ec to r . ”
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This member-driven election process in turn affects the level of independent 
oversight generally, as well as potentially the ability of administrateurs to bring 
unbiased strategic oversight to the organisation individually. One commentator notes 
that “[u]nder the guise of freedom of association,” “few people” other than the “NGOs 
themselves” verify accounts [author translation] (Perouse de Montclos 2005, 613). 
Within this protection from state interference, Soublin emphasised the difference 
between administrateurs and US-style trustees, the latter instilled with responsibility for 
acting on behalf of (literally “in trust for”) donors and beneficiaries both strategically 
and financially (Soublin call December 2007). As the examples above show, the system 
also results in an entrenched highly political member-driven process whereby the most 
vocally represented candidates rather than the most competent to oversee governance 
become administrateurs (Soublin call December 2007; Archambault discussion 2008; 
Organisations 14, 25, 30, C, D, and L).
Associations bemoan the trickle-down impact of the 1901 Law member structure 
on lack of independent oversight of both management and governance. Several 
nationally dispersed organisations experience difficulty controlling “unwieldy” 
delegations of members in terms of activities, accounting back up the chain to 
headquarters, or identifying individual members to comply with Comite regulations on 
registers (Organisations 1, 22, 27, 30, D, and potentially L and Organisation 28, 
respectively). For example, member volunteers create individual pods around the 
country using the association’s name and claiming to speak out on behalf of the 
association without prior approval, common operating guidelines, or accountability to 
headquarters. Associations occasionally consider transforming their legal structure into 
a foundation in order to “escape” the “nightmare” of membership, including the 
member-elected conseil d'administration (Organisation D; Comite senior management 
interview 2007).
Finally, the member-driven conseil d ’administration election process for 
associations also hinders recruitment of independent administrateurs. Few organisations 
have actively sought independent directors, but one Control Group respondent seeking a 
“US-style board” considered his biggest challenge recruiting “competent board 
members” (Organisation D). Other member-based organisations’ conseil 
d'administrations avoid nominating independent administrateur candidates, fearing the 
embarrassment of rejection by members and/or vocal objection to management
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accountability-related proposals more generally (Comite senior management interviews 
2007; Organisations 14, 25, and 30).
Audit Committee. The audit committee comprising independent directors 
remains one of the top three requirements adopted by US NPOs post-Sarbanes Oxley 
Act and integrated into state law for organisations above a certain revenue threshold 
(Independent Sector 2005, No. 5; California State Senate 2004, Section 12586(e)(2)). 
The absence of independent directors across both respondent groups precludes a US- 
style audit committee with the independent oversight function.241 While a significant 
number of Comite Group members confirmed some form of audit committee, most
• 9 4 9comprise management and other non-independent administrateurs.
Whistleblower Mechanism. While the whistleblower mechanism is one of the 
two Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirements legally applicable to NPOs, and therefore 
increasingly broadly implemented in the US, it remains the most controversial of the 
VAMs in the French context (US Government 2002, Section 806; e.g. Jackson 2006, 7 
and 116). As Table 4-1 shows, only one Control Group organisation has a procedure 
even resembling the US whistleblower mechanism allowing for confidential reporting 
of fraud, sexual harassment, and other such cases by employees and others affiliated 
with the NPO (Organisation C). The three organisations considering the whistleblower 
mechanism mention a US affiliate’s pressure and a belief that the “whole house would 
benefit” (Organisations 31 and Organisations D and 25, respectively). Finally, like 
document retention policy (Section 4.2.3 below), certain sectors such as medical and 
childcare are subject to procedures similar to whistleblower mechanisms through 
substantive regulation of their activities (e.g. Organisations 10, 25, and 31). The 
militant organisations (imilitants) (i.e., advocacy or solidarity groups generally focused 
on achieving awareness and legal or societal reform rather than service delivery) 
suggested that the open culture encouraging debate mitigates the need for whistleblower 
mechanisms (Organisations 9, 16, and 30) 243 Other proposed substitutions include the 
personnel representative (delegue du personnel) and enterprise committee {comite 
d ’entreprise), both of which provide a forum for expressing employee views
241 See Section 3.1.1 “The Sarban es-O xley A c t a n d  A ccou n tab ility ’’ and Table 3-1. See also Section 8.2.2 
for related policy recommendations.
242 See Section 3.1.1 “The Sarbanes-O xley A c t a n d  A cc o u n ta b ility ”
243 For example, some of the militant organisations focus on speaking out or lobbying on controversial 
issues such as immigrant rights or death penalty reform. In the case of associations, the militants are 
almost always members. The term “militants” does not indicate violence or radical approaches in this 
context.
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(Organisations 23 and 24, respectively). However, none of these options assures 
confidentiality.
The resistance to whistleblower mechanisms is primarily cultural (Frotiee 
teleconference January 7, 2008 and Jaffe teleconference December 2007). Three 
respondents stated they would never allow whistleblower mechanisms for reasons of a 
“cultural” aversion to the idea of “turning in” colleagues or “collaborating with the 
enemy” stemming from memories of World War II (Organisations 18 and 19).244 The 
official position of the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertes (the 
French national data protection agency), after consultation with the US authorities, 
reflects the French reticence with respect to denunciation despite recent changes to 
accommodate for-profit corporations (Commission nationale de l'informatique et des 
libertes 2005).245 Soublin confirms that after years of discussion with Comite member 
organisations the whistleblower mechanism would be virtually impossible to introduce 
for the Comite itself or as a Comite requirement for members for these cultural reasons 
(Soublin call December 2008).
Conflicts o f Interest. Control of conflicts of interest is fundamental to 
accountability and trust (including the scandals addressed in Section 7.2). Like financial 
transparency, conflicts of interest are heavily regulated and another of the Comite’s four 
best practice rules (Comite 2006a and 2006d).246 The interview question on conflicts of 
interest elicited among the strongest emotional reaction in the study among virtually all 
respondents across both groups. Two respondents emotionally phrased the sentiment 
as, “we absolutely do not tolerate conflicts” and “we don’t allow any conflicts of any 
kind” on the conseil d ’administration (Organisations 17 and B, respectively). Examples 
of financial conflicts of interest include providing commercial or paid legal services to 
the organisation. Examples of non-financial conflicts of interest include serving on a
244 Other commentators focus on the “scars of the occupation of 1940” and a Judeo-Christian mistrust of 
“denunciation” and “collaboration with the enemy” (e.g. working groups on corruption in Africa) [author 
translation] (Conseil fran9ais des investisseurs en Afrique 2007, 1).
245 The CNIL rejected two initial Sarbanes-Oxley Act-related requests for whistleblower mechanism 
(including McDonald’s France) fearing self-interested attacks on others, “disproportionate” requests, 
and overlap with existing French regulations (e.g. alerting the commissaires aux comptes for financial 
matters) (Deleurence 2005). Currently the CNIL permits the whistleblower procedure under specified 
conditions relating to scope/subject and handling of complaints (Commission nationale de l'informatique 
et des libertes 2005, 2-7). The CNIL’s formal 2005 report acknowledges the legitimate concerns of 
senior management of US-France dual stock exchange listed companies regarding managing uneven 
regulatory regimes (Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertes 2005, 3). Two respondents 
noted potentially similar concerns in international NGO networks (Organisations 25 and 30).
246 The Comite requires “...unbiased management” -  i.e., essentially assurance of proper control and 
elimination of conflicts of interest by the assemblee generate and conseil d ’administration (Comite 
2006a, Section 1.2).
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competitor NPO board or supporting a political agenda of another organisation directly 
or indirectly related to an issue for vote.
Given the limited margin for voluntarily improving the conflict of interest 
practice above regulation, the main adjustment would be implementation of an annually 
signed declaration addressing financial and non-financial conflicts of interest as is US 
best practice (e.g. USGDTIRS 2008a, Part VI, Section 12 a-c). Under French law, the 
commissaires aux comptes report financial conflicts of interest (primarily significant 
commercial contracts) that could require assemblee generale approval (Durand call 
2007; Frotiee and Chartier teleconference January 2008; Memento Pratique Francis 
Lefebvre 2006-07, Sections 5930, 5935, 5945, and 78000).247 However, the 
financial/non-financial distinction is important because it determines appropriate 
management of the conflict (Jackson 2006, 52-3 and 137). Despite the passionate 
response to the subject, only two respondents expressed interest in implementing a 
requirement of a US-style written conflict of interest declaration (Organisations 21 and
3 2 ) 2 4 8
Respondents’ extreme view of conflict elimination and reliance on the 
commissaires aux comptes does not necessarily yield effective governance. Eliminating 
potential administrateurs with any conflicts may exclude competent administrateurs 
who might participate ethically on all but limited conflicted issues. Furthermore, 
reliance exclusively on commissaries aux comptes may fail to address conflicts arising 
during time of service in between audits. Effective management of conflicts is central 
to NPO accountability (e.g. a core issue with l’ARC) and adequately handled by 
withdrawal from discussion and vote in the case of financial conflicts and withdrawal 
from vote in the case of non-financial conflicts (e.g. The David and Lucile Packard 
Foundation 2003).
247 Many com m issaires aux com ptes  require written declarations of financial conflicts from 
adm inistrateurs  as a foundation for the report (e.g. Frotiee and Chartier teleconference January 2008).
248 Despite the role of the com m issaires aux com ptes,  the separate written declaration serves a dual 
purpose: first, updating conflicts of interest declarations annually and again verbally at the time they arise 
in conseil d ’adm in istra tion  discussion and second, a separate written record confirmed by the persons 
involved.
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4.2.2 VAMs Relatine to Financial Transparency
Financial Transparency. Financial transparency ranked first in importance in 
supporting donor trust in both the Comite Group and Control Group and is also 
fundamental to ethical, effective management. As noted in Table 3-1 and Section 3.2.1, 
financial transparency is a highly regulated aspect of accountability in France, as well as 
the most widely cited of the Comite’s four best practice rules (Comite 2006a).249 
However, despite the regulatory and Comite requirements reflecting increasing 
accountability, financial transparency is not fully developed. In the Comite/Sofres 
Survey financial transparency appeared as the least well controlled accountability 
mechanism in the survey (61% of participants considering controls inadequate) (Comite 
de la Charte/TNS Sofres 2007, 16).
The Statement of Use of Funds, the most oft-cited example of the Comite’s core 
financial transparency requirement for donors and the subject of recent regulatory
9SOmodification, exemplifies the need for further refinement (Comite 2008e). According 
to Soublin, the Comite’s version had become a widely used model in the absence of 
clear regulatory guidance until recent regulatory clarification on commissaires aux 
comptes oversight (Soublin call April 2008; Conseil National de la Comptabilite 
2008).251
Nonetheless, the Comite and respondents still struggle with on-going issues 
directly relevant to strategic assessment of accountability. Revenue disclosure such as 
the proper handling of financial ratios, the appropriate footnoting of pie charts with each 
“slice” delineating a revenue source, and explanatory disclosure for tables emerge as 
common challenges. Respondents’ sense of entrapment in a relentless “ratio race” to the 
lowest percentage of donor revenue allocated to administrative costs (e.g. accounting 
and legal advice, and personnel security) emerges in two principal ways (Comite 2008o,
249 The others include rigorous management, and effective communication and best practices in fund­
raising (Comity 2006a and 2006d). See also Comite/Sofres Survey citing financial transparency as the 
third greatest influence on donor trust (Comity de la Charte/TNS Sofres 2007, 12).
250 See Section 3.2.1. A 1991 law required every NPO with more than €153,000 in revenue to publish the 
Statement of Use of Funds but did not specify how or, until recently, require certification by the 
commissaires aux comptes of conformity to accounts (French Government 1991a, Article 4; Conseil 
National de la Comptabilite 2008).
251 The Conseil National de la Comptabilite debate centred on whether to require disclosure o f revenue 
from all sources (the Comite’s version) or only revenue from the general public (the Cour des comptes’ 
position) (Soublin call April 2008). Note that the Cour des comptes’ position streamlines the tasks and 
reduces costs of its statutory mission to audit the use of funds from the general public but provides less 
complete information (Iteo tegard & Associes Conference 2008).
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24). First, members universally opposed publication of member organisation financial 
statements on the Comite web site for fear of comparison with other organisations. 
Second, there is an on-going internal debate among members on allocation of expenses 
and appropriate levels of costs not directly supporting programs (Comite 2008f; Soublin 
interview 2007). Most Comite Group respondents cited 20% as the appropriate number, 
whereas in the US there is greater flexibility. Even these leaders lag behind the US, and 
believe their donors lag behind the US public, in understanding the importance of 
administrative spending to ensure proper financial and legal oversight (Organisation 2; 
Independent Sector 2004c, Section V, respectively). In the US, best practice dictates a 
donor bill of rights that includes requirements of reasonable expenditures for 
administrative costs to ensure effective accounting oversight, accumulation of operating 
funds, and allocation of revenue to programs (e.g. Independent Sector 2004c, Sections I 
and V).252
In addition, the limitations of the Statement of Use of Funds (which discloses 
only how funds are allocated) diminishes the Comite’s and non-Comite NPOs’ potential 
role of educating the public to look beyond simple donor checkbook to benificiaries 
questions -  “whether my euros buy food” -  to more complex questions. The 
Statement of Use of Funds does not address issues such as whether the food made it into 
the proper hands (e.g. instead of the hands of dishonest government officials) and/or 
whether the NPO handling the food properly assured the security of its employees and 
volunteers and the beneficiaries of the food. Also, no respondents in either group have 
considered the importance of warnings to readers of such limitations in the Statement of 
Use of Funds.254
Finally, financial transparency might be expanded to match US standards on 
disclosure of terrorism-related matters and individual executive compensation 
(USGDTIRS 2008a, 14, 15, and 16 and Part VII, respectively).255 The only two 
respondents disclosing individual executive compensation (and exceeding Comite
252 The donor bill o f rights was not listed as a VAM due to overlap with the code of ethics. Typically the 
donor bill of rights includes such matters as an obligation to use donor restricted funds in accordance with 
the terms of the gift, confidentiality of data bases with donor information, and provision o f adequate 
information to donors. This overlaps somewhat with the Statement of Use of Funds and the Comity’s 
Charter requirements (Independent Sector 2004c, Section IX; Comity 2006a, Part III).
253 The Comite’s negative view of income statements (described in Section 5.3.1 “The Comite and 
Corporatisation”) also limits transparency.
254 See related policy recommendation for the Comite in Section 8.4.
255 With related Form TD F-90-22.1 (Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts).
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requirements) are among the largest, most international organisations with leaders 
heavily focused on accountability (Organisations 18 and C).
Oversight and Disclosure o f  Management Compensation and Performance. 
Oversight of management compensation (i.e., fixed and discretionary salary and other 
monetary and non-monetary benefits) showed consistent results across both groups but 
a lower standard of independent oversight than in the US. The most common practice is 
oversight of the Director General’s compensation by the President or, in rare cases, a 
conseil d'administration committee. Three interviewees mentioned a budget or salary 
grid establishing ratios between the highest and lowest salaries as a guide for the 
Director General’s salary decisions (Organisations 3, 18, and C). Typically in the US 
a compensation committee comprising at least one or two independent directors would 
recommend compensation for full board approval, particularly in the larger 
organisations. Best US practice also dictates a process of “benchmarking” top 
management compensation packages to comparable positions and organisations in the 
industry.257
Transparency of management compensation to donors and the public also 
appears weak. Even though the Comite now requires disclosure of the top five salaries 
in aggregate (and the law the top three in aggregate), the processes for oversight are less 
rigorous and not clear to donors in the public documents (Comite 2008a and 2008r). 
The Comite/Sofres Survey showed management compensation as second in importance 
for determining donor trust levels, with 60% considering controls insufficient and only 
21% considering controls adequate (Comite de la Charte/TNS Sofres 2007,16).
Evidence of performance evaluation of the Director General and senior 
management across both groups was uneven, ranging from informal discussions to end- 
of-multi-year mandate reviews. The Control Group overall showed more uniform 
attention to the issue (Table 4-1) and higher standards in terms of regularity, formality, 
and professionalism of the evaluation process (most importantly, establishing 
quantitative and non-quantitative objectives for the year and then assessing performance 
against such objectives). Moreover, here again a US-style compensation committee
256 It is likely that other respondents have a salary grid but did not mention this in the interview given the 
widespread use of this technique in France (Binder meeting 2007).
257 US NPOs are more carefully benchmarking salaries due to the Internal Revenue “intermediate 
sanctions” regulations aimed at controlling excessive executive compensation with an excise tax penalty -  
an alternative to the more draconian penalty of rescinding the charitable exemption status (USGDTIRS 
2005, Section 4958; Keating and Frumkin 2000, 15; USGDTIRS 2008a, Part VII; Doubleday 
teleconferences 2006).
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would provide significantly more consistent and independent oversight involving 
independent directors. One Comite Group and two Control Group respondents also 
evaluated performance of volontaires (Organisations 19, C, and E), and a few also 
evaluate volunteers thus tying into the increasing professionalisation referred to in 
Section 5.1.1 below (Organisations 21 and 23).258
4.2.3 VAMs Relatim  to Accountability Generally
The document retention policy and Code of Ethics relate to accountability more 
generally.
Document Retention Policy. As mentioned in Section 3.1.1, the document 
retention policy is one of only two Sarbanes-Oxley Act accountability requirements 
directly applicable to NPOs in the US (US Government 2002, Section 802; Jackson 
2006, 7). The document retention policy is an accountability obligation tied to 
organisational record-keeping. The wide implementation of document retention 
procedures reflects non-accountability regulatory reasons more than accountability 
efforts in France. No respondents in either group raised document retention as an 
important accountability issue -  whether in furtherance of donor trust, ethical, effective 
management, or otherwise. One of the interviewees most focused on accountability and 
Soublin both avowed weakness in this area (Organisation 19; Soublin interview 2007). 
Rather, the complex non-accountability regulation explains the relegation of document 
retention to a lower level administrative matter rather than an issue of accountability. 
Frotiee cautions that unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s overarching and accountability- 
driven requirements, document retention requirements in France depend on the type and 
purposes of individual documents (e.g. contracts or medical files) but do not target 
accountability (Frotiee and Chartier teleconference January 2008).
Code o f Ethics. The code of ethics, the most overarching VAM, is commonly 
adopted by NPOs of all sizes in the US but remains rare among respondents. The code 
of ethics aligns all VAMs with the mission and ensures application of VAMs to all NPO 
stakeholders included in the definitions of trust and accountability (e.g. Independent
258 A few other respondents with volontaires did not comment on voluntaire evaluation.
259 For example, contracts are governed by civil contract law, and the medical research and treatment 
NPOs respect separate, more extensive archive regulations (US Government 2002, Section 802; Frotiee 
and Chartier teleconference January 2008; organisation codes are omitted to protect confidentiality).
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Sector 2004c, Sections I and II). However, both the Comite’s Charter and a 
combination of other related documents show movement toward functionally a US-style 
code of ethics (Comite 2006a, 2008a, 2008h).
The Independent Sector Code of Ethics was published in 2004 as a model for 
NPOs nationally to adopt or reassess existing codes of ethics (Independent Sector 
2004c). The only respondent using such a model, a Control Group organisation, 
reported hearing from a government ministry official that this was the “first real code of 
ethics he had ever seen in many years of reviewing dossiers for privileged international 
NGO funding status.”261
The Comite’s Charter applicable to all Comite members is, however, a strong 
alternative to the US-style code of ethics. No Comite Group members felt they would 
gain by adding a code of ethics to the Comite’s Charter. While there is significant 
overlap between the Comite’s Charter and the Independent Sector Code of Ethics, the 
key differences for purposes of this analysis are the latter’s requirements of an 
obligation of disclosure to the public and the media in addition to donors and other 
stakeholders and an obligation to spend adequate amounts to ensure proper 
administration (accounting and legal oversight) (Independent Sector 2004c, Sections VI 
and V, respectively).262 The low number of Control Group participants with a formal 
code of ethics shows a rare area of broader implementation of an accountability 
mechanism by the Comite Group (again assuming that the Comite Charter is considered 
an effective substitute for an independent code of ethics).
Critics of codes of ethics target the difficulty of applying the rules and the ease 
of sidestepping the rules due to lack of enforceability (e.g. a former Doctors Without 
Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres President (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2003)). These 
arguments are not compelling. First, codes of ethics may include enforcement 
mechanisms when appropriate, for example in the case of a NPO engaged in activities 
potentially facilitating bribery. Second, the law also provides a fallback enforceability 
mechanism for underlying legal violations (such as fraud with l’ARC or child 
trafficking as with Zoe’s Ark). Third, the benefits of the code of ethics generally 
outweigh enforceability, including as a communications vehicle to establish a common
260 See Independent Sector 2004a.
261 Organisation code is omitted to protect confidentiality. Note that a Cour des comptes report criticises 
the Ministere des Affaires Etrang6res et Europ6ennes’ evaluation of French state subsidised NGOs 
(Charasse 2005, 5).
262 See Section 8.4 for recommendations to the Comity regarding spending on administrative oversight 
noted in Section 4.4.2 and 6.6.3.
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understanding of standards among all involved with the organisation from volunteers to 
the board to vendors, beneficiaries of services and beyond. Specifically in the case of 
the Comite Charter, the censeurs do enforce obligations through a trienniel review 
process that make mandatory recommendations and, potentially, a recommendation to 
retract accreditation in rare cases (Comite 2008n, 3). Finally, clarity of drafting and 
communication of organisation-wide standards mitigate the difficulty of application of 
the rules.
4.3 Beyond VAMS, the Comite, and the Law -  Unique Voluntary Practices of
Respondent Organisations and Priorities for Improvement of VAMs
In addition to responding to a pre-established list of potential VAMs, the 
interviews revealed a range of voluntary accountability mechanisms respondents had 
individually implemented, and/or consider immediate priorities for future 
implementation, that exceed the law, Comite requirements, VAMs, or in a few cases 
even US best practice standards. This section extends the empirical assessment of 
how energetically, individually, and from the inside out accountability is increasing in 
France. This section also shows that the accountability mechanisms most critical to 
remedying the lack of independent oversight in the French nonprofit sector that is 
emerging as a theme in the empirical findings (e.g. audit committee and internal 
controls) are also highly susceptible to organisations’ independent initiatives for 
implementation -  both in terms of the regulatory gap to fill and the capacity of 
organisations to act independently.264 This is one of several points where the analysis 
pushes the limits of the empirical findings to suggest the complexity and individuality 
of the strategic assessment process.
The examples of voluntary accountability mechanisms implemented beyond the 
above-referenced requirements (listed and explained in Appendix 4) fall primarily 
within five categories: general conseil d ’administration oversight; audit committee
263 See Appendix 4 for a complete list and Section 6.3.2 for accountability mechanisms specifically 
relating to volunteers.
264 See Section 4.2.1 “Independent Directors” and “Audit C o m m itteerespectively, and Section 8.2.2 for 
related policy recommendations. See Section 5.3.1 on the extent of possible voluntary initiatives in this 
area relating to corporatisation.
265 See also Sections 6.3.2 (on volunteers) and 7.2.3 (on whether increased accountability might have 
mitigated the impact of scandal).
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matters; donor matters; volunteer matters; and examples exceeding US best practice. 
Many compensate, or functionally substitute, for US practices that seem culturally 
inappropriate or otherwise too extensive for the French context. According to 
respondents, all exemplify strategic assessment tailored to the priorities of each 
organisation reflecting the inside out process. Therefore, these initiatives do not indicate 
generally the extent of overall implementation of accountability mechanisms by the 
Comite Group, the Control Group, and/or the sector more broadly. Finally, the findings 
show that this list does not reflect a response to external variables.
Similarly, respondents’ priorities for implementing additional VAMs when 
resources and time allow also support the base assumption of increasing accountability 
and the theme of bottom up, organisation by organisation implementation of 
accountability mechanisms. Their highest priorities span a range of areas in accordance 
with individual needs. All targeted some of the most functionally crucial voluntary 
accountability mechanisms in terms of improving independent oversight and 
accessibility of accountability-related disclosure. The overriding conclusion is that in 
both the Comite Group and the Control Group no two organisations were alike in terms 
of current accountability mechanisms implemented or priorities for the future.
Goals that interviewees prioritised for further increasing accountability within 
their organisations fell primarily into three basic categories: conseil d ’administration 
matters; management techniques; and transparency. First, the most frequent conseil 
d ’administration objective was establishment of committees with targeted objectives 
(three mentioning audit committees (Organisations 8, 29, and F), but also compensation 
committee (Organisation 12) and conseil d ’administration nominating committee 
(Organisations 5 and D)). Three respondents also wanted to improve conseil 
d ’administration functioning -  either through recruiting more competent governance 
experts, developing risk analysis programs to ensure financial stability, or conseil 
d ’administration training (Organisations 7 and 32; Organisation 18, respectively). Three 
others suggested functionally-equivalent alternatives to the US-style audit committee, 
internal controls, and whistleblower mechanisms (Organisations 25, 31, and E). Second, 
the management matters included first and foremost internal controls/audits and internal 
manuals of procedure (Organisations 3, 7, 15, 16, 19, and 20; Organisations 12 and 17, 
respectively). Other more general suggestions included developing an organisational 
accountability “reflex” of questioning the accountability aspects of all decisions and 
more generally improving management and human resources procedures (Organisations
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21; Organisations 3, 14, 22, 26, and 31, respectively). Third, the transparency goals 
addressed primarily publishing financial information on the organisation’s web site and 
tracking information between the field and headquarters (Organisations 30, C, and G; 
Organisation C, respectively).
Thus despite the limited influence of the accountability regulation and tax 
system discussed in Chapter 3 on strategic assessment, collectively organisations’ 
individual implementation of accountability mechanisms creates an external context of 
increasing accountability from the inside out. The accountability efforts and “wish lists” 
provide evidence of the continuing dynamic of increasing accountability.
4.4 Relevance of Internal and External Variables to Increasing Accountability
Organisational size and initiative and profile of leader emerge as the two most 
important influences on the strategic assessment of accountability in the interviews.266 
International engagement, as noted above, is addressed in Chapter 5 as most relevant to 
increasing accountability in furtherance of ethical, effective management. The 
external variables discussed in Chapter 3 (accountability regulation and the tax system) 
were virtually not mentioned as an influence on strategic assessment of accountability. 
There was no noticeable difference (even anecdotally) in the importance and relevance 
of the variables between the two respondent groups. These trends will track throughout 
the empirical findings in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The complexity of interrelationships 
among the variables is addressed in Section 5.4.
4.4.1 Oreanisational Size268
The US literature and French empirical findings show that organisational size is 
a key factor in effectively determining the appropriate balance between a NPO’s 
commitment to donors to use funds properly for programs and responsibility to, 
implement effective accountability mechanisms (Reiser 2005, 582). Larger
266 See Appendix 1-G for a breakdown of organisation size.
267 See Section 5.3.2.
268 Throughout this section organisation codes are omitted as necessary to protect confidentiality given the 
revenue information in Appendix 1-G that is linked to size.
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organisations are generally better able to absorb additional costs of implementing 
accountability mechanisms and benefit more from the effort -  whether regulatory or 
voluntary. For example, a pivotal Independent Sector survey shows acceptance of post- 
Sarbanes Oxley Act requirements for NPOs to be size-dependent (Ostrower and 
Bobowick 2006, 5). State law introduces requirements such as independent audit 
committees based on size ($2 million in gross revenue or more (California State Senate 
2004, Section 12586(e)(2)).269
In general, the empirical findings in France follow the US with respect to the 
importance of organisational size to the decision to adopt, and the efficacy of, VAMs 
and other voluntary accountability mechanisms. For example, all of the Comite Group 
and Control Group respondents with audit committees evolving toward US standards 
were large organisations. Even a self-selecting body like the Comite sets a minimum 
threshold of €500,000 in annual donor revenue for membership (Soublin call January
7 7  n2007). Conversely, all of the smaller Comite Group and Control Group organisations 
(even within the Comite threshold) mention the impact of resource limitations on 
decisions relating to voluntary accountability mechanisms. Only two respondents also 
emphasised that VAMs were less necessary given their size because either the risk of 
failure of accountability was smaller or the small team de facto increased accountability,
771 •  •in part by working more closely together. Therefore, the smallest organisations have 
generally implemented the fewest non-Comite required mechanisms and have the
• 77 7fewest immediate priorities for new voluntary accountability mechanisms. 
Nonetheless, each organisation in both respondent groups had a unique approach to the 
strategic assessment -  even within a similar size range. This likely reflects, among other 
factors, the influence of an organisational leader on accountability choices, even within 
a particular revenue level (as discussed further in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.3).
The only respondent without objectives to implement additional voluntary 
accountability mechanisms was the same one that did not see an increase in 
accountability in his organisation due to the small size, lack of resources, and loyal
269 See also Salamon and Geller on US study showing smaller organisations as less likely to implement 
“ethical protections” (2005, 8).
270 See Note 23, supra.
271 See also Putnam (2000) in Section 2.1.3 and the discussion of the theoretical implications of small 
NPOs in Sections 1.3 “Associations and Associative Sector,” 1.5, and 4.5.
272 See also Sections 5.4.1 and 6.5.
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'yi'xdonor base. At the other extreme, five respondents felt that they already had 
implemented sufficient accountability mechanisms -  all large organisations except one 
particularly sophisticated Control Group B organisation. These respondents do not alter 
the general conclusions regarding the relevance of the influence of organisation size to 
accountability decisions.
Size also influences the Comite’s own strategy for recruiting members and 
developing accountability requirements for members. The potentially large remaining 
market for the Comite might include smaller organisations.274 However, neither the 
Comite nor any Comite Group respondents interested in including smaller organisations 
in the Comite argued for lowering standards to facilitate membership of smaller 
organisations (Comite interviews 2007; Organisations 5, 11, 21, and 28). Such a 
uniform approach ignoring size would exceed even the tiered US regulatory approach 
mentioned above. The stage of development of this initiative and the debate on 
introducing size-tiered accountability requirements is too early at the time of this thesis 
for analysis.
4.4.2 Initiative and Profile o f  Leader
The initiative and profile of leaders is a particularly important influence on 
increasing accountability in both groups -  in terms of general views and authority for 
driving specific changes in accountability. Professional experience, willingness to take 
risks, and a personal belief in the importance of accountability all counted.
Almost without exception, the interviewees were experienced leaders (e.g. 
former captains of industry, one former government minister, and the elite of the 
younger French nonprofit sector leaders) based on previous professional records. They 
are willing to take a strong position on the importance of accountability generally and 
on specific accountability mechanisms -  regardless of their views on the rationales for 
increasing accountability explored in subsequent chapters. As Robert Lloyd of One 
World Trust noted, “leadership is vital for accountability reform to be successful” 
(Lloyd, Oatham et al. 2007, 8 and 5 and 60 for risks and challenges). Examples of
273 Six respondents, all in the Comity Group, did not answer the question for various reasons 
(Organisations 1,6, 11, 22, 23, and 24).
274 See Section 1.2.1 regarding the current €500,000 annual revenue threshold and target market.
275 See also Section 8.4. Some flexibility in timing of application of Comity requirements for new smaller 
organisations was considered (Organisations 5 and 32).
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leaders taking risks include proactively soliciting an audit from the Ministry of the 
Interior, soliciting double external audits, and publishing an annual report including
9 7 6accountability weaknesses {rapport moral) (Organisations B, 7, and C, respectively). 
There was also an overall enthusiasm among respondents in both groups for the 
accountability challenges -  willingness to reach, to invest effort, and to push cultural 
barriers in several cases. One medium-sized Control Group respondent said there was 
“nothing he would refuse” (Organisation E).
The initiative and profile of leader also proves important in both groups to 
assessing where the authority for accountability decisions resides. Institutionalisation of 
accountability practices (i.e., the strategic assessment, resulting accountability 
decisions, and implementation of decisions) depends largely on the leader (generally 
either Director General or President, or occasionally member of the bureau). 
Technically a NPO conseil d ’administration is at the top of the chain of authority -  with 
authority over accountability matters. This authority includes submission for a vote as 
necessary (by law or organisational practice) to the assemblee generale in the case of 
associations. However, the conseil d ’administration is much less likely than a US board 
of directors to assume responsibility for accountability issues. Technically a NPO 
conseil d ’administration is at the top of the chain of authority -  with authority over 
accountability matters. This authority includes submission for a vote as necessary (by 
law or organisational practice) to the assemblee generale in the case of associations. 
However, the conseil d ’administration is much less likely than a US board of directors 
to assume responsibility for accountability issues.
The wide variety of examples of increasing accountability reflects individual 
organisational approaches and differing levels of engagement of the conseil 
d ’administration, President, and/or Director General in determining accountability 
priorities, resource allocation, and necessary internal structural changes to implement 
accountability mechanisms. Twelve respondents mentioned the importance of co­
leaders: a General Secretary referencing the President (Organisations 5, 6, and 27); the 
President highlighting the driving role of the Director General (Organisations 10, A, H, 
and J); or a strong Treasurer or other senior manager supporting the Executive Director 
(Organisations 4, 15, 16, 22, and 32)). The interviews also show the initiative of leader 
is increasingly important as increasingly complex, international accountability
276 See discussion of initiative of leader in Section 4.4.2 and 5.4.3.
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mechanisms are assessed (e.g. a Director General laying the groundwork for a 
whistleblower mechanism). Finally, 12 interviewees from both groups trumpeted 
their own assumption of responsibility for accountability issues in their organisations as 
encouragement for broader interest in accountability in the French nonprofit sector 
(Organisations 4, 21, 25, 27, 30, 31, 32, B, C, D, E, and I). Therefore, leaders’ interest 
in their own influence crossed both respondent groups.
The process of bringing accountability to the organisation’s agenda relies in 
large part on the Director General for those areas most related to operations and the 
President for the areas most closely linked to governance or the conseil 
d  ’administration. With respect to the former, most Directors General simply give 
orders to implement specific practices. For example, one Comite Group member piloted 
an internal audit process himself (Organisation 25); one enforced a process of focusing 
on accountability for volunteers (Organisation 21); and a third decided that the conseil 
d ’administration should have a dashboard (one-page summaries of key financial and 
performance indicators most relevant to a particular NPO) (Organisation 15). These 
voluntary accountability mechanisms do not require conseil d ’administration approval. 
Similarly, with respect to the latter, many Presidents single-handedly order procedures. 
One President declared that all of his expenditures would be approved by the conseil 
d ’administration (Organisation 17). An example requiring a lengthier process is the 
election of independent directors to the Comite’s conseil d ’administration. The election 
required over a year of Soublin’s piloting an information and internal lobbying 
campaign, engaging individual Comite administrateurs, members, and outside experts. 
Finally, two Comite Group interviewees noted using the Comite as an “excuse” or 
vehicle for convincing their conseil d ’administration to approve accountability-related 
matters if the conseil d ’administration resists (Organisations 25 and 30; Comite senior 
management calls/interviews 2007). Alternatively, a few persistently raise issues until 
the conseil d ’administration follows the advice and/or administrateurs change over time 
as their terms end (Comite senior management calls/interviews 2007). Finally, as noted 
in Section 4.4.1, the initiatives of the leaders likely overshadow even size in terms of 
accountability efforts.
277 See also Section 5.4.3 on leadership and ethical, effective management.
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4.5 Relationship of Empirical Findings on Increasing Accountability to 
Theoretical Framework
Rose-Ackerman’s analysis of weighing the various costs, benefits, and 
influences on “signalling” trustworthiness explains the core strategic assessment process 
around the organisation-driven increasing accountability exposed in this chapter. This 
strategic assessment of accountability-related decisions across a range of NPOs, taking 
into consideration internal and external variables noted in Section 4.4, underlies the 
general approach to increasing accountability (the “how” accountability is increasing 
that serves as a foundation for asking “why”).
The importance of size as a variable in the strategic assessment of accountability 
mechanisms noted in Section 4.4.1 relates directly to Hansmann’s model. The increased 
need to implement accountability mechanisms with increasing size of organisation links 
to Hansmann’s explanation that the higher the earnings, the higher the risk of 
unreasonable distribution of funds to controlling management (Hansmann 1980, 871). 
Smaller organisations theoretically present less incentive to controlling persons to 
circumvent the nondistribution constraint (i.e., earnings must be significant enough not 
to be able to be paid out as reasonable management salaries) (Hansmann 1980, 871; 
Independent Sector and Board Source 2006; Unerman and O'Dwyer 2006, 310).278
Finally, the empirical findings relate to Salamon’s insistence that modem tmst 
must be earned through accountability rather than assumed from the intrinsic 
characteristics of the nonprofit form. Even the few respondents beginning to extend the 
notion of accountability as far as performance evaluation insist on the on-going
9 7 0importance of tmst generally. All imply a tmst based on something other than 
accountability even if they do not articulate the idea of a nondistribution constraint in
^QA
such words. The extent to which respondents currently consider accountability a 
necessary supplement to tmst, as opposed to an issue separate from tmst, differs 
depending on the cited rationale for increasing accountability and underlies the 
empirical and theoretical explanations in Chapters 5 and 6.
278 VAMs are not irrelevant to small NPOs but rather should be examined on a case-by-case basis to 
maximise the strategic assessment in the organisational context. Moreover, no respondents commented on 
the importance of administrative expenditures to ensure adequate financial/accounting/legal oversight that 
underlies US best practice (e.g. Independent Sector 2004c, Section V). See also Section 4.2.3 “Code o f 
Ethics”
279 Performance evaluation is further explored in Chapter 5.3.1.
280 See Chapter 2 Introduction and Section 2.1 for references to literature on donor trust.
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4.6 Conclusion
Interest in accountability, and the efforts to introduce mechanisms to enhance 
accountability, among French NPOs representing a range of sectors of activity, size, 
degree of international engagement, and initiative and profile of leader, are increasing. 
Evidence of dedication to increasing accountability includes the interest in the subject 
demonstrated during the interview process and the supporting concrete examples of 
accountability efforts. Respondents in both the Comite Group and the Control Group 
have individually adopted a range of VAMs, implemented additional voluntary 
accountability mechanisms beyond regulatory obligations, Comite requirements, and/or 
the defined list of VAMs, and prioritised others for future implementation.
For both groups of respondents, the increasing accountability in France derives 
largely from organisation-generated, inside out efforts based on the strategic 
assessment, as opposed to the US accountability environment derived largely from 
federal and state regulation. Internal variables appear to influence this strategic 
assessment; however, external variables are significantly less important. Thus the / 'air 
du temps in France reflects the collective creation of external context of increasing 
accountability from individual organisations’ accountability efforts more than 
organisations’ generalised sense of, or reaction to, a top down regulated accountability 
framework. There are no significant differences between the two respondent groups in 
terms of level of interest in accountability, implementation of VAMs, priorities for the 
future, or relevance of the variables. The Code of Ethics was the one area of weakness 
in the Control Group compared to the Comite if the Comite’s Charter is considered a 
code of ethics. However, the key conclusion is that no two respondents are alike in 
terms of accountability mechanisms implemented and/or accountability priorities for the 
future.
Nonetheless, overall respondents in both groups still fall short of US standards 
on a variety of levels. First, the most significant discrepancies include the accountability 
mechanisms related to independent oversight of accountability matters, particularly 
independent directors, audit committees, and the whistleblower mechanism. The 
weakness in independent oversight in turn affects decision-making relating to oversight 
of management compensation, conflicts of interest, hiring and supervising the Director 
General, and general unbiased governance. Similarly, while the Comite recently has
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taken the significant step to elect independent administrateurs, the Comite also 
continues to lag significantly behind US best practice standards. Second, the findings 
also show weakness regarding accessibility of disclosure of accountability-related 
matters. Both are taken up in the policy recommendations in Chapter 8.
The next three chapters explore in greater detail the strategic assessment process 
and the possible reasons for the growing interest in accountability and adoption of 
measures to increase accountability. The spectrum from Hansmann’s trust to Salamon’s 
accountability-based trust underlies the empirical analysis.
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Chapter 5 
Ethical, Effective Management 
“Doing the Right Thing”? Disregarding Donors?
“Accountability is not really about donor trust...it is a normal part of being an association and 
goes along...with being modem...and it’s the right thing to do” [author translation] (Organisation H).
“NPOs should not spend their time trying to figure out what it is that donors want” [author 
translation] (Organisation C).
Introduction
Building on the previous chapter’s analysis of organisations’ strategic 
assessment of accountability as the fundamental process showing how accountability is 
increasing, this chapter moves on to the empirical analysis of why accountability is
•  •  981mcreasing. In particular, this chapter analyses ethical, effective management, the 
most oft-cited explanation for increasing accountability above even donor trust 
(addressed in Chapter 6). It then explores key factors driving increasing accountability 
in furtherance of ethical, effective management and the relevance of the variables to 
organisations’ decision-making relating to such factors: corporatisation, integration of 
international standards, and funder accountability requirements (each as defined below). 
This chapter also considers the relevance of donor trust generally to respondents citing 
ethical, effective management, including how, if at all, these organisations position 
themselves within the Hansmann to Salamon trust theoretical spectrum.
First, ethical, effective management of NPOs in the current nonprofit 
environment emerges as the single most important reason for increasing accountability. 
Ethical, effective management is an internally driven process, resulting in the bottom 
up, organisation-driven increase in accountability introduced in Chapter 3 (as opposed 
to the regulation downward US system). Moreover, the attention to ethical, effective 
management through accountability penetrates many layers of the organisation.
Second, the chapter explores three key factors driving accountability efforts in 
furtherance of ethical, effective management: corporatisation (i.e., the transfer of 
corporate accountability mechanisms and policies from the corporate/for-profit world to
281 Drafting advice from Howell (e-mail 2009).
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the nonprofit sector (hereinafter referred to as “corporatisation”)); the integration of 
international standards of accountability (primarily US models explored in Chapter 3); 
and compliance with accountability requirements imposed by 
govemmental/corporate/institutional funders (hereinafter referred to as “funder 
accountability requirements”). All three of these driving forces function within the 
larger ethical, effective management objective rather than as independent rationales for 
increasing accountability. Overall, the Comite as an independent organisation does not 
focus on ethical, effective management and lags behind the member organisations in 
implementation of many related accountability mechanisms tied to corporatisation and 
international standards. Finally, as the results will indicate, respondents do not consider 
accountability mechanisms implemented to further ethical, effective management as 
mitigating the danger to an organisation’s reputation from scandal linked to failure of 
accountability within the organisation or another NPO.
All respondents citing ethical, effective management emphasise the idea of a 
continually evolving individual best balance of accountability. The internal variables 
prove particularly important lenses for organisations’ strategic assessment relating to 
corporatisation, integration of international standards, and funder accountability 
requirements. Respondents across both groups view the external variables as relatively 
unimportant, which aligns with the internally driven focus of the ethical, effective 
management rationale.
The last section then dissects the theoretical implications of the ethical, effective 
management rationale for increasing accountability. The theoretical discussion first 
considers the relationship between the driving forces behind ethical, effective 
management and Hansmann’s trust theory. In addition, a functional equivalent of Rose- 
Ackerman’s strategic assessment of “signalling” trust emerges but through a different, 
ethical, effective management focused approach. Salamon’s suggestion of 
accountability as a necessary support for Hansmann’s trust in the current environment 
remains separate from the ethical, effective management group’s motivation. Finally, 
irrespective of the extent of, and/or the cited primary rationale for, increasing 
accountability, all respondents in both groups agree on the enduring importance of trust.
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5.1 Ethical. Effective Management: Key Concepts282
5.1.1 Components o f Ethical. Effective Management
The proposed empirically-derived conceptual overview of ethical, effective 
management delineates three combined elements: effective management (including, in 
turn, professionalisation, internal trust (as defined below), respect of appropriate 
divisions between governance and operations, and strategic planning); ethical 
behaviour.; and a notion of “normal” organisational behaviour in “today’s world” 
(Organisations C and H). Ethical, effective management was not one of the specified 
options in the interview question exploring the most important explanations for 
increasing accountability within respondent organisations. Critically, the term emerged 
empirically from interviewees’ responses. Every respondent that answered the question 
spontaneously described accountability as “the right thing to do” (la bonne chose a 
faire) using exactly those words.
Even after further prodding and repeating alternative explanations for increasing 
accountability (including donor trust), respondents re-emphasised that there was only 
this one reason for efforts to increase accountability. When asked to explain further, 
different respondents emphasised different aspects of ethical, effective management. 
Thus the evidence comprises a range of individual examples and perspectives, reflecting 
the individuality of the strategic assessment process. However, all included a reference 
to one or more of effective management, an ethical component, and the notion that there 
was “no choice” in the current era. This “no choice” perspective reflects organisations’ 
individual perspective rather than an externally driven sentiment. Finally, ethical, 
effective management is primarily achieved through corporatisation, integration of 
international standards, and compliance with funder accountability requirements.
Effective Management. First, effective management is the core operational 
component of ethical, effective management and most closely linked to the 
implementation of accountability mechanisms. All respondents in both groups citing 
ethical, effective management describe accountability as essential for effective NPO 
management generally. Management in turn comprises four areas: professionalisation; 
internal trust (i.e., trust of the conseil d ’administration, management, and others within
282 The strategy for defining ethical, effective management reflects comments from Mangen (meeting
2008).
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the organisation (Anheier 2005, 238-9)); appropriate separation of
governance/operations; and strategic planning processes that integrate accountability 
mechanisms. Examples are individual to various organisations and demonstrate the key 
theme in the thesis of organisation upward, inside out increasing accountability in 
France.
The most oft-cited management objective in both respondent groups was 
“professionalisation” through implementation of voluntary accountability mechanisms. 
Some cite redefining chief financial officer roles, internal controls, and committee 
structure of the conseil d'administration (Organisations 6, 25, and A; Organisations 14, 
17, and 23; Organisations 17 and D, respectively). Other examples include changing 
the Director General regularly enough to have a “fresh eye” on accountability, attention 
to clarification of roles of different members of the management team, upgrading 
computer systems relating to accountability, centralising national fund-raising event 
procedures, and improving meeting write-up and record-keeping procedures 
(Organisation 10; Organisations 7 and 12; Organisation 15; Organisations 14 and 15, 
respectively). At each level the notion of professionalism from within was clear -  
irrespective of perceived behaviour outside the organisation. In addition, ten (30%) 
Comite Group members and five (42%) Control Group members describe ethical, 
effective management through accountability as “executing the profession better,” 
including improving accountability of field operations and more generally linking 
accountability to operations (Organisations 7, 14, 17, 19, 22, 24, 25, 30, 31, 32, A, B, C, 
D, and H). Another commented that accountability was the “right thing” to ensure 
“pertinence and efficacy” (Organisation C). Two senior sector leaders exclaimed that 
they “deplore” and “abhor” “the absence of professionalism in the nonprofit sector!” 
and “do not believe in enthusiastic amateurism” (Organisations 17 and D, respectively). 
Finally, respondents did not link professionalism to exchanging volunteers with paid 
employees -  in contrast with the Foreign Affairs Commission Report’s suggestion that 
professionalising NPOs requires replacing volunteers with paid professionals (National 
Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission 2007, 45). All but one of the respondent conseil 
d ’administration Presidents are volunteers, as are a few management positions 
(Organisation 14 (paid President); Organisations 23 and 33 (particular emphasis on 
volunteer management), respectively).
283 See Section 6.3.2 on volunteers.
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Accountability mechanisms have also become a tool for effective management 
through ensuring “internal trust.” Respondents’ definition of internal trust matches the 
literature: reassuring the executive team and ensuring the trust of the conseil 
d ‘administration in management (Anheier 2005, 238-9). The key aspect of internal trust 
is responsibility of leaders for accountability matters. Leaders suggested that 
accountability “comes from [them],” complimented a predecessor on major 
accountability initiatives, and in the case of one small organisation “even [dumped] the 
founder/former President” for failure to enforce a culture emphasising accountability 
(Organisations 21, 25, and 24, respectively). Thus part of the management benefits and 
requirements include leaders’ “will” to “do the right thing.”
The respondents citing ethical, effective management also demonstrated the 
greatest awareness of the importance of clear boundaries between governance and 
operations that defines most well-functioning US boards of directors. One seasoned 
President believes implementation of accountability mechanisms confines the conseil 
d  ’administration to using “their noses but not their fingers” with regard to operations 
(Organisation 17). One Control Group respondent strives for a “true board (a US-style 
board) that...oversees the paid executive director, budget, and planning” (Organisation
D). Another established a charter for the bureau that reflects exclusion of operational 
matters (Organisation 30). Finally, two international NPOs undertook a major 
restructuring of conseil d ’administration!senior management relations, each with 
outside expert consultants (Organisations 30 and C). This governance/operations line 
requires independent oversight by independent directors, which is complicated by the 
membership structure of associations and resulting general absence of independent
"J O/T
administrateurs.
Finally, accountability has become an “instrument of strategic differentiation” 
and a “strategic and management tool” (Organisations 18, 19, and 23; Organisation 25, 
respectively). The management component of ethical, effective management 
increasingly includes detailed qualitative/quantitative strategic planning (e.g. one 
organisation’s three-to-five year plan including delegation of authority and employee 
“contracts” to meet strategic planning objectives) (Organisations 23 and 31;
284 See also Sections 4.4.2 and 5.4.3 on the initiative of the leader.
285 The line between governance and operations is just developing in the French nonprofit sector as a 
formal responsibility for conseil d ’administration oversight but is most advanced among respondents 
citing ethical, effective management. See also Section 5.4.3.
286 See Sections 4.2.1 “Independent Directors” and 5.3.1.
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Organisation 18, respectively). Accountability considerations underlie the strategic 
planning process, and voluntary accountability mechanisms increasingly appear as 
planning objectives along with operating objectives (Organisations 18, 19, C, D, and
E). One respondent even requested confidential treatment of the network of internal 
strategic/reporting structure documents shared during the interview due to the 
importance to competitive strategy (Organisation 19).
Ethics. Second, ethical, effective management includes an ethical component for 
all respondents in both respondent groups, even for respondents speaking more 
extensively of the management aspects. Respondents described this aspect of ethical, 
effective management as “defending” values, reflecting in organisational behaviour the 
“values that the mission is about,” a “culture of accountability with core values,” and a 
“moral contract of trust” (Organisations 22 and 32; Organisations 21, and 13; 
Organisations 2 and 12, respectively). Comments all explicitly and implicitly refer to a 
general ethical obligation to behave in accordance with expectations irrespective of 
others’ reaction (recalling Rose-Ackerman) rather than donor trust. This question of 
“why ‘do the right thing’?” in a situation where, as noted in Sections 2.1.3 and 3.1.1, the 
nondistribution constraint eliminates financial incentives and is weakly enforced is 
central (Hansmann call 2008).
The ethics element again exemplifies organisation-specific context influencing 
individual strategic assessment. Militant organisations believe militant members’ 
historically consistent demand for dialogue increases attention to ethical matters, 
including increasing accountability efforts (Organisations 9 and 30). One medical 
support organisation ethically “owed accountability to parents and patients because 
members are responsible to peers” (Organisation 14). Another emphasised that ethical 
management is more important than even in the for-profit world because they “sell 
health!” (Organisation 7).
Normal Practice. Third, respondents consider accountability efforts in 
furtherance of ethical, effective management “normal” effective NPO practice in a 
world increasingly concerned with accountability. Comments include acceptance that 
accountability is “part of the normal evolution of things in particular in an era when
287 Other organisations may include accountability in the strategic planning process, but due to time 
constraints the interview did not explore this except where respondents demonstrated particular emphasis.
288 See Section 4.2.1 “Whistleblower Mechanism” and Note 243, supra for a description o f militant 
organisations. All interviewees who spoke out on the importance of militancy represent Comity Group 
respondents.
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accountability is on everybody’s mind” and part of the “normal functioning of an 
association” (Organisations 29 and C, respectively). Two Directors General insisted that 
accountability is “part of keeping up with the times” and “being modem” -  with all 
other respondents agreeing (Organisations J and H, respectively). Thus accountability is 
becoming ordinary course for both governance and operations, notwithstanding the 
varied levels o f sophistication of implementation of accountability mechanisms among 
organisations. This notion of “normal” rarely involves the influence of external 
variables on accountability or donor tmst. Rather, “normal” appears to reflect both 
organisations’ internal sense of what is the “right” way to behave with respect to 
accountability plus organisations’ sense of other organisations -  i.e., internally 
generated accountability efforts collectively creating the external level of normalcy.290
5.1.2 Ethical. Effective Management Responses -  For Show or For Real?
The question of whether some of the ethical, effective management responses 
were “for public show” rather than the true underlying reason for increasing 
accountability emerged during the follow-up verification and analysis of the interview
9Q1findings (Comite senior management call/interview 2007). This concern appears 
unfounded. As described throughout this chapter, the group of respondents citing 
ethical, effective management as the primary rationale for increasing accountability 
includes the most committed and sophisticated organisations in terms of implementation 
of accountability mechanisms (surpassing the Comite itself and Comite standards for 
members in many cases). Thus the rhetoric is backed by concrete actions. Moreover, the 
candour and depth of disclosure of weaknesses in the organisations’ accountability 
mechanisms during the interviews, even among the largest and most well-known 
respondents, argues against “acting.” Also, as noted in Section 1.2, the interviewees 
were senior members of the French nonprofit sector, and indicated that they have 
“nothing to prove” as NPO leaders or individuals. Finally, the question of public image 
(i.e., whether ethical, effective management is an example of “the right deed for the 
wrong reason”) is, nonetheless, important to ask even though the end result is still
289 There do not appear to be important links between ethical, effective management and new public 
management (NPM) (Schedler and Proeller 2002, 165 and 170). No respondents referred to NPM.
290 See Sections 2.3, 3.2, 4.1, and 4.2 for sector context. See Section 5.4 citing Howell on the impact of 
environment.
291 See also Section 5.2 on how ethical, effective management respondents do not cite, although some 
explicitly refute, donor trust as a key rationale for increasing accountability.
147
9Q9substantively higher levels of accountability. Arguably a public image incentive 
might more closely approach the donor trust rationale that respondents separated from
9 0 9ethical, effective management.
5.2 Empirical Findings: Accountability and Ethical. Effective Management -  
Respondent Organisations and the Comite
This section explores the empirical findings of the importance of the ethical, 
effective management rationale for increasing accountability among respondents in both 
the Comite Group and the Control Group, compared to the relatively lesser importance 
of ethical, effective management to the Comite itself as an independent organisation. 
The analysis then considers the relationship between the ethical, effective management 
and donor trust responses. Finally, evidence of the depth of implementation of 
accountability mechanisms to achieve ethical, effective management within the 
organisations adds perspective.
The most frequently and vehemently cited reason for increasing accountability 
in both the Comite Group and the Control Group organisations is that accountability is 
essential for ethical, effective management. The ethical, effective management results 
were stronger on a percentage basis in the Control Group. Within the Comite Group, 19 
(58%) cited ethical, effective management. Within the Control Group, nine (75%) 
prioritised ethical, effective management. All respondents were then asked to comment 
on a brief list of other possible reasons for increasing accountability (omitting any that 
respondents raised spontaneously): donor trust, the media, corporatisation, the influence 
of international standards of accountability, donor pressure, funder accountability 
requirements, and regulation. As noted above, the idea of ethical, effective management 
was not specifically offered for comment as it emerged empirically through the course 
of the research.
Respondents citing ethical, effective management as the primary rationale for 
increasing accountability focused on the intrinsic importance of accountability as both 
the basic morality and management strategy irrespective o f  donor reaction {trust or
292 The reference from T.S. Eliot’s poem Murder In the Cathedral responds to a question and reference to 
the poem from Mangen (meeting 2008; Eliot 1935).
293 See, for example, the discussion on performance evaluation in Section 5.3.1.
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otherwise). In every case, respondents citing ethical, effective management answered 
without hesitation and rarely referred to the other potential rationales. There were no 
moderate answers like “somewhat important” among ethical, effective management 
respondents. No respondents in either group cited ethical, effective management as a 
second priority. Only one respondent cited donor trust as a second rationale closely 
behind ethical, effective management (Organisation 15). For respondents citing ethical, 
effective management there was only one acceptable answer. Certain respondents 
concisely described the independent importance of accountability as “no choice” (i.e., a 
mandatory management obligation) (Organisations 7, 18, 25, 31, C, and D). Similarly, 
no respondents affirmatively said that ethical, effective management was not a factor. 
Finally, within the ethical, effective management category, only seven Comite Group 
and two Control Group organisations also offered a secondary explanation after ethical, 
effective management other than donor trust (Organisations 6, 15, 21, 24, 25, 29, 31, 33, 
I, and J).
All respondents in both groups suggested, explicitly or implicitly, that this view 
had moved accountability to a higher level than donor trust or other donor result driven 
rationales. However, as with the respondents citing donor trust, the risk to an 
organisation’s reputation of failure of accountability remained a consistent parallel 
theme.294
Despite the frequently crucial focus of leaders on ethical, effective management 
described in Section 5.4.3, the ethical, effective management practices are deeply 
integrated into the organisation’s policies and operations. Multiple examples offer 
evidence of the individual, organisation upward efforts to increase accountability 
beyond regulation, Comite requirements, and VAMs. The ethical, effective 
management group included the most sophisticated organisations with respect to written 
policies. The most effective and pro-active were a clear directive from the President to 
implement all policies in writing, specifically to avoid loss of accountability at 
succession of the President or Director General (Organisation 17) and written strategic 
documents binding headquarters and the field through a network of written policies 
considered strategically unique (Organisation 19). Other examples include top down
294 This aligns with a 2005 study of approximately 500 US NPOs by The Johns Hopkins Nonprofit 
Listening Post Project that concluded “...relatively limited numbers of the organizations making recent 
changes in their accountability practices cited funder demands, media attention, or other outside pressures 
as reasons for the changes. Much more common were reasons related to a desire to ensure transparency 
and accountability..., demonstrate effectiveness..., and serve customers and clients better...” (Salamon 
and Geller 2005, 9).
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mandates for written internal audit procedures (Organisation 25) and written policies 
and letters binding management and the administrateurs with respect to certain
90Saccounting and/or auditor policies (Organisation 18).
In addition, the group citing ethical, effective management includes all of the 
most resolutely accountable in both groups in terms of internal documents relating to 
accountability matters (e.g. internal manuals and volunteer codes). Respondents felt that 
the internal documents/procedures offered concrete examples of wide understanding of 
the term “accountability” among employees, the conseil d  ’administration, and 
volunteers (despite the absence of a formal organisation-specific or French language 
definition). Respondents also suggested that these documents establish a breadth of 
expectation of ethical, effective management within the organisation, even if employees 
do not always read all the documents. More generally, 13 (39%) Comite Group 
respondents and two (17%) Control Group respondents citing ethical, effective 
management have implemented the most extensive accountability mechanisms (in terms 
of number and type -  VAMs and others) in the entire study (Organisations 7, 14, 15, 17, 
18, 19 ,21 ,24 ,25,21,29,30,31, C, and D).296
Finally, the explicit separation of ethical, effective management from donor trust 
among respondents citing ethical, effective management merits particular emphasis. 
Ethical, effective management requires acting on the basis of independent managerial, 
ethical, and sector analyses -  not on the perception of donor or any other external 
reaction. 13 (ten (30%) Comite Group and three (25%) Control Group) respondents 
stated that they did not consider, or hardly considered, donor trust or external reaction 
with phrases such as “regardless of donor trust” or the “irrelevance of donor trust” 
(Organisations 6, 7, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 32, B, C, and FI).297 Many of the 
examples of voluntary accountability mechanisms cited targeted management objectives 
that would not even be known and/or understood by individual donors (e.g. the 
dashboard described in Section 2.2.1 and in Appendix 4). One acknowledged that the 
“Coca-Cola level renown” his organisation enjoys overprotects donor trust. 
Professionalising the organisation through the implementation of accountability 
measures provides credibility and, more generally, is the “right thing to do” ethically
295 In the case of the Fondation de France, there is a further trickle-down effect on foundations housed 
within the Fondation de France through the written policies and requirements (Fondation de France study 
interview 2007 (See Appendix 1-A); Fondation de France 2007, 2-8).
296 See Section 4.2, Table 4-1, and Appendix 4.
297 Note that this number may be small as others communicated the idea less explicitly.
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(Organisation 25). One international organisation respondent suggested that the 
extreme example is that “in the US good management compensates for trust...because 
the US organisations have stereotypes of good management and therefore no real 
suspicion by donors” (Organisation 18).
Those that recognised the de facto benefits to donor trust of ethical, effective 
management carefully noted the cause and effect: “It is simply normal to work with 
clarity and transparency...nonetheless it is true that good accountability establishes 
donors trust” (Organisation 7). One noted that the positive effect of accountability on 
trust is an “underlying assumption” even if not motivated by donor trust (Organisation 
14). Similarly, four respondents explicitly mentioned the importance of image, but all as 
affected by accountability after the fact and none as the reason for accountability efforts 
(Organisations 6, 12, 24, and I).
The Comite and Ethical Effective Management. The Comite itself does not 
focus on ethical, effective management as a rationale for increasing accountability. In 
2005 the Comite’s conseil d’administration formally reaffirmed the donor trust mission 
and revamped the logo to state “Comite de la Charte giving with trust” (Comite 2008n; 
Comite assemblee generate 2008; Comite 2005d). Moreover, none of the representatives 
of Comite senior management mentioned ethical, effective management in any of the 
numerous formal interviews or informal conversations on the subject -  either with 
respect to Comite members or within the Comite itself. Even the Conseil de 
Deontologie (Ethics Council), a group of independent advisors that advised the Comite 
periodically on ethical issues until recently dissolved into individual advisors, 
functioned within the donor trust mission (Comite senior management call/interview 
2007; Cohas-Bogey e-mail May 2008). Similarly, the financial transparency 
requirements target donors specifically, with the Statement of Use of Funds the 
lynchpin (Comite senior management calls/interviews 2007; Organisation 4). 
Separately (i.e., outside the discussion of the Comite’s mission and requirements), 
Comite senior management does address accountability as related to ethical, effective 
management generally. Also, de facto many of the Comite’s requirements further 
ethical, effective management (e.g. Comite 2008e and Comite 2008f). However, the 
lack of direct focus on ethical, effective management both within the Comite and on 
behalf of Comite members results in the Comite lagging behind member organisations
298 See Section 5.3.1 “The Comite and Corporatisation” on the restriction on publication of income 
statements by Comity members.
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with respect to implementation of accountability mechanisms relating to corporatisation 
and international standards (analysed below).
5.3 Empirical Findings: Three Key Forces Driving Increasing Accountability to
Achieve Ethical. Effective Management -  Corporatisation. Integration of
International Standards, and Compliance with Funder Accountability
Requirements
This section explains how organisations increase accountability in furtherance of 
ethical, effective management. Three key driving forces for implementing voluntary 
accountability mechanisms to achieve ethical, effective management include: 
corporatisation, the integration of international standards of accountability, and 
compliance with funder accountability requirements. All three reflect the individual 
organisational strategic assessment of appropriate accountability initiatives that generate 
inside out increasing accountability and demonstrate the dynamic nature of 
accountability. However, despite the evidence of the implementation of accountability 
mechanisms triggered by these factors, few cited them as independent rationales for 
increasing accountability. Most respondents in both groups considered all three 
corollaries to, or forces in support of, ethical, effective management. Respondents also 
insisted unwaveringly on the on-going independent importance of donor trust 
irrespective of the choice of ethical, effective management as the primary rationale for 
increasing accountability and/or the relevance of these three factors. Finally, 
respondents do not perceive accountability efforts targeting ethical, effective 
management (whether or not triggered by any or all of these three factors) as protection 
from scandal resulting from failure of accountability within their own organisation or 
another NPO. Table 5-1 sets out the approximate response levels with respect to each of 
the three.
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Table 5-1
Driv ing Forces for Accountability Targeting Ethical, Effective M anagement
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in International Standards 
o f  Accountability
27%
9
17%
2
27%
9
42%
14
58%
7
48%
16
33%
4
Some Corporatisation No Corporatisation Some Interest No Interest
Funder
Accountability
Requirements3
9%
3 1
Compliance With 
Funder Accountability 
Requirements
■  CC Group
■  Control Group
Source: Author's research data.
'Corporatisation: 7, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 29, C, and I. Affirmatively stated no corporatisation: Organisations 1, 2, 
3, 4, 10, 15, 16, 22, and 27. Organisation codes and table reflect respondent comments. Note that de facto some o f  
these organisations did exhibit corporatisation.
2 N o respondents focused on integration o f  international standards o f  accountability as a direct rationale for their own 
increasing accountability. Some interest in international standards: Organisations 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 18, 19, 25, 26, 
27, 30, 31, 32 (“from advisors only”), B, C, D, E, G, I, and H (“when ready”). N o interest in international standards: 
Organisations 1, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, A, J, K, and L. Control Group respondents 
stating “no interest” still de facto implemented international practices.
3 Organisations 5, 19, and D. Note that other organisations have state, corporate, and institutional funding but did not 
consider them at all related to increasing accountability or ethical, effective management.
5.3.1 Empirical Findinss: Corporatisation as a Driving Force for Increasins 
Accountability
Corporatisation is the most important driving force for increasing accountability 
practices in furtherance of ethical, effective management. Performance evaluation is at 
the most advanced edge of corporatisation. While few considered corporatisation an 
independent explanation for implementing new accountability mechanisms, many cited 
newly implemented VAMs and other voluntary accountability mechanisms that de facto
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exemplify corporatisation.299 Accountability mechanisms implemented through 
corporatisation target almost exclusively ethical, effective management.300
The most important areas of corporatisation are selected individually by 
organisations and therefore offer evidence of the bottom up approach to increasing 
accountability. The organisations decide internally which VAMs and other voluntary 
accountability mechanisms within the corporate menu are important in their own 
organisational context. These include setting qualitative and quantitative objectives as a 
basis of employee evaluations; formal strategic planning; risk analysis; internal audit 
procedures; and hiring senior management positions through professional search firms 
generally focused on corporate hiring (Organisations 8, 18, C, and D; Organisations 18, 
19, and C; Organisation 7; Organisations 7, 25, and 32; Organisations 7 and 31,
• OAIrespectively). One Control Group A organisation has adopted an advisory board of 
corporate luminaries who share overall business world perspective at regular semi­
annual meetings, which the Director General considers an important part of “staying 
with the times” (Organisation C). Another major Comite Group organisation’s study of 
the whistleblower mechanism reflects the importance of accountability “...as in the 
corporate world” (Organisation 25).
In addition, the list of best voluntary accountability practices above and beyond 
regulation, the Comite requirements, and VAMs, collected during the course of the 
interview shows extensive and sophisticated borrowing from corporate practices. A 
significant number reflect best practice in corporations, such as “dashboards,” internal 
audit teams, disclosure of individual management compensation, and linking variable 
compensation (e.g. year-end bonuses) to individual and team performance of specified 
planning objectives. Only a few practices in that list were specific to the US or French 
nonprofit sectors such as those relating to donors and volunteers. Other practices are 
designed to substitute functionally for the corporate equivalent in a less resource­
intensive manner and/or a less culturally sensitive manner.
Finally, performance evaluation remains on the latest edge of corporatisation- 
driven accountability mechanisms, as well as the most costly, difficult to implement, 
and complex to evaluate (KPMG-Observatoire 2007, 52). There is no significant
299 Some overlap between the international standards and corporatisation explanations is logical given the 
largely US origins for both. See Section 3.1.1 and 5.3.2.
300 The literature suggests that corporatisation could also reflect increasing competition even outside the 
sector with business (Archambault 1997b, 14; Ryan 1999, 127-9).
301 See also Section 5.1.1 “EffectiveManagement”
302 See also Section 4.3 and Appendix 4.
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difference in level of interest in performance evaluation between the two respondent 
groups. Approximately 25% of the organisations in each of the Comite Group and the 
Control Group spontaneously raised performance evaluation at some point in the 
interview (Organisation 5, 9, 20, 26, 30, 31, 33, A, C, H; Soublin call December
OAT
2008). In general, these organisations had already demonstrated a high level of 
understanding of accountability and implementation of challenging accountability 
mechanisms and therefore were ready to add complex performance evaluation.
Several examples illustrate the scope of the challenge of effective, objective 
performance evaluation -  as well as the particularly individual nature of performance 
evaluation as an accountability mechanism. One respondent discussed how expense 
tracking must be extended to evaluate the program efficacy of specified sites in Africa 
(Organisation C). Two respondents cautioned that donors will not necessarily 
understand expense allocation for activities or how to measure success (Organisations 
30 and 31). Another Director General emphasised the on-going performance evaluation 
dilemmas of short-term performance versus long-term accountability and other 
priorities, as well as objectively measurable versus more subjective results. His donors 
support continued funding of a lobbying effort for a vote that a multilateral organisation 
would approve even without additional investment largely because the end result (i.e., 
the vote) is measurable. In contrast, funding for another politically challenging project 
that yielded unmeasurable “planted seeds” for future progress would trigger a donor 
backlash because he could not deliver objective measurable results. Even the 
organisation’s international network leadership (International Secretariat) internally 
seeks measurable results on a short-term basis.304 Certain of these examples, while 
raised by organisations citing ethical, effective management and focusing on 
performance evaluation as an element of ethical, effective management, seem to circle 
back somewhat to donor reaction (although perhaps not donor trust).
Vehicles for Corporatisation. Regulatory and self-regulatory patterns leading to 
corporatisation in the US offer a point of comparison for the explanation for potential 
increases in corporatisation in France. As discussed in Chapter 3, the most important 
recent US example of transfer from the corporate world to the nonprofit world was the 
direct application to NPOs of key Sarbanes-Oxley Act provisions (i.e., the document
303 As noted in Section 2.2.2(a), the definition of accountability proposed, as well as the Comity’s 
approach to accountability as defined through internal operations and activities with members, excludes 
performance evaluation (Comity 2008h).
4 Organisation code is omitted to protect confidentiality.
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retention and whistleblower provisions) and the rapid adoption in state nonprofit law of
OAC
various Sarbanes Oxley Act provisions such as the audit committee. These Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act and state law changes were in turn supplemented by such self-regulatory 
efforts as the Independent Sector’s sector-wide best practice guidelines. In contrast to 
the federal regulation downward influence in the US, in France corporate accountability 
practices emerge from organisations selecting individually relevant corporate-derived 
voluntary accountability mechanisms through the strategic assessment process, based in 
part on the internal and external variables. As noted in Section 4.3, many respondents’ 
accountability practices far exceeded regulation and pushed the boundaries of 
accountability on an individual basis.
Further down the corporatisation chain from regulation, the transfer of 
accountability requirements from funder to grantee organisations has become an 
increasingly important explanation for expansion of NPO accountability into 
performance evaluation. A growing number of funders must themselves report to their 
own funders -  particularly corporate foundations and venture philanthropy funds. The 
increase in corporate foundations in the US and France has led to a focus on the 
oversight of grantee NPOs’ independent directors in order to assure, in turn, 
accountability to the donor corporate foundation’s own independent board of directors 
(Arrillaga e-mail 2008; SV2 group meetings 2002-04; Organisation A; Little (Third 
Sector) 2006, 10). Venture philanthropy similarly expedites the fusion of for-profit and 
nonprofit models as funds are raised from the venture and private equity communities to 
grant to NPOs. A selling point to donors is that venture philanthropy firms will report 
back to the funders in a business language they understand -  i.e., results-based reporting 
(Dawson and Sloane meeting 2006). Impetus Trust, a well-known UK venture 
philanthropy fund, raises funds (largely from successful venture capital and private 
equity investors) for redistribution to NPOs in the belief that Impetus Trusts’ knowledge 
of the sector is worth the cost of services, including due diligence, on-going monitoring, 
and “demonstrable social return on investment” (Impetus Trust 2007, “What Impetus 
Trust Does”). Impetus Trust’s web page is rife with terms such as “results focused,” 
“investment approach,” and “business frameworks” modelled on US venture 
philanthropy firms such as SV2 in Silicon Valley (founded in Silicon Valley 1998) and
305 See Section 3.1.1 “Follow-On to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in State Law"
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Social Ventures Partners International (founded in Seattle in 2001) (Impetus Trust 2007, 
“Investment Approach”).306
Notes o f  Caution. Corporatisation is viewed with some skepticism and generally 
with the caution of maintaining the “heart and soul” of the nonprofit world and 
addressing the challenges of the 1901 Law membership structure. All respondents 
across both groups accept that NPOs need management and accounting tools and 
techniques. Nonetheless, two in the Comite Group (but none in the Control Group) 
reacted against going “too far” with “too much governance” and cited a need to keep the 
for-profit and nonprofit worlds somewhat separate (Organisations 27 and 18, 
respectively). Some association respondents also referred to the difficulty of obtaining 
the support of members on certain practices and the need to convince members in 
incremental steps over time of the value of corporate-derived accountability 
mechanisms (Organisations 30 and I). Two highlighted the need to transform slowly 
employees’ and volunteers’ acceptance of these practices; however, all indirectly 
expressed this measured approach (Organisations 25 and 21, respectively). In virtually 
all cases involving operations the Directors General had the authority to implement new 
internal regulations and practices and enforce compliance. While all respondents 
interested in corporatisation commented on the need for consistent oversight, the limited 
specific commentary on this issue may reflect that fact that overall relatively few
• •  •  0^7organisations are actively engaged in corporatisation (Table 5-1).
Critics feel that the quantitative reporting and professionalisation has reached an 
extreme, hindering progress of humanitarian work and the administrative efficacy of 
NPOs (Organisation 3 and 27; Bruneau 2004, 4). An overriding sentiment persists that 
not everything in the nonprofit world is measurable or, as Hansmann notes, even that 
every donor will measure (Hansmann 1980, 896; Comite de la Charte Conference 
2008). Beyond these general interview discussions, more specifically performance 
evaluation is not without risk or critics regarding utility. Even sector experts focused on 
performance evaluation such as Martin Brookes, Executive Director of UK charity 
rating service New Philanthropy Capital, argued that performance evaluation is a “moral 
imperative” but recognises that a poorly executed, erroneous, or misinterpreted
306 Impetus Trust does not disclose the amount of its own overhead costs raised separately. This is 
necessary to allow donors to measure the efficacy of gifts irrespective of funding source for operating 
costs (e.g. Independent Sector 2008b; Brody 2002, 483).
307 See also Section 5.3.2 “Cautions”
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comment on a NPO’s performance can have disastrous reputational effects on the 
organisation (Brookes (The Guardian) 2007).308
The Comite and Corporatisation. The Comite does not generally exhibit or seek 
to integrate corporate practices internally or in requirements of members despite 
Soublin’s long career with the Schlumberger Group and deep understanding of 
international corporate practice.309 Soublin exemplifies the profile of leader referred to 
in Section 5.4.3 below that recognises the need to function differently in the context of a 
NPO. Soublin considers the corporatisation process generally slow and faults the 
corporate world for not “pushing” enough (Soublin interview 2007).
At the Comite level, the Comite does not disclose management salaries 
individually, requires improvement in document retention, and has not implemented a 
US-style audit committee or a whistleblower mechanism (Soublin interview 2007; 
Comite senior management e-mail 2008). (The audit committee could change now that
*1 1 A
the pre-requisite of independent directors is in place.) Another example of the 
Comite’s failure to corporatise that should be culturally less sensitive is the outdated fee 
structure of a membership fee based on a sliding scale linked to organisations’ total 
revenues from private sources (Comite senior management call/interview 2007). 
Standard practice among similar NPOs, the US member of the International Committee 
on Fundraising Organisations (ICFO) (described in Section 5.3.2), and for-profit 
accountability certification companies is a variable annual fee for services approach 
(Comite senior management call/interview 2007; e.g. Bureau Veritas Quality 
International 2008). One Comite representative suggested a de minimis membership fee 
and commercial fees, combining the French association membership requirements and 
corporate standards (Comite senior management call/interview 2007). This system 
complicates management and would require approval by members to implement.
The Comite’s requirements for members, for example as articulated in the 
guidelines for censeurs, do not generally cover voluntary corporate practices such as 
those mentioned earlier in this section or in Appendix 4 (Comite 2006c). The Comite’s
308 Brookes also notes a key reason charities have not been subjected to performance scrutiny is that many 
donors do not care about performance because they give for social, emotional, and personal reasons 
(Brookes (The Guardian) 2007). The disproportionately successful recipients of aid for the tsunami, 
however, combine renown, the cause, and long-standing reputations for ethical management (e.g. French 
Red Cross) (Cour des comptes 2007, 13). See Section 7.2.1 “The December 26, 2004 Asian Tsunami.”
309 Schlumberger Group is a global oilfield and information services company (Schlumberger Group 
2009).
310 See Table 4-1.
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overwhelming focus on respect of mission and transparency does overlap some (e.g. 
recent modifications regarding disclosure of certain financial ratios and management 
compensation). However, even certain basic areas such as discouraging publication of 
income statements lag behind the most basic US corporate disclosure practices 
(Organisation 26; Comite senior management interviews 2008).311
5.3.2 Empirical Findings: Intesration o f International Accountability
Standards as a Drivine Force for Increasins Accountability
The integration of international standards of accountability is the second most 
important driving force through which ethical, effective management is achieved. As 
part of the discussion of whether, how, and why accountability was increasing within 
the respondents’ organisations, respondents were asked if they considered international 
standards as a matter of information or guidance and/or as a rationale for increasing 
accountability. Virtually all respondents interpreted international as “US.” Only two 
respondents referred to EU or other EU country standards at any point. The 
integration of international standards largely overlaps with corporatisation but targets 
certain of the particularly US-based mechanisms and some different vehicles for 
transfer. As with corporatisation, few considered the integration of international 
standards an independent rationale for increasing accountability. Rather, the integration 
of international standards almost always reflected general interest or awareness and a 
corollary to ethical, effective management. (See Table 5-1.)
First, the interviews revealed a moderate difference on a percentage basis 
between the significant number of Comite Group respondents not interested generally in 
international standards compared to the majority of the Control Group respondents that 
were. The most interested Comite Group interviewees focused on three areas. Two 
respondents emphasised developing Comite standards to a level acceptable to 
international donors in light of the “porous frontiers” for both giving and service 
delivery (Organisation 2 and 18). One focused on greater attention to management and 
transparency of donor capital raised in France and distributed to programs outside of
311 The financially sophisticated reader would need the income statement (along with the balance sheet 
and the Statement of Use of Funds) to understand fully the financial statements. See Section 5.2 “The 
Comite and Ethical, Effective Management.”
312 These respondents lamented the challenge o f harmonising with the EU and the absence of a standard 
EU form of NPO by-laws (Organisations 14 and 22, respectively).
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France (Organisation 26). Finally, two argued for greater awareness of international 
standards generally among Comite members -  whether or not internationally directed 
and whether or not they would actually implement any international standards 
(Organisations 4 and 32).
The most important international standards to consider -  due to their importance 
in the US and, as with corporatisation, respondents’ priorities -  overlap with many of 
the important examples of corporatisation. These include: independent directors, the 
whistleblower mechanism, disclosure of executive compensation individually for senior 
management, and the document retention policy (discussed in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 
4.2.3, respectively). These are also the most complex procedurally to implement. The 
key differences among them are the mechanisms for transfer described below.
Vehicles o f  Transfer o f International Standards o f  Accountability. The 
mechanisms for transfer of accountability mechanisms include regulation, non- 
regulatory vehicles, internal international NPO networks, and nonprofit sector experts. 
The whistleblower mechanism (required for companies listed on a US exchange) 
exemplifies a recurring vehicle of historical migration of accountability practices from 
the US through for-profit companies listed on both US and French securities exchanges. 
French companies have adapted the whistleblower mechanism requirements to the 
French legal limitations and overcome the significant cultural barriers resulting from the 
historical distaste for denunciation mentioned in Section 4.2.1 (e.g. Business Objects 
Corporation corporate documents (2007)). The French nonprofit sector follow-on -  both 
as a result of the desire within individual organisations and the evolution in business 
world practices -  is only slowly beginning to emerge.
Non-regulatory forces also contribute to the transfer of VAMs and other 
voluntary accountability mechanisms from the US to France. Philanthropic 
organisations such as the European Venture Philanthropy Association (EVPA) are 
propagating US models around Europe (including France), growing their international 
donor base, and transferring US venture philanthropy reporting and performance 
evaluation requirements to European grantee NPOs (European Venture Philanthropy 
Association 2007; Miller call 2006). These practices increase both grantee NPOs’ 
perception of necessary accountability mechanisms and EVPA donors’ expectations 
(Miller meeting 2006; Dawson and Sloane meeting 2006). These models originated with 
organisations such as Social Venture Partners International (Seattle) and SV2 (Silicon 
Valley), as well as Impetus Trust mentioned above (Arrillaga discussion 2007; Social
160
Ventures Partners International (SVPI) 2006; Impetus Trust 2007, “What Impetus Trust 
Does”).313 Phi Trust in France engages similarly with grantees based on these 
international models (de Guerre meeting 2007).
In addition, the international NPO networks contribute to influencing the 
transfer of international accountability practices through their governance structure. 
The primary governance mechanisms include an international secretariat and/or 
international federated structure, an international top down governance structure, and a 
mandate from the US to consider implementing particular VAMs (Organisations 30, D, 
and 31, respectively). Larger organisations engaged in international accountability 
networks include the Amnesty International Accountability and Control Committee 
(established in 2007) with oversight over financial control and risk management, review 
of international NPO and corporate models, and mandatory independence from the 
executive as one of 21 detailed membership criteria (Amnesty International 2007, 20). 
Amnesty International also joined a group of 11 international organisations (e.g. 
Transparency International and CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation) that 
in 2007 jointly signed an “unprecedented” accountability charter focusing on 
transparency and best practice (Amnesty International 2006). Doctors Without 
Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres also recently improved alignment of accountability 
matters among its approximately 20 international divisions (de Torrente discussion 
January 2008).
Finally, consultants and other experts transmit best international practice to 
clients in France. Two interviewees regularly learn of international practices through 
international legal advisers and consultants (Organisations 32 and E). The Fondation de 
France occupies a central role through housing many other foundations (Fondation de 
France 2006b; Charhon meeting 2005; Organisation 31, respectively).314
Notes o f  Caution. As with corporatisation, the association of the term 
“international standards” with the US triggered fear of excessive accountability 
mechanisms. Also as with corporatisation, the limited number of respondents actively 
assessing international standards (Table 5-1) limits the evidence to anecdotes. The 
larger organisations and a few exceptional small organisations in both respondent
313 See Section 3.1.1 ”Relationship Between Accountability Regulation and Voluntary Accountability 
Mechanisms.”
314 See Note 41 supra.
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groups were more aggressively willing to accept the cultural differences (Organisations 
7, 15, 21, 25, 30, 31, and C, D, E, and J).
International standards exceed legal and Comite requirements and therefore may 
trigger a reflex to protect the French context, particularly the balance between freedom 
of association and stringent accountability standards (Organisations 20, 22, and 27). 
Comments cautioned against “going too far” and the need to apply international 
standards “in the French setting” (Organisations 18 and 27 and Organisation I, 
respectively). Even organisations forming part of an international network struggle with 
potentially serious institutional resistance (e.g. work load) and/or cultural resistance to 
implementing international accountability mechanisms without immediately apparent 
tangible value. Six Directors General explained that persistent rule enforcement 
internally gradually brought employees into compliance and even agreement with 
accountability “habits” (Organisations 23, 25, 31, D, E, and I). Thus the importance of
• 1^7the authority and initiative of the leaders is clear.
Comite and International Standards. The Comite itself remains behind even 
many of its members in actively seeking to understand and implement accountability 
mechanisms based on international standards. According to a senior Comite 
spokesperson, only two Comite representatives are extensively interested in 
international standards -  Soublin and Andre de Montalembert, the Head of Controls at 
the time of the study. The conseil d'administration rarely shows interest in or discusses 
international standards or issues (Comite senior management call/interview 2007). 
Similarly, the Comite’s assemblee generate does not address international standards 
(Comite 2008o; Comite de la Charte General Assembly 2008).
The Comite’s main international engagement is through membership in the 
ICFO, a group of 11 member NPO accountability accreditation organisations from 
different countries (Comite 2008i). However, ICFO membership has not resulted in 
transfer of new noteworthy international best practices to the Comite or its members. 
The ICFO also includes uneven levels of exigency among the organisations (e.g.
315 See Section 1.3 and, secondarily, Sections 2.3.1, 5.3.2, and 6.6.1 on freedom of association.
316 Organisation codes are omitted to protect confidentiality.
317 See Sections 4.4.2 and 5.4.3.
162
softening of requirements for account certification to attract members) (Comite senior
O 1 o
management call/interview 2007).
As noted in the discussion on corporatisation, the Comite has not implemented 
any of the four most important US accountability standards except the early 2008 
election of seven independent administrateurs (out of a total of 13) (Cohas-Bogey e- 
mail September 18, 2008). However, repeated mention of the fear of cultural backlash 
during the discussion of the shift to of independent administrateurs suggests the cultural 
resistance would hinder other mechanisms such as more extensive disclosure of 
individual senior management compensation (Soublin interview and calls 2006 and 
2007). Moreover, until recently the Comite had never considered a non-French national
a 1 o
for the conseil d ’administration (Comite senior management call/interview 2009).
The Comite has not been to date a vector for transfer of international 
accountability standards to members either. Soublin believes that only a few members 
are interested -  mostly individual leaders -  but that now the Comite should begin to 
impose consideration of international matters on members. As shown in Table 4-1, 
none of the most important international standards cited above are Comite requirements. 
Nor has the Comite considered international standards and mechanisms necessary to 
implement in France in order to avoid the widely feared scandal from failure of
-I
accountability within a member or non-member organisation.
5,3.3 Empirical Findings: Funder Accountability Requirements as a Drivine 
Force for Increasins Accountability
Funder accountability requirements are consistently viewed as a third but 
significantly less important mechanism potentially provoking increasing accountability 
in both the Comite Group and Control Group. However, while funder accountability
318 This certification of accounts was compulsory for all Comite organisations even prior to becoming a 
French law requirement for all organisations with revenues of €153,000 or more (French Government 
2006b, Article 2; Chartier and Frottee teleconference January 2008; de Montalembert interview 2007).
319 See Section 4.1 “Increasing Accountability Within the Comite.” In April 2009, an additional 
independent director, the author, was elected.
320 One recent example was inviting the author to speak as an “international observer” at a Comity- 
sponsored conference on financial transparency (Comity de la Charte Conference 2008).
321 See Section 8.4 on self-regulatory policy suggestions for the Comity.
322 See Appendix 1-F for a breakdown of participant organisations’ revenue among a range o f sources: 
individual donors, corporate donors, international aid agencies, the EU or other foreign states, and French 
government sources.
323 Many receiving French state or other French “public” funding (i.e., from a government departement, 
ministry, agency, or other such entity) and/or EU or EU donor funding raised the issue of funder
163
requirements de facto trigger implementation of accountability mechanisms, 
respondents consider compliance with funder accountability requirements normal 
business practice and not an independent rationale or motivation for increasing 
accountability. These donor exigencies are explained as a necessary step or “hoop to 
jump through” to achieve the specific operations goal of obtaining funding from a 
particular govemmental/corporate/institutional donor -  “part of doing business these 
days” (Organisation 19).324 As such, respondents separate funder accountability 
requirements from the more general internally-driven accountability efforts based on 
general strategic assessment of accountability. The former relate only to a funding 
opportunity and require a second level of strategic assessment linked to the specific 
opportunity. The latter establish a barometer for increasing accountability in the French 
nonprofit sector. One additional partial explanation for the limited perception of funder 
accountability requirements as a motivation for improving accountability systems 
generally may be that the funders’ accountability priorities differ from the Comite 
requirements, VAMs, and other voluntary accountability mechanisms the organisations 
prioritise (i.e., the definition of accountability as developing among respondents 
internally and as proposed in this thesis). As shown in this section, most 
govemmental/corporate/institutional funders focus in particular on justification of use of 
funds as the overriding objective of accountability.
The key funder accountability requirements relate to the French state, the EU, 
corporate donors, and institutional donors. The variation in degree of exigency 
respondents perceive ranges from the EU at one extreme as by far the most demanding, 
to the French state/governmental agency donors as demanding but more moderate, to 
corporate donors as generally far less stringent, and institutional donors as strict but 
uneven. Despite complaints of administrative burden, funder accountability 
requirements were not generally considered excessive. Reactions may reflect a parallel 
increase in expectation of growing demands for accountability and/or an acceptance of 
the need for the underlying funding.
First, the French state (e.g. the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the 
Ministry of the Interior, departements, and the collectivites) is widely considered to 
require detailed reporting from grantee organisations. Requirements focus on
accountability requirements at some other point in the interview but not directly connected to 
accountability efforts.
324 See Section 5.3.3.
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justification of use of funds and evaluation of projects but occasionally include more 
ordinary course reporting and audits (e.g. French Government 2006a; 
associations.gouv.fr 2008a and 2008b; Organisations 5, 18, 19, 32, and B). A recent 
example of controlling for use of funds is the Cour des comptes report on the tsunami 
that analysed the sector-wide donor funding situation, but also organisation by 
organisation in detail the use of funds among the top recipients of donor funds (Cour 
des comptes 2006b and 2007; Cour des comptes 2007, 22 (for the 16 participants in this 
study included)). More generally, some respondents describe French government 
representatives travelling to visit humanitarian work at overseas sites in order to verify 
program expenditures first hand (Organisations 5 and 19). All interviewees receiving 
French state funding described the French state accountability requirements as 
justifiably thorough and generally predictable -  even those who consider requirements 
stringent. Anecdotally the key criticism targeted the unreliability of the funding, 
particularly as changes in politically appointed personnel and/or policy often result in an 
unexpected delay or withdrawal of funding. One Executive Director of a large 
renowned French NPO exclaimed that he “can’t be bothered and is much happier on his 
own as it’s not worth the effort” (Organisation 11).
Second, European Union funding sources (benefiting approximately 11 Comite 
Group and three Control Group respondents), including ECHO and PEAD, were 
universally considered draconian.325 Respondents in both groups uniformly complained 
of “awful” and “harsh” obligations, and affirmed that the EU far exceeds both French 
government requirements and Comite obligations -  particularly in terms of justification 
of use of funds. One Director General of an international NGO claimed that his Chief 
Financial Officer even suggested refusing aid for starving children in Africa because the 
drain on resources to comply with the accountability requirements would be so severe 
(Organisation 18). Another equated compliance with the EU accountability obligations 
with the amount of required work to manage the programs themselves (Organisation H). 
A General Secretary of a major international NGO and founding Comite member 
reported having to reimburse funds early because local South American partners were
325 According to self-completion questionnaires and therefore based on participants in the self-completion 
questionnaire. Numbers could vary slightly based on a few respondents to the self-completion 
questionnaire answering the question on international funding with exclusively non-EU foreign 
government sources of funding and/or respondents not participating in the self-completion questionnaire.
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unable to provide the information necessary for compliance with the picayune EU audit 
standards.326
Third, overall accountability requirements imposed by corporate donors were 
seen to be modest and again unrelated to decisions to implement accountability 
mechanisms more generally. Comments ranged from “not really demanding” to “only 
the results matter” to “nothing in particular” and “corporations only care about a good 
image” (Organisations 31, H, J, 18, respectively). Only one respondent described 
corporate funder accountability requirements as “serious” (Organisation F). The 
discussions did not cover whether the advantages of corporate philanthropy in terms of 
image or pressure to prove corporate social responsibility influenced or justified the 
corporations’ limited accountability requirements as this point would require input from 
the corporations. However, this possibility is somewhat mitigated by respondents’ strict 
limitations on the type of engagement with corporations (e.g. prohibition on use of NPO 
name on products like toothbrushes distributed to the homeless).
Finally, all but one of the few organisations that had institutional funding noted 
that requirements for accountability were strict and uneven, in one case more 
demanding than the Comite and in another case more demanding than those of the 
French government (Organisations 13 and 20, respectively). Even those with small 
grants were strictly controlled (Organisations 13 and E). However, none suggested that 
the requirements rose to the level of the EU or hesitated in maintaining the funding 
relationship.
Notes o f  Caution. A diverse group of organisations in terms of size, sector, and 
perspective on accountability mechanisms spoke of the considerable burden and 
inefficiency of funder accountability requirements, the issues of duplication, and for 
some even the impact on operations and administrative cost, both spontaneously and in
‘I ' l A
response to direct questions. The French system was the most widely discussed and 
most relevant to the analysis in this thesis. Virtually all respondents in both groups 
believe that the work of the commissaires aux comptes, 1’IGAS, the Cour des comptes, 
and French government funding staff such as the Ministry of Foreign and European 
Affairs could and should be streamlined without losing quality of accountability (also
326 Organisation code is omitted to protect confidentiality.
327 Corporate funding was most often corporate foundations but may include broader corporate social 
responsibility efforts.
328 Organisation code is omitted to protect confidentiality.
329 See also Section 3.2.1 “Empirical Findings: ”.
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Soublin interview 2007; Archambault discussion 2008). Virtually all respondents also 
described the burden on staff, particularly the finance team, as considerable. Two 
organisations cited the need to allocate an office for six months plus over half of the 
time of a Chief Financial Officer and junior finance team member for 1’IGAS or Cour 
des comptes investigation (Organisations 18 and 30).
The duplication of efforts is perhaps not as extensive as many respondents 
suggest. Durand suggests that while there is limited overlap, different controls function 
and apply differently. First, the role of the commissaires awe comptes is to provide 
independent certification of the accounts annually and inform the authorities of any 
errors or irregularities (Durand call 2007). The Cour des comptes targets proper use 
of NPO funds raised from the general public and not the regularity of accounts. As 
noted in Section 3.2.1, the Cour des comptes controls almost exclusively large 
organisations and only several each year absent unusual events (Leo Jegard & Associes 
Conference 2008).332 The Cour des comptes does not have enforcement authority but 
does publish reports publicly (unlike the Comite) so can have a significant negative
' X ' X ' Ximpact on an organisation’s public image. Finally, 1’IGAS audits organisations with 
health and social issues (and not, for example, culture or poverty in developing 
countries) -  auditing proper management with limited overlap regarding use of funds 
(Ministere du Travail, des Relations sociales, de la Famille, et de la Solidarity 2008). 
The Comite considers its role “complementary” to all three (Comite 2008k).
The other most common objection to funder accountability requirements is the 
concern that donors will use accountability controls in ways that jeopardise independent 
operations and policy-making. Eight organisations insisted that in order to maintain 
complete independence of management and activities (e.g. in determining allocation of 
donor funds to activities) they may not accept governmental, corporate, and/or 
institutional gifts (Organisations 11, 14, 15, 17, 21, C, D, and F). Certain respondents 
mentioned avoiding governmental funding and specified corporate and institutional 
donors (e.g. corporations engaged in an industry related to their core activities such as
330 See Section 3.2.1 “Empirical Findings: ”.
331 The commissaires aux comptes for for-profit companies function similarly but within different 
applicable accounting and governance rules.
332 See “Empirical Findings...” The Cour des comptes is expected to test the new Statement of Use of 
Funds laws with an audit of ten to 20 NPOs each year starting in 2008 (Frottee and Chartier 
teleconference January 2008).
333 The Cour des comptes also responds to rumours, for example the PARC enquiry following 1’IGAS’ 
detection of evidence of wrongdoing. See Section 7.2.1 “Z,’ARC: The First and Continuing ‘Reference’ 
Scandal.”
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pharmaceuticals for Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres; Organisation 
11). There was no particular pattern among those prioritising independence. However, 
the level of passion against accepting govemmental/corporate/institutional funding to 
prevent even the potential for infringement on NPOs’ independence under the guise of 
accountability requirements was clear. In all cases this concern reflects both firm 
organisational policy and the management and personal philosophy of the organisations’ 
leaders.334
The interview comments and examples described above also indicate that, like 
corporatisation and international standards, the external funding sources reflect a 
strategic assessment whereby the burden of demonstrating accountability to funders is 
weighed up against the financial and strategic value of the funding received (e.g. the 
prestige of an EU grant to attract subsequent funding from other 
governments/institutions). In the end, given the magnitude of the funding relative to 
their overall budget, most respondents considered even the EU requirements acceptable 
and occasionally more predictable than French government funders (Organisation 19 
and 11 (emphasising the relevance and regularity of the EU requirements)). However, 
this analysis reflects a business decision regarding the net qualitative and quantitative 
value of the specific potential funding opportunity to the individual organisation. This 
decision process does not explain increasing accountability generally.
Finally, no respondents viewed compliance with funder accountability 
requirements as mitigating the risk of the negative consequences of scandal triggered by 
an accountability lapse within an organisation or elsewhere in the French nonprofit 
sector. This again suggests that the respondents citing funder accountability 
requirements see the funder organisations as primarily targeting the specific purpose of
33 7verifying the funding triggering the controls.
The Comite and Funder Accountability Requirements. In general, the Comite 
does not accept govemmental/corporate/institutional funding with the exception of a 
recent first-time subsidy of approximately €70,000 allocated to communication projects
334 See also Section 6.2 “Expected Benefits o f Donor Trust’ on donor trust and independence.
335 See e.g. Action contre la Faim sign-posting govemmental/corporate/institutional donors as a validation 
of credibility (Action contre la Faim 2007). Action contre La Faim represents a relatively unusual case in 
the study with approximately 70% of annual revenues from govemmental/corporate/institutional funding.
336 See Section 7.2.3 for a discussion of the potential relationship between accountability and prevention 
of scandal.
337 See Section 3.2 for regulatory weakness generally that also relates to funding.
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(Comite 2008o, 20; Comite 2008p, 25). The Comite is committed to maintaining 
financial independence and therefore has not addressed this issue directly.
5.4 Relevance of Variables to Increasing Accountability and Ethical. Effective
Management
This section parallels Section 4.4 that addresses the relevance of internal and 
external variables to respondents’ strategic assessment of accountability. As with the 
empirical findings on increasing accountability generally in Chapter 4, the internal 
variables emerge as important to both Comite Group and Control Group respondents. 
However, interviewees rarely mention external variables with respect to accountability 
in furtherance of ethical, effective management.
In general, the key internal variables (size, international engagement, and 
initiative and profile of leader) potentially affecting respondents’ strategic assessment of 
accountability proved more important to the three forces driving accountability 
mechanisms in furtherance of ethical, effective management than to the more basic 
accountability mechanisms analysed in Section 4.4. Within the ethical, effective 
management group, the findings reveal similar importance of the three internal variables 
to corporatisation and integration of international standards across both the Comite 
Group and the Control Group. This is logical given the overlap in those accountability 
mechanisms as noted above. In contrast, funder accountability requirements relate more 
to the specific organisation and funding situation and not patterns across the study or 
more broadly. In addition, the sample size of respondents referring to funder 
accountability requirements is too small to draw conclusions. In all three cases, the 
internal variables result in individually analysed strategic assessments thus reflecting the 
theme of bottom up, organisation-driven increasing accountability.
The lack of attention to external variables is logical given that respondents citing 
ethical, effective management explicitly discuss disregarding external reaction to 
accountability. The only external variable relevant to ethical, effective management was 
regulation and only insofar as related to the theoretical framework for funder 
accountability requirements analysed in Section 5.3. All respondents spontaneously 
mentioned scandal but none in connection with directly motivating accountability
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efforts related to ethical, effective management. Almost all of the interviewees citing 
ethical, effective management spoke of a combination of evolution of the organisation 
and the climate of increasing accountability among NPOs (the “normal” element of 
ethical, effective management). The key point is that this “climate” is not directly one or 
a combination of external variables. Rather, according to respondents in both 
respondent groups, this combination largely reflects the creation of a context of 
increasing accountability through a collective but still organisation by organisation 
effort from the inside out. These internally-driven accountability efforts are 
incorporated into the definition of ethical, effective management, but the overall context 
includes actions of respondents citing donor trust.
Finally, the analysis of the empirical findings relating to ethical, effective 
management reinforces limitations on conclusions relating to the interrelationships 
among variables. Key general concerns include: the overriding subjectivity of the 
initiatives of leaders; the impossibility of determining the extent of any one leader’s 
influence on the strategic assessment process generally or implementation of any 
specific VAMs or other voluntary accountability mechanisms; and how other factors not 
tested in this study affect the strategic assessment process and individual decisions 
within that (e.g. budget constraints, unique organisational events such as fraud or the 
introduction of new services, or the influence of individual administrateurs). A detailed 
understanding of the complex interrelationship among the size and leadership variables, 
as well as the potential impact of variables not considered in this study, would require 
further research.
5.4.1 Size
Size was particularly important to all respondents’ strategic assessment of 
accountability related to ethical, effective management generally and corporatisation 
and international standards in particular. The greater sophistication and complexity of 
corporate and international accountability mechanisms require both prior 
implementation of more basic accountability mechanisms (also size-driven as noted in 
Section 4.4.1) and a higher level of organisational understanding, management capacity,
338 See Section 7.2.2. Note, however, Howell’s suggestion that NPOs underestimate the impact of the 
external environment on civil society (e.g. governmental backlash from terrorism limiting the “spaces for 
civil society to flourish and act”) (Howell et al. 2006, 4; Howell e-mail June 2008).
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and resources. With rare exceptions, all of the most sophisticated and international 
VAMs noted in Table 4-1 (the whistleblower mechanism, audit committee, and written 
conflict of interest policy (although mostly financial conflicts)) were adopted only by 
organisations among the top 15 and top five organisations in revenue level in the
' i ' i Q
Comite Group and Control Group, respectively. Nonetheless, the importance of 
initiative of leader even among larger organisations (as well as a range of other possible 
factors noted in Section 4.4.1) still leads to considerable variation even among large 
organisations as further analysed in Section 5.4.3.
The smaller Comite participants specifically noted the resource constraints and 
lack of need for, or benefit from, corporate and international derived accountability 
mechanisms.340 Moreover, while as noted in Section 4.4.1, no respondents (or the 
Comite) argued in favour of moderating the Comite’s requirements to encourage 
smaller members, several respondents of various sizes advised that any corporate of 
international mechanisms would need adapting to smaller organisations. Four even 
considered current Comite requirements corporate (e.g. the level of exigency with 
respect to financial statement and ratio preparation) and particularly at risk of imposing 
excessively on the Director General’s and finance staffs time (Organisations 13, 18, 30, 
and 32). Finally, for the strategic assessment of external funding, size is evaluated 
relative to magnitude of funding and cost of accountability requirements. A mix of 
different size organisations obtains govemmental/corporate/institutional funding 
(Organisations 1, 13,19, E, H, and J).
5.4.2 International Enea2ement
A connection emerged in both respondent groups between the importance of 
international engagement and both corporatisation and the integration of international 
standards.341 Five of the nine Comite Group respondents and both Control Group 
respondents specifically mentioning corporatisation were also internationally engaged 
(Organisations 8, 18, 19, 25, 29, C, and I). Approximately 50% of the Comite Group
339 The exceptions were for written conflict of interest policies and ranked 21, 23, and 27 in revenue level.
340 One organisation considered personal contact a substitute for accountability to some extent among his 
almost exclusively corporate donors (recalling Putnam 2000). Organisation code is omitted to protect 
confidentiality. See Section 2.1.3.
341 Of the small sample size of organisations citing funder accountability requirements, two organisations 
are international, and the two others are large, well-known national French associations with a slight bias 
for humanitarian aid. Organisation codes are omitted to protect confidentiality.
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and 29% of the Control Group organisations interested in international standards were 
linked internationally either by an organisational network or some other means, such as 
addressing an internationally relevant issue or an international donor base 
(Organisations 2, 8, 18, 19, 25, 26, 31, D, and I). Conversely, in both groups those 
specifically stating they had no interest in international standards were almost 
exclusively operating in France. All three of the organisations considering the most 
controversial international accountability mechanisms -  the whistleblower mechanism -  
are large, internationally networked organisations. The sample size is small, but within 
the study the connection is clear.
5.4.3 Initiative and Profile o f L ea d ed 1
As with size and international engagement, the passion and commitment of the 
respondent leaders play an essential role in defining the ethical, effective management 
focus of an organisation across both respondent groups. The importance of the initiative 
and profile of leaders to strategic assessment discussed in Section 4.4.2 becomes even 
more pronounced with corporatisation and international standards. However, as in 
Section 4.4.2, the conseil d ’administration exerts a weaker influence as a group than the 
Presidents of the conseil d ’administration, Directors General, or other senior finance or 
fund-raising leaders individually. Moreover, the subjectivity of the initiative of leaders 
leads to differing results even among organisations of similar sizes.
The interviewees in both groups citing ethical, effective management as the 
primary rationale for increasing accountability were senior leaders heavily focused on 
accountability despite a frequently less focused conseil d ’administration. Only four 
were Presidents. The others were Directors General or in a few cases senior financial 
officers. The difference between the role of the President of the conseil d ’administration 
(with significant authority over the conseil d ’administration) and the role of the Director 
General (to drive the management/operations and organisational culture) proves less 
important than the conseil d ’administration’s weakness in acting as a governing body. 
In many cases, the respondent President or Director General took personal credit for 
specific accountability efforts, or even the overall drive to increase accountability to 
improve ethical, effective management. One Director General implemented an
342 See Section 4.4.2 for a discussion of how leaders drive the implementation of accountability 
mechanisms generally -  irrespective of rationale for increasing accountability.
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ambitious strategic planning and evaluation process; one Director General spearheads 
the organisation-wide accountability effort himself; and one Director General furthers a 
personal philosophy of asking “Is it good for the organisation strategically? Is it 
ethical?” with every decision among all engaged with the organisation in any capacity 
(Organisations 18, 25, and 21, respectively).343
The findings show some links between the several Directors General and 
Presidents with corporate background and the corporatisation responses. All of the nine 
Presidents and Directors General influenced by corporate practice spoke of bringing 
corporate background to their position, as did the two in the Control Group. 
Overwhelmingly, respondents in both the Comite Group and Control Group 
affirmatively denying corporatisation as an influence spoke of greater career depth in 
the nonprofit sector, and none raised the relevance of professional background during 
the interview. However, a link between lack of corporate experience and low levels of 
corporatisation cannot be concluded without further investigation.
One Director General particularly influential in the sector through other national 
leadership positions believed that leaders with corporate backgrounds adapt to the 
nonprofit world and do not approach their new professional situations with the idea of 
transferring for-profit business practice (Organisation 27). However, a range of 
examples of corporatisation identified in the interviews reflect the individual experience 
of the President or Director General. These include sophisticated employee evaluation 
and human resources procedures borrowed from previous corporate experience that 
exceed the expected practice for the small organisation size and partnerships with 
corporations for core activities (Organisations 8 and 21; Organisation A, respectively).
While the leaders citing corporatisation and international standards exhibit 
experience and energy, the conseil d ’admnistration functioning of their organisations 
shows the weaker penetration of corporatisation and international standards. Few 
respondents in both groups mentioned the philosophy of ethical, effective management 
as a conseil d ’administration philosophy beyond the individual efforts of the President. 
For example, only four organisations affirmatively praised respect for the line between 
governance and operations so fundamental to accountability in the US (all prioritising
343Age of the leaders was not a factor as there was a wide range of ages from late thirties to significantly 
post-retirement. Thus accountability is not a generational issue among the “doers.” Age was not a factor 
among donor trust respondents either except insofar as a few cited the “new generation” of more 
accountability-focused donors as relevant to demands for additional evidence of accountability 
mechanisms (Organisation 31).
173
ethical, effective management) (Organisations 17, 23, C, and D; e.g. Hamilton and 
Trautmann 2002, 159; US Government 2002, Section 2001 “Purpose of the Bill”).344 
None mentioned board self-evaluation procedures to assess the performance of either 
individual administrateurs or the conseil d ’admnistration as a whole. In comparison, 
US board best practice generally would advise self-evaluations and individual board 
member evaluations at least every three years (Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007,17).
The lesser involvement of the conseil d ’administration as a body may be 
explained in part by the member-driven election process (referred to in Section 4.2.1 
“Independent Directors”) that leads to a conseil d ’administration comprising a 
significant number of subject matter experts (e.g. medical experts for a medical 
association) or “friends” of the association with no governance expertise (Organisations 
14 and C, respectively).345 Another explanation may be that the bulk of the work is 
handled by the President and the bureau, which differs from US-style boards with 
multiple active committees such as governance committees.
Finally, the subjectivity of the initiative of leaders may be one factor (along with 
others not tested in this study) leading to differing results among organisations even 
among similar sizes.346 Within this study, leadership appears to trump size, although a 
direct correlation cannot be concluded again due to the range of other possible 
influences on accountability beyond size. For example, six out of the ten Comite Group 
respondents with the highest revenue levels, and two of the five Control Group 
Organisations with the highest revenue levels do not have a written conflict of interest 
policy (Organisations 2, 6, 11, 19, 22, 32, B, and D). (This compares to four Comite 
Group and three Control Group that do (Organisations 5, 7, 15, 25, B, C, and D).) Only 
three of the top ten Comite Group organisations in terms of revenue and no Control 
Group organisations have audit committees approaching US standards (Organisations 
11, 19, and 32). Thus, while it may be possible to conclude within the sample tested that 
only the larger organisations have implemented the most complex VAMs and other 
voluntary accountability mechanisms (with rare exceptions), it is not possible to 
conclude that large organisations will necessarily demonstrate this higher level of 
accountability. Moreover, it is also not possible to tell within the scope of this study
344 Nonetheless, while progress remains to be made, the ethical, effective management group is more 
concerned with the governance/operations separation than other respondents.
345 See Section 4.2.1 “Independent Directors.”
346 Note that in the US board practices and board control over the strategic decisions of the Director 
General or equivalent leader significantly diminish the influence of any individual on the outcome of 
accountability. See e.g. Table 3-1 and Section 4.2.1 “Audit Committee.”
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exactly how and/or the extent to which leadership influenced the strategic assessment 
generally or VAMs targeting ethical, effective management beyond the law and Comite 
requirements specifically.
5.5 Ethical. Effective Management. Accountability, and the Theoretical
Framework
This final section considers the relationship between ethical, effective 
management and the three corollary forces to the theoretical framework. First, the 
analysis extends to how and why corporatisation, integration of international standards, 
and compliance with funder accountability requirements relate to Hansmann’s model of 
the dual rationale for the importance of trust as both an explanation for the nonprofit 
form and necessary to compete in an increasingly challenging nonprofit environment. It 
then connects accountability efforts targeting ethical, effective management to the Rose- 
Ackerman and Salamon extensions of the theory, including implications for the strategic 
assessment and the relevance of internal and external variables.
5.5.1 Corporatisation/International Standards/Funder Accountability
Requirements and the Theoretical Framework
The analysis of ethical, effective management and the three related driving 
forces supports the thread throughout this thesis across both the ethical, effective 
management and donor trust groups that the nondistribution constraint no longer 
provides adequate levels of trust to compensate for Hansmann’s information asymmetry 
and contract failure in the nonprofit market. Nor does Hansmann’s trust suffice to meet 
competition in the current nonprofit environment. However, each of corporatisation, 
integration of international standards, and compliance with funder accountability 
requirements has a different relationship to Hansmann’s nondistribution constraint and 
the ethical, effective management and donor trust rationales.
Evidence of corporatisation (including the small but growing number of 
organisations spontaneously raising performance evaluation) and international standards 
suggests that the competitive environment requires increasingly broad accountability 
efforts to compensate for inadequacy in the nondistribution constraint. This logically
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could be considered competition for donors but appears to be increasingly independent 
of donor trust as most respondents explicitly separated donor trust from corporate and 
international models. Accountability may indirectly benefit donor trust irrespective of 
motivation, but such benefits are secondary.347 Moreover, NPO leaders moving to the 
higher level of performance evaluation recognise they have not done all that is 
necessary to achieve ethical, effective management through VAMs and their other 
more fundamental voluntary accountability mechanisms (Organisations 5, 19, 26, 31, 
33, C, and H). The grey area emerges when, as noted in Section 5.3.1, performance 
evaluation posited as the furthest step in ethical, effective management appears to circle 
back to a concern with donor interpretation of performance. This suggests that this 
ethical, effective management mechanism approaches both donor trust generally and 
Salamon’s suggestion that performance evaluation supports donor trust. Further study 
specifically on performance evaluation would be necessary to evaluate this.
In contrast, funder accountability requirements fall in an in-between space. 
Accountability is required but elected through a business decision (to seek a certain 
amount and type of funding from a specific funder) in direct exchange for this ethical, 
effective management result relating to a financial opportunity. For most 
govemmental/corporate/institutional funders improved accountability has become a 
prerequisite for trust -  largely by supplementing information relating to accountability 
when Hansmann’s trust is no longer adequate. Thus funder accountability requirements 
relate to Salamon’s idea of accountability as a basis for trust but in a manner limited to 
the specific funder imposing the controls. However, while the funders may have a 
Salamon accountability-based trust motive, the organisations have an ethical, effective 
management objective of obtaining funding unrelated to donor views. Finally, because 
most funder accountability requirements prioritise justification of use of funds, and 
because the nondistribution constraint focuses on preventing misuse of funds by 
controlling persons, functionally both contribute to the same end (Hansmann 1980, 844 
and e.g. 874 and 875).
347 The discussions of the most widely studied and adopted US accountability mechanisms in the US 
literature emphasise the grounding in notions of trust even if de facto they are considered “corporate” and 
necessary to function in a nonprofit environment increasingly concerned with accountability (Independent 
Sector 2008a).
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5.5.2 Rose-Ackerman
The Rose-Ackerman extension of the theory with the concept of strategic 
assessment applies to the ethical, effective management rationale for increasing 
accountability and the three corollary influences with one key difference from donor 
trust. In the case of ethical, effective management, the strategic assessment of 
accountability evaluates the appropriate level of accountability to maximise ethical, 
effective management in light of the resources available -  not as a “signal” to donors as 
with donor trust. The overriding characteristic of this strategic assessment process is the 
individual, inside out bespoke approach to accountability and the assessment of the 
impact of variables on the individual organisation’s ethical, effective management 
objectives. No respondent canvassed all best corporate or international practices. The 
margins of the type of accountability mechanisms supporting ethical, effective 
management, and the related strategic assessment, expand in an increasingly 
competitive landscape.
5.5.3 Salamon
The ethical, effective management analysis continues the theme of how 
organisations position themselves within the spectrum from Hansmann’s 
nondistribution constraint based trust to Salamon’s accountability-based trust as 
accountability becomes increasingly complex. However, the findings on increasing 
accountability as defined by the Comite and in this thesis (i.e., heavily focused on 
concrete, specified accountability mechanisms together with an overall obligation to 
answer for an organisation’s behaviour) suggest a gap between Salamon’s view and 
ethical, effective management respondents. For respondents citing ethical, effective 
management, accountability is essential but analysed as a management tool rather than 
as a means of supporting donor trust generally or weaknesses in Hansmann’s trust.
In addition, Salamon’s suggestion of accountability as the modem means of 
achieving trust does not suggest that tmst no longer matters.349 The empirical findings 
confirm continued undisputed insistence on the importance of underlying tmst across
348 Contrast, for example, contingency theory suggesting pre-set adaptation to variables (Donaldson 2001, 
7).
349 Salamon recognises that trust still matters but posits accountability as the modem alternative means to 
the tmst end (call 2008). See also Section 2.2.1. See Section 3.1 for US context.
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both respondent groups -  irrespective of cited rationale for, or levels of, increasing 
accountability. The ethical, effective management objective also highlights the 
distinction in reverse: the independent importance of accountability for reasons beyond 
replacing trust for all respondents.350
While the challenge in determining the appropriate level of accountability may 
appear to be “where to draw the line” in the Hansmann to Salamon spectrum, in fact a 
key finding is that there is no line to draw. First, respondents citing ethical, effective 
management place themselves outside the Hansmann-Salamon spectrum by engaging in 
the strategic assessment for purposes other than supplementing trust. Second, while 
respondents citing ethical, effective management accept the on-going importance of 
trust irrespective of the rationale for increasing accountability (and the de facto 
improvement of trust through implementation of accountability mechanisms), 
accountability will never fully support trust (Organisation 18). Even for those following 
Salamon’s analysis to the limit of performance evaluation, the risks and weaknesses in 
performance evaluation suggest that performance evaluation only partially supports 
trust at best. Salamon acknowledges dangers such as the cost outweighing the resources 
available, the measurability outweighing programmatic importance, and the failure to 
consider diverse accountability requirements to accommodate multiple stakeholders 
(Salamon 2003, 35-6). Finally, it is difficult to understand how accountability that is 
complex (such as the US Form 990 disclosure forms criticised as excessively 
complicated) or unavailable (such as in the French context) could replace the 
nondistribution constraint as a basis for trust. The mechanisms for accountability may 
exist, but the “consumer” of accountability cannot access or effectively use 
accountability so in the end still relies on Hansmann’s trust.
More generally, for most NPOs, the cost of accountability efforts will outweigh 
the benefits before the adequate level of trust (for example, the level of accountability 
that for-profit corporations need in a non-nondistribution constraint/non-trust based 
environment) is reached. Moreover, as the research has shown, the line will be 
individually drawn on an organisation by organisation basis in France. Finally, even for 
organisations prepared to invest heavily in accountability and/or that are exclusively 
motivated by ethical, effective management, some level of trust independent of
350 See Sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.
351 Concerns relating to cost and resources should be mitigated on an organisation by organisation basis 
by the strategic assessment approach, including grantee involvement in accountability (EVPA Conference 
on Venture Philanthropy 2006, Halton remarks).
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accountability will always matter in parallel. This conclusion holds even when 
accountability extends to performance evaluation and irrespective of perceived and/or 
actual benefits to donor trust resulting from accountability efforts. Therefore, the 
question becomes why organisations engage in accountability when trust is not an 
objective and/or knowing that the nondistribution constraint is poorly enforced 
(Hansmann call 2008). Respondents citing ethical, effective management answer 
both, at least in part.
5.6 Conclusion
Ethical, effective management emerged as the most frequently cited explanation 
for increasing accountability, followed by donor trust (discussed in Chapter 6) a close 
second. On a percentage basis, the Control Group showed a moderately higher level of 
ethical, effective management. For respondents citing ethical, effective management, 
accountability is not a choice. Accountability is explicitly motivated by internal 
management, strategy, and ethics concerns and not external factors -  whether donor 
trust, external variables, or other outside influences.
The three primary driving forces for implementing accountability mechanisms in 
furtherance of ethical, effective management include corporatisation, the transfer of 
international accountability standards, and compliance with funder accountability 
requirements. While all three advance NPOs toward greater accountability, almost all 
respondents in both respondent groups considered them within the larger ethical, 
effective management objective rather than independent rationales for increasing 
accountability.
Corporatisation and international standards allow organisations to remain current 
in a nonprofit sector increasingly concerned with accountability. Corporate and 
international accountability mechanisms do not target, or replace, donor trust. 
Respondents in both groups also generally consider funder accountability requirements 
a normal part of doing business. However, imposition of funder accountability
352 Note Salamon’s general warning of the “threat to the public trust” and the need to restore the balance 
as NPOs have increasingly adapted activities, policies, and management practices to the market (Salamon 
2003, 79 and 77, respectively). Note also that donor trust respondents ask the further question how much 
further accountability must extend to achieve the estimated “necessary” trust level. See Section 6.6.3.
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requirements more directly aims to protect (but not replace) donor trust by positioning 
accountability as a pre-requisite for donor trust.
No respondents in either group considered accountability mechanisms 
implemented in order to achieve ethical, effective management -  whether or not via the 
three driving forces cited -  as mitigating the risk to a particular organisation or the 
sector more widely of a scandal caused by failure of accountability within the 
organisation or another NPO. However, collectively, the impact of the individual efforts 
contributes to an external context of increasing accountability.
The Comite remains focused almost entirely on donor trust and does not address 
accountability in terms of ethical, effective management despite the strong shift in this 
direction among Comite members (explained in Chapter 6). The Comite has not proven 
effective as a vehicle for integration of corporate or international standards within the 
French nonprofit sector. Nor, according to Comite Group, has the Comite adequately 
represented its members in matters relating to funders that establish funder 
accountability requirements.
All three driving forces for increasing accountability in furtherance of ethical, 
effective management suggest the insufficiency of the nondistribution constraint to 
protect against inappropriate behaviour of controlling persons (misuse of funds, fraud, 
and other such examples Hansmann offers) in the current environment (Hansmann 
1980, 874-5). In Hansmann’s terms, the distribution of additional information to funders 
would mitigate the information asymmetry involving those funders’ grantees potentially 
leading to contract failure. In addition, all three driving forces are integrated on an 
individual basis into the strategic assessment. However, rather than “signalling trust” as 
in Rose-Ackerman’s model, the strategic assessment targets ethical, effective 
management objectives. Finally, Salamon’s linking accountability to compensating for 
weaknesses in trust derived from intrinsic NPO characteristics does not apply to 
organisations and leaders that engage in accountability efforts for reasons other than 
trust relating to ethical, effective management. Moreover, the limits of Salamon’s 
proposal more generally include the cost of increasing accountability and accessing 
accountability-related information. Hansmann’s trust still matters because the cost of a 
level of accountability independently supporting trust will always outweigh the benefits, 
particularly in the nonprofit sector. Chapter 6 extends the unpacking of the strategic 
assessment process by positioning the donor trust rationale for increasing accountability 
within the Hansmann-Salamon trust theoretical framework.
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Chapter 6 
Donor Trust 
The Basis o f  Survival?
The success of “large and small organizations serving the public good... is directly related to the 
trust they inspire, and the public holds them to a higher standard of accountability...than it does other 
sectors of our society” (“Keeping the Trust: Confidence in Charitable Organizations in an Age of 
Scrutiny” (Independent Sector 2002, 2)).
“Donor trust is the starting point... [and] basis of survival” [author translation] (Organisation
10).
Introduction
This chapter further develops the discussion of the empirical findings with an 
analysis of donor trust, the second most-off cited rationale for increasing accountability 
after ethical, effective management. The chapter continues the exploration of 
organisations’ strategic assessment of accountability and the positioning of the findings 
within or outside the Hansmann-Salamon trust theoretical spectrum traced through 
Chapters 3 through 5. The hypothesis of this thesis that a desire to support donor trust 
explains increasing accountability proves accurate with respect to the respondents citing 
donor trust. However, the hypothesis was not valid with respect to the respondents 
citing ethical, effective management analysed in Chapter 5. The trust-focused 
respondents address accountability matters largely in response to their perception of the 
link between accountability and trust. In contrast, as seen in Chapter 5, respondents 
focused on ethical, effective management assess accountability matters almost 
exclusively independently of donor trust and other external reaction. Donor trust 
respondents represent a higher percentage of Comite Group respondents, whereas 
ethical, effective management respondents represented a higher percentage of Control 
Group respondents.
The first section explores the empirical findings on the donor trust rationale. The 
analysis includes expected benefits of donor trust and the importance of existing levels 
of trust independent of accountability. The analysis then considers evidence that
353 See Table 6-1 and Section 5.2, respectively.
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attitudes toward the relationship between accountability and trust are changing, in part 
to integrate more ethical, effective management concerns into strategic assessment. 
Such evidence includes: evolution in the Comite Group’s view of the rationale for 
increasing accountability toward increasing focus on ethical, effective management; 
newly developing attention toward volunteer trust and public trust (each as defined in 
Section 6.3.2 below); and respondents’ adaptable perspectives on whether 
accountability functions to increase/maintain trust or rather remedy/mitigate mistrust. 
The three most important potential forces driving increasing accountability within the 
donor trust objective are: Comite membership; donor pressure; and the media. However, 
these three forces prove less relevant to donor trust than the parallel three driving forces 
(corporatisation, integration of international standards, and funder accountability 
requirements) proved to ethical, effective management. The internal and external 
variables also prove less influential on the strategic assessment process with donor trust 
respondents than with ethical, effective management respondents in both respondent 
groups. Finally, the analysis explains the relationship between the empirical findings 
and the theoretical framework.
In addition to reinforcing the strategic assessment process and the trust 
theoretical framework, this chapter highlights several key sub-themes throughout the 
research. All are independent of cited primary rationale for increasing accountability, 
and all apply to both respondent groups. First, donor trust proves essential to ensure 
both financial stability and independence from donor influence on use of funds and 
organisational policy. Second, donor trust is widely perceived as fragile -  irrespective of 
the organisations’ existing levels of donor trust. Third, as with ethical, effective 
management, the empirical findings show the strategic assessment and implementation 
of accountability efforts in furtherance of donor trust as a dynamic, evolving process 
seeking best “next steps” for improvement. Finally, the potential consequences of the 
failure of accountability for both individual organisations and the sector more broadly 
remain an overriding concern among respondents.
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6.1 Empirical Findings: Accountability and Donor Trust -  Respondent 
Organisations and the Comite
This section explores the empirical findings that donor trust is an important 
rationale for increasing accountability but nonetheless cited second most often after 
ethical, effective management. The donor trust results are higher for the Comite Group 
than the Control Group, but similar for associations and foundations and between 
Control Groups A and B.354
The interview questions included details about the level of importance of donor 
trust to respondents’ strategic assessment. A range of issues were addressed, for 
example: how respondents measured levels of donor trust and reaction of donors to 
accountability efforts; advantages of donor trust; the relevance of increasing donor trust 
versus mitigating mistrust (and any issues particular to the organisation’s situation or 
history relevant to this answer); whether the donor profile related to the importance of 
donor trust; factors other than accountability relating to donor trust and whether the 
respondent addressed those; and other rationales for increasing accountability. Similar 
questions were raised with respect to the importance of accountability to donor trust in 
the French nonprofit sector more broadly.
For most respondents citing donor trust as the primary factor influencing 
accountability, the answer was clear, without hesitation, and without the need to 
embellish with explanatory details. For those affirmatively stating donor trust is not 
relevant, the clarity of conviction was equally strong. As discussed in Section 4.1, all 
but one Comite Group respondent and all Control Group respondents noted an increase 
in accountability within their organisations. Respondents that did not mention donor 
trust themselves when asked to describe the primary motivation for this increasing 
accountability were subsequently specifically asked to comment on the relative 
importance of donor trust. In addition to the questions relating to donor trust, the same 
menu of alternatives was offered to donor trust respondents as to ethical, effective 
management respondents. Table 6-1 shows the detailed breakdown of responses 
relating to donor trust.
354 This result was expected as the six foundations participating in the study all fimd-raise from the 
general public, which respondents defined as the most important common criterion among the study
participants. See Section 1.3.1.
See Section 5.2 for more detail on the interview process.
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Table 6-1
Importance of Donor Trust 
as a Rationale for Increasing Accountability
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Donor Trust By Far Donor Trust A Donor Trust Only For Donor Trust Not A Did Not Mention 
Most Important Secondary Factor But Defensive Reasons Factor At AD Donor Trust
Rationale Not Important to
Accountability
Source: Author's research data.
1 Organisations 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 26, 27, 28, E, and F.
2 O f the remaining Control Group respondents, two said some donor motivation but not donor trust (i.e., a more vague 
sense o f  donor expectation) (Organisations B and J). One respondent affirmatively stated donor trust did not matter, 
and two stated that donor trust was “essential” but not the reason for accountability (Organisations H and 
Organisations L and C, respectively).
3 Organisations 21, 24, 25, 31 and G.
4 Organisations 1 and 16.
5 Organisations 6, 7, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, and A.
6 Organisations 29, 30, 32, 33, D, I, and K.
Comments among Comite Group respondents citing donor trust as the most
important rationale included “essential,” “key,” “number one now and then” (i.e., at the
founding of the Comite), “ 100% the reason,” and “the starting point and basis of
survival” (Organisations 2, 13, 3, 4, and 10, respectively). Similarly, Control Group
respondents citing donor trust described donor trust as “essential,” “the biggest reason,”
and “key,” specifying that “other factors are not really an issue” (Organisations E, F, G,
and L, respectively). Those citing “defensive reasons” referred to a crisis involving
accountability in the organisation or the sector or just general awareness that even
organisations with high levels of donor trust are always at risk (Organisations 1 and 16).
The relationship between the respondents citing donor trust as the most
important influence on increasing accountability and those citing ethical, effective
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management reveals a clear split between the two groups. As noted in Section 5.2, only 
one respondent cited donor trust as a second choice to ethical, effective management 
(Organisation 15).
The Comite and Donor Trust. The Comite’s overriding focus on donor trust 
highlighted in Section 5.2 -  as opposed to accountability more generally -  arguably may 
be a weakness. This question may become even more acute as members’ attention to
o r /
accountability to the public increases.
6.2 Empirical Findings: Expected Benefits of Donor Trust and Donor Trust 
Independent of Accountability
The expected benefits and the on-going fragility of donor trust further inform the 
general findings on donor trust. Both areas also relate to respondents citing ethical, 
effective management.
Expected Benefits o f Donor Trust First, although donor trust emerged as the 
second most oft-cited motivation for increasing accountability, all organisations in both 
groups consider donor trust the “basis of survival” for economic reasons (Organisations 
10, 11, and 15). The primary expected benefit and objective of donor trust is ensuring 
the financial stability of the organisation, including for those with more 
govemmental/corporate/institutional funding such as those in Control Group B with a 
higher percentage of high level individual and/or corporate donors. Thus donor trust is 
not the only reason for accountability but is important for all NPOs irrespective of the 
cited motivation for increased accountability.
The second key benefit of donor trust is independence from donor restrictions on
•  •  •allocation of funds and/or policies. The concern with independence extends beyond
govemmental/corporate/institutional donors (discussed in connection with funder 
accountability requirements) to verification of the independence of large individual 
donors (e.g. Organisation D’s tracking of all donors above a certain threshold amount). 
For organisations attentive to independence, accountability supports donor trust, which 
in turn supports a wide platform of current and potential donors (Organisations 2, 7, 11,
356 See Section 6.3.2.
357 See Section 5.3.3.
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15, 17, C, and D). This selection of respondents may under-represent the concern with 
independence as a number of respondents did not focus on this issue.
Donor Trust Independent o f Accountability and Fragility o f Donor Trust. 
Respondents’ perception of existing strong levels of donor trust in their organisations 
irrespective of the level of accountability further explains the empirical findings on 
donor trust. Most importantly, all respondents discussing existing trust consider donor 
trust fragile and view accountability as supporting donor trust. This sense of instability 
surfaces irrespective of the level of trust unrelated to accountability that organisations
ICO
enjoy. Also, perceived existing levels of donor trust do not necessarily correspond to 
views on donor trust or ethical, effective management as the primary rationale for 
increasing accountability.
First, organisations in both respondent groups of all sizes, irrespective of 
primary rationale for increasing accountability, claim significant donor trust and loyalty 
for reasons of emotional attachment to the cause and/or the exceptional renown of the 
organisation. 15 (33%) respondents (12 (38%) Comite Group and three (25%) Control 
Group) spontaneously reported high levels of donor trust and loyalty irrespective of 
accountability efforts and, in the case of the Comite Group, irrespective of Comite 
membership (Organisations 6, 9, 12, 16, 18, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, C, D, and I).359 
Thus there is no significant difference between the two respondent groups. Such loyalty 
is measured through tracking repeat donors from year to year, as well as interviewees’ 
general perceptions of donor loyalty. The self-completion questionnaires showed that 
100% of the Comite Group organisations and 80% of the Control Group organisations 
work to ensure renewal of donors from year to year. All Comite Group organisations 
also commented on their own renown as far superior to that of the Comite 
(Organisations 5, 22, 24, 25, 30, and 31 particularly emphasising reputation). Both 
Soublin and Cohas-Bogey agreed that virtually all of the Comite members benefit from 
significantly greater national and even international reputation than the Comite. Ten of 
the 12 Control Group respondents also felt their organisations were better known than 
the Comite. For example, seven respondents (six from the Comite Group) were among 
the nine most significant recipients of gifts in aid of the tsunami, comprising over €269 
million of the approximately €284 million total in aid to these nine French organisations
358 The relationship between the fragility of donor trust and accountability efforts is considered on the 
broader sector-wide level in Chapter 7.
359 These organisations affirmatively mentioned donor loyalty. However, the fact that others did not does 
not mean that they do not experience loyal donors.
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as of December 31, 2005 (Organisations 4, 5, 16, 19, 25, 26, and C; Cour des comptes 
2007, 13; Cour des comptes 2006a, 52).
Second, there was little connection between respondents selecting donor trust as 
the primary rationale for increasing accountability and respondents spontaneously 
evoking existing long-standing donor trust. Nine Comite Group and one Control Group 
respondents citing donor trust did not mention existing and/or long-term donor trust 
(Organisations 3, 4, 10, 12, 15, 26, 27, 28, 33, and E). Only three Comite Group and 
two Control Group respondents citing donor trust (both from Control Group B) 
affirmatively expressed existing high levels of donor trust (Organisations 5, 13, F, and 
G).
Third, almost all respondents consider donor trust important yet fragile 
irrespective of renown and cited rationale for increasing accountability. No organisation 
citing either donor trust or ethical, effective management felt that they could rely 
complacently on past or present levels of donor trust and/or long-standing reputation -  
even the most well-known organisations with a historically outstanding reputation. One 
respondent summarised this universal sense that donor trust is “always at risk” and 
“fragile” (Organisation 16). One of the largest and most internationally known Comite 
Group members concluded the interview with “we are very vulnerable to the slightest 
thing.” He cautioned that even his organisation’s high level of existing donor trust no 
longer suffices because donors are “looking over their shoulders” requiring them to 
“prove themselves" through accountability efforts (Organisation 31). This does not 
necessarily mean that these organisations do not benefit from longstanding donor 
loyalty and trust. Rather, the leaders perceive that any such trust is insufficient alone 
and/or does not diminish the need to reinforce donor trust through accountability efforts. 
Comite Executive Director Cohas-Bogey agreed that French NPOs have an enormous 
“built-up trust capital” but that trust is fragile (Cohas-Bogey call 2007).360 Finally, only 
the respondents citing donor trust as the primary rationale for increasing accountability 
linked accountability directly to addressing this fragility.
Fourth, respondents’ strategic approach to donors (i.e., targeting specific donors 
or seeking a relatively constant flow of overall number of donors and amount of 
revenue) also shows concern with both fragility of even longstanding trust based on
360 The Comit^/Sofres Survey also showed reputation as among the least important sources of donor trust 
(compared to rigour and transparency in fund management and the type of cause (e.g. poverty reduction) 
being the most important) (Comity de la Charte/TNS Sofres 2007, 13).
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reputation and enhancing trust through accountability efforts. On the one hand, the
profile of the donor populations of the respondent organisations -  mostly large numbers
of small gifts -  might suggest that organisations focus more on the overall levels of
donor revenue (i.e., a revenue stream) rather than individual donors. Average gifts in
many organisations (other than Control Group B organisations) ranged from
1
approximately €20-35 annually. The organisations with higher giving levels did focus 
on the personal contact with the donors as essential above and beyond accountability 
efforts generally. However, the interviews indicated that accountability penetrates 
many levels of donors, including concern with specific donors even at lower giving 
levels. Certain respondents systematically respond to questions and complaints from 
every donor or, in one case, every donor or non-donor (on the theory that every non­
donor is a potential donor) (Organisations 4 and 14; Organisation B, respectively). 
Some respondents have also implemented donor committees offering donor 
representatives access to senior management and an opportunity to liaise between 
headquarters and all levels of individual donors (Organisations 10 and 30). While the 
question remains as to donor effort and/or ability to benefit from the detailed financial 
disclosure that the Comite requires and that many Control Group organisations offer, all 
respondents in both groups target lower level donors in preparing and distributing 
accountability-related documents.
Finally, almost all respondents highlight the fact that increasing attention to 
accountability may protect trust. Again, however, for the group citing ethical, effective 
management as the motivation for increasing accountability, the distinction between 
trust as an on-going concern and benefiting de facto from increasing accountability, 
compared to trust as the direct motivation for accountability efforts, is essential.
361 See Appendix 6-A for a breakdown of donor revenue among the respondents. The Comit6 was unable 
to provide an average for organisations individually or collectively, and many organisations either did not 
provide this information or provided an estimate (Berlincourt e-mail November 2008). This range reflects 
estimates of approximately 50% of respondents.
362 This includes primarily the Control Group B organisations and organisations with corporate donors but 
excludes governmental and institutional donors. Organisations codes are omitted to protect 
confidentiality.
363 See also Section 1.4. Such concerns echo the criticisms o f the US disclosure system analysed in 
Section 3.1.1 and the Comit^/Sofres Survey showing that 61% of respondents surveyed cared more about 
the availability of accountability materals than actually reading them (Comitd de la Charte/TNS Sofres 
2007, 18).
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6.3 Empirical Findings: Evolution in the Relationship Between Accountability
and Donor Trust
This section explores empirical evidence of change in respondents’ views of the 
donor trust rationale for increasing accountability. The dynamic nature of increasing 
accountability as defined in the thesis emerges as crucial to organisations’ strategic 
assessment of accountability and perceptions of trust -  including how respondents 
position themselves within the Hansmann-Salamon spectrum, if at all. Evidence of 
changing approaches to the strategic assessment include: greater attention to ethical, 
effective management as a rationale for increasing accountability among Comite Group 
respondents (from donor trust as the primary rationale for joining the Comite at the time 
of joining); emerging attention to volunteer trust and public trust; and adaptability in 
respondents’ positioning accountability as a tool for maintaining/increasing donor trust 
versus remedying/mitigating mistrust.
6.3.1 Empirical Finditi2s: Evolvine Perspectives on Donor Trust o f Comite
Group Members
A comparison of the Comite Group respondents’ rationales for originally joining 
the Comite (overwhelmingly donor trust) with the explanations for increasing 
accountability in their organisations at the time of this thesis shows an evolution away 
from donor trust toward ethical, effective management. Three nuances -  the importance 
of a group dynamic, the value of an external review of organisations, and efforts to 
“police themselves” -  add contour to the emerging trend.
Donor trust was the key reason for Comite membership at the time the 
organisations joined. 27 Comite Group respondents cited protecting and/or enhancing 
donor trust as the most important reason for joining the Comite at the time they 
joined.364 12 respondents were among the 18 original founding members, therefore 
involved in the initial donor trust-driven impetus of anticipating the consequences of 
l’ARC for their organisations and the French nonprofit sector (Comite 2006e). Of the
364 The Comit6 Group self-completion questionnaire also showed that donor trust as a reason for joining 
the Comity mattered “a lot” for 13 (45%), was the “essential motivation” for 11 (38%), and was the only 
motivation for five (17%) of respondents participating in the Comity Group self-completion 
questionnaire.
365 See Sections 1.2.4 and 7.2.2 “The Comite, Accountability, and Scandal' and Appendix 1-D.
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27 Comite Group organisations citing protecting/enhancing donor trust as the reason for 
joining initially, only twelve felt donor trust was the primary motivation for their 
improving accountability systems at the time of this thesis. The other 15 cited ethical, 
effective management as the current motivation for increasing accountability. Table 6-2 
shows the rationales for joining the Comite at the time of joining and on-going 
relevance of donor trust.
Table 6-2
Reason for Joining Comite at Time of Joining and On-Going Relevance of Donor
Trust1
■  Time o f  Joining
■  Time o f  Study
21%
Being Part o f  "Chib" Value o f External O ther4
Control3
Source: Author's research data.
1 Numbers include multiple responses from certain respondents. Results suggest trends more than reliable quantitative 
results given respondents’ mixing o f  different responses. See discussion below for the on-going relevance o f  the 
rationales for joining other than donor trust. These are not represented in the table as they are not rationales for 
increasing accountability.
2 Donor trust at time o f  joining: Organisations 2, 3, 5 ,6 , 7 ,9 , 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 2 3 ,2 4 , 26, 
27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33. Donor trust at the time o f  this thesis (the others saying ethical, effective management): 
Organisations 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 20, 26, 27, and 28.
3 Organisations 8, 12, 17, 21, 28, and 30.
4 Organisations 4, 8, 18, and 21.
Several secondary comments on reasons for joining remain relevant. Seven 
respondents continue to consider being outside such a group, movement, or Comite 
“club” “impossible” once it exists for fear of donors questioning why they are not 
members (i.e., the organisations’ assumption that failure to join “signals” inadequate
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accountability to donors) (Organisations 1, 4, 5, 9, 20, 23, and 31). Respondents 
perceive probable donor reaction as “if the Comite exists, why aren’t you a member?” 
more than a judgment that Comite membership is substantively beneficial. These 
comments specifically separated the “club” phenomenon from motivation for increasing 
accountability or even potential substantive benefit of membership.
Other explanations for joining the Comite initially, usually as a second priority, 
included external oversight (particularly the exigency with financial transparency and 
technical progress through work with the censeurs), “policing themselves,” and 
individual issues such as support for grant applications (Organisations 12, 28, and 30;
'l&fL
Organisations 4, 8, 21, and 9; Organisations 12,28, and 30, respectively). There was 
virtually no link between the notion of “policing themselves” individually and the larger 
question of the relationship between self-regulation and regulation as might have been 
expected (e.g. self-regulation as a deterrent for excessive governmental intervention).
6.3.2 Empirical Findings: Sisns of Evolvins Perspectives on Volunteer and
Public Trust
This section explores early signs of evolution in respondents’ perception of the 
relationship between accountability and trust of volunteers (defined below) and the 
general public (i.e., non-donors) in the organisation (hereafter referred to as “volunteer 
trust” and “public trust,” respectively). While volunteer trust and public trust remain 
considerably less important to respondents in both the Comite Group and the Control 
Group than donor trust, both are starting to be seen as related to the strategic assessment 
of accountability. Both test the boundaries of the evolving views of donor trust as a 
rationale for increasing accountability and the strategic assessment process.
Volunteer trust is defined to include two perspectives: the impact of an 
organisation’s accountability on its own volunteers’ trust and organisations’ 
engagement of volunteers in the implementation of accountability mechanisms. 
Accountability in furtherance of public trust is widely interpreted as the same exercise 
as accountability to donors, particularly in the ethical, effective management group.
366 See also Independent Sector on self-regulation as a deterrent to excessive regulation (Panel on the 
Nonprofit Sector 2007, 3). See also Section 4.4.2 on Comite obligations as pressure on conseils 
d ’administration to adopt accountability mechanisms..
367 Hansmann also noted that he would have expected deterring excessive regulation to be a factor in 
increasing accountability (Hansmann call 2008). See Section 3.2.1 “Relationship Between Accountability 
Regulation and Self-Regulatory Initiatives...” for US emphasis on deterring regulation.
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Thus, the findings raise the question of whether increasing importance of the ethical, 
effective management rationale for accountability efforts may result in a parallel 
increase in accountability to the public and even volunteers -  if only because de facto 
the accountability measures are not specifically targeting donors but rather the right
•  •  •  1 ^ :0level and mechanisms for the organisation generally irrespective of beneficiary. 
Finally, notwithstanding the significantly lesser importance of volunteer trust and public 
trust compared to donor trust as a rationale for increasing accountability, the recurring 
recognition of the fear of the failure of accountability surfaces with respect to all three 
types of trust.
O / 'Q  •
Volunteers. Accountability, and Trust. Overall respondents in both groups 
and the Comite do not view volunteer trust as an important motivation for their own 
increasing accountability. This is primarily because most organisations do not perceive 
accountability efforts as important to attracting volunteers. Nonetheless, the respondents 
starting to direct accountability efforts at increasing/maintaining volunteer trust 
demonstrate changing attitudes -  even if describing the link as moderately important 
and in some cases in early stages. The increasing competition for volunteer recruiting 
and retention, especially for high level volunteers, largely explains signs of change 
(Organisations 4, 16, 23, 33, A (“hunt for volunteers”), and E). The Comite/Soffes 
Survey showed that 42% of participants felt that a “label of good practice” would 
positively influence their desire to volunteer with the certified organisations, compared 
to 53% saying it would not (Comite de la Charte/TNS Soffes 2007, 19). Similarly, a 
significant number of organisations in both groups believe accountability counts to 
some extent for volunteers. Table 6-3 sets out the findings.
368 See also Section 5.2 on the view of some respondents citing ethical, effective management that their 
level of accountability exceeds that of the donor trust group.
369 See Appendix 6-B for further details of numerical distribution of employees and volunteers among 
respondents.
370 Two of the seven respondents affirming the importance of accountability distinguish volunteers 
(bertevoles) and volontaires.
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Table 6-3
Importance of Accountability to Volunteer Trust
100
90
■  CC Group
■  Control Group80
70
60
50
45%40
42%
36%30 33%
20
18%10
0
Accountability Somewhat Volunteers Do Not Care About D o Not Have Any or Many 
Important or Starting to Be Accountability (and Respondent Volunteers 3
Important to Volunteers Makes N o Effort)
Source: Author's research data.
1 O rganisations 4 , 5, 6 , 8, 12, 13, 20 , 2 4 , 2 6 , 28 , 2 9 , 33 , A , B, C, D , and E . Level o f  importance varies but 
respondents usually emphasised importance to higher level volunteers.
2 O rganisations 1, 2 , 3 , 7, 14, 15, 18, 19, 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 5 , 27 , 30 , 31 , 3 2 , F, H, I, and K. Control Group 
respondents in this category emphasised that only the mission counted.
3 O rganisations 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 2 3 , G, J, and L.
Within both the Comite Group and Control Group those that did not believe 
volunteers cared about accountability insisted on the emotional attachment to the 
organisation’s reputation, as well as the mission, usefulness of the work, personal 
convictions about volunteering, and, to a lesser extent, the social experience 
(Organisations 3, 14, and 25; Organisations 3, H, 23, and 23, respectively). The “cause”
also appears as one of the two most important factors for donor trust (along with
rigorous transparent fund management) in the Comite/Sofres Survey (Comite de la 
Charte/TNS Sofres 2007, 13).371 One respondent concluded that “volunteers are spoken 
to [about accountability matters] but don’t care” (Organisation 32).
Despite limited direct focus on volunteer trust, anecdotal examples of 
management of volunteers indicate inclusion of volunteer matters in overall efforts to 
increase accountability. All who commented on volunteers believed that the higher level
371 T his section  o f  the C om ite/S ofres Survey did not sp ecify  the type o f  trust, but donor trust w as im plied  
and understood as the basis for the C om ite’s com m ission ing  o f  the survey (Sou b lin  call June 2 0 0 8 ).
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volunteers demonstrate greater interest in accountability, for example the regional 
delegates or other senior representatives of local offshoots of a national association. A 
few organisations have a volunteer charter (charte de benevoles) outlining volunteer 
responsibilities, ethical standards, and general functioning or volunteer-driven 
democratic membership procedures (Organisations 8, 21 and C; Organisation 19, 
respectively). Others have detailed procedures monitoring volunteer participation in 
major fund-raising events (Organisations 4, 14, and B). Three have professionalised 
high level volunteer positions (in one case the Director General and almost half of the 
senior management team are volunteers) to be “almost interchangeable with paid 
employees” (Organisations 21 and 29; Organisation 23, respectively). Finally, the 
administrateurs in all organisations are high level volunteers but represent a distinct 
case as their statutory role intrinsically involves responsibility for oversight of 
accountability matters.372
Finally, the recurring theme of the danger to NPOs of failure of accountability 
affects volunteer trust. Irrespective of respondents’ views on the various motivations for 
increasing accountability, respondents generally believe that failure of accountability 
would negatively affect volunteer trust and, in turn, recruiting and retention of 
volunteers. One Comite Group respondent noted that “not having accountability is the 
best way to have [volunteers] leave” (Organisation 25). Another reminded that 
volunteers “have l’ARC in mind” (Organisation 30). A third insisted that volunteers 
“don’t ask about accountability but would leave if there were a scandal” (Organisation
21).
The Comite and Volunteer Trust. The Comite is not specifically concerned with 
members’ accountability toward volunteers despite the volunteer-driven structure of the 
Comite itself. The Comite web site does not directly address volunteer trust (Comite 
2008c). Similarly, the Comite representatives do not discuss accountability to volunteers 
or as a vehicle for generating volunteer trust as part of the membership screening or on­
going compliance. No Comite Group respondents reported any conversations or other 
interaction with the Comite regarding volunteers.
372 See Sections 4.2 and 5.4.3 for limitations in conseil d ’administration participation in accountability 
matters. The Comity still does not permit paying administrateurs, including the President (although 
permitted under French law in limited circumstances). This subject is currently under discussion within 
the Comity. The decisive issues concern disclosure of the salary, benchmarking of salaries against market 
practice, and compensation of administrateurs for time away from regular paid work dedicated to conseil 
d ’administration duties (Soublin call June 2008).
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The Comite’s substantive work is, however, almost entire volunteer-driven. A 
team of approximately 70 exclusively independent volunteer examiners (censeurs) 
assumes responsibility for reviewing applications for accreditation, engaging with 
member organisations triennially for an in-depth review, approving any improvements 
required for on-going accreditation, and, if necessary, recommending sanctions (Comite 
2008c and 2008g; 2008o, 8-9; 2008b, respectively). The censeurs are high level 
professionals with accounting and finance background. Almost all Comite Group 
respondents noted the censeurs ’ significant professional experience, and no respondents 
complained of competence issues. Volunteers also comprise the Commission 
d’agrement et de controle, the Conseil de deontologie (until recently dissolved into 
independent volunteer advisors), and the conseil d ’administration, and a few assist with 
communication (Comite 2008c).
The reasons volunteers join the Comite are “multiple and complex” according to 
Soublin. The word “accountability...is not in their vocabulary” even though the concept 
is “practised without using the word” (Soublin interview 2007). Soublin notes that five 
to ten years ago the Comite had a similar volunteer structure yet a much less advanced 
accountability level (Soublin interview 2007). Nonetheless, the volunteers’ primary 
activity and the Comite’s standards are difficult to separate as the volunteers are 
essentially finance experts volunteering in a role of overseeing organisational 
accountability and expressing views on accountability requirements for members 
(Comite senior management call/interview 2007). Finally, Comite senior management 
echoes respondents’ concern that the highly experienced censeurs ’ would leave if 
accountability standards were insufficient (Comite senior management call/interview 
2007).
The General Public. Accountability, and Trust. Respondents’ sense of 
obligation of accountability to the general public and perception of the importance of 
public trust also suggest changing priorities for increasing accountability that affect 
strategic assessment. One key issue involves whether accountability to donors differs 
from accountability to the public. A follow-on question is whether the respondents 
citing donor trust differ from respondents citing ethical, effective management with 
respect to the level the public benefits from accountability efforts not directly targeting 
the public.
373 See Section 4.1 “Increasing Accountability Within the Comite.”
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Respondents were briefed that the debate in the US regarding accountability to 
the public and public trust in NPOs has been largely linked to the tax system through 
which the government supports eligible NPOs through tax deductible gifts with tax 
revenue (e.g. Anheier 2005, 40; USGDTIRS 2008a). Best US practice now also 
includes accountability to the public. For example, the Independent Sector Code of 
Ethics specifically includes an obligation of comprehensive and timely disclosure to the 
general public and the media in addition to donors and other stakeholders (Independent 
Sector 2004c, Section VI). The question has become more pertinent in France given the 
series of increases in tax benefits of donations to NPOs since 2003 and increasing levels 
of accountability generally.374
The Control Group was generally more concerned with accountability to the 
public than the Comite Group on a percentage basis. 19 (57%) Comite Group 
respondents expressed concern with accountability to the public; two expressed 
moderate concern; and 12 do not consider the public in the strategic assessment of 
accountability (other than general “awareness” in three cases) (Organisations 13, 24, 
and 25). One respondent not concerned with the general public believed that most 
Comite organisations focused on basic ethical standards irrespective of the beneficiary 
or level of specific focus on the public (Organisation 13). Only one deliberately targeted 
accountability efforts only to donors (Organisation 20). Within the Control Group nine 
(75%) respondents felt that accountability to the public is important (almost all actively 
focused on the public); and two did not. However, conclusions cannot be drawn from 
this discussion alone that the Comite Group respondents focus more exclusively on 
donor trust and less on public trust as a result of their Comite membership and the 
Comite’s position on public trust (below).
The comparison between views on obligations of accountability to the public 
and views on the donor trust and ethical, effective management rationales shows a 
relatively balanced distribution. Again there is a somewhat greater focus on public trust 
in the Control Group in both cases. Approximately half of the Comite Group 
respondents prioritising each of donor tmst and ethical, effective management 
prioritised accountability to the public. All three in the Control Group prioritising 
donor tmst and six of the nine in the Control Group prioritising ethical, effective 
management also focused on the public.
374 See Section 3.2.2.
375 Two responses were not clear.
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The respondents citing donor trust and respondents citing ethical, effective 
management share a common view of accountability to the public. All respondents from 
both groups who answered the question, regardless of cited rationale for increasing 
accountability or their perspective on accountability to the public, felt that the 
accountability measures required would be the same as they currently do or would 
undertake for donors. Five respondents specified that “there isn’t one type of 
accountability for one set of stakeholders and different for others” (Organisations 18, 
19, C, D, and E).376 Only one Comite Group organisation affirmatively distinguished 
obligations to the public and to donors (Organisation 30). In particular, the respondents 
prioritising ethical, effective management considered their standards adequate for all 
beneficiaries of accountability -  internally and externally. The comments from some 
that the ethical, effective management objective generated a higher level of 
accountability than a donor trust focus raises the question of the extent to which 
respondents assessing accountability for ethical, effective management provide greater 
accountability to the public (even without specifically targeting the public) than those 
citing donor trust.377 In addition, a few respondents in both the donor trust and ethical, 
effective management groups viewed one sub-purpose of accountability to the public as 
addressing potential donors (therefore arguably falling back, in part, into the donor trust 
explanation) (Organisations 18,19, and B; Organisation 19, respectively).
Finally, although the explanation of the interview question cited a tax-based 
origin to concern with public trust (i.e., NPOs’ benefit from the public’s funding of tax 
deductions on donations to NPOs), only one Comite Group and three Control Group 
respondents associated accountability to the public with the tax argument (Organisations 
9, E, G and I). Two Comite Group respondents rejected the tax argument outright 
(Organisations 1 and 4). One respondent insisted that the state’s payments through the 
tax system were normal because there was also a transfer of competence through the tax 
system (Organisation I).
The Comite and Public Trust. The Comite’s reaction as an organisation 
(represented by management) regarding the public is split (Comite senior management 
calls/interviews 2007). Comite management states that they do not pay attention to the 
public -  or only “very indirectly.” Nonetheless, the fact of “acting in a zone of trust”
376 Hansmann notes that in certain NPOs the fiduciary role vis-el-vis donors and beneficiaries is “one and 
the same” (particularly for commercial NPOs). However, he does not specifically address the public 
(Hansmann 1980, 845).
377 See Section 5.2. This would require additional study.
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touches the public because the Comite is in a position to change the public’s perception 
of the French nonprofit sector (Cohas-Bogey interview 2007). Soublin believes that the 
concern with the public has begun to emerge in the past few years but was not an initial 
concern (Soublin interview 2007).
6.3.3 Empirical Findings: Adaptability o f Perspective on Accountability -
Increasing/Maintaining Trust or Remedying/Mitigating Mistrust?
A debate as to whether accountability efforts aim to increase/maintain trust or, 
conversely, to remedy/mitigate mistrust emerged during the preparatory discussions
*ino
with experts for the study and the interview process. This debate, offering a third 
example of adaptability of respondents’ perspective on trust as a rationale for 
accountability, is not addressed in the literature. The question focuses primarily on 
assessing accountability efforts from an operational sense of whether a proactive 
approach to trust, or a defensive approach to threats to trust, guides the strategic 
assessment. Respondents were asked whether their organisation’s accountability efforts 
fell into one or both of the increasing/maintaining or remedying/mitigating 
interpretations and, more generally, the extent to which the debate was useful in the 
French context. All participants in both groups felt that the question was relevant to the 
overall discussion of accountability. Responses reflect interviewees’ views and not 
measured data.
The findings do not show a clear bias toward one side of the debate. The results 
show slightly more respondents prioritising increasing/maintaining trust adapting 
somewhat to two variables: most importantly, scandal and, to a lesser extent, individual 
internal organisation leadership initiatives. Table 6-4 shows the distribution of 
responses. In an ordinary (i.e., scandal free) environment, the balance is stronger toward 
increasing/maintaining trust. At the other extreme (i.e., immediately post-scandal), 
remedying/mitigating mistrust reflects accountability efforts directed at post-scandal 
recovery.379 Finally, a significant number also said “both” or “avoidance of 
decline/management of risk.” Within the “both” group, again many considered timing
378 Le Grand raised this debate at the Major Review discussion (February 2007).
379 One Comity Group respondent and former Comite board member noted the “irrational” dimension of 
mistrust of the nonprofit sector among the French public (Organisation 25; Comite de la Charte/TNS 
Sofres 2007 (showing 36% of those surveyed mistrusted associations and foundations (but still third after 
40% trust and 57% respect, 10))).
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relative to scandal crucial. Post-PARC (and post- any French nonprofit sector or NPO 
crisis), there were significant efforts to remedy mistrust, including the founding of the 
Comite. This is the only question eliciting references to movement in accountability 
directly relating to scandal, and these responses almost exclusively related to the 
founding of the Comite. L’ARC remains a highly sensitive and relevant issue, but 
almost all respondents acknowledge an evolving perspective on the implications of
OOA
PARC for accountability efforts. Other sources of a changing perspective on this 
debate arise from management issues such as the hiring of a new Director General with 
a particular perspective and/or mandate from the conseil d ’administration on 
accountability issues (Organisations 10 and C, respectively).
380 See Section 7.2.1 for a detailed discussion of l’ARC, as well as the Comity as the only example of 
adaptability of accountability systems to scandal.
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Table 6-4
Increasing/Maintaining Donor Trust or Mitigating Mistrust?
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Increase/Maintain Both Increase/ Avoid Decline Remedy/Mitigate Essential For
Trust Maintain Trust and (Risk Management) Mistrust Credibility
Remedy Mitigate 
Mistrust I CC Group 
I Control Group
S o u r c e :  A u t h o r ' s  r e s e a r c h  d a t a .
1 Four Comit£ Group responses that were unclear were omitted. Certain respondents cited “Essential For Credibility” 
together with another option and therefore are counted twice. Three Control Group answers positioned respondents 
outside o f the debate themselves, notwithstanding their view o f the relevance o f  the question (Organisations C, H, 
and J). Some organisations offered two answers, and both were included. Some did not answer. Accordingly, results 
indicate a general qualitative panorama rather than reliable specific quantitative results.
2 Organisations 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 26, 30, 32, 33, A, B, and F.
3 Organisations 6, 7, 8, 13, 16, 25, and 27.
4 Organisations 1 ,3 , 18, 23, 3 1 ,1, and K.
5 Organisations 2, 4, 19, 21, D, and E.
6 Organisations 10, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 32, A, D, G, and K.
The three most militant organisations (all in the Comite Group) believe that the 
militant culture and activities (e.g. lobbying and speaking out on behalf of human rights
n o i
victims) modify somewhat the perspective on this debate positioning donor trust. All 
three leaders focus on accountability as increasing/maintaining trust but consider their 
militant actions themselves a trust-enhancing source of accountability. These include 
recruiting volunteer “militants” to speak out, as well as members voting on bureau 
proposals for organisational priorities at the bi-annual member congress or exerting 
pressure for accountability through the assemblee generale (all actions taken
381 S e e  a l s o  S e c t i o n  4 . 2 . 1  “  W histleblower M echanism ”  o n  m i l i t a n t  o r g a n i s a t i o n s .
382 O r g a n i s a t i o n  c o d e s  a r e  o m i t t e d  t o  p r o t e c t  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y .
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independently of donor trust). One boasts average donation levels twice the French 
NPO average, high donor stability across even challenging times, and total expenses 
related to fund-raising approximately ten times lower than most French NPOs 
(Organisation 9).
The Comite Perspective. Comite management offers a mixed perspective. 
Soublin acknowledges increasing/maintaining trust as the goal reflected in all of the 
Comite documents. However, he and Cohas-Bogey recognise that everyone “still 
believes mistrust exists,” and the sector must consolidate accountability efforts 
following FARC (Soublin and Cohas-Bogey interviews 2007). The Comite/Soffes 
Survey reflects this combination, showing 51% of the 1000 survey respondents trust 
NPOs, and 47% do not (Comite de la Charte/TNS Sofres 2007, 9). The former includes 
more donors, volunteers, and those with higher education, and the latter includes more 
non-donors (Comite de la Charte/TNS Sofres 2007, 9). The Comite/Sofres Survey also 
showed that greater controls (e.g. with respect to honesty, management compensation, 
and transparency) should result in increased trust (Comite de la Charte/TNS Sofres 
2007, 15 and 16). However, these results are unclear regarding the impact of scandal on 
responses. Moreover, the results do not lead to conclusive findings regarding actual 
reliance of the donor trust group on improved accountability controls or whether 
accountability actually does increase trust.
6.4 Empirical Findings: Key Potential Factors Driving Increasing
Accountability in Furtherance of Donor Trust: Donor Pressure. Comite
Membership, and the Media
This section explains three key potential driving forces behind increasing 
accountability in furtherance of the donor trust objective: donor pressure; Comite 
membership; and the media. These three potential triggers of increasing accountability 
parallel the three driving forces addressed in the analysis of ethical, effective 
management (i.e., corporatisation, integration of international standards, and funder 
accountability requirements). However, in the case of donor trust, in both respondent 
groups the connection between these expected forces within the larger donor trust 
rationale proves less direct than in the case of the three within ethical, effective 
management. Rather, leaders appear to engage in the strategic assessment and act in
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accordance with an internally generated idea of trust and/or a notion of the importance 
of being “trustworthy.”383
6,4.1 Empirical Findings: Donor Pressure as a Drivine Force for Increasing
Accountability
Respondents do not generally perceive donor pressure, whether from individuals 
or institutions, as an important impetus for increasing accountability. Donor pressure 
might manifest itself as specific requests for additional accountability mechanisms 
(including transparency) and/or discourse or giving practices linking the level of 
accountability or the implementation of specific accountability mechanisms to gifts. The 
organisations’ perceptions of donor pressure and/or specific donor requests for 
accountability mechanisms might have logically been an important counterpart to donor 
trust based on the perception organisations have of donor reaction to media coverage of
-3 0 4
accountability-related scandal such as l’ARC. In contrast, the findings showing 
absence of a link between donor pressure and efforts to increase accountability to 
support donor trust reinforce the recurring theme of inside out accountability. 
Organisations appear to make accountability decisions based on their perceptions of 
accountability efforts necessary to enhance their idea of trustworthiness rather than in 
response to specific donor requests or other evidence of donor requirements.
The Comite Group and Control Group again showed similar results on a 
percentage basis, both low relevance of donor pressure. Only three Comite Group 
organisations mentioned donor pressure -  all weakly; three others mentioned 
institutional donor pressure; and seven affirmatively said there was no donor pressure 
(Organisations 3, 16, and 18; Organisations 2, 5, and 19; Organisations 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 
10, and 30, respectively). Only two Control Group respondents mentioned donor 
pressure as “somewhat” important; one other mentioned institutional donor pressure; 
and three affirmatively felt no donor pressure (Organisations I and K; Organisation E; 
Organisations A, G, and H, respectively).
383 This empirically-based conclusion reinforces a suggestion from Howell early in the research process 
(Howell meeting 2006). Hansmann commented that ultimately trustworthiness is key, and it is nice to 
have trust as well (Hansmann call 2008).
384 Every respondent that discussed the media noted the fear of impact on donors, even though most did 
not consider the media as an important rationale for increasing accountability. See also Section 7.2.2.
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In addition, funder accountability requirements were not perceived as donor 
pressure to increase accountability generally. Rather, as noted in Section 5.3.3, even for 
respondents mentioning institutional donor pressure funder accountability requirements 
reflect “normal business” linked to the specific funding opportunity and the related 
accountability mechanisms required by the funder.
Further research would be needed to measure actual donor behaviour relative to 
accountability, as well as whether and how donor pressure is effective in increasing 
accountability or for achieving any other objectives. The supply side research here 
confirms that the respondent organisations do not generally react to donor pressure or 
integrate donor pressure in the strategic assessment of accountability -  irrespective of 
how much donor pressure may actually exist, the perspective of donors, and whether the 
organisations are excluding a factor that, if considered, would change the strategic 
assessment.386
6.4.2 Empirical Findin2s: The Comite as a Driving Force for Increasins
Accountability? -  The Comite Paradox
Unlike donor pressure, Comite membership does appear to increase 
accountability within member organisations.387 The extent of the Comite’s influence on 
increasing accountability and/or increasing donor trust is fundamental to the Comite’s 
success with both current members and recruiting of new members (e.g. Comite 2008n). 
However, the research reveals a key paradox. On the one hand, the Comite emphasises 
developing donor trust, and a significant percentage of respondents’ motivation for 
increasing accountability through Comite membership is to enhance donor trust. On the 
other hand, respondents perceive lack of awareness of the Comite among donors and the 
public, and the single biggest criticism of the Comite was the Comite’s failure to 
communicate the value of Comite membership and the accreditation logo. A reverse 
logic of the impossibility of not having the Comite logo appears the key reason for 
remaining a member.
385 See Section 1.4 on excluding donor perspective in the empirical research for this thesis.
386 While actual donor perception is beyond the scope of this thesis, this combination of the empirical 
findings relating to donor trust and donor pressure raises the question of the extent to which individual 
donors do pressure NPOs for and/or take into consideration accountability efforts.
387 See Section 7.2.2 “The Comite, Accountability, and Scandal' for a discussion of the broader sector- 
wide implications of the Comity.
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Respondents’ criticism was without hesitation and/or mitigating factors. 20 
respondents commenting on the issue believe that donors do not know of the Comite, 
and, among the few who do, the value of the logo is poorly understood. All other 
respondents noted less directly the limited impact of Comite membership on donors, 
and none contradicted this view. Two affirmatively offered that “not being a Comite 
member would make no difference at all” with donors, and several others agreed 
indirectly (Organisations 1 and 21). Three respondents did note that the logo may be of 
“some help” for the “few” donors who know of the Comite (Organisations 2, 14, and
22).
Neither the Comite nor the respondents offered any evidence for this 
overwhelmingly negative view of the value of the logo and Comite membership to 
donors. None of the 33 Comite Group respondents had a mechanism for measuring the 
impact of Comite membership on donor response. None reported ever having any 
significant donor feedback or Comite feedback on donor reaction. Similarly, Comite 
management had never evaluated the impact of the logo with the exception of the few 
points addressed in the Comite/Sofres Survey (Comite de la Charte/TNS Sofres 2007, 
19-20). Moreover, there has been no effort to develop any evaluation tools either 
individually or within the Comite. Members simply do not know if the logo helps. 
Failure to assess the impact of Comite membership on donor reaction appears to reflect 
strategic assessment -  i.e., other organisational priorities (including the investment in 
accountability mechanisms directly). The more the trend moves toward ethical, effective 
management as the primary motivation for increasing accountability, the more logical 
the failure to solicit donor feedback on the Comite becomes.
The cause(s) and possible remedy for the Comite’s ineffective communication 
remain undefined. One impediment to donor and public awareness of the Comite may 
be that the Comite does not publish the censeurs’ reports as, for example, the Cour des 
comptes does (Comite senior management call/interview October 2007; Perouse de 
Montclos 2005, 615). Whether failure to disclose compliance weaknesses among 
respondents and/or sanctions applied (short of expulsion) affects the Comite’s 
reputation or the value externally of being a Comite member remains unclear. In the last 
12 years, only three organisations have left the Comite, all during the course of a routine 
control (Soublin e-mail October 28, 2008; Perouse de Montclos 2005, 615; Comite
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2008g, 12).388 Only one Comite Group respondent argued for a “radical change” to 
more severe sanctions for failure to comply with Comite requirements (Organisation 
17).
While few respondents recognised a positive benefit of the Comite logo, the 
recurring theme emerged of the fear that absence, particularly the loss, of Comite 
membership and the failure to be part of a sub-community like the Comite would be 
noticed and interpreted as a failure of accountability. Thus respondents perceive loss of 
the logo as a risk to the NPO’s reputation despite the perception of the logo’s limited 
positive benefits (Organisations 1, 4, 5, 7, 13, 15, 23, 27, and 32).389 Only three of the 
33 Comite Group respondents did not post the Comite logo on their web site despite the 
above-mentioned paradoxical lack of belief in donors’ understanding of the logo.390 
Moreover, this is one of only two areas throughout the interview process where 
respondents mentioned sector of activity, specifically the need to be members if others
OQ 1
in their sector were members (Organisations 1 and 15). This attitude reflects fear of 
being perceived as less accountable than a competitor -  not simply a question of 
prestige. As noted in Section 6.2, repeatedly both the respondents and Soublin insisted 
that the individual organisations are significantly more well-known than the Comite 
itself and do not need the Comite for prestige reasons. Five respondents explained 
remaining a Comite member to be “part of the French association world,” one in order 
to balance the organisation’s international profile (Organisations 5 ,11,21,31, and 32).
None of the Control Group respondents felt that joining the Comite would 
improve donor trust or otherwise benefit them vis-^-vis donors or the general public. 
Two Control Group respondents know “very little about,” and one had never heard of, 
the Comite despite their experience and prominence in the nonprofit world 
(Organisations A and F; Organisation J, respectively). The Control Group A 
respondents already exhibit in four of six cases a high level accountability standards and
388 These organisations include AFM, Fondation Raoul-Follereau, and Mouvement pour les Villages 
d’enfants (Comity senior management call/interview 2007). Note that Comity management does not agree 
with Perouse de Monclos’ characterisation of the Raoul-Follereau case as expulsion.
389 These organisations explicitly stated that they could not “not be” members. However, all organisations 
communicated this idea indirectly (e.g. needing the logo to be a model for the sector).
390 Approximately half of the Comite Group respondents posted the logo on the home page, and 
approximately half on either the main donor page or the frame. Some also published the logo on the 
financial statement page.
391 The other is when NPOs are subject to whistleblower type mechanisms or document retention policies 
due to the sector of activity (e.g. working with children). See Sections 4.2.1 “ Whistleblower Mechanism” 
and 4.2.3 “Document Retention Policy.”
392 See Section 6.2 “Donor Trust Independent of Accountability and Fragility o f Donor Trust”
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practices -  two exceeding Comite requirements (Organisations C and D). Two others 
categorically refused the possibility of Comite membership on the grounds of lack of 
independent administrateurs, which has changed since the interview (Organisations B 
and C).394 The Control Group B respondents focused largely on ethical, effective 
management and were not compelled to join for reasons of donor trust. Only one 
Control Group organisation (an internationally renowned organisation highly focused 
on accountability with successful donor relations) expressed interest in joining the 
Comite but with the objective of “good sector citizenship” and not for donor trust 
reasons (Organisation D).
The Comite recognises the need to increase communication and public education 
efforts. In 2007, the Comite secured its first grant to do so (Soublin interview 2007; 
Comite 2008p, 25). Comite management queries how members might raise awareness 
of the Comite logo, suggesting that they should contribute as well (Soublin interview 
2007). However, no Comite members accepted supporting the Comite’s communication 
efforts, financially or otherwise, as their responsibility.
Finally, the attitude toward the improvements in the underlying accountability 
that Comite membership triggers generally does not fall within the paradoxical lack of 
awareness of donors of the Comite despite the Comite’s donor trust focus. 
Organisations believe donors do recognise the value of the underlying improvements in 
accountability even if the logo alone fails, or leaders believe fails, to “signal” (in Rose- 
Ackerman’s terms) trustworthiness or increase donor trust. Internal benefits are also 
recognised, such as raising awareness of the conseil d ’administration consideration of 
accountability mentioned in Section 4.4.2. Both points reinforce the inside out 
accountability.
393 See Section 5.2.
394 See Section 4.1 “Increasing Accountability Within the Comite.”
395 See Section 7.2.2 “The Comite, Accountability, and Scandal’ on the Comity’s media efforts relating to 
scandal.
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6.4.3 Empirical Findims: The Media as a Corollary to Donor Trust and
Drivine Force for Increasine Accountability
The media was not cited as an important rationale for increasing accountability 
by any respondents in either group, even though the interview question specifically
• 1QA •  •  •offered the media as one of several potential explanations. Given the increasing 
media scrutiny of French NPOs individually and the sector more generally, the media
“^ 07might have been expected to trigger increasing accountability. The issue is on 
respondents’ minds in both the Comite Group and the Control Group but as a corollary 
to the primary donor trust rationale rather than directly linked directly to accountability 
efforts. For most respondents, the media relates above all to organisational image 
generally, and, in turn, impact on donors’ perception of the organisation -  whether or 
not they cited donor trust as a rationale for increasing accountability. Nine (27%) 
Comite Group and two (17%) Control Group respondents said that the media counts 
“somewhat” but “really not much” (Organisations 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 16, 21, 24, E, and I 
(“only after scandal”)). Six Comite Group and two Control Group respondents 
affirmatively rejected the media as a trigger for efforts to improve accountability 
(Organisations 1, 8, 19, 22, 23, 29, B, and J). 17 (51%) Comite Group and eight (67%) 
Control Group respondents did not mention the media at all despite the inclusion of the 
media as an option in the interview question.
There is no clear link between respondents’ comments on the media and the 
donor trust and ethical, effective management rationales for increasing accountability. 
Among the group saying the media counted somewhat, there was a 50-50 split between 
donor trust and ethical, effective management (Organisations 4, 5, 12, 13, 16, and E; 
Organisations 6, 7, 21, 24, 31, and I, respectively). Among respondents saying the 
media affirmatively did not count, two cited donor trust and six cited ethical effective 
management (Organisations 1, and 8; Organisations 19, 22, 23, 19, B, and J,
396 See also Salamon and Geller on the media as of limited importance to accountability efforts in a 
broader study of US NPOs (2005, 9).
397 See also Note 536, supra. For example, an advanced Google search of French language entries only on 
March 31, 2008 revealed approximately 322,000 articles on the Zoe’s Ark scandal approximately six 
months after the initial press coverage in October 2007. This does not include other languages, radio and 
television, and other forms of web/media communication. Stories in the international media such as even 
the positive story of Doctors Without Borders/MSdecins Sans Frontidres early closure of tsunami gifts 
were reported as having an important impact on French branches of the international NPO networks (e.g. 
Action contre La Faim response (de Torrente discussion 2005; Cour des comptes 2006b, 100; Bennhold 
(International Herald Tribune) 2005). (See Section 7.2.1.)
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respectively). In addition, given the number of respondents that did consider the media 
important enough to discuss conclusions cannot be drawn.
Despite the limited attention to the media as a motivation for increasing 
accountability, the media was overwhelmingly present in the interviews defensively as a 
potential source of “disaster.” Most respondents expected mediatisation in the event of 
failure of accountability within an organisation or elsewhere in the sector to play a key 
role in the impact of scandal (e.g. extensive questions at Comite de la Charte
OQO
Conference 2008). Scandal is explored more fully in Section 7.2. However, as 
previously noted, every respondent evoked spontaneously and forcefully the sector-wide 
impact of the mediatisation of l’ARC. All interviews post-Zoe’s Ark feared the impact 
on the sector generally and even on Comite members.399 Some noted fear of a direct, 
potentially dramatic effect of the media on “fragile” and indispensable donor trust noted 
in Section 6.2 (Organisations 13, 16, C, and E). All respondents described this as an 
issue within the larger donor trust concern. However, none connected this fear of media- 
driven “disaster” directly to their own accountability efforts. Overwhelmingly 
respondents separated their own strategic assessment from the media despite 
impressions that scandal in one organisation is usually close enough to harm the sector 
and therefore other organisations individually (particularly in the same sector of 
activity) to varying degrees.
The Comite and the Media. Echoing respondents’ views, Soublin also believes 
that attracting donors through trust is by far the most direct and primary incentive to 
improve accountability. Soublin notes that some media pressure may count secondarily 
insofar as the media functions as a corollary to donor trust (Soublin interview 2007). 
The Comite claims to be solicited by the media, public authorities, and the French 
nonprofit sector on “current topics” (Comite 2008k).400 However, as noted in Section 
6.4.2, respondents frequently criticised the Comite for failing to use the media as a 
communications vehicle to expose the benefits of the Comite and express views on
398 No respondents praised the media’s ability to report the nonprofit sector objectively, one criticising the 
media’s consistently underestimating the importance and existence of donor loyalty (Organisation 2). 
Only two respondents vaguely referred to potentially positive repercussions of media coverage 
(Organisations 13 and 21).
399 24 Comite Group and ten Control Group interviews were completed at the time the Zoe’s Ark story 
first appeared in the press in late October 2007. See Section 7.2.1 “The 2007 Zoe ’s Ark Scandal....”
400 The Comity expressly excludes acting on behalf of individual members. Thus the criticism that the 
Comit6 fails to engage in effective lobbying efforts (e.g. the dual tax deduction levels) remains an on­
going debate (Soublin meeting February 2008; Organisation 31). See Section 7.2.1 for further discussion 
on the Comite’s media practices and scandal.
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accountability-related matters. Comite press releases have been few (approximately five 
in 2007) (Comite 2008s). Most address ordinary Comite business, with the exception of 
three on the tsunami in 2005 (but none address Zoe’s Ark) (Comite 2005a, 2005b, 
2005c, and 2008o, 15).401
6.5 Relevance of Variables to Increasing Accountability and Donor Trust
There do not appear to be any important patterns between the internal or external 
variables and the prioritisation of donor trust as the primary rationale for increasing 
accountability. Nor did any patterns emerge with respect to the impact of the variables 
on the potential driving forces behind donor trust. Both proved true for both the Comite 
Group and the Control Group.
With respect to size, a broad range of small, medium, and large organisations 
ranked donor trust as the most important rationale. The only notable nuance is that all of 
the smallest four Comite Group respondents cited donor trust, whereas only three of the 
six smaller Control Group organisations (all Control Group B) cited donor trust.402 On 
the one hand, as noted in Section 4.4.1, “small” Comite members still meet the 
€500,000 revenue requirement. On the other hand, smaller members even at that 
revenue level do report struggling to comply with Comite requirements 403
Similarly, the international engagement of the organisations was not a 
determining factor. In both the Comite Group and the Control Group, there was almost a 
50-50 split between France focused activities and internationally focused activities 
among both respondents citing donor trust as the essential motivation for increasing 
accountability and respondents affirmatively refuting the importance of trust.
Third, the same elements with respect to leadership apply to donor trust as noted 
in Section 5.4.3 with respect to ethical, effective management. However, overall,
401 See Section 6.4.2.
402 As noted in Section 1.2.1, all of the smaller Control Group organisations are Control Group B 
organisations with a different profile of donors (i.e., a much smaller number of larger donors). The 
sample size was too small to determine with certainty the importance of donor profile.
403 Organisation codes are omitted to protect confidentiality given the small number of small 
organisations and publication of revenue data in Appendix 1-G.
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specific efforts of individual leaders were not as important to the donor trust 
respondents as to the ethical, effective management respondents.404
Finally, no respondents in either respondent group connected external variables 
to focusing accountability efforts on donor trust. Thus again the external variables do 
not factor into the strategic assessment -  irrespective of the outcome of the strategic 
assessment /or cited rationale for increasing accountability.
Other than leaders’ initiative in joining the Comite, the internal and external 
variables do not appear to affect the strategic assessment of the three factors driving 
increasing accountability to support donor trust either. First, a wide variety of size, 
international engagement, and initiative of leader represent the varying perspectives on 
volunteer trust and public trust. Moreover, no respondents linked the external variables 
with proactive accountability efforts toward volunteers or the public. However, arguably 
scandal affects the defensive posture -  i.e., the conclusion mentioned that volunteers 
would leave in the event of scandal -  even if less important to affirmative efforts to 
increase accountability. Second, respondents did not link the media to the internal or 
external variables.405 Third, in contrast to volunteer and public trust and the media, the 
decision to join the Comite, as well as the evolution toward ethical, effective 
management among Comite Group respondents, is largely linked to the initiative of the 
leader (although no particular profile of leader). According to Comite Group 
respondents, individuals were important at the outset in setting the organisation on a 
particular course by being a founding member of the Comite or by joining post­
founding.
6.6 Donor Trust. Accountability, and the Theoretical Framework
This section addresses the two most important links between the empirical 
findings on donor trust and the theoretical framework. First, the relationship among 
accountability, trust, and French 1901 Law associations as a nonprofit form, on the one 
hand, as compared to Hansmann’s analysis of trust as a rationale for the US nonprofit 
form, on the other hand, proves crucial to explaining a tension respondents expressed
404 See Section 5.4.3.
405 The relevance of the media to the definition of scandal is addressed in Section 7.2.1.
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between freedom of association and accountability (Organisations 18, 22, 27, 30, and H; 
Cohas-Bogey interview 2007).406 Second, the three potential driving forces behind 
donor trust relate to Hansmann’s theory in different ways. Third, the empirical findings 
relating to the VAMs most important to trust link to both Rose-Ackerman’s analysis of 
accountability efforts and Salamon’s extension of Hansmann’s theory to accountability 
as a prerequisite for trust.
6.6.1 Relationship Amone Donor Trust Accountability. and Orieins o f the
Nonprofit Form: Tension Between Freedom o f  Association and
Accountability
First, even to the extent donor trust is a primary motivation for increasing 
accountability in the French nonprofit sector, donor trust does not relate to the French 
1901 Law associations based on a freedom of association objective in the same way as 
to the rationale for the US NPO form as articulated in Hansman’s economically-driven 
theory. French associations and US NPOs do, however, share the underlying economic 
concerns of the NPO form and trust (Hansmann 1980, 843-5; French Government 
1901b, Article 2).
As noted in Section 2.1.2, Hansmann’s trust derived from the nondistribution 
constraint addresses consumers’ inability to police the market through ordinary for- 
profit type contractual means. In contrast to Hansmann’s primarily market-driven 
analysis, the 1901 Law combines economic limitations on profit distribution with a 
fundamental emphasis on freedom of association (French Government 1901b, Article 
1). The essential economic parallel with the US is the 1901 Law prohibition on statutory 
objectives to distribute profits among members. All profits must be reinvested in the 
mission or risk reclassification of the association as a for-profit entity (French 
Government 1901b, Article 3). However, the concept of “members” with freedom of 
association creates a tension with increasing accountability that has surfaced throughout 
the study and that underlies many of the policy recommendations.407 Therefore, while 
the economics of associations overlap Hansmann’s analysis of the intrinsic US
406 Foundations are not addressed in the first part on freedom of association because the foundation 
structure (without members) does not raise these 1901 Law based theoretical differences from 
Hansmann’s theory (e.g. the Fondation de France’s self-electing, more independent governance (Durand 
call 2007)). One association is seriously considering a structural change to foundation status 
(Organisation D).
407 See Sections 1.3.1 and 8.2.2.
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nonprofit form, the political and social overlay of freedom of association creates tension 
with accountability that the economic view alone does not.
The 1901 Law’s implementation of a freedom of association regime -  not an 
economic objective or even a subject matter or sector of activities objective -  proves 
fundamental to the analysis of increasing accountability. Regardless of the cited 
primary motivation for increasing accountability, respondents frequently positioned the 
issue as one of balance or tension between accountability and freedom of association. 
14 (42%) Comite Group and five (41%) Control Group leaders spontaneously raised 
encroaching on democratic functioning as a direct risk of accountability efforts 
(Organisations 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 32, 33, B, C, D, E, and L).408 This 
concern was particularly important for leaders of large French national member-driven 
associations (Comite de la Charte/TNS Sofres 2007, 18).409 The legal basis and 
theoretical purpose for 1901 Law associations results in an overriding preoccupation 
with democratic organisation, potentially linked to a political history suppressing 
voluntary associations. The emphasis on democratic associations continues to suggest a 
power struggle with political establishments (Tchemonog 2007b, 6; Archambault 
1997b, 28-9; French Government 1791; Organisation 32).410
As noted in Section 1.3.1, the general absence of accountability or 
administrative regulations in the 1901 Law further exacerbates this tension between 
accountability (and trust) and freedom of association because practices of the assemblee 
generate, conseil d'administration, and bureau reflect accountability norms developing 
under the influence of the freedom of association tradition (French Government 
1901b)411 Some experts feel this organisational culture rather than legal rationales 
directly relates to views of, and potentially efforts to hinder, increasing accountability 
(Binder meeting 2007; Soublin interview 2007).
Finally, the freedom of association purpose highlights the ambiguous balance 
between trust based on the mission (again a political/social priority) as opposed to trust 
based on Hansmann’s nondistribution constraint (an explanation based on economic 
considerations). Hansmann’s trust does not emphasise charitable purpose, despite the 
requirement of charitable purpose for US tax exempt status (USGDTIRS 2006a and
408 Within the Control Group, all four of the 1901 Law associations in Control Group A but only two in 
Control Group B would find this issue relevant given donor structure.
409 Organisation codes are omitted to protect confidentiality.
410 See Sections 2.3 and 7.1.
411 See Section 1.3.1 “Associations and Associative Sector.”
212
2008c).412 Archambault describes Hansmann’s nondistribution constraint as “a label of 
trust and quality” even in certain cases in the French context (Archambault 1997b, 233). 
However, Archambault also notes that French public opinion considers “nonprofit 
purpose...a guarantee of ethical behavior” -  the absence of charitable purpose 
requirement in the 1901 Law and scandals such as l’ARC notwithstanding 
(Archambault 1997b, 14).413 Thus it is unclear the extent to which the French donor 
population and/or the French public places more importance on trust based on the cause 
or trust based on the economic basis of the nonprofit form.
The question then becomes how, if at all, accountability can be democratic (i.e., 
function effectively in the 1901 Law context) -  whether intended to reinforce trust, to 
achieve ethical, effective management, or to further other objectives. As discussed in 
Section 4.2.1, the fact that members elect democratically the conseil d ’administration 
(often up the organisational hierarchy from regional member groups on the basis of 
personal or political connections and/or membership seniority rather than governance 
expertise) hinders election of independent directors (Organisations 14, 22, 27, 30, C, 
and D; Table 3-1). This prioritisation of freedom of association and general feeling that 
independent oversight violates basic member rights collides with the increasing 
emphasis on accountability. The US focus on independent oversight that underlies the 
arguments and policy recommendations in this thesis proves the core challenge (Comite 
de la Charte Conference 2008).414
Finally, despite the emphasis on freedom of association, respondents in both 
groups acknowledge the link between donor trust and the economic reality of NPOs’ 
extensive reliance on donor funds. Most respondents addressing the risk of failure of 
accountability noted the danger for trust, and in turn for donor/economic stability. No 
respondents affirmatively separated failure of accountability from an impact on donor 
trust.
412 This is exemplified by the overlap in activities between NPOs and commercial enterprises (e.g. 
hospitals or nursing homes) (Hansmann 1980, 863). See also the UK law public purpose requirement 
(United Kingdom Government 2006, Part 1, Sections 1 and 2).
413 See also Fondation de France-Observatoire de la Fondation de la Fondation de France/TNS Sofres on 
compassion for the cause as a key factor in giving (2007,10).
414 See Chapter 8 Introduction.
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6.6.2 The Three Potential Forces Driving Accountability and the Theoretical
Framework
First, the link between donor pressure and the theoretical framework remains 
unclear. Hansmann did not address the reasons underlying donor pressure or reactions 
in his seminal 1980 article (1980, 897-8).415 The impact of differing donor capacities 
and/or incentive to investigate NPOs and understand research relating to accountability 
also remains unclear (Keating and Frumkin 2000, 6-7; Reiser 2005, 603-4). However, 
Hansmann notes that the validity of the theory does not require that every donor assess 
effectiveness of the nondistribution constraint and engage in a detailed cost-benefit 
analysis of the market failure involved in deciding whether to give to a particular NPO 
(1980, 896). Similarly, the debate on increasing trust versus remedying mistrust seems 
largely irrelevant to the theoretical framework as the market commodity is trust -  
whether the organisation achieves trust affirmatively or defensively.
In contrast, the media as a corollary to donor trust through distribution of 
information appears to challenge Hansmann’s trust based on intrinsic NPO 
characteristics. The current media culture suggests that Hansmann’s nondistribution 
constraint may alone be insufficient to address the information asymmetry and ensure 
donor trust. Specifically, the media may be viewed as a mechanism for re-balancing 
Hansmann’s information asymmetry. The media disseminates information on matters 
most relevant to trust (e.g. fraud) and pressures organisations into implementing 
accountability mechanisms related to information dissemination (e.g. financial 
transparency) as a pre-emptive strategy to protect against the impact of negative media 
coverage.
Finally, the Comite also enhances distribution of information and addresses the 
information asymmetry. The Comite was founded on the basis that more accountability, 
particularly more information, was needed to ensure donor trust than Hansmann-type 
trust based on the intrinsic NPO economic characteristics. The continuing focus on 
financial transparency -  as opposed to good governance or even transparency on 
governance matters such as with the Form 990 -  shows room for additional progress 
(Comite de la Charte Conference 2008).
415 See Section 1.4 on donor perspective.
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6.6.3 Rose-Ackerman and Salamon
The Rose-Ackerman analysis of “signaling]” trustworthiness proves 
particularly .relevant to both the donor trust rationale for increasing accountability and 
the underlying tension between accountability and freedom of association. Salamon’s 
suggestion that accountability (specifically performance evaluation) has become the 
means of demonstrating trustworthiness is also crucial to the donor trust analysis.
First, the analysis of the benefits of a reputation for reliability versus the effort 
and expense of accountability mechanisms to further such reputation reflected in the 
empirical findings links to Rose-Ackerman’s notion of “one-sided reliability” and 
“signaling]” trustworthiness (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 6). Arguably, VAMs and other 
voluntary accountability mechanisms could be considered “purchasing trust” (Rose- 
Ackerman call 2008). The strategic assessment then becomes how much to invest in 
implementation of accountability mechanisms and with the expectation of generating 
how much trust. The former is more quantifiable (e.g. time and financial cost) than the 
latter. One example of such “signal” of “one-sided trust” is the Comite Group’s fear of 
the negative consequences for donor trust of the loss or absence of the Comite logo 
addressed in Section 6.4.2 and the resulting willingness to continue to invest in the 
membership process.
In addition, the strategic assessment of accountability relates to image of 
trustworthiness in the reverse sense. The perceived negative impact of administrative 
expenses required to implement accountability mechanisms balanced against program 
expenditures results in a fear of negative “signalling” -  both within individual 
organisations and across the French nonprofit sector -  that potentially affects both 
transparency and the underlying financial analysis.416 The choices behind the allocation 
of expenses to particular budget categories are complex and often skewed and/or opaque 
to the reader (e.g. the percentage of the Director General’s salary allocated to fund­
raising costs or whether the Director General’s flight to Africa to review a local director 
is an administrative or program expense)417
In many cases, the balance between freedom of association and accountability 
emerged as a key cost of “signalling]” in the strategic assessment of VAMs,
416 The underlying accountability implications of decisions relating to administrative expenses should be 
important as well.
417 See e.g. Section 4.2.2 “Financial TransparencySection 7.3, and Note 262, supra.
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particularly in the smallest, most resource-constrained organisations. Even some large 
organisations highly focused on accountability consider even the appearance of 
infringement on the democratic 1901 Law ideals a key cost component of strategic 
assessment of accountability (Organisations 22 and 27).
Second, almost all respondents citing donor trust support Salamon’s argument 
that trust-related VAMs and other voluntary accountability mechanisms (particularly 
performance evaluation) have become indispensable supplements to the nondistribution 
constraint as a basis for trust -  whether or not extending the definition of accountability 
to include performance evaluation. Similarly, even respondents that did not cite donor 
trust as the primary reason for increasing accountability viewed any de facto positive 
impact of accountability efforts as a complement to Hansmann’s trust. Salamon’s 
accountability (e.g. through VAMs) also relates to Rose-Ackerman’s institutional 
reform point as institutional practices (i.e., accountability in this case) generating and/or 
compensating for trust (Rose-Ackerman 2001, 2; Salamon 2003, 24-5). However, none 
of the respondents citing donor trust as the primary motivation for increasing 
accountability view accountability as a strategy for mitigating risk to donor trust of 
scandal. Perhaps this recalls Rose-Ackerman’s view of the “difficulty of producing 
trustworthiness” (2001, 2). Finally, as noted above, within the donor trust group even 
those respondents prioritising freedom of association recognise the required strategic 
balance between the need for accountability to support trust and freedom of association.
6.7 Conclusion
The empirical findings show that donor trust is an important but nonetheless the 
second most oft-cited rationale for increasing accountability. Response levels for the 
donor trust rationale for increasing accountability were somewhat higher in the Comite 
Group but similar in both respondent groups with respect to the various related aspects 
of the issue discussed throughout the chapter and summarised below. This conclusion 
suggests that the hypothesis of this thesis is only correct with respect to the respondents 
specifically citing the donor trust rationale. However, two related conclusions emerge
418 See Section 2.2.1 “Supporting Versus Replacing Hansmann's Trust’ for importance of the distinction 
between replacing and supplementing trust.
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that colour respondents’ strategic assessment of accountability -  irrespective of cited 
rationale for increasing accountability. For all respondents, donor trust remains fragile, 
as well as fundamental to financial health and independence -  even respondents 
prioritising ethical, effective management (and explicitly refuting donor trust). 
Moreover, even the respondents citing ethical, effective management recognise the de 
facto positive impact of accountability on donor trust -  just not donor trust as a direct 
motivation for accountability.
Three areas suggest evolution in organisations’ views of increasing 
accountability and donor trust. First, the perspectives of Comite Group respondents 
have evolved from donor trust as the overwhelming reason for joining the Comite to 
greater emphasis on ethical, effective management as the primary rationale for 
increasing accountability at the time of this thesis. This shift echoes the ranking of 
donor trust as the second most oft-cited rationale for increasing accountability. Second, 
emerging interest in both volunteer trust and public trust indicate broadening of the 
individual strategic assessment process. Control Group respondents expressed greater 
concern with public trust than Comite respondents. Third, respondents’ positioning of 
accountability as increasing/maintaining trust versus remedying/mitigating mistrust 
shows adaptability -  particularly to scandal even though scandal is not seen as a 
rationale for increasing accountability.419
While all three potential forces driving increasing accountability in furtherance 
of donor trust reflect the dynamic nature of accountability as defined in this thesis, two 
of the three (donor pressure and the media) do not directly influence respondents’ 
accountability efforts. The third vehicle, the Comite, did emerge as a vehicle for 
change, primarily through implementation of Comite accountability requirements. 
However, paradoxically, the Comite does not necessarily achieve the statutory objective 
of donor trust directly via the logo given the widely criticised low level of awareness of 
the logo among donors and the public.
The size and international engagement variables proved less important to 
respondents citing donor trust than to those citing ethical, effective management. 
Similarly, while leadership was generally important, the specific actions of leaders 
proved less important among donor trust respondents.
419 See Section 7.2.
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Finally, Hansmann’s theory as applied to the donor trust rationale highlights the 
tension between accountability and freedom of association. The Rose-Ackerman 
emphasis on “signalling” trustworthiness applies directly to VAMs and other voluntary 
accountability mechanisms motivated by donor trust. Respondents citing donor trust 
also align with Salamon’s view of accountability as a prerequisite for trust. Chapter 7 
continues the thread of the strategic assessment and the Hansmann-Salamon trust 
theoretical spectrum, broadening the analysis to integrate the relevance of the non- 
regulatory external variables.
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Chapter 7 
The Challenges
Completing the Analysis o f  External Variables: 
the Welfare State Environment and Scandal
“Without hesitation...our roots are welfare state dependence [author translation] (Organisation
A).”
“It’s genetic for French people. They are not concerned about others [author translation] 
(Organisation J).”
“There can’t be one single weak link in the chain [author translation] (Organisation 20).”
“The trauma of 1’ARC affected everyone [author translation] (Organisation K).”
Introduction
This chapter broadens the empirical analysis to evaluate the relevance of the two 
non-regulatory external variables on the empirical findings: the welfare state and 
scandal. The assessment closes the four-part frame of external variables started in 
Chapter 3 with the two regulatory external variables (accountability regulation and the 
tax system). The focus is on how these variables influence respondents’ strategic 
assessment, views of the rationales for increasing accountability, and positioning of 
individual organisations’ accountability within or outside the Hansmann-Salamon trust 
theoretical framework. The analysis also looks outward at respondents’ views of the 
impact of increasing accountability on these two challenges to the sector.
Section 7.1 explores the third external variable: the relationship between the 
welfare state environment and increasing accountability. Notwithstanding the 
significant influence of the welfare state on the French nonprofit sector addressed 
generally in Section 2.3, the key conclusion is that overall respondents in both groups 
do not consider the welfare state environment a direct motivation for increasing 
accountability or related to the trust theoretical analysis.
Section 7.2 explores the fourth external variable: scandal. The concept that all 
respondents and other sector participants interviewed referred to as “scandal” is defined 
as a combination of failure of accountability together with broad public notoriety 
(always involving the media to some degree). Scandals are dynamic, changing in 
intensity over time. Not all fraud or other illegal or criminal activity of the same type
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and/or same scale develops into scandal. The three most significant French nonprofit 
sector scandals -  l’ARC, the 2004 Asian tsunami, and Zoe’s Ark -  reveal a paradoxical 
combination: overwhelming concern with scandal generally; increasing accountability; 
yet failure to link accountability to mitigation of the risk or impact of scandal within an 
organisation or involving another NPO. Scandal is not perceived as a direct rationale for 
increasing accountability beyond the exceptional and specific collective effort to found 
the Comite in either respondent group.420 The section concludes by challenging the 
limits of respondents’ views by arguing that, while unproven, accountability might have 
mitigated the negative impact of scandal irrespective of donor or other external reaction 
in each of the key scandals.
Section 7.3 analyses the implications of the analyses of the welfare state and 
scandal for the theoretical framework. The analysis of these external variables suggests 
a triangular relationship among accountability, trust, and Hansmann’s nondistribution 
constraint. All three remain necessary, but the equilibrium among them may vary 
depending on the internal variables and other organisation-specific aspects of the 
strategic assessment.
Through all three sections of this chapter, the largely internally-driven, bottom 
up origin of accountability emerging in the previous chapters remains evident, 
irrespective of the potential influence of the welfare state and scandal on accountability. 
The collective impact of these individual accountability efforts also explains in large 
part the sense of an environment of increasing accountability irrespective of, and indeed 
rather than, these external variables.
7.1 Empirical Findings: The Relationship Between Increasing Accountability
and the Welfare State Environment
The welfare state is the most oft-cited environmental influence on the French 
nonprofit sector -  both in the literature and among respondents -  and considered largely 
responsible for the lag behind the US nonprofit sector in terms of giving to NPOs.421 
However, the overwhelming separation in respondents’ views of the relevance of the 
welfare state environment as a motivation for increasing accountability recalls the gap
420 Despite extensive press on scandal. See Section 7.2.1.
421 See Note 77, supra and the discussion of the welfare state in Section 2.3.
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in the France-focused literature regarding accountability matters. Similarly, the internal, 
organisation-driven increasing accountability is considered necessary and helpful to the 
organisations but generally not a solution to the welfare state challenges to the French 
nonprofit sector.422
In light of the extensive focus in the literature on the welfare state as essential 
backdrop to the French nonprofit sector (particularly as a negative influence on giving 
to NPOs), the interviews included detailed questions regarding the relevance of the 
welfare state influence on the French nonprofit sector. The key point was to test 
respondents’ perception of the importance of the welfare state to the public and to their 
organisations against the views expressed in the literature. How important or effective 
are NPOs’ accountability efforts targeting donor trust in an environment where, 
according to the literature, the financial and social service aspects of the welfare state 
significantly influence donor behaviour? Do organisations even consider the welfare 
state in the strategic assessment of accountability? Does the importance of the welfare 
state to the public and respondent organisations differ depending on the cited rationale 
for increasing accountability? This welfare state context contributed to more accurate 
interpretation of interview responses, including any relationship between the welfare 
state and the strategic assessment. This context also established necessary foundation 
for considering how the research findings contribute to addressing the gap in the 
literature on accountability noted in Section 2.3.
Respondents were asked to prioritise and comment on three classic explanations 
for any lagging behind in giving levels there may be in the French nonprofit sector 
relative to Anglo-Saxon countries, Germany, or other European countries. These are: 
the welfare state explanation that donors expect the French state to assume 
responsibility for financing and delivering social services (both due to high tax levels 
and historical assumption of responsibility by the French state); French culture (i.e., 
excessive individualism and lack of concern for others reflected in lower giving and 
volunteering levels); and the tax system’s lower incentives to giving and higher levels 
of taxation (recognising the recent improvements to deductibility of gifts to NPOs)423
422 An analysis of economic trends is beyond the scope of this thesis and deliberately omitted because 
none of the respondents in either group at any point in the interview raised sector-wide economic factors 
as linked to accountability.
423 Two respondents asserted that the sector was not “lagging behind” in giving, but these responses 
reflected growth in the sector rather than comparison to the US and certain other countries (Organisations 
8 and B; e.g. Toullec 2007). See also Section 2.3.1.
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Overwhelmingly, respondents in both groups considered the welfare state the 
key explanation for the lagging behind of the US in giving.424 23 (70%) Comite Group 
and six (50%) Control Group respondents cited the welfare state without hesitation. 
Similarly low levels in both groups (five (three in the Comite Group and two in the 
Control Group)) affirmatively did not consider the state’s role an important factor 
(Organisations 11, 15, 29, C, and K). Thus there was no significant difference between 
the two respondent groups with respect to the welfare state variable.
As in the literature, the most important theme in the interviews was the 
pervasiveness of the state’s intervention and resulting dependency. The state is viewed 
as having extensive reach, creating in turn a habit of reliance and expectation that the 
state is best suited to address a variety of issues. One respondent highlighted the 
increasing grasp of the French state under President Sarkozy whose “hand is in 
everything” (Organisation D). As another Director General noted, “We are 
Gallic...dependent!” (Organisation 14). The public both waits for the state to solve 
issues and waits for opportunities to complain and criticise the state’s intervention 
(Organisations 14, 16, and D). Moreover, this cyclical dependent relationship 
contributes to a lack of public recognition of the complementarity of the French 
nonprofit sector, which in turn dissuades donors who believe that the state takes care of 
social and medical services (Organisations 13 and H).
Respondents’ comments also closely paralleled the literature in focusing 
primarily on a two-pronged source of welfare state influence on the French nonprofit 
sector: financial concerns and appropriate allocation of responsibility for social service 
delivery. Responses were similar in both the Comite Group and the Control Group. 
First, as noted in Section 2.3.2, the financial element turns primarily on the high level of 
personal taxes. Four respondents felt their donors and the general public believed that 
they have “already paid” through the tax system and therefore should not need to 
support the French nonprofit sector as well (Organisations 23, 24, F, and J).425 
Approximately 50% of remaining respondents referred to the “already paid” problem 
less directly. Organisations perceive donors as expecting the state to assume 
responsibility for social and medical matters given that the public pays for such services 
through the tax system. The effect, if any, of the state’s perceived role as the biggest 
donor through the tax system on donors’ or the public’s perception of “having already
424 See a related policy recommendation relating to the multitude of associations in Section 8.2.1.
425 See Section 2.3.2.
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paid” remains unclear to virtually all respondents (Organisation 31; Coignard (Le Point)
2007).
Second, respondents in both groups believe the French public considers social 
service delivery in large part most appropriately and effectively handled by the state. 
This allocation of responsibility reflects in part a concern with ensuring (and an 
assumption of) fair access and quality when the state handles certain matters (medical 
research the most oft-cited example), as well as in part the reverse fear of ineffective 
handling of such matters by the private sector. This view of the state becomes somewhat 
a “chicken-and-egg” question of considering the state’s appropriate role based on 
habit.426 Comite representatives also believe that the French public rejects NPOs 
stepping in for the state to deliver social services (Comite senior management 
call/interview 2008).427 Again, these findings echo the attention to allocation of social 
services in the literature.428
Respondents also highlighted the French state’s persistence in maintaining the 
welfare state system. Interview responses doubting that the system would change 
significantly in the near future aligned with the hesitation regarding future progress in 
the literature on recent developments in the welfare state noted in Section 2.3.1 (e.g. 
Archambault 1997b and 1999b; Worms 2002). Two respondents specifically 
acknowledged that the state was rapidly approaching the financial limits of the system 
but did not extend the comment to the impact on the French nonprofit sector 
(Organisations 19 and 33). Even political rhetoric, for example Prime Minister F rancis 
Fillon’s keynote speech at the February 2008 Davos World Economic Forum 
summarising the Sarkozy administration’s proposed changes compared to “the past,” 
ignored the French nonprofit sector near the end of the first year in office (Fillon
2008).429
The key conclusion is that respondents consider the significant general influence 
of the welfare state on the French nonprofit sector separate from the strategic 
assessment of accountability within respondent organisations. The empirical findings 
show that increasing accountability and the underlying strategic assessment is not
426 See Chapter 2.3.1.
427 L’ARC exceptionally was widely considered an essential player in France in cancer research as a 
funder of many public and parapublic-public research projects, while French state funding financed 
mostly permanent research infrastructure (Cour des comptes 2005c, 8; Organisation 7).
428 See Section 2.3.2.
429 This is despite President Sarkozy’s pre-election commitment in his book to copy US models of NPOs 
(Sarkozy 2006, 245-6).
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motivated by, or viewed as mitigating, the negative fall-out of the welfare state on 
giving to NPOs -  irrespective of the primary rationale cited for increasing 
accountability.430 No respondent in either the Comite Group or Control Group 
connected the welfare state to accountability positively or negatively. Examples of such 
a connection might have included associations as preferable providers of social services 
due to more understandable accountability for resources than government (suggested by 
Organisation 22) or complications to accountability arising from the complex 
govemment-NPO “partnership” relationships (described in Section 2.3.2). The internal 
focus of respondents citing ethical, effective management highlights the separation of 
the welfare state environment (and all other external variables) from the organisation- 
driven lens of internal justification of accountability efforts to achieve ethical, effective 
management. However, even respondents citing donor trust separate the strategic 
assessment of accountability from welfare state influences on the sector generally or the 
attitudes and behaviour of their donors towards giving and allocation of social service 
responsibility.431
This separation of strategic assessment from the welfare state raises the question 
of the extent to which accountability generated on the basis of individual organisational 
priorities benefits only the organisations themselves or also benefits the sector 
irrespective of organisations’ motivations. As seen in Section 6.3.2, some respondents 
citing ethical, effective management as the primary rationale for increasing 
accountability feel that accountability efforts do benefit the public and potentially 
increase public trust. However, no respondents linked increasing accountability as 
explored in this thesis to mitigation of the consequences of the welfare state.432
430 The details of increasing accountability within the government budget are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, no respondents felt that changes in the French state’s approach to budgetary 
accountability affected their decision-making in accountability matters (other than indirectly as funder 
accountability requirements in limited cases) -  even those technically subcontracting French state 
services.
431 See Section 2.3.
432 Additional research is necessary to explain fully the relationship between the welfare state and NPO 
behaviour. Only a few specific cultural manifestations of the welfare state surfaced in the interviews that 
could affect accountability, most significantly the general attitude of discretion in discussing financial 
matters that could relate to disclosure of management salaries. However, even the few respondents that 
mentioned this attitude do not link decisions regarding implementation of voluntary accountability 
mechanisms to this attitude.
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7.2 Empirical Findings: Impact of Pivotal French Nonprofit Sector Scandals on
Accountability and Donor Trust
A Harvard Business Review article on trust in NPOs begins, “When...[NPOs] 
are good, they are very good...But when [they] ...are bad, they are horrid” (Herzlinger 
1996, 1). The impact of scandal on the strategic assessment of accountability is the final 
stage of the empirical analysis of increasing accountability.
This section starts with background on the key scandals -  PARC, the 2004 
Asian tsunami, and Zoe’s Ark -  most relevant to accountability and trust. The analysis 
of the relationship among scandal, increasing accountability, and trust demonstrates that 
these scandals, rooted in three different types of failure of accountability, remain 
overwhelmingly at the forefront of respondents’ concerns for both their own 
organisations and the sector. However, respondents generally did not link scandal 
directly to their own strategic assessment process or consider scandal a direct 
motivation for increasing accountability -  across both respondent groups and 
irrespective of cited rationale for increasing accountability. The founding of the Comite 
is the only evidence of direct adaptability to scandal or indeed any of the external 
variables. The founding of the Comite represents, therefore, a collective response to 
this external variable with, in turn, an impact on individual organisations.433
The empirical findings reveal a difficulty reconciling three parallel perceptions. 
Respondents express a combination of continuing fear of scandal erupting from failure 
of accountability within individual NPOs, the conviction of the importance of increasing 
accountability, and the failure to link efforts to increase accountability to protection 
against scandal either internally or elsewhere in the sector. These three separate tracks 
nonetheless reflect consistency with the themes of bottom up accountability, a 
diminishing reliance on trust based on the nondistribution constraint, and the strategic 
assessment explored throughout the empirical findings on ethical, effective management 
and donor trust in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. Finally, the section includes an 
analysis showing that, while unproven, more effective accountability policies and 
practices might have mitigated the impact of these scandals on the sector. In particular, 
VAMs and other voluntary accountability mechanisms providing independent oversight 
of use and audit of funds, conflicts of interest, and oversight of significant expenditures
433 See Section 1.2.1.
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and exceptional programs could more closely monitor any intentional fraud, misuse of 
funds, or other illegal behaviour.434 In other words, the thesis questions respondents’ 
judgment that scandal should not factor into the strategic assessment directly.
7.2.1 Key Accountability Scandals: L ’ARC. the Tsunami. and Zoe’s Ark
L ’ARC: The First and Continuing “Reference” Scandal. The TARC scandal 
first discovered in 1988 by 1’IGAS is the landmark scandal in the history of the French 
nonprofit sector. L’ARC was at the time widely considered the “wake-up call” on 
accountability and donor trust issues and has since become the “Richter scale” for 
evaluating scandal (often referred to as a “booster shot” reminding of the need for 
accountability) (Organisations 4 and 7; Organisation D, respectively). The l’ARC 
scandal involved the indictment of the founder and President of 34 years at the time the 
scandal was revealed, Jacques Crozemarie, for misuse of funds for personal benefit and 
mismanaging donor funds (Cour des comptes 2005c, 5). The scandal continued 
throughout the early 1990s until a public announcement in 1996 of the firing of the 
entire management team and Crozemarie’s trial.435 Most infamously, less than 30% of 
all annual resources had been allocated to the mission of cancer research (Cour des 
comptes 2005c, 7). Most relevant to the accountability and donor trust analyses, l’ARC 
noted a failure of oversight of accountability matters by the conseil d ’administration. 
The new conseil d ‘administration subsequently increased allocation of revenues to the 
mission to 70% and has since maintained the commitment (Cour des comptes 2005c, 7).
The key governmental oversight events show the duration of the l’ARC 
investigation. These involved, in order: a 1988 1’IGAS warning criticising Crozemarie’s 
personal intervention in the distribution of research grants; a 1991 1’IGAS report 
denouncing significant expenditures for administration and publicity (72% of the €3.5 
million in donor funds); and 1993 and 2005 Cour des comptes reports following up on 
the 1’IGAS investigation and looking forward (Cour des comptes 2005b, 3-4; Cour des 
comptes 2005c, 6).
L’ARC suffered a shock to donor revenue as a result of the scandal and, more 
generally, conceived of the problem as directly related to donor trust. L’ARC referred to
434 See Section 7.2.3.
435 Crozemarie received a four-year prison sentence and fines exceeding €30.5 million (Cour des comptes 
2005c, 5). The Director of Communications Michel Simon was also charged with fraud-related crimes 
and sentenced with a prison term and fine (Cour des comptes 2005c, 5).
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the post-recovery as the “return to trust” in 2004 (Cour des comptes 2005a, 4). In 1996, 
the year of the exposure of the scandal, the Cour des comptes press release noted a loss 
of 2/3 of donors (400,000 donors), comprising approximately 75% of revenues from 
fund-raising (Cour des comptes 2005a, 4; Cour des comptes 2005b, 10, respectively). 
1995 donor revenue exceeded €20 million but fell to €6.4 million in 1996 and as of 
2003 had still only reached a level of half of the pre-1996 in terms of revenue amounts 
(Cour des comptes 2005b, l l ) .436 As of 2007, l’ARC still had only 220,000 donors, 
compared to 228, 824 in 2003 (Cour des comptes 2005b, 10; L’ARC 2008a, 
respectively).
The sector-wide ripple of l’ARC and the depth and breadth of detailed 
awareness was the clearest message in the empirical findings. Neither l’ARC nor the 
term “scandal” was mentioned in any interview question asked, directly or indirectly. 
Zoe’s Ark and the tsunami were not mentioned either. Nonetheless, every respondent in 
both the Comite Group and the Control Group spontaneously mentioned I ’ARC at some 
point early on in the interview. Moreover, irrespective of the importance of donor trust 
to the interviewees’ assessment of their organisation’s own increasing accountability 
efforts, every respondent described the impact of l’ARC as both sector-wide and on 
individual organisations. Both groups shared emphatically the most commonly used 
term -  “trauma” -  to describe the l’ARC scandal (Organisations 18 and J, as well as 
over 50% of respondents in both groups). Those Comite Group organisations in the 
medical field (especially directly cancer) reported both the impossibility of not being a 
Comite member after l’ARC and the lingering confusion in the public’s mind about any 
French cancer organisations 437 One of many anecdotes shared illustrating the public’s 
confusion between l’ARC and other cancer organisations involved an emotional taxi 
driver refusing to donate to his passenger’s (i.e., the interviewee’s) totally unrelated 
organisation in 2001 because of the l’ARC scandal over 10 years prior. Finally, a range 
of other experts and participants outside the groups interviewed all also spontaneously 
mentioned l’ARC (Kemoun call 2007; Binder meeting 2007; Charhon meeting 2005; 
Soublin interview 2007; de Guerre meeting 2007).
The longevity of the impact of l’ARC continues to concern virtually all 
respondents in both groups. Two respondents described this comment sentiment as
436 As of 2003, PARC had not recovered fully despite a 44% increase in total donations between 1998 and 
2003 (Cour des comptes 2005b, 10).
437 Organisation codes are omitted to protect confidentiality.
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1’ARC being still “very, very present even in 2007” and “not yet healed” (Organisations 
20 and 21, respectively). The fact that a study undertaken in 2007-08 such as this one 
reveals such a universal preoccupation with l’ARC -  across size, international 
engagement, initiative and profile of leader, sector of activity, political affiliation, and 
even profile of donors -  testifies to the severity and duration of the impact. While the 
implications for donor trust and the general gravity of the problem were widely and 
passionately discussed among all respondents, the specific impact on respondents’ 
donor revenue of l’ARC was rarely mentioned (Organisations 15 and 23). Most 
respondents were not concerned with the quantitative impact on donor revenue or the 
number of donors. Rather, those that discussed revenue viewed actual impact on past 
revenue as irrelevant to the level of conviction and fear with which respondents spoke 
of the possibility of a similar future scandal.
L’ARC’s own internal strategy for repairing and preventing future damage 
focused almost exclusively on a rapid and thorough transformation of accountability (as 
defined for this thesis) standards, policies, and procedures (L’ARC 2008b). All of these 
accountability efforts related to the VAMs and other voluntary accountability 
mechanisms explored in previous chapters. First, l’ARC and the French nonprofit sector 
recognised that the fault lay both with Crozemarie and with the conseil 
d ’administration’s, failure of oversight (including conflicts of interest and inadequate 
financial transparency) (Cour des comptes 2005b, 4). In 1996, l’ARC underook a major 
reconstruction of the conseil d ’administration, including: separation of the President’s 
expenses and payment (by the Treasurer); limitation of administrates terms (to avoid 
the 34-year term Crozemarie had served at the time of scandal); open bids for suppliers; 
a scientific commission overseeing all requests for subsidies or grants; and prohibition 
on applications by administrateurs for research grants from l’ARC (Cour des comptes 
2005b, 4; l’ARC interview for this study 2007). L’ARC also established a budgeting 
process, as well as better defined research themes, internal control processes, and 
allocation of revenue (Cour des comptes 2005b, 5). In order to address the previously 
discussed negative impact of the association membership structure on governance, 
l’ARC modified the voting system to allow only vote by correspondence, with a 
distinction between member status (paying a membership fee) and donor status (making
438 However, a Fondation de France survey showed that certain non-donors use scandals such as l’ARC as 
an excuse not to give (Fondation de France-Observatoire de la Fondation de France/Wei Etudes 
qualitatives 2005a, 8).
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a gift). Under Crozemarie the two were mixed and left many blank votes in 
Crozemarie’s hands (Cour des comptes 2005b, 4). The Comite requirements address 
many of these l’ARC-initiated improvements, such as the open bids and control of 
financial conflicts of interest involving administrateurs (Comite 2008a).
Since the scandal, l’ARC has been among the, if not the, most resolutely 
accountable NPOs in France. L’ARC was recently honoured by the Cour des comptes at 
its bicentennial as a model of accountability (L’ARC 2008b). L’ARC also remains the 
only organisation in the study to engage a double external audit, obtaining both Bureau 
Veritas Quality International certification and a successful 2005 Cour des comptes 
audit, in addition to Comite membership and an independent scientific audit (Cour des 
comptes 2005a, 3; l’ARC interview for this study 2007 (Appendix 1-A)).
The December 26. 2004 Asian Tsunami. In the wake of l’ARC, the 
unprecedented international donor response to the 2004 Asian tsunami immediately 
raised accountability issues (National Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission 2007, 5). 
Unlike the intentional fraud, deception, and conflict of interest with l’ARC, the scrutiny 
of giving to the tsunami focused on justification of use of funds even within legal and 
frequently organisation-approved and appropriate activities. These issues also fall 
squarely within the definition of accountability addressed in this thesis and relate to a 
number of VAMs and other individually adopted voluntary accountability mechanisms.
The tsunami resulted in an unprecedented influx of donor funds for many 
organisations and the sector more broadly (National Assembly Foreign Affairs 
Commission 2007, 5 and 18).439 For example, the Director General of the Red Cross 
reported receiving approximately €115.8 million (approximately five times the 
contributions as for the 1999 ethnic conflicts in Kosovo, their second biggest revenue 
influx for a humanitarian disaster), and UNICEF France received approximately €57.5 
million (Red Cross and UNICEF France interviews for this study 2007 (Appendix 1-A); 
Cour des comptes 2007, 13; Cour des comptes 2006b, 51-55). The Comite Group and 
Control Group self-completion questionnaires included an open question requesting 
comments on whether and how revenue varied significantly during the five years 
preceding the study. Nine Comite Group organisations cited the tsunami. The only 
Control Group respondent with a mission related to humanitarian or emergency aid,
439 See also Fondation de France-Observatoire de la Fondation de France/Wei Etudes qualitatives 2005b 
on donor response to levels of tsunami giving.
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Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres, also reported unusually significant 
gifts due to the tsunami.
The record fund-raising quickly led to accountability concerns regarding 
appropriate and timely use of funds. The tsunami highlighted the so-called “mission 
creep” risk -  i.e., accepting funds that do not fall within an organisation’s stated 
statutory mission and/or ad hoc expansion of activities without verification of fit with 
the mission solely based on an unexpected influx of funds. The gravity of both 
depended in large part on how much long-term restructuring, and therefore longer term 
holding of funds, could be justified on the basis of the organisation’s existing mission- 
derived activities. The most highly publicised positive case, Doctors Without 
Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres, stopped accepting tsunami-restricted giving within 
only a few days of the tsunami because their mission of emergency medical relief 
limited the scope of their work to a shorter time frame (de Torrente discussions 2005 
and 2008; National Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission 2007, 20, 21, 23-4, and 36; 
Cour des comptes 2006a, 12).440 A longer term example, the French Red Cross, still had 
not spent a significant percentage of funds as of the end of 2007 due to their mission 
driven long-term involvement (Red Cross interview for this study 2007 (Appendix 1- 
A); Cour des comptes 2006b, 51-55).
The change in rapidity and intensity of the government’s response to the 
exceptional flow of donor funds during the tsunami exemplifies the deepened sensitivity 
l’ARC created. Despite less concern with fraud than in the l’ARC case, the 
accountability-related use of funds issues triggered questions of whether the 
humanitarian organisations deserved the trust placed in them. The Cour des comptes 
rapidly began investigating in-depth the allocation and timing of use of funds among the 
32 largest recipients of donor funds and issued an unprecedented series of detailed 
reports within less than two months of the tsunami (Cour des comptes 2006b; Charasse 
and Gouteyron 2005). In comparison, the 1993 Cour des comptes l’ARC report came 
years after the initial 1988 1’IGAS warnings and even the more official 1991 1’IGAS
440 The author has been a member of the Advisory Board of Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans 
Frontieres USA since 2001 but was not involved in the decision-making relating to the tsunami. 
Unrestricted gifts were halted on January 3, 2005 (approximately one week after the December 26, 2004 
tsunami) (de Torrente discussions 2005 and 2008; Bennhold (International Herald Tribune) 2005; Cour 
des comptes 2006b, 1997). UNICEF France and Handicap International were the only other two 
organisations assessed by the Cour des comptes that followed this model in late January (Cour des 
comptes 2006a, 12).
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report. Even several years post-tsunami, the Foreign Affairs Commission Report 
following up on the tsunami warned of the need to avoid repetition of a new “FARC 
type scandal” and specifically questioned the use of investment proceeds from tsunami 
funds for other uses (National Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission 2007, 47 and 5-6, 
respectively).441
Generally respondents perceived, and believed the public perceived, the tsunami 
as another scandal or potential scandal possibly affecting a range of organisations from 
those directly involved through the Cour des comptes investigation to those not 
involved in tsunami-related activities at all. The primary evidence of abuse was 
allocation of donor funds to activities outside the statutory mission and/or failure to 
spend donor funds in a timely manner. (The reference to “potential” scandal that could 
be revealed well after the tsunami relates to the fact that allocation of resources is not 
necessarily immediately evident to donors and the public but may surface months or 
even years later after an audit or other review.) The tsunami scandal was less identified 
with a particular organisation or sector of activity than with a specific accountability 
issue. As with l’ARC, none of the organisations raised the impact of the use of funds 
issue on giving within their own organisations. Soublin also confirmed that Comite 
members did not express concern with impact on their own revenue (Soublin call June
2008). Rather, respondents focused on related accountability questions. Three 
respondents raised the need to ask regularly the questions “Who are we? Is this what we 
do?” when considering both programs and restricted gifts (Organisations 25, D, and E). 
Many included the tsunami in the discussion of fear of Zoe’s Ark described below, thus 
continuing the “chain” of scandal in respondents’ minds.
The 2007 Zoe’s Ark Scandal: The Most Recent Shock to the Sector. The 2007 
Zoe’s Ark scandal, the most recent shock wave in the French nonprofit sector, differed 
considerably from l’ARC and the tsunami in stretching the accountability analysis from 
financial wrong-doing in France to alleged national and international criminal and 
humanitarian law/protocol violations and lying to French government officials (e.g. 
Chayet et al. (Le Figaro.fr) 2007; Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et Europeennes 
2008b).442 Zoe’s Ark is a small NGO founded immediately following the tsunami to aid
441 See Section 3.2.1 "Key Provisions o f Accountability Regulation” for a discussion of the debate 
surrounding the Statement of Use of Funds, particularly the Cour des comptes’ position on recent 
regulation.
442 Most of the Zoe’s Ark sources are press reports from reputable French newspapers, cross-checked 
against each other (generally at least three in each case). The French Government Ministry of Foreign
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orphans. The scandal involved conviction in Chad of Zoe’s Ark President Eric Breteau 
and two other employees for child trafficking. Breteau and his colleagues attempted to 
transfer 103 Chadian children claimed to be orphans from war-torn Darfur to French 
families for paid adoption (e.g. L'Arche de Zoe 2007; Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres 
et Europeennes 2008b, N o .ll; Nougayrede (Le Monde.fr) 2007). Even if the children 
had been orphans and the adoptions legitimate, respondents with expertise in the field 
accused Zoe’s Ark of failing to respect protocol for international adoption (Laurent 
(Elle) 2007).443 The Zoe’s Ark defendants’ sentence in Chad (eight years of hard labour 
and a fine exceeding €6 million) was modified in France pursuant to an international 
treaty between the two countries and then in March 2008 pardoned by the Chadian 
government (French Government and Chad Government 1976).444
With lingering heightened sensitivity from l’ARC and the tsunami, the fear of a 
sector-wide impact was quickly clear -  exacerbated by widespread media coverage and 
the emotional character of international kidnapping charges (e.g. Le Monde (Service 
France avec AFP et Reuters) 2007). The criminal and competency aspects of the events 
echoed l’ARC and therefore immediately resonated throughout the sector in a way the 
tsunami did not. 24 of the 33 Comite Group interviews for this thesis had been 
completed at the time Zoe’s Ark was revealed. Yet five of the next eight spontaneously 
and emotionally mentioned Zoe’s Ark and the fear of impact on the sector. The concern 
was serious and a high priority for all. Two engaged in a sector of activity similar to 
Zoe’s Ark, but in all cases the concern was explicitly extended to general impact on the 
sector. All were among the largest and most well-known organisations in the study,
and European Affairs also provides some information, which reflects a uniquely government perspective 
(e.g. Ambassade de France 2007). The Zoe’s Ark web site contains no relevant factual information. 
Access to the French tribunal papers for the trial in Paris was obtained only after months of interaction 
with the Ministry of Justice and proved of limited value for perspective on the case (Ministere de la 
Justice 2008). As of the date of this thesis, the Cour des comptes had not reviewed the organisation -  
perhaps because the issue involved a level of criminal activity and diplomatic engagement extending well 
beyond use of funds. The absence of primary sources remains an issue, and verification of the media 
reports impossible in most cases. Over 300 press articles were read during the period from the October 
2007 announcement of the scandal to March 31, 2008, the date of the official pardon of the defendants, 
and beyond (L’EXPRESS.ff 2008c). (80 of these that were used to triangulate points in the thesis are 
listed in the References.) Only two of these articles mentioned accountability-related issues (both by the 
same journalist) (Baudet (Le Monde.fr) 2007 and 2008). Finally, for Breteau’s perspective, see Breteau 
2008.
443 Respondent code numbers are omitted to protect confidentiality.
444 See also Bordenave (Le Monde) 2008a and 2008b; Le Monde.fr (avec AFP) 2007; Ministere des 
Affaires Etrangeres et Europeennes 2008b, No.l and No. 8. The Chad government pardon did not include 
the fine (LeMonde.fr (avec AFP) 2008c; Liberation.fr 2008). See also Le Monde.fr (avec AFP) 2008c; 
NouvelObs.com 2008b; Le Monde.fr (avec AFP) 2008a.
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compared to a small NGO that most had not heard of prior to the extensive media 
coverage just days or weeks earlier. As with l’ARC, those engaged in similar activities 
such as the international adoption divisions of Medecins Du Monde and UNICEF 
France expressed deep concern, particularly regarding impact on other humanitarian 
agencies (Laurent (Elle) 2007; Chayet et al. (Le Figaro.fr) 2007). UNICEF France was 
visible in the press in response to Zoe’s Ark, partly to reinforce their own international 
adoption protocol (e.g. CBC News 2007; LeMonde.fr (avec AFP) 2008a; Le Figaro.fr 
(avec AFP et AP) 2008; LeMonde.fr (avec AFP et Reuters) 2007). Thus in this case 
both accountability and management’s handling of operations and procedures shocked.
The humanitarian/criminal/international nature of Zoe’s Ark does not mitigate 
the internal failure of accountability that contributed to the illegal actions or the fear of 
the sector-wide impact of this failure of accountability.445 Yet there is a discrepancy 
between the focus of the press coverage and respondents’ concerns reflecting an on­
going absence of attention to the potential accountability implications. For example, 
according to press reports, several phone calls to the Ministry of Foreign and European 
Affairs from potential adoptive families questioning the adoption fee of several 
thousand euros triggered an in-person warning of the international adoption protocol 
from Rama Yade, Secretary of State for Human Rights, to Breteau (Chayet et al. (Le 
Figaro.fr) 2007; Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et Europeennes 2008a). Thus a 
question of fees was a key trigger for government intervention. Yet there does not 
appear to be subsequent consideration of the accountability and conseil d ’administration 
oversight aspects of fee structures. Finally, the post-Zoe’s Ark senate testimony of 
Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Bernard Kouchner on NGOs concluded that 
the range of accountability-related controls already in place (e.g. Cour des comptes, 
funder accountability requirements, and for members the Comite) was adequate (Senate 
2007,6-T).446
More generally, there is virtually no mention of Zoe’s Ark’s conseil 
d ’administration or any other form of internal oversight responsibility in any of the
445 Press coverage in this case revealed a focus on diplomatic issues rather than attention to government 
oversight of NPO accountability. Widely mediatised diplomatic issues include President Sarkozy’s 
personal interventions (e.g. trips to Chad to repatriate journalists prior to trial and request of a pardon 
from President Deby) (Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et Europeennes 2008b, No. 1 and No. 5; 
L’EXPRESS.fr 2008h; Omara-Otunnu (Black Star News) 2007; V.F. et al. (LeFigaro.fr) 2008; Prier (Le 
Figaro.fr) 2007a; Le Monde.fr (avec AFP) 2008c).
446 Without questioning Mr. Kouchner’s intentions, his background as one of the founders of Doctors 
Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres perhaps is relevant to his views on NGOs.
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press articles researched or any subsequent writing -  even as late as January 28, 2008, 
the date of the ruling of the French tribunal (Ministere de la Justice 2008; Tribunal de 
Grande Instance de Creteil call 2009; Remy (Le Monde.fr) 2007a on the “extreme 
confusion”). The only exception is Soublin’s statement in articles by one journalist 
(Baudet (Le Monde.fr) 2007 and 2008). Nor do any of the press reports or any 
respondents comment on the flagrant lack of transparency.
7.2.2 Empirical Findinss: Does Scandal Directly Influence Strategic
Assessment o f Accountability?
Against the broad awareness among respondents of the background context, 
accountability issues, and potential contagion of fall-out from scandal, the key question 
becomes the extent to which scandal influences organisations’ strategic assessment of 
accountability. The findings show that overwhelmingly organisations across both the 
Comite Group and the Control Group do not consider scandal a direct motivation for 
increasing accountability and do not link implementation of accountability mechanisms 
to protection against future scandal. The founding of the Comite following l’ARC is the 
only example of a direct collective effort to adapt accountability efforts post-scandal.
First, respondents in both groups widely agreed on the central paradox 
combining fear of scandal, emphasis on increasing accountability, yet failure to connect 
accountability to protection from scandal.447 Respondents’ reactions reflect the 
components of the definition of scandal in the introduction to this chapter.
While several respondents did link the media with scandal, so few cited the 
media as a direct influence on increasing accountability, and all in second place, that the 
fear of mediatisation of scandal is not driving accountability (Organisations 4, 5, and E). 
Rather, as noted above, the media comprises part of the basic definition of scandal -  i.e., 
the requirement of notoriety (Organisation 5 (“reveal the scandal”)). This parallels the 
results of The Johns Hopkins Nonprofit Listening Post Project surveying approximately 
460 US NPOs that concluded limited link between accountability efforts and the media 
(Salamon and Geller 2005, 9 )448
447 Only a few respondents specifically described accountability as counting “in the reverse”: the absence 
of accountability is dangerous even if the presence of accountability does not prevent failure of 
accountability (Organisation 13 and 21).
448 See also Section 6.4.3 on the media and donor trust.
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In addition, even during the lengthy discussion of the accountability failures 
associated with the scandals, and even for those respondents commenting that much 
changed “since 1’ARC” in terms of increasing accountability, no respondents in either 
group linked increasing accountability with success in protecting against future scandal. 
Even in a case where the accountability “fixes” within organisations relate directly to 
the accountability failure underlying a scandal in another organisation such as l’ARC, 
no respondents considered accountability mechanisms implemented a solution for the 
fear of another similar 1’ARC-type scandal -  let alone a different type of scandal such as 
the tsunami or Zoe’s Ark. The importance of ethical, effective management (and the 
declining importance of donor trust and increasing importance of ethical, effective 
management among Comite Group participants during times of increasing awareness of 
scandal) also aligns with this the concern with accountability independent of scandal. 
Thus inside out strategic assessment has resulted in increasing accountability 
irrespective of the actual or potential efficacy of accountability as a deterrent from 
scandal.
Finally, the response to l’ARC exemplifies the individual bottom up, 
organisation by organisation initiatives seen throughout the empirical analysis. L’ARC 
improved accountability internally to recover from the scandal. However, as noted in 
Section 3.2.1, in France there was no sweeping regulatory response such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act reaction to scandal or the improvements in the Form 990 
implementing an umbrella mandatory prevention and response program. Accordingly 
and logically, there was no broad trickle-down accountability fall-out from regulation as 
was seen with state law, self-regulatory organisations such as Independent Sector, and 
the US sector voluntary best practice more broadly post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (e.g. 
Independent Sector and Board Source 2006). The Comite represents the lone example 
of self-regulation but also emerged from organisations’ bottom up efforts rather than 
from regulatory fall-out. Thus overall respondents in both groups consider their own 
accountability efforts independently of l’ARC’s or other NPOs’ response to specific 
scandal and scandal more generally -  even if scandal is an on-going concern in the 
sector. Moreover, respondents feel that despite the heightened sensitivity among 
individual organisations, accountability is not the, or not the only necessary, preventive 
measure. This sense of inability to control scandal elsewhere may explain at least in part 
the little direct connection in respondents’ answers between scandal and efforts to 
increase accountability. Though unproven, this perhaps also explains in part why the
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Comite was such an important response to scandal as seen below -  i.e., a collective 
effort was seen as the only potential influence on other NPOs.
The Comite. Accountability. and Scandal Despite respondents’ separation of 
scandal from their own motivation for, and/or benefit from, accountability, the founding 
of the Comite in anticipation of the consequences of l’ARC does exemplify a collective 
effort to increase accountability in response to scandal. As noted above, l’ARC is 
widely considered the panic impetus for the initial reflection on the relationship between 
accountability and donor trust. L’ARC also represents the symbol of on-going concern 
with nurturing and protecting donor trust. Almost all of the founding members 
interviewed relayed the concern at the time of founding about the potential effects of the 
l’ARC scandal on the public’s perception of their own organisations and the French 
nonprofit sector more broadly as the primary reason for founding the Comite 
(respondent interviews (Appendices 1-A and 1-D); Soublin interview 2007).449 Almost 
all cited the desire to demonstrate accountability and the need to react quickly. Three 
organisations expressed this as the l’ARC “problematic” and “starting point,” as well as 
the need to be “part of a clean group” at that time (Organisations 14, 17 and 5, 
respectively). As noted in Section 6.3.1, several respondents used the expression “join 
the movement” to indicate that the l’ARC phenomenon had become a dynamic social 
and business force within the sector. This effort to unite with potential competitors at 
the founding is evidence of the depth of impact of 1’ARC and a key example of adapting 
accountability practices to the threat of scandal.
The active Comite response to the tsunami also demonstrates the Comite’s on­
going concern with the potential impact of scandal. The Comite outlined good 
accountability practice for tsunami matters for Comite members in several different 
press releases, an unusually intensive response for the Comite (e.g. Comite 2005a, 
2005b, and 2005c).450 The advice included detailed questions about the mission, 
respecting the Comite’s Charter, the collection of funds, amounts spent, distribution of 
funds, periodic revision of plans for remaining balances, and internal control procedures 
for tracing funds (Comite 2005a). The Comite also organised a working group soon 
after the tsunami, and on the occasion of the tsunami’s anniversary published an
449 See Appendix 1-D for a list of the founding members of the Comity. See Section 6.3.1 on donor trust 
as the principal reason for the founding of the Comite.
450 Section 6.4.3 “The Comite and the Media.”
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unedited synthesis of member association accountability-related actions (Comite 
2005c).
Nonetheless, as noted in Section 6.4.2, despite the clarity of the context of the 
Comite’s founding and the response to the tsunami, the on-going role of the Comite 
remains ambiguous. All nine of the Comite Group respondents interviewed post-Zoe’s 
Ark insisted that the Comite must act on behalf of its members to minimise the impact 
of Zoe’s Ark specifically and potentially other French nonprofit sector scandals.451 
Approximately 50% of the Comite Group respondents interviewed prior to Zoe’s Ark 
also consider the Comite a defensive move to protect against a decline in donor trust in 
the event of a future problem, including arguing for a more sophisticated, thoughtful 
approach to the media generally and more targeted commentary on best practice and 
perspective on scandals 452 No one offered more specific ideas as to how the Comite 
should intervene, however. Finally, none of the Control Group suggested that Comite 
membership would offer protection from scandal.
The Comite acknowledges the need to increase media exposure in relation to 
scandal (Comite management interview 2008; Soublin interview 2007). Comite 
management also acknowledges the lack of communication on Zoe’s Ark specifically 
(Comite senior management call/interview 2007). From the perspective of Comite 
management, Zoe’s Ark reinforces the need to define universally in France the term 
“accountability.” Expected Comite reaction might have been communication on the 
unique complexities of a Zoe’s Ark issue to avoid misunderstanding and sector-wide 
fall-out. For example, the Comite could have explained Zoe’s Ark as intentional 
criminal activity of a leader and therefore a rare criminal case and not a common 
example of failure of NPO leadership or accountability (as did the Fondation de France 
(Charhon 2007)). The Comite might also have explained how the Comite’s 
requirements improve accountability oversight to limit the risk of a similar scandal 
among members. Such explanations would, nonetheless, need to address the limitations 
of accountability procedures with respect to preventing certain intentional illegal acts 
such as well-hidden fraud.453 In addition, the Comite might also have issued guidelines
451 This group includes four Comity Group respondents among the most internationally respected NGOs.
452 Respondent code is omitted to protect confidentiality.
453 See policy recommendation in Section 8.4. Even the highest level accountability practices (e.g. a US 
stock-exchange listed corporation respecting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) do not protect against intentional 
fraud, grossly negligent management, or other such illegal behaviours. For example, the major accounting 
firms for both for-profit companies and NPOs focus their audit letters on procedures undertaken and 
exclude an opinion on the preventive efficacy of the internal controls (The David and Lucile Packard
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for improving oversight of accountability matters following Zoe’s Ark as they issued 
guidance following the tsunami (particularly conseil d ’administration oversight of 
criminal matters and the role of independent administrateurs in approving exceptional 
budget items and program projects).
One main difference in the Comite’s position in the two cases is that potentially 
a number of Comite member organisations shared tsunami use of funds issues, whereas 
Zoe’s Ark was cast as important to the sector but not likely “at home.” The Comite has 
not offered this explanation, however. As of January 14, 2009, approximately 16 
months after the initial major media coverage, the Comite has not acted or addressed the 
issue on its web site.
7.2.3 Would Better Accountability Have Helved Protect Asainst Scandal?
The underlying question of whether, and if so how, accountability protects an 
organisation from scandal requires further exploration. This section aims to question 
and respond to interviewees’ almost universal failure to link increasing accountability 
with improved protection against scandal. It explores whether the accountability 
standards as articulated by the law, the Comite in the case of the Comite Group, and the 
VAMs and other voluntary mechanisms discussed in this thesis might have prevented 
any consequences of the scandals. While unproven, the analysis argues that although 
even the most draconian accountability policies and procedures do not prevent 
intentional dishonest or criminal activity such as the three different issues raised in the 
scandal cases discussed, improved accountability systems might have mitigated the 
impact and duration of the crises. Finally, this additional perspective on scandal 
reinforces the inside out, bottom up increasing accountability that underlies the overall 
analysis.
This exercise represents more than speculation. Rather, the analysis works 
through the potential implications of certain US best practice recommendations adopted 
in response to the US scandals (e.g. Red Cross blood and Liberty Fund scandals and 
corporate scandals reviewed in Section 3.1.1). In addition, the analysis highlights the 
fact that the response to the scandals in France (from l’ARC in the case of the l’ARC 
scandal and from the Comite guidance in the case of the tsunami) included a number of
Foundation 2006). (See also e.g. recent Soci6te Generate fraud (Gauthier-Villars et al. (The Wall Street 
Journal) 2008).)
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VAMs and other related voluntary accountability mechanisms. This a posteriori reaction 
to apply accountability remedies further emphasises the question of why respondents do 
not link accountability to prevention of scandal. In other words, if the appropriate 
reaction after the scandal is accountability, why would voluntary accountability-based 
recommendations not at least be perceived as useful in mitigating the potential impact 
of scandal if implemented preventively? Thus, while this assessment is unproven, the 
exercise is rooted in the US background and empirical findings.
The key theme of independent oversight emerging from the empirical research is 
a crucial link between accountability and protection from scandal. The greater the board 
or conseil d'administration oversight through such mechanisms as an independent audit 
committee (that controls conflicts of interest, closely reviews the audit process 
(including management’s audit role), insists on high levels of transparency, and pre­
approves significant expenditures) the less likely cases of fraud and mismanagement of 
funds. These accountability mechanisms erect at least some barrier to intentional wrong­
doing and facilitate discovery should a problem occur -  for example, by regular and 
more intensive review with the auditors of the financial situation and management 
behaviour. Therefore, the impact of potential problems may be mitigated. Examples 
relating to the three major French scandals are cited below. Other examples might 
include an audit committee requiring a second signature on checks by an independent 
director for all amounts above a certain threshold or requiring detailed explanations by 
the auditors of the internal controls used to ensure proper tracking of funds.
First, in the case of l’ARC, while the types of accountability analysed in this 
thesis would not have prevented the initial intentionally fraudulent actions, the internal 
accounting staff and conseil d ’administration might have detected the problem at a 
much earlier stage. Moreover, many of the contributing factors might have been 
prevented. Conflict of interest procedures and independent directors might have 
identified and controlled the myriad of conflicts of interest among administrateurs that 
allowed Crozemarie to engage in cronyism for grants and to control blank assemblee 
generale votes. The failure of conseil d ’administration oversight and insufficient 
internal controls that exacerbated the magnitude and duration of the criminal behaviour 
and the impact of the scandal might have been mitigated with pre-emptive 
accountability policies and procedures such as internal controls, an audit committee, and 
oversight of executive compensation. Indeed the impressive range of accountability 
measures l’ARC subsequently undertook to repair the damage all fall within the VAMs
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and other voluntary accountability mechanisms noted in this thesis.454 Moreover, many 
of the voluntary accountability mechanisms 1’ARC implemented in response to the 
scandal relate to US best practice 455
Second, the tsunami issues combining mission creep and appropriate and timely 
use of tsunami-restricted donor funds are also susceptible to prevention or early stage 
mitigation of the individual and collective impact 456 Again, a well-functioning conseil 
d ’administration and management team would have immediately considered the 
implications of such an exceptional influx of funds to the French nonprofit sector 
generally and the organisation in particular. At a minimum, the bureau, audit 
committee, or an ad hoc committee specifically appointed to address tsunami financial 
matters would have analysed the level of donor funds justifiable within the mission for 
tsunami-relief activities. With this baseline analysis, such committee could have also 
addressed appropriate public communication to ensure transparency regarding use and 
management of tsunami-restricted funds, a plan for future expenditure of unused funds, 
and accounting procedures allowing tracking of restricted gifts and use of funds. The 
Comite recommended most of these approaches. However, even under public pressure 
for accountability NPOs such as Action contre la Faim immediately criticised Doctors 
Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres’ halting donations for these accountability- 
based reasons as dangerously communicating a general lack of need for humanitarian 
funds (e.g. Bennhold (International Herald Tribune) 2005; Agence France Press 
2005).457
Finally, while unproven, the evaluation of Zoe’s Ark demonstrates that even 
basic improvements in accountability might have contributed greatly to preventing the 
debacle. The opacity of the organisation to the general public and the complex 
combination of political, criminal, and accountability matters complicated the 
situation459 However, none of the media, the government, or other commentators
454 See “Z, ’ARC : The F irs t a n d  C ontinuing R eference S can da l’’ in Section 7.2.1 above. See Sections 8.2.2 
and 8.3 for policy recommendations stemming from 1’ARC.
455 See Table 4-1 and Section 4-2.
456 See also the Comity’s suggestions in Section 7.2.2 “The Comite, A ccountability , a n d  Scandal. ”
457 Public authorities, including then New York District Attorney Elliot Spitzer, commended the Doctors 
Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres approach much later (e.g. de Torrente discussion January 
2007; Cour des comptes 2006b, 97 and 100; National Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission 2007, 20- 
21; Elliot Spitzer letter to the board read by the author (not publicly available)).
458 The political and criminal aspects are beyond the scope of this thesis.
459 As of October 31, 2007 and January 14, 2008, the Zoe’s Ark web site had no management or con seil 
d ’adm in istration  roster, no financial information (including whether they charge fees for services, accept 
membership fees, or fund-raise), no membership procedures, and no donor-related information. The
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focused on the range of accountability weaknesses that contributed to the magnitude of 
the issue. Most importantly, if significant programs such as the repatriation of children 
from Chad had been appropriately examined by the conseil d ‘administration for formal 
prior approval (even in the normal course of programmatic and budget oversight), the 
conseil d ’administration could have vetoed the project and perhaps taken steps (even 
blocking funds) to stop the Executive Director from carrying out an illegal act. Thus 
while accountability cannot prevent intentional violation of child trafficking or other 
criminal conduct, the link between accountability and criminal conduct is critical. 
Moreover, codes of ethics sensitise organisations, whether or not enforced. One small 
Control Group organisation has a Code of Professional Protocol that, while not 
addressing governance matters, specifically prohibits and sanctions illegal conduct 
involving sexual abuse or kidnapping, thereby sensitising all involved, including the 
conseil d ’administration (Organisation K).
Moreover, Zoe’s Ark exemplifies the problem of the number and range of 1901 
Law associations as discussed in Section 1.3.1.460 As eight respondents argued, smaller 
organisations far too often escape adequate oversight (Organisations 5, 7, 21, 22, 26, 32, 
33, and E). The larger organisations are more likely to be caught by at least one of the 
commissaires aux comptes, the Cour des comptes, PIG AS, or tax review (even if less 
tied to accountability than in the US) -  perhaps the one positive outcome of the 
criticised regulatory overlap.461 More generally, the failure of accountability regulation 
at both the legislation and application levels discussed in Section 3.2.1 -  particularly 
independent oversight of financial and accounting matters by the conseil 
d ’administration -  demonstrates the importance of the organisation upward 
accountability approaches suggested in this analysis.462
absence of information on the Chad mission was perhaps expected given the legal proceedings at that 
stage. Two anonymous “potential donor” requests by the author to a cell phone number (the only contact 
information on the web site) for a copy of the annual report and financial statements to be sent to a local 
Paris address (to avoid postage issues) were ignored (L’Arche de Zoe 2007; L'Arche de Zoe 2008).
460 See also Section 3.2.1 and Section 8.2.1 for a related policy recommendation.
461 It is somewhat surprising that a governmental organisation relating to child welfare did not intervene 
as many of the Comity Group organisations engaged with children report significant oversight. See e.g. 
Section 4.2.1 “Whistleblower Mechanism” regarding whistleblower procedure required for organisations 
serving children. Organisation codes are omitted to protect confidentiality.
462 See Table 3-1 and Section 4.2.
241
7.3 Theoretical Implications of the Non-Regulatorv External Variables
The extension of the accountability analysis into the sector -  the welfare state 
and scandal variables -  further supports the three-part conclusion relating to the 
theoretical framework emerging throughout the thesis. The empirical findings show the 
perceived insufficiency of trust derived from the nondistribution constraint alone; the 
on-going importance of trust to all respondents; and the need for accountability as a 
complement to the nondistribution constraint and to support trust.
First, the l’ARC and tsunami scandals offer examples of the types of risk 
Hansmann’s nondistribution constraint should address but may either fail to address 
and/or address with inadequate enforcement. While Zoe’s Ark involved criminal 
activity beyond straightforward mismanagement of funds, the nondistribution constraint 
should have offered some protection there as well. Some consider scandal the proof of 
the inadequacy of the nondistribution constraint (Brody 2002, 477). Arguably such 
“proof’ is unnecessary. While Hansmann’s nondistribution constraint functions to deter 
the incentive of controlling persons to misappropriate funds and engage in other such 
misconduct, Hansmann acknowledges that the nondistribution constraint is insufficient 
in some cases -  even short of these types of scandal (e.g. personalised service delivery) 
(Hansmann 1980, 871).
Hansmann also offers indications of sources of support for the weaknesses in the 
nondistribution constraint and/or failure in legal enforcement. Hansmann’s suggestion 
of the potential additional protection from a certain profile of leader (i.e., more 
interested in service and less interested in financial gain) pre-sages the importance of 
leadership to accountability (Hansmann 1980, 876 and Appendix). On a positive side, 
Hansmann’s distinction among leaders is reflected in the importance of the leaders’ 
initiative to increase accountability throughout the empirical findings. However, the 
scandal cases demonstrate the opposite extreme -  leaders entirely focused on their own 
gain or even non-financial objective such as Crozemarie and Breteau, respectively. In 
addition, Hansmann’s suggestion that “social norms” may reinforce the likelihood of 
ethical behaviour failed in the l’ARC, tsunami, and Zoe’s Ark cases (Hansmann 1980, 
875).463 Hansmann’s comment that social norms are more likely to be enforced in 
larger organisations given the scrutiny by a larger number of employees and the
463 See Section 2.1.2.
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bureaucratisation was proven false with l’ARC and even certain of the problematic 
tsunami examples (Hansmann 1980, 876). In those cases, conflicts of interest and 
mismanagement of the mission and arguably donor revenue, respectively, trumped the 
social protection assumed to be provided by a larger structure.
Other theory-derived themes relating to the inadequacy of the nondistribution 
constraint relate to the analysis of scandal and smaller organisations. As noted in 
Section 4.5, Hansmann’s theory applies to a lesser extent in smaller organisations due to 
limited incentives to misappropriate funds because the excess funds available above 
normal salaries and expenses is less (Hansmann 1980, 871 (and 876 on lesser value of 
normative constraints in smaller organisations)). Yet smaller organisations still have a 
high risk of failure of accountability due to more limited resources for, and arguably at 
least perceived reduced benefit from the expense of, accountability (Rose-Ackerman’s 
analysis). Zoe’s Ark has become the key example of this potentially damaging failure of 
accountability in a small NPO, although arguably beyond just the adaptation of strategic 
assessment to small size. The problem of the multitude of (especially smaller) 
associations also exacerbates this risk of failure of accountability because smaller 
organisations are less likely to fall above thresholds for formal regulatory review, 
particularly in France.464 The different types of non-economic scandal that do not 
directly relate to the nondistribution constraint as with Zoe’s Ark also complicate the 
analysis. In addition, weaknesses in accountability regulation in France echo 
Hansmann’s remarks that state authorities do not adequately enforce the law, thereby 
failing as a deterrent -  again particularly with smaller organisations (Hansmann 1980, 
874-5).465
Even Hansmann, in 1980 before NPO accountability became such an important 
subject of discussion, recognises the need for accountability in the for-profit world 
where trust is less important (because of the absence of nondistribution constraint basis 
for trust and therefore greater incentive to misappropriate funds). As noted in Section 
2.2.1, Hansmann does not directly link accountability to the nonprofit sector. However, 
using the example of CARE, Hansmann suggests that were CARE a for-profit 
institution, due to the skewed incentives and the need to protect shareholders from 
management/controlling persons significant VAM-type accountability mechanisms
464 See Note 36, supra contrasting the US thresholds for accountability regulation for smaller 
organisations.
465 See Section 3.2.1 “Empirical Findings...”
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would be required (Hansmann 1980, 847).466 As Salamon argues, the increasing 
complexity and professionalisation of the nonprofit world -  i.e., the narrowing of the 
differences between for- and non-profit functioning and public expectations -  now 
requires extending accountability as protection from controlling persons into the French 
nonprofit sector to support trust. L’ARC’s Crozemarie and Zoe’s Ark’s Breteau again 
offer rare but relevant examples. Thus the analysis is no longer the nondistribution 
constraint and trust duo. It has become a nondistribution constraint, trust, and 
accountability trio in the context of the evolving nonprofit sector. Yet like trust, 
accountability within one organisation is not viewed as protecting that organisation or 
others from scandal.
Criticisms of the on-going relevance of Hansmann’s theory are unconvincing. 
As discussed in Section 5.2, trust based on the intrinsic qualities of the nonprofit form 
remains essential even if supported by accountability. The insufficiency of the 
nondistribution constraint alone critics cite does not mean the intrinsic elements of the 
nonprofit form do not establish a stronger base against illegal behaviour, a compelling 
basis for trust, and a positive influence on the sector (e.g. Brody 2002, 477). Law- 
abiding controlling persons respecting a NPO charter and applicable laws have a 
significantly reduced incentive, compared to for-profit organisations, to misappropriate 
funds.
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 5.5.3, the levels of accountability in a NPO 
will never reach those in the for-profit world -  due to both the regulatory and cultural 
constraints described throughout this thesis and the implications for the strategic 
assessment (costs and benefits) of individual organisations. In particular, the accepted 
range of expenditure of donor revenue on administration will limit the implementation 
of VAM-type mechanisms even post-scandal. In France the greater attention to 
administrative expenditures referred to in Sections 4.4.2 and 6.6.3, compared to US best 
practice focusing on ensuring adequate administrative expenditures on legal, 
accounting, and other good management, parallels the difference in maturity of levels of 
accountability (Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007, 22).467 Thus while the relative 
importance of the three sides of the triangle may be evolving toward greater emphasis 
on accountability as a means of enhancing trust, Hansmann’s trust remains essential -  
because accountability remains insufficient, inaccessible, or both and notwithstanding
466 See Section 2.1.2.
467 See Section 4.2.2.
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the insufficiency or poor enforcement of the nondistribution constraint. This conclusion 
holds across both the Comite Group and the Control Group, and irrespective of cited 
rationale for increasing accountability and/or views on appropriate levels of 
accountability.
Finally, the sector-wide impact of Hansmann’s trust remains unclear (Hansmann 
1980, 897). Trust in an organisation does not necessarily protect against the contagion 
of scandal within another organisation at some levels.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter brought the discussion full circle from the analysis of the two 
regulatory external variables (accountability regulation and the tax system) in Chapter 3 
to an analysis of the two non-regulatory external variables (the welfare state and 
scandal). The chapter also broadened the perspective on the empirical findings in 
Chapters 3 through 6 to include key elements of the nonprofit sector other than 
regulation. These non-regulatory external variables reinforce respondents’ on-going 
view of the inside out approach to accountability and corresponding limited influence of 
external variables on accountability efforts.
First, the welfare state is widely perceived as an on-going negative influence on 
the French nonprofit sector generally and giving in particular across both respondent 
groups. Nonetheless, respondents did not connect the welfare state to increasing 
accountability. Second, the l’ARC scandal triggered a lasting, heightened sensitivity to 
the risk of scandal and, along with other subsequent scandals, established fertile ground 
for increasing accountability. Nonetheless, respondents refute the direct influence of 
scandal on the strategic assessment of accountability. Rather, the strategic assessment 
and resulting increasing accountability is primarily driven by the internal motivations 
analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. The one notable exception is the collective reaction to 
form the Comite following the l’ARC scandal.
In addition, none of the three elements among the nondistribution constraint, 
trust, and accountability prevents intentional criminal activity, effectively compensates 
for regulatory weakness, or overcomes welfare state infrastructure. Moreover, 
respondents do not see further increasing accountability as a solution for welfare state
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challenges or the threat of scandal. However, while unproven, pre-emptive and 
responsive accountability might have substantially mitigated the damage in all three 
major scandals and, therefore, supported donor trust as a complement to the 
nondistribution constraint.
Finally, the trust theoretical framework remains relevant in four principal ways. 
First, trust remains essential for all respondents. Second, the nondistribution constraint 
continues to limit the misappropriation of funds by controlling persons and therefore 
establishes a base for trust -  even if no longer the exclusive basis of trust. Third, as 
Salamon argues, as the nonprofit sector approaches for-profit world complexity and 
competition, accountability becomes increasingly necessary to support Hansmann’s 
trust -  notwithstanding the apparently limited influence of the external variables. The 
key question in this chapter is why the external variables have so little direct influence 
on organisations’ strategic assessment -  irrespective of cited primary rationale for 
increasing accountability. Finally, the accountability, trust, nondistribution constraint 
trio remains a dynamic balance with all three parts of continuing importance. This 
triangular relationship links directly to the policy objectives and related policy and 
voluntary best practice recommendations in Chapter 8, the final chapter.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
“Nothing Prevents Another PARC (Organisation 21) .. ?
“For several years now, French NGOs have absorbed the idea that it is necessary to display a 
certain level of financial transparency. This is why they all publish annual financial reports. However, 
their responsibility to donors should not stop there. In accordance with the initiatives of Anglo-Saxon 
NGOs, French NGOs must not only account for their expenses but more broadly for their actions, in a 
word their behaviour” [author translation] (National Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission 2007, 9).
Introduction
This chapter summarises the key findings, analyses, and conclusions explored in the 
thesis. The thesis aimed to explain the increasing accountability in the French nonprofit 
sector. The theoretical framework positioned the empirical investigation and analysis as the 
“next step” or “supply side query” following Hansmann’s demand side theory of trust based 
on intrinsic NPO characteristics. The research aimed to explore how and why organisations 
behave as they do with respect to accountability in the increasingly competitive nonprofit 
environment and in the French context. The analysis explored the rationales for increasing 
accountability through a lens of organisations’ individual, inside out strategic assessment of 
accountability -  including the underlying driving forces, the relevance of US models, and 
the impact of internal and external variables on strategic assessment.
Section 8.1 reviews synthetically key empirical findings and relevant theoretical 
implications with a view to distilling the highest priorities for policy objectives and related 
recommendations. The first section concludes with suggested broader implications of the 
research.
The remainder of the chapter proposes policy objectives (Section 8.2) and a series 
of related recommendations based on the research findings. Recommendations aim to 
address the most pressing concerns of the respondents individually and on behalf of their 
organisations (Section 8.3); the Comite as a separate organisation and on behalf of its 
members (Section 8.4); and the relevant gaps in French law and practice relative to the US 
approach to accountability (integrated throughout).
The overriding policy objectives are independent oversight of NPO accountability 
and enhanced quality and accessibility to the public of information relating to
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accountability. Within these objectives, a series of specific recommendations reflecting the 
strategic assessment process link policy to regulatory and voluntary best practice initiatives. 
Many recommendations derive from US regulation and best practice but adapted to the 
French nonprofit context.
8.1 Key Findings. Analyses, and Conclusions
This section highlights the key empirical findings of bottom up, increasing 
accountability through the strategic assessment process and related conclusions. In 
addition, this section traces the Hansmann-Salamon spectrum of trust and accountability as 
relevant to the empirical findings and policy recommendations later in the chapter. Section
8.1.3 draws on both to suggest possible next steps in the research. Throughout these 
discussions the limited differences in the findings between the Comite Group and the 
Control Group, including with respect to the relevance of the variables, emerges as an over­
arching theme.
8.1.1 Empirical Analysis
The findings confirmed the underlying assumption that accountability in the French 
nonprofit sector is increasing. With one exception, all respondents in both groups, as well 
as Comite management, confirmed increasing accountability, both within their own 
organisations and across the sector more broadly. Evidence includes a range of reflection 
on accountability issues, implementation of VAMs and other voluntary accountability 
mechanisms, plans to introduce additional accountability mechanisms in the future, and a 
less tangible sense that accountability is “in the air” within the nonprofit sector and beyond. 
The most relevant evidence of increasing accountability within both the Comite Group and 
the Control Group reflects a bottom up, organisation by organisation-driven process of 
strategic assessment of accountability -  in contrast with the more regulatory-driven, top 
down movement of increasing accountability in the US. This, in turn, results in a collective 
impact on the external accountability context and sense that accountability is “part of being 
modem” (Organisation H).
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Accountability was defined in both general terms (i.e., having to answer for one’s 
behaviour) and operationalised terms (i.e., the VAMs derived from US best practice). The 
definition offered applicability in the French context despite the absence of a formal French 
language definition of accountability, as well as comparability among research participants 
and with US best practice. The definition also addressed the complexity of multiple 
stakeholders and range of types of accountability. The most noteworthy types of 
accountability excluded from the definition, primarily for reasons of relevance to the core 
accountability issues and measurability challenges, were mission and performance 
effectiveness.
Nonetheless, with the exception of a few large, internationally engaged respondents, 
increasing accountability in the French nonprofit sector continues to lag behind the 
reference standard of the US regulatory, self-regulatory, and voluntary best practice 
models. Standards of accountability also remain uneven across the Comite Group and 
Control Group respondents despite the level of renown among study participants. The most 
essential areas of on-going weakness in accountability relate to independent oversight of 
accountability matters and quality and accessibility of information relating to accountability 
to the public. In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, related state law follow-on, and 
nonprofit sector best practice (in part through national self-regulatory organisations such as 
Independent Sector) impose and suggest a range of accountability priorities. Key examples 
of US accountability mechanisms still infrequent in France include: independent and 
financial expert directors; independent expert audit committees; widely disseminated 
accountability information; and the whistleblower mechanism. More generally, the more 
top down US approach and emphasis on sector-wide best practice leads to greater 
homogeneity in publicly available information than the largely individually generated 
accountability efforts among French respondents. Nonetheless, certain trends emerge, 
particularly with respect to respondents’ views of the importance of the internal variables 
and overriding lack of importance of the external variables. These are addressed in more 
detail in the policy recommendations in Section 8.2 and 8.3 below.
Against the hypothesis of trust as the primary explanation for increasing 
accountability, two overriding explanations for increasing accountability emerge. The 
research shows ethical, effective management as the most frequently cited rationale. The 
Control Group showed a moderately higher response level citing ethical, effective 
management but no significant differences within the nuances of the analysis. Donor trust 
was a relatively close second most oft-cited rationale in both respondent groups. This
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shows the inadequacy of Hansmann’s trust theory as the sole or primary explanation for 
increasing accountability. Moreover, the dynamic nature of increasing accountability offers 
evidence of an evolving relationship between accountability and trust across both 
respondent groups. In particular, evidence of movement from donor trust as the primary 
rationale by far for joining the Comite at the time of joining to ethical, effective 
management as the rationale for increasing accountability at the time of this thesis across 
the Comite Group (and reinforced by the views of the Control Group) highlights the 
importance of observing the evolving nature of accountability (as first mentioned in the 
definition of accountability in Section 2.2.2(a)) -  both in this study and in future research.
Evidence of increasing accountability in furtherance of ethical, effective 
management appears primarily in organisation-specific initiatives. In many cases, 
respondents citing ethical, effective management considered that increasing accountability 
in response to ethical, effective management achieves a higher level of accountability than 
those motivated by donor trust. The most significant improvements in accountability in 
furtherance of ethical, effective management occur primarily through two vehicles: 
corporatisation and the transfer of international standards of accountability (largely 
overlapping given the extensively US origin of both). A third vehicle, funder accountability 
requirements, does de facto result in increasing implementation of accountability 
mechanisms. However, because funder accountability requirements relate to a specific 
funding opportunity, the requirements are almost always limited to the application for, and 
stewardship of, the funding rather than general efforts to increase accountability.
Donor trust remains essential to financial stability and therefore the survival of the 
organisation for all respondents. However, for an increasing number of organisations donor 
trust does not directly drive accountability decisions even if  donor trust de facto benefits 
from accountability efforts. Donor trust is widely viewed as fragile, even for organisations 
benefiting from considerable donor trust independently of accountability efforts. Among 
respondents citing donor trust, two potential triggers for increasing accountability proved 
relatively unimportant: donor pressure and the media. In contrast, Comite membership 
appears to influence changes in accountability practice -  notwithstanding widespread 
criticisms of the recognisability and appreciation of the value of the Comite logo and the 
aforementioned movement from donor trust to ethical, effective management.
Finally, the enduring emphasis on freedom of association, as well as lingering 
cultural impediments to excessive integration of corporate and/or international practices, 
affects the strategic assessment for respondents across both respondent groups and both
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primary rationales for increasing accountability. Certain of the VAMs (particularly the 
whistleblower mechanism, the election of independent directors, and disclosure of 
individual management compensation) are particularly susceptible to cultural resistance.
A specified set of internal and external variables relating to the costs and benefits of 
accountability were assessed throughout the study. The internal variables size of 
organisation and initiative and profile of leader emerge as the two most important variables 
for both respondent groups. International engagement is also important with respect to the 
integration of international standards. Trends showing the importance of these internal 
variables are clear. However, the complexity of interrelationships among variables, 
particularly the individuality of leaders’ initiatives and a range of other potential factors not 
addressed in this study, prevents clear conclusions linking internal variables with a general 
level of accountability and/or the implementation of specific VAMs or other voluntary 
accountability mechanisms.
Large organisations have greater resources to dedicate to accountability and/or 
greater incentive and benefit from accountability efforts. With few exceptions, all of the 
most complex VAMs were implemented by the larger organisations. Smaller organisations 
have more limited resources, some relying more on close interaction with team members as 
a substitute. The increased need to implement accountability mechanisms with increasing 
size of organisation links to Hansmann’s explanation that the higher the earnings, the 
higher the risk of unreasonable distribution of funds to controlling management (Hansmann 
1980, 871). The more internationally engaged organisations show greater openness to 
international standards of accountability.
Initiative of leaders is more organisation- and person-specific. The strategic 
assessment process and initiative of the leader with respect to accountability decisions 
proves more important than leaders’ backgrounds, although certain leaders in the ethical, 
effective management group had a more corporate-focused approach. Even Hansmann 
suggests differentiating between financially-focused and cause-focused leaders (1980, 876 
and Appendix). The subjectivity and individuality of the leaders’ views and initiatives 
results in variation even among organisations of a similar size. No two organisations had 
identical approaches to accountability.
The external variables (accountability regulation, the tax system, the welfare state, 
and scandal) are not generally perceived as driving increasing accountability in either 
respondent group, even if important background context and influence on the French 
nonprofit sector generally. Rather, the key finding is a general sense of increasing
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accountability as “normal” or a “sign of the times” arising in large part from the collective 
impact of individual NPOs’ accountability efforts on the sector -  i.e., an awareness of 
organisations’ practices as more relevant than external regulatory or non-regulatory 
variables.
Respondents rarely connect the regulatory external variables to individual 
accountability efforts through the strategic assessment process. Accountability regulation is 
considered largely “enough” but not effective, clear, well-enforced, or overall motivating 
increasing accountability within individual organisations or across the sector -  even if de 
facto accountability increases somewhat through regulation. Similarly, unlike the US 
“gatekeeper” framework, the tax system is viewed as separate from accountability. Again, 
responses were relatively consistent between the respondent groups.
Despite frequent references to both the enduring welfare state environment and 
scandal (the two non-regulatory external variables), neither directly influence respondents’ 
strategic assessment of accountability. Respondents view the welfare state as a historically 
and currently important negative influence on the French nonprofit sector (particularly with 
respect to levels of giving), affecting the sector through a range of policy areas such as tax, 
state budget, and allocation of responsibility and resources for social services. However, no 
respondents consider the welfare state a rationale for increasing accountability or, 
conversely, increasing accountability efforts as positively affecting the welfare state 
influences. Similarly, despite a series of highly mediatised scandals and virtually universal 
fear of contagion of scandal, no respondents directly linked increasing accountability 
efforts to protection against scandal. The only exception is the founding of the Comite in 
anticipation of the impact of the 1’ARC scandal.
8,1,2 Theoretical Implications o f the Empirical Findings
Hansmann’s demand side theory of trust as an explanation for the nonprofit form 
and necessary to meet competition was the starting point for the supply side empirical 
research. As outlined in Section 2.1.2, Hansmann’s foundational “contract failure” theory 
rests on an economic basis of NPOs as a “reasonable response” to a particular type of 
market failure due to an inability on the part of consumers to police producers through 
ordinary contracts (1980, 845). NPOs are perceived not to exploit the advantage over the 
consumer resulting from this “contract failure,” largely due to the nondistribution constraint 
that reduces management incentive to misuse or inefficiently allocate resources.
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Hansmann’s originally US-based form functions like a “collective contract” through which 
the state Attorney General brings suit to enforce the nondistribution constraint on behalf of 
donors and potentially other stakeholders (1980, 853). The French system has a similar 
restriction on profits and state-driven enforcement mechanisms.
This trust-based NPO form is not, even in Hansmann’s theory, a perfect solution to 
protect donors or even beneficiaries of services -  due to both the substantive limits of the 
nondistribution constraint and the weak enforceability. The findings reveal a perception that 
Hansmann’s trust no longer suffices to meet competition in an increasingly complex 
nonprofit world. Accountability has emerged as the key mechanism for 
cultivating/maintaining trust or remedying/mitigating mistrust through both regulatory and 
voluntary mechanisms.
Rose-Ackerman’s notion of “signalling]” trustworthiness suggests the strategic 
assessment concept through which organisations weigh up the quantitative and non- 
quantitative costs of accountability efforts mechanisms against the expected benefits. This 
strategic assessment approach applies to accountability efforts in both the ethical, effective 
management and donor trust groups and across the range of VAMs and other voluntary 
accountability mechanisms explored. However, in the case of donor trust, the effort 
“signals” trustworthiness, whereas the ethical, effective management group interprets 
strategic assessment with a view to achieving ethical, effective management objectives. 
Performance evaluation, the most complex and costly voluntary accountability mechanism, 
suggests that for the most sophisticated organisations in terms of types and extent of 
accountability efforts this further step is needed to keep pace with competition. Thus the 
strategic assessment process is becoming increasingly complex as the French nonprofit 
sector becomes increasingly professional, international, and competitive. Finally, as noted 
above, this strategic assessment in turn reflects an effort to adjust accountability in 
accordance with internal variables as appropriate but generally disregards external 
variables.
The key forces driving increasing accountability in furtherance of ethical, effective 
management and donor trust also relate to the theoretical framework. Integration of 
corporate and/or international standards may relate to trust as de facto supporting donor 
trust and/or indicative of a need to supplement the nondistribution constraint based trust -  
irrespective of the generally ethical, effective management motivation. Funder 
accountability requirements have perhaps become a prerequisite for trust mitigating the 
information asymmetry -  but limited to the specific funder and funding opportunity. Donor
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pressure, the media, and Comite membership all function to provide additional information, 
again addressing Hansmann’s information asymmetry.
Salamon’s suggestion that accountability (particularly performance evaluation) has 
become the modem prerequisite for tmst and a necessary supplement to the nondistribution 
constraint as a basis for tmst was both reflected in the findings and irrelevant to the 
findings. Every respondent in both the Comite Group and Control Group clearly confirmed 
the on-going importance of donor tmst, irrespective of the cited rationale for increasing 
accountability. For ethical, effective management respondents, tmst itself is not outdated, 
but accountability is separate from tmst. For the donor tmst respondents, most agreed with 
Salamon that accountability complements tmst. On the spectmm from Hansmann’s tmst 
based entirely on the intrinsic nonprofit characteristics to Salamon’s tmst earned through 
accountability, for most NPOs the cost of accountability will outweigh the benefits well 
before reaching the “replacement level.” This differs from for-profit corporations, which 
adopt a different basis for strategic assessment of accountability given the absence of the 
nondistribution constraint protection. Therefore, Hansmann’s tmst still counts along with 
accountability -  particularly in France where the NPO accountability environment has not 
matured sufficiently for such extensive focus on performance evaluation. Moreover, 
Hansmann, and indeed respondents, expect and accept that NPOs are less efficient than for-
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profit firms. This translates into the expectation that mechanisms to increase 
accountability will not “go too far,” for example toward corporatising or integrating 
international standards. In the French context, the preoccupation with freedom of 
association adds a particularly sensitive balancing consideration.
8.1.3 Potential for Extension o f Research
This study establishes a preliminary basis for diverse subsequent research. Within 
France, there is a wide range of legal and non-legal topics that merit further consideration. 
Examples might include: investigation of the reasons behind the lack of independent 
oversight (many of which may cross cultural, legal, and French nonprofit sector lines); 
more in-depth analysis of the impact of scandal; how the various governmental/regulatory 
entities work together; French corporate law models for the nonprofit world; the 
relationship of the welfare state to accountability; and a larger sampling of current views
468 See Section 2.1.3.
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and practices of smaller NPOs on accountability. In addition, as US-based accountability 
mechanisms become increasingly common, more in-depth research on the impact of 
specific accountability improvements internally and externally would be valuable. Finally, 
more quantitative research on the true costs of implementing various accountability 
mechanisms, as well as comparative quantitative research against the US and other welfare 
state countries, might inform policy.
Internationally, the internal, organisation-driven nature of much of the increasing 
accountability in furtherance of both ethical, effective management and donor trust suggests 
the extension of the research into other countries where past research has primarily focused 
on external governmental and/or cultural barriers to French nonprofit sector accountability. 
These include other welfare state countries such as Germany. These also include countries 
such as China where organisation upward accountability might relate to foreign funding 
opportunities and, therefore, increasing legitimacy vis-a-vis the government.
8.2 Policy Objectives and Related Recommendations
Having examined the empirical findings and theoretical implications of the research, 
the challenge becomes identifying the key policy objectives and determining how the 
related recommendations should tackle the issues identified in an effective, yet practical 
and culturally sensitive, manner. The overriding policy objectives are reinforcement of 
independent oversight of NPO accountability and improvement of quality and accessibility 
to the public of information relating to accountability.
The recommendations within these two objectives emerging from the empirical 
analysis fall within three categories. All aim to institutionalise improved accountability. 
First, improvement of independent oversight of accountability matters from within the 
organisation, primarily through the composition and functioning of the conseil 
d ’administration, should be the highest priority. Second, more understandable, comparable, 
and readily available financial transparency methods should be implemented. Third, the tax 
system should be more closely linked to accountability and tied to the first two objectives. 
This section recommends addressing these larger areas through targeted regulatory 
recommendations rather than broad reform or sweeping changes. This approach should 
assuage cultural and governmental sensitivities to change and increase both regulatory and
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organisational efficiency. Finally, voluntary best practice recommendations and 
recommendations for the Comite related to the objectives of independent oversight and 
information accessibility to donors follow in Sections 8.3 and 8.4, respectively.
The recommendations supporting the policy objectives, while both regulatory and 
practical in nature, also logically relate to the theoretical findings. The recommendations 
address the implications in the current French nonprofit environment of Hansmann’s trust, 
the related Rose-Ackerman and Salamon extensions of the theory, and the internal and 
external variables, to complete an updated empirical/theoretical/policy triangle. Both the 
regulatory and voluntary proposals address the types of accountability mechanisms 
necessary to support Hansmann’s trust in the current competitive and accountability-driven 
environment, including the on-going challenge of the separation of the donor from the 
beneficiary of NPO services triggering the increased need for trust (Hansmann 1980, 846- 
7). Rose-Ackerman’s suggestion of a process like strategic assessment underpins both the 
regulatory recommendations in this section and the voluntary best practice 
recommendations and recommendations for the Comite in Sections 8.3 and 8.4, 
respectively.
Of the key internal variables underlying the strategic assessment analysis -  size, 
extent of international engagement, and initiative and profile of leader -  size is the 
overriding variable for the policy recommendations. International engagement becomes a 
second-tier concern for both independent oversight and financial transparency. Leadership 
depends on the individual but is inherent in the recommendations insofar as many require 
leadership initiative. The policy recommendations also address the regulatory external 
variables accountability regulation and tax policy. None address the welfare state 
environment directly in light of the separation in respondents’ view of the welfare state and 
accountability. Finally, implementation of these policy recommendations should de facto 
result in diminished risk of failure of accountability leading to scandal and/or mitigation of 
the impact in the event of scandal arising from intentional, unpreventable misconduct.
256
8.2.1 Accountability Regulatory Recommendations: 1901 Law Modifications -
Separating Fund-Raising Orsanisations
The threshold policy recommendation is to modify the pivotal 1901 Law to 
distinguish between those associations fund-raising from the general public and those that 
do not (including ARUPs).469 Segregating fund-raising associations targets the unwieldy 
coverage from the perspective of accountability of the 108-year old 1901 Law addressed in 
Section 1.3.1 470 This threshold segregation of fund-raising NPOs underlies all subsequent 
regulatory and best practice policy recommendations. Foundations and FRUPs that fund­
raise from the public should be segregated as with 1901 Law associations and ARUPs and 
subject to the same independent director, financial expertise, and audit committee 
requirements discussed in Section 8.2.2 below. While foundations are not limited by the 
1901 Law association practices regarding election of administrateurs by members, many 
foundations do not elect appropriately skilled and independent administrateurs471 As 
discussed in Section 1.3.1, the overriding consensus among respondents is that the decisive 
criterion for common application of standards is fund-raising from the general public. Most 
generally, the 1901 Law, law governing ARUPs, and related regulation should impose on 
fund-raising associations and foundations a level of accountability that assures access to 
information relevant and adequate to making the “investment” decision that charitable 
giving implies (e.g. United Way 2008a).472
This global separation of fund-raising and non-fund-raising organisations relates to 
the theoretical framework. In contrast to fund-raising associations, associations funded 
from membership contributions may require a lower standard of general accountability 
because the cost of the membership fee relative to membership benefits is a clear, in some 
cases, commercial choice. Although unproven, the necessary accountability effort should be 
lower among co-members of a tennis club, for example, all of whom pay the same
469 Direct modification of the 1901 Law may prove politically impossible. An alternative would be to address 
the separation within each of the subsequent laws and best practice recommendations.
470 As noted in Section 1.3.1 “Associations and the Associative Sector ,” the 1901 Law covers approximately 
1.1 million associations. The variation in sector of activity, size, management structure, relationship to 
government, and interaction with the public through fund-raising and/or service delivery complicates such 
broad application of a single law (Tchemonog 2007b, 31). See Appendices 1-B and 1-G.
471 See Section 1.3.1.
472 See Section 3.2.1 on confusion in existing regulation. Certain laws do distinguish fund-raising 
organisations somewhat (e.g. the law requiring a Statement of Use of Funds, which must be publicly available 
at the association’s head office) (French Government 1991a, Articles 3 and 4 respectively). However, there is 
no systematic and clear regulation of organisations generating revenues from fund-raising.
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membership fee and enjoy the same rights but none of whom give solely for the benefit of 
others.473
8.2.2 Accountability Regulatory Recommendations: Requirements for
Independent Oversisht -  Independent Administrateurs. Financial/Accountin2
Expertise Requirements. and Audit Committees
The second over-arching regulatory recommendation addresses the lack of 
independent, expert oversight of accountability matters in a member-elected conseil 
d ’administration system through enhanced regulation of independent financial expert 
administrateurs and a modified version of US-style audit committees. The objectives are to 
address the governance and experience inadequacies resulting from member-elected 
administrateurs and to impose independent, more objective checks and balances.474 
Accountability regulation should be modified to require both a minimum number of 
independent administrateurs (as defined below) and a minimum number of administrateurs 
with financial, accounting, and/or governance expertise (which may overlap). These 
requirements should apply to all associations and foundations fund-raising -  whether from 
the general public and/or govemment/corporate/institutional donors -  above a minimum 
size threshold (based on annual revenue as in the CNLA).475 The appropriate level of this 
threshold would depend on an in-depth analysis of the number of organisations at various 
revenue levels and closer investigation of the governance practices of the smaller 
organisations.
First, member-elected conseil d ’administrations should generally be supplemented 
by a requirement of at least one-third independent administrateurs 476 Ideally, a majority 
would be independent, particularly for the largest, more complex organisations such as the 
international NPOs. However this is unlikely to succeed from a legislative and/or cultural
473 Note the relationship to Hansmann’s theory. In the case of clubs the purchaser is essentially the consumer 
(e.g. of membership benefits) (Hansmann 1980, 892-3). Therefore, the alignment mitigates the reliance on 
trust (as opposed to the classic scenario of fund-raising NPOs of separation of the “purchaser” (i.e., the donor) 
and the beneficiaries). Commercial NPOs fall in between the two as requiring accountability but less trust 
given the absence of information asymmetry (Hansmann 1980, 843). Hansmann notes other reasons for clubs 
adopting the nonprofit status, such as search for a common social status and lack of need to distribute 
dividends (1980, 892-3).
474 See Section 4.2.1 “Independent Directors.”
475 The CNIA requires $2 million in revenue (California State Senate 2004, Section 12586 (e)(1)). All of 
the respondents in both groups would meet this threshold. See Appendix 1-G.
476 See Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.3 for the failure of governance in the member-driven system of electing 
administrateurs, as well as the role of lack of independent expert oversight in the major scandals.
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Annperspective in light of the historically rooted tradition of freedom of association. The
a h q
definition of independent would be borrowed from the US model in Section 4.2.1.
Second, the conseil d'administration should be required to have a minimum of one 
administrateur with financial, accounting, and/or investment expertise and experience 
(perhaps more for the larger, more complex organisations). Financial expert
administrateurs may overlap with fulfilment of the independent , director requirement. An 
independent, expert perspective would significantly improve oversight of accountability 
matters, particularly conflicts of interest, internal controls, and relationships with 
commissaires aux comptes and other auditors -  largely by making an audit committee 
possible. (See below.)479
The independent and expert director requirements would not unduly interfere with 
the democratic philosophy of associations or the process of member election of 
administrateurs. Members would still nominate and elect the independent and expert 
administrateurs. They would just be required to elect a specified number of the total 
number of administrateurs with a specified profile. Reflection on appropriate composition 
of the conseil d ’administration in terms of profile of administrateurs is crucial to protect 
the organisation from failure of accountability, as well as to protect innocent 
administrateurs and management individually in such a case.
Third, regulations should require a US-style audit committee for organisations 
above the same specific size threshold as for independent expert administrateurs. The audit 
committee is an extension of, and depends on, both the independent administrateur and 
expert administrateur requirements explained above and rendered de facto impossible by 
the current system of member-appointed administrateurs in 1901 Law associations 
(Soublin interview 2007). Audit committees should comprise at least two (and in any case 
a majority of) independent administrateurs with financial and accounting experience.480 
The recommendation adapts US models to the French commissaire aux comptes
477 See Section 4.2.1 “Independen t D irec to rs .” See also Section 5.3.2 “The C om ite a n d  In ternation al 
S tan dards” on cultural resistance within the Comity process of electing independent directors.
478 This definition would exclude anyone employed by, paid any salary, fees or other remuneration by, or 
engaged in any commercial operations with the organisation, any of its employees or affiliates. Independent 
adm in istra teurs  could not be a member of the executive co m m itted  bureau  of, or provide consulting or legal 
services to, the NPO (US Government 2002, Section 301(3); Jackson 2006, 54). Board service on other 
competitive and/or commercially related organisations or government entities should also be excluded.
479 See Section 4.2.1 for Soublin’s support of independent directors by praising the US “trustee” role that is 
deemed to oversee an association’s assets “in trust” (Soublin call December 2007; e.g. California 
Government 2006, Section 12582).
480 One outside non -adm in istra teur  financial or accounting expert could be permitted as an alternative in 
compelling circumstances such as temporary lack of expertise on the con seil d ’adm inistration .
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procedures, perhaps re-organising existing finance committees or the bureau to segregate 
audit oversight (US Government 2002, Section 301; California State Senate 2004, Section 
12586(e)(1)).
The primary purpose of the audit committee is to institutionalise -  internally and 
legally -  a relationship between the external auditors (the commissaires aux comptes) and
•  d . 8 1  • •the independent administrateurs. This allows a cross-check on management’s policies, 
procedures, and cooperation with auditors, as well as the scope and content of the audit and 
selection of auditors, free of management conflict of interest or biased perspective. 
Independent administrateurs also assess financial risk and address unusual events (e.g. the 
handling of unexpected tsunami income or fraud).
Audit committees could be adopted on a voluntary basis absent a regulatory 
solution. In addition, the recommendation is to extend audit committees to voluntary best 
practice even for smaller organisations that are not required by law to prepare formal 
external audits (addressed in Section 8.3.2) following Independent Sector guidelines for the 
US (Jackson 2006, 91; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007, No. 21, 20).
8.2.3 Accountability Reeulation: Universal Disclosure Form -  Alternative 
Modular Disclosure
Presently there is no publicly available filing of updated important financial and 
organisational information for associations and foundations in France. The policy 
recommendation is to implement a universal annual disclosure form publicly available on­
line similar to the Internal Revenue Service Form 990 but adapted to French regulations 
(USGDTIRS 2007b and 2008a). As with the independent director, financial expertise, and 
audit committee requirements, the universal disclosure form would apply to organisations 
fund-raising from the general public under the amendment proposed in Section 8.2.1 
(Organisations 1, 7, 8, B, K, and I particularly supporting this idea). This form would 
replace, in whole or in part, a range of other filings currently required.
The key objectives of a universal disclosure are to establish a base for both initial 
approval of legal establishment of association and foundation status and on-going updated
481 See Table 2-1 and Section 4.2.1 “Audit Committee.” The audit committee, like all other conseil 
d ’administration committees, should have a written charter detailing responsibilities. Ultimate approval of 
the accounts and hiring of the auditors should, in most cases, require a full conseil d ’administration vote on 
the basis of audit committee recommendation.
482 See Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.3.
483 No respondents opposed the idea if efficiency were enhanced.
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reporting.484 In addition, the universal disclosure form would begin to address respondents’ 
criticisms of reporting requirements: inconsistency in form and application; random 
controls (e.g. unpredictably timed 1’IGAS or Cour des comptes audits); inadequate 
compliance and enforcement; and failure of regulatory authorities to read the documents.
The form would have a core disclosure section with the most essential financial and 
organisational information guaranteeing a minimum basis of transparency for individual 
and institutional donors. The structure would allow for incremental additional disclosure 
addressing specialised circumstances (e.g. international expansion) or characteristics (e.g. 
size) to be completed only as applicable (modelled on the Form 990 (USGDTIRS 2008a)). 
Efficiency at all size levels should be enhanced because only those organisations triggering 
certain requirements would complete the more detailed, time-consuming, and costly 
sections. Small organisations would, however, still be required to complete the basic form 
(thereby addressing the Zoe’s Ark case).
The universal disclosure form would enhance the quality and accessibility of 
accountability efforts.486 First, the exercise of preparing a publicly available form 
disciplines management and should improve the quality of disclosure. The process also 
educates the conseil d ’administration and obligates the conseil d ’administration to review 
the most important financial matters (including management compensation, major risks, 
and general financial health) and other organisation issues -  all in an efficient “once a year
A o n
in one document” manner that is currently impossible with the disparate system. An 
annual filing ensures availability of updated, consistently presented information. Third, a 
web site (perhaps modelled on the Internal Revenue Service site) could publish comparable 
information to the general public at no cost. However, as currently even many of the 
Comite members and Control Group respondents do not publish all information on-line, the 
comparability element is likely to trigger some resistance in the sector. The Comite only 
started publishing its own financial information on-line in May 2008 (although not legally 
required to do so) as a model to members. Due to on-going objection from members the
484 The form should be useable for ARUPs and FRUPs as well, with additional information required as 
necessary to meet the more substantial legal requirements.
485 See Section 3.2.1 “Empirical Findings: Confusion and Criticism Surrounding French Accountability 
Regulation.”
486 Even if all donors do not have the incentive and/or capability to read and assess the disclosure, some will. 
Moreover, the universal form should improve readability of an organisation’s information over time.
487 The current changes to the Form 990 even include a box to check regarding whether the full board reads 
the Form 990 (USGDTIRS 2008a, Part VIA 10).
488 Even the Foreign Affairs Commission Report emphasised the importance of NPOs’ considering 
accountability from the donors’ perspective and the need for simplicity (National Assembly Foreign Affairs 
Commission 2007, 32).
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Comite is not likely to change its policy not to publish comparable information relating to 
member organisations but should require member organisations to publish key financial and 
accountability-related information on their own web sites (Comite senior management 
calls/interviews 2007 and 2008).
The question of resources should not preclude implementation of a universal 
disclosure form in France. The consistent format, number, and types of filings and 
streamlining of disclosure to only the necessary information should improve efficiency and 
the overlap respondents complained of -  particularly after the first year when the basic 
information and formatting need only be updated.489 The administrative burden and cost to 
controlling agencies such as 1TGAS and the Cour des comptes, and even to individual and 
institutional donors, should be reduced when all use the same standard base 490
Finally, even if resource issues limited the extent of regular review of NPOs, the 
information would be readily available should there be a need for an audit by tax or other 
governmental authorities or donor institutions due to unusual circumstances (e.g. suspicion 
of a failure of accountability).491 While it is impossible to force an increase in reading of 
required documents by officials, a common format and organised system should improve 
authorities’ ability to target and efficiently review organisations of interest. Nonetheless, 
given the limited likelihood of government implementation of this proposal, the range of 
organisation up and more basic legislative proposals should take priority.
489 An alternative to universal disclosure could be at least a few core modules of basic financial and 
organisational information that the Cour des comptes, l’IGAS, the tax authorities, and French state donor 
organisations could agree to use as a baseline.
490 Information specific to govemmental/corporate/institutional donors could be requested in addition to the 
recognised and accepted base, such as more detailed justification of use of funds or program effectiveness, 
and perhaps not made public as appropriate.
491 In ordinary circumstances, the majority of the organisations will not go on to be audited by l’IGAS, the 
Cour des comptes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or other government divisions. Even for those that do, the 
starting point could be this preliminary review step. Ideally, there should also be a joint centralised authority 
combining tax and compliance review of the universal forms. However, the government is unlikely to create 
such an entity (meeting with Ministry of Finance representatives 2007).
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8.2.4 Tax Resulatorv Recommendations
The overriding policy objective for the tax system should be to link the tax 
deduction privileges more closely to accountability. Within this accountability focus, the 
two proposed modifications to current tax regulation seek to ensure that in the newly 
internationally competitive tax deduction scheme regulators maintain fair treatment in the 
application of threshold amounts and availability of deductions among different types of 
associations and foundations.492 These recommendations are complicated by the French 
state’s numerous non-tax objectives tied to the tax system (and resulting in part from the 
welfare state environment).493 In particular, the government’s prioritisation of certain areas 
of interest in delivery of social services such as food and shelter for the needy and 
reintegration into society emerges.
First, the dual deduction scheme allowing a deduction of 66% of the value of a gift 
from income taxes but 75% in the case of a limited group of NPOs offering food, shelter, 
and other services to the needy is confusing to donors and considered unfair.494 A 
compromise position might be to allow the higher tax deduction rate for organisations that 
comply with a certain number of accountability requirements in addition to those 
“grandfathered” in by the current regulations (suggested by Director General of 
Organisation 25; Institut Montaigne 2004, 13). Nonetheless, eliminating the dual level 
deductions requires challenging the government’s prioritisation of services to the needy and 
not exclusively fiscal concerns.
One means of efficiently monitoring such accountability-based tax privilege would 
be the universal disclosure form -  either the basic form or additional appendices. Such a 
form would also eliminate the irregular process of approving charitable deductions through 
which donors often learn of the availability of the deduction (or refusal of the request for 
deduction) only post-gift and post-submission of the tax receipt495
Second, as addressed in Section 3.2.2, the recent addition of a deduction from the 
wealth tax for donations to FRUPs engaged in specified education and reintegration 
activities unfairly favours certain charitable foundations over ARUPs because of their 
foundation structure. The main criterion should be the level of accountability overall rather
492 See Section 3.2.2.
493 See Sections 2.3 and 7.1.
494 See Section 3.2.2.
495 See Section 3.2.2.
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than the type of legal structure -  even within a specified service delivery area.496 At a 
minimum, associations engaged in the same priority areas as foundations benefiting from 
the wealth tax deduction should be granted the same wealth tax deduction privileges. 
Preferably, privileges should be linked to NPOs’ compliance with accountability measures 
(including voluntary efforts such as those noted in Section 8.2.2) rather than penalising 
associations or ARUPs as a group. Nonetheless, this recommendation also faces potential 
political challenge given the long history of the strategic outsourcing to NPOs on the basis 
of the welfare state’s inability to finance and/or lack of competence or capacity certain 
social services.497
8.3 Voluntary Best Practice Recommendations
In order to address the importance of voluntary accountability mechanisms to 
increasing accountability both in the US model and de facto in the French environment, the 
policy analysis includes voluntary best practice recommendations beyond the law and 
existing Comite requirements. While the industry approach in the US has been aggressive 
adoption of voluntary mechanisms, partly in an effort to forestall excessive legislative 
intervention, this balance between regulatory and voluntary should not be interpreted as a 
temporary status (Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007, Introductory Letter). Rather, given 
the tremendous variety in size, degree of international engagement, sector of activity, and 
management structure, the ideal accountability should balance regulatory compliance with 
the most relevant and effective organisation-specific voluntary efforts on an on-going 
basis.498
The highest priority recommendations all target overriding policy objectives of 
improved independent oversight and accessibility of NPO accountability and, therefore, 
accompany the recommendations under Section 8.2. Similarly, the recommendations
496 The French state’s policy unjustly focuses on financing certain government social service priorities and 
discriminating against even ARUPs within those areas, all of which have endured lengthy pre-approval 
processes and met stringent government oversight standards similar to FRUPs (e.g. Archambault 1997b, 5; 
Berthet call 2008; Teissier 2008). Moreover, as the rationale for this distinction is not widely understood, the 
government appears to suggest through this tax initiative that associations may be less trustworthy and/or of 
less benefit to society than foundations (Berthet call 2008).
497 See Section 2.3.
498 As noted above, some US and French regulation distinguishes at least among size, and at certain levels, 
international engagement but also among other categories of organisations.
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consider both the strategic assessment process (including the relevance of the internal and 
external variables) and the French legal and cultural constraints.
8.3.1 Written Conflict o f Interest Policy Declarations
The current weaknesses relating to conflicts of interest include the absence of 
detailed written policies, inconsistency in organisational oversight of conflicts, failure to 
address most non-financial conflicts, and failure to address the appearance of conflicts.499 
Conflicts of interest are at the heart of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the policy 
recommendations set forth in Section 8.2 above addressing weaknesses in independent 
oversight of accountability matters by French NPO conseils d ’administration.
The recommendation is to supplement the existing French law requirements with 
best practice, including both substantive assessment of non-financial conflicts and a pre­
emptive annual declaration form (Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007, No. 3,9). A written 
policy signed by administrateurs, senior staff, and “every person who has the ability to 
influence decisions of the organization,” together with a questionnaire disclosing all 
financial and non-financial conflicts (including professional and voluntary service to other 
for-profit entities or NPOs as appropriate) of such persons and/or family members, should 
be collected annually (Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007, No. 3, 9). An appropriate 
conseil d ’administration committee such as the audit or executive committee, as well as the 
commissaires aux comptes, should review the declarations.
Such a policy permits appropriate management of both financial and non-financial 
conflicts of interest and the appearance of conflicts of interest (such as the PARC 
examples).500 This approach also reminds administrateurs and others to disclose their 
conflicts on an on-going basis when necessary (e.g. at a meeting when a relevant topic 
arises).
499 See Section 4.2.1 “Conflicts o f Interest.”
500 See Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 on conflicts of interest and scandal.
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8.3.2 Financial Review
Organisations not legally required to have externally audited financial statements 
(i.e., associations with less than €153,000 in revenue), should nonetheless consider audited 
financial statements. Both the Cour des comptes tsunami reports and Independent Sector 
recommend an audit or financial review from an outside accountant even if not legally 
required (Cour des comptes 2007, 19; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007, No. 21, 20).501 
NPOs that do have a financial review or audit, whether or not legally required, should also 
consider the audit committee addressed in Section 8.2.2 (Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 
2007, No. 21, 20).
8.3.3 Whistleblower Mechanism
Although the whistleblower mechanism is one of only two Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
legally mandated accountability mechanisms for US NPOs, given the deep cultural 
resistance and even legal barriers to whistleblower procedures in France, the policy 
recommendation falls within the best practice discussion rather than the legal policy 
category (US Government 2002, Section 806).502 All organisations regardless of size 
should consider such a confidential mechanism given the low cost and minimal effort 
involved and the potential utility in prevention and identification of failure of 
accountability. The whistleblower procedure may be a simple on-line service allowing 
confidential e-mails to report wrong-doing at a nominal cost (e.g. The Network 2008). The 
internal variables are relevant as the larger and more complex and international the 
organisation, the more compelling the whistleblower mechanism becomes. In particular, 
French NPOs that are part of a US-based network should consider the consequences of 
accountability procedures inferior to their US counterparts. The whistleblower 
mechanism should be linked to the audit committee or, absent an audit committee, the 
bureau to review any complaints.
501 See Section 7.2.1.
502 See Section 4.2.1 “Whistleblower Mechanism ”
503 See Section 4.2.1 “ Whistleblower Mechanism” and Table 4-1.
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8.4 Policy Recommendations for the Comite de la Charte504
Policy recommendations for the Comite are important because of its unique position 
as the only nonprofit self-regulatory organisation in the accountability field to influence the 
French nonprofit sector and potentially the government. In addition, the Comite directly 
influences 56 (and growing) sector leaders, who in turn influence best practice among 
organisations and expectations of donors and the public (Soublin call October 2008). The 
Comite recommendations emphasise disclosure and include only recommendations that all 
could be equally relevant to organisations outside the Comite that consult the Comite as a 
guideline on specific issues.505 Key areas include: first, understandability of financial 
statements; second, context for financial ratios and management compensation; third, 
clarification of the value of disclosure; and fourth, establishing a “materiality” standard for 
disclosure (as defined below). Moreover, all echo the themes throughout the mandatory and 
best practice policy recommendations: targeting independent oversight of accountability 
areas; tailoring international models appropriately to the French context; and efficiency. 
Further relationship to the theoretical framework and internal variables is noted as 
appropriate.
First, a concise commentary by management on key financial and operating trends 
would improve understandability of financial statements (including the Statement of Use of 
Funds).506 The summary should address significant trends or changes in trends (e.g. a 
decline in a particular donor base or rising personnel costs). The summary should also 
emphasise extraordinary items (e.g. a political event or natural disaster such as the tsunami 
affecting financial matters, or change in strategy or mission) and any important points not 
readily understandable from reading the financial statements (e.g. calculations that may 
reflect policies on resource allocation such as division of the Director General salary among 
different categories).
504 Soublin confirmed the validity of all of the proposals after thorough review of this section (call December 
2008).
505 The most recent example of such consultation was the Comity’s practice on the Statement of Use o f Funds 
that has become used by non-Comite member NPOs (Soublin call April 2008). (See Table 3-1 and Section 
3.2.1.)
506 See Sections 1.4 and 3.1 “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Accountability” on donor attention to accountability 
information. A strong majority of respondents believe that the general public does not understand the 
Comity-required financial information, including the legally mandated Statement of Use of Funds.
507 This is the author’s recommendation to the Comity and exceeds current US practice.
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Second, financial ratios and disclosure of management compensation prove 
attractive financial disclosure, in part due to ease of readability. However, both require 
context in order to avoid miscommunication or opacity. The Comite should develop 
standard language explaining the risks of reliance on financial ratios (e.g. cost of fund­
raising or administrative costs relative to overall donor revenues) and how to read ratios 
(Comite 2008f). The Comite already provides guidelines on the content of the numerator 
and denominator. However, these guidelines still result in varied application and target the 
organisation preparing the ratios and not the reader (Comite 2008f; e.g. Organisation 18). In 
addition, disclosure of management compensation numbers should provide adequate 
context. Examples include practices across NPOs in a particular sector of activity or 
relevant economic and/or NPO compensation trends in France (e.g. Independent Sector 
2007, 2 and 10-11).
Third, in light of both the respondents’ overriding concern with the potential impact 
of scandal, together with the assumption that donors and the public read organisation 
disclosure with failure of accountability in mind, the Comite should draft a succinct 
standard statement explaining the appropriate level of expectations regarding the protection 
that the Comite logo and underlying accountability practices can offer. In addition to the 
Comite’s current web site statement regarding the purpose and meaning of Comite 
accreditation, the Comite should more clearly communicate the extent of appropriate 
reliance on organisations’ disclosure in prevention and detection of scandal (currently 
absent from the Comite 2007 annual report) (Comite 2008o; Baudet (Le Monde.fr) 2007). 
In particular, the fact that the Comite targets best practice in governance and transparency 
but cannot (like any NPO) investigate or prevent intentional fraud (e.g. l’ARC) or other 
illegal behaviour (e.g. Zoe’s Ark) should be emphasised. Such a statement could be similar 
to the major audit firms’ audit letters that focus on procedures covered and explicitly do not 
guaranty absence of fraud (e.g. The David and Lucile Packard Foundation 2003).
Fourth, an over-arching standard of “materiality” for disclosure is needed among 
Comite members (and ultimately across the sector). Currently, the Comite’s censeur review 
relies somewhat on individualised judgments and results in varying levels of review of 
dossiers, for example some focusing excessively on minor details or small regional sites. 
The policy recommendation is to adopt a concept of “materiality” modelled on the 
reasoning of corporate disclosure in the US: providing all “material” information that a 
“reasonable donor” would take into account. The level of disclosure required for most 
public companies in the US or France would be financially and organisationally untenable
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for NPOs in both countries (e.g. United States Securities and Exchange Commission 2008; 
Keating and Frumkin 2000, 20-21). However, the standard of all information that a 
“reasonable donor” would consider important in making a decision to give to a NPO could 
guide the organisations and ensure donors and the public adequate, but not excessive,
C A O
information. Moreover, the materiality assessment would support donor trust by 
effectively, efficiently mitigating Hansmann’s information asymmetry.
Finally, the Comite’s reflections should consider the relationship between size and 
accountability requirements apparent in the trust theory, the empirical findings, US 
practice, and Rose-Ackerman’s cost-benefit analysis of “signalling” trustworthiness (e.g. 
Independent Sector’s recommendation of financial oversight in a “manner appropriate to 
the organization’s size and scale of operations”) (Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 2007, 
20).509 Even if in general the Comite maintains uniformly applicable standards across 
different NPO sizes, the relatively significant burden of joining the Comite and on-going 
compliance for smaller organisations could be mitigated by a step-up in reaching eligibility 
criteria and/or compliance over a slightly longer time frame. In addition, reduced technical 
requirements that do not sacrifice the functionally key areas (e.g. conflicts of interest and 
disclosure) could reduce the cost of membership to smaller organisations. The materiality 
standard could also help protect against dedicating resources to unnecessary details. These 
suggestions parallel the multi-tiered approach in US law, including, for example, with the 
Form 990 varied filing requirements for different revenue levels (USDTIRS 2008a).
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter began with a targeted summary of the theoretical basis for the thesis 
and the empirical findings. The overview primarily aimed to offer perspective and refine 
key points for consideration for policy recommendations. Details of the findings were then 
addressed throughout the policy discussion.
508 Even if some donors that give for the “cause” would not pay attention to broad application of such a 
standard, de facto such donors might benefit from industry-wide (or at least Comity-wide) alignment of 
standards.
509 Approximately one-third of Comity Group respondents felt that reaching out to expand membership to 
smaller organisations is an important method of increasing membership and therefore increasing 
accountability across the sector. Most Comity Group respondents opposed a two-tier set of requirements.
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The policy recommendations target regulatory, voluntary best practice, and Comite 
requirements. All pre-suppose a regulatory separation of fund-raising and non-fund-raising 
associations within or related to the 1901 Law, ARUPs, and foundations. The policy 
objective should be assuring independent oversight of accountability matters and improving 
the quality and public availability of disclosure relating to accountability. This includes, in 
turn, on a regulatory level independent expert administrateurs, more effective and 
accessible disclosure of financial and organisational matters, more effective, efficient 
regulatory oversight processes such as the proposed universal disclosure form, and greater 
overlap between tax benefits and accountability measures taken. In addition, organisations 
should consider a series of voluntary best practice recommendations addressing specific 
issues key to independent oversight and accessibility of accountability-related information. 
High priority voluntary accountability mechanisms include a written policy and declaration 
addressing conflicts of interest, a financial review alternative to audited financial 
statements, and the whistleblower mechanism. Finally, recommendations for the Comite 
also all buttress these specific voluntary areas and the larger objectives of independent 
oversight and accessibility of accountability. The Comite’s focus should be on clarifying 
disclosure: context for ratios and accountability-related information generally, as well as a 
materiality standard for disclosure.
The specific recommendations also aim to demonstrate sensitivity to the 1901 Law 
freedom of association objective and other cultural matters, as well as to integrate the 
relevant theoretical links. The internal and external variables discussed in the analysis of 
the empirical findings re-emerge in the policy recommendations at the level of the 
government, individual organisations, and the Comite. In particular, size and, secondarily, 
extent of international engagement should be considered in implementing almost all of the 
recommendations. The recommendations also address the two regulatory external 
variables, accountability regulation and the tax system. Conversely, the policy 
recommendations do not address the non-regulatory external variables, the welfare state and 
scandal. Both were widely perceived as less directly relevant to accountability decision­
making and without apparent access points for change.
Finally, the research offers a tribute to the thoughtful, creative, charismatic leaders 
in the French nonprofit sector who have not waited for the external regulatory, tax, or even 
donor environment to inspire them toward significant improvements in accountability. 
Moreover, their individually conceived and implemented accountability efforts result in a 
marked collective impact on the sector. The future of the sector will depend in large part on
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the French state catching up with these individuals and their organisations -  aligning with 
the highest international standards of accountability in a global nonprofit environment 
while respecting the French cultural and nonprofit tradition. The sector must reconcile the 
concept of independent oversight with democratic governance in order to keep pace within 
France and internationally. In addition, organisations cannot hide behind the 1901 Law -  
and/or confusion of, or gaps in, the network of accountability regulations -  as an excuse for 
anything less than full financial and organisational transparency. Finally, in an era of 
interdependence of government (including an increasingly advantageous French tax 
system), the business world, and the French nonprofit sector, sector leaders must view the 
general public as a stakeholder in accountability and apply the same standards of 
accountability to all stakeholders.
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IV. Interviews (other than respondents of Comite Group and Control Group)532 
by Susan Liautaud
1. Archambault, Edith (Professor Emeritus, Universite Paris 1 -  Pantheon- 
Sorbonne), discussion in Paris, December 10, 2008 (on Comite de la Charte and 
accountability priorities)
2. Arrillaga, Laura (Founder, SV2), discussion in Palo Alto, California, August 28, 
2007 (on SV2)
531 T he related Rapport financier du Com ity de la Charte for fisca l year 2 0 0 7  is availab le  on request but is 
not availab le  on the w eb  site (2 0 0 8 o , 18).
532 Certain o f  the interview s and ca lls are not directly cited in the text but provided  im portant background  
inform ation and/or a second  confirm ation o f  various points.
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3. Bazin, Sebastien (Principal, Managing Director Europe, Chief Executive Officer 
of Colony Capital SAS), call, October 7, 2005 (on structuring nonprofit 
initiatives in the real estate sector)
4. Berthet, Eugenie (Avocate at Landwell & Associes/PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Paris)
a. call, February 18, 2008
b. teleconference, September 2, 2008, also including Patrick Frotiee (Partner 
specializing in nonprofit work), Philippe Durand (Tax Partner), and 
Francis Chartier (Senior Manager) (all at Landwell & Associes/ 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Paris) (on accountability regulation and 
accountability mechanisms in France)
5. Binder, Olivier (Senior Partner), meeting at Cejex-Alexen Paris office, 
November 22, 2007 (on impact of culture on nonprofit accountability and on 
public utility foundations)
6. Bradshaw, Patricia (Associate Professor, York University), call, August 6, 2008 
(on contingency theory and consulting)
7. Charhon, Francis (Executive Director, Fondation de France), meeting at 
Fondation de France Paris, October 25, 2005
8. Chartier, Francis (Senior Manager at Landwell & Associes/ 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Paris Office)
a. teleconference, January 7, 2008, with Patrick Frotiee (on VAMs 
important in the US and differences with implementation in France and 
increasing accountability in France)
b. teleconference, September 2, 2008, also including Eugenie Berthet 
(Avocate), Philippe Durand (Tax Partner), and Patrick Frotiee (Partner 
specializing in nonprofit work) (all at Landwell & Associes/ 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Paris) (on accountability regulation and 
accountability mechanisms in France)
9. Cohas-Bogey, Cyrille (Executive Director, Comite de la Charte)
a. formal study interview at Comite de la Charte Paris office, September 12, 
2007
b. call, November 20, 2007
10. David-Weill, Helene (President, Musee d’Arts Decoratifs), discussion in Paris, 
April 2006 (on fund-raising practices for the new museum)
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11. Dawson, Stephen (Co-founder, Chairman and Volunteer Executive, and Sloane, 
Nat (Co-founder, Vice Chair and Volunteer Executive, Impetus Trust), meeting 
at Impetus Trust London office, February 24, 2006 (on Impetus Trust)
12. de Guerre, Olivier (Co-Founder/Partner PhiTrust), meeting at PhiTrust Paris 
offices with Sebastien Gervais de Laffond (French venture capitalist), February 
12, 2007 (on venture philanthropy and my research)
13. de Montalembert, Andre (Directeur -  Controle, Comite de la Charte), interview, 
September 24, 2007 (on international issues and accountability generally)
14. de Torrente, Nicholas (Executive Director, Doctors Without Borders/Medecins 
Sans Frontieres (MSF) USA)
a. discussion at MSF New York office, January 8, 2005 (on general matters 
and the December 26, 2004 Asian tsunami)
b. discussion at MSF event in London, January 10, 2008 (on a range of 
current accountability issues)
15. Doubleday, Diane (and colleagues) (Consultant, Mercer), multiple 
teleconferences in 2005-06 (on US best practice in compensation matters 
(particularly benchmarking and Internal Revenue Service intermediate 
sanctions) for service on the Lucile Packard Foundation for Children’s Health 
Board)
16. Durand, Philippe (Tax Partner at Landwell & Associes/PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Paris)
a. call December 16, 2007 (on tax aspects of French NPOs)
b. teleconference, September 2, 2008, also including Eugenie Berthet 
(Avocate), Patrick Frotiee (Partner specializing in nonprofit work), and 
Francis Chartier (Senior Manager) (all at Landwell & Associes/ 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Paris) (on accountability regulation and 
accountability mechanisms in France)
17. Fries, Richard (Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics), meeting at 
London School of Economics, November 2, 2006 (on general UK accountability 
issues)
18. Frotiee, Patrick (Partner at Landwell & Associes/PricewaterhouseCoopers Paris, 
specialising in nonprofit work)
a. teleconference, January 7, 2008; with Francis Chartier (on VAMs 
important in the US and differences with implementation in France and 
increasing accountability in France)
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b. teleconference, September 2, 2008, also including Eugenie Berthet 
(Avocate), Francis Chartier (Senior Manager), and Philippe Durand (Tax 
Partner) (all at Landwell & Associes/PricewaterhouseCoopers Paris) (on 
accountability regulation and accountability mechanisms in France)
19. Hansmann, Henry (Augustus E. Lines Professor of Law, Yale Law School), call,
September 11, 2008 (on confirming updated understanding of the trust theory)
20. Howell, Jude (Director of the Centre for Civil Society, London School of 
Economics and primary adviser for this thesis)
a. meeting October 25, 2006 (comments on thesis)
b. meeting January 8, 2007 (comments on thesis)
c. meeting, April 29, 2008 (comments on thesis)
21. Jaffe, Michael (Partner at Landwell & Associes/PricewaterhouseCoopers Paris), 
Philippe Durand (Tax Partner), and Eugenie Berthet (Avocate) (both at 
Landwell & Associes/PricewaterhouseCoopers Paris), teleconference, December 
10, 2007 (on the French nonprofit tax system)
22. Kemoun, Ingrid (Executive Director, jeveuxaider.com), call July 10, 2007 (on
the study and various aspects of the French nonprofit sector)
23. Le Grand, Julian (Professor, Social Policy Department, LSE Health, London 
School of Economics)
a. meeting at London School of Economics, February 7, 2007 (Major 
Review Presentation)
b. meeting at London School of Economics, April 30, 2007 with Dr. David 
Lewis (Reader in Social Policy, Department of Social Policy, London 
School of Economics) (comments on Major Review Presentation at 
London School of Economics)
24. Lucile Packard Foundation for Children’s Health, interviews, November 2005 
(with individual board members while author served as Chairman of the 
Committee on the Board (on Board governance))
25. Lucile Packard Foundation for Children’s Health, interviews, September - 
November 2006 (board interviews while author served as Chair of Committee 
on the Board 2006 (on various governance issues))
26. Mangen, Steen (Program Director, European Social Policy, 
Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and secondary 
adviser for this thesis), meeting, May 2,2008 (comments on thesis)
533 Numerous other advising sessions with Jude Howell were omitted from the References as not directly 
relevant to citations.
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27. Meier, Linda (Co-Chair, Stanford Campaign), meeting at Stanford University, 
March 31, 2008 (on current and past campaigns at Stanford University)
28. Miller, Doug (Founder, European Venture Capital Association)
a. meeting at Institute of Directors in London, July 6, 2006 (on EVPA 
business)
b. call, September 25, 2006 (on EVPA business)
29. Oddo, Philippe (Managing Partner, Oddo et Cie), meeting at Oddo et Cie Paris 
office, May 21, 2007 (on corporate social responsibility)
30. Paris, Christophe (Executive Director, AFEV), meeting at AFEV Paris office, 
December 12, 2005 (on governance issues)
31. Pratten, Belinda (Development Officer reporting to Karl Wilding, Head of 
Research), meeting at NCVO London, December 4, 2006 (on issues of trust, 
donor motivation, and NCVO initiatives such as Impact Coalition)
32. Robin, Jean (Executive Director, Fidesco), meeting in London, November 7, 
2006 (on accountability research and donor issues)
33. Rose-Ackerman, Susan (Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and 
Political Science)), Yale Law School and Department of Political Science, Yale 
University), call, October 8, 2008 (on "signalling" trust and confirming strategic 
assessment process)
34. Salamon, Lester M. (Director, Center for Civil Society Studies, Institute for 
Policy Studies, Johns Hopkins University), call, September 24, 2008 (on trust as 
a replacement for accountability and recent US studies)
35. Soublin, Michel (President, Comite de la Charte)534
a. call, September 13, 2006 (on miscellaneous accountability issues)
b. meeting at Schlumberger Paris office, November 22, 2006 (on Comite 
restructuring, research proposal, trust, and interview process)
c. meeting at Schlumberger Paris office, December 29, 2006 (confirming 
research proposal approval by conseil d ’administration and on the 
restructuring of Comite (need for independent board (profile and election 
process), restructuring commission not under board authority, and use of 
strategic plan as mechanism for accountability)
d. call, January 11, 2007 (on various issues relating to the study)
534 Numerous other informal calls and e-mail exchanges with Michael Soublin are not noted in the 
References.
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e. formal study interview at Paris office, October 16, 2007
f. call, October 27, 2007 (on using Comite as research case study, questions, 
potential Comite structural changes, and lack of impact of tax changes in 
France)
g. call, December 17, 2007 (on independent directors and structure of US- 
style boards of directors versus French conseils d ‘administration)
h. meeting at Comite de la Charte Paris office, February 19, 2008 (on 
comments on report to Comite members on summarising research 
findings)
i. call, April 29, 2008 (on the details of the Statement of Use of Funds)
j. call, June 20, 2008 (on paying administrateurs and impact of the 2004 
Asian tsunami on giving)
k. call, October 28, 2008 (on miscellaneous accountability and Comite 
issues)
1. meeting at Comite de la Charte Paris office, November 24, 2008 (on 
update on thesis issues)
m. call, December 19, 2008 (confirming comments on policy
recommendations and corrections in draft chapters)
36. Tribunal de Grande Instance de Creteil call January 14, 2009 (regarding 
publication of Zoe’s Ark court documents)
V. Conferences and Group Meetings Attended
1. Comite de la Charte Conference on Financial Transparency, at Ordre de Malte 
Paris office, May 20, 2008 (author attended as a guest speaker on international 
perspective with Denis Metzger, President, Action contre la Faim; Stephane 
Rozes, Directeur General et Directeur du Departement Opinion-Corporate de 
l’lnstitut CSA (Conseil Superieur de L’Audiovisuel) and Maitre de Conference 
en Sciences Politiques a Sciences Politiques; and Michel Soublin, President, 
Comite de la Charte)
2. Comite de la Charte General Assembly (assemblee generate), at Ordre de Malte 
Paris office, May 20, 2008
3. Common Purpose Festival of Leadership, at Peterhouse College, Cambridge, 
England, July 2, 2008
535 Call made by research assistant.
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4. EVPA Conference on Venture Philanthropy, at Le Senat, Paris (Fiona Halton 
remarks, Chief Executive of Pilotlight UK), September 15, 2006
5. Leo Jegard & Associes: Conference: Appel a la generosite du public: Le 
nouveau compte d'emploi des ressources repond-il aux besoins des donateurs ? 
(Avis 2008-08 du CNC: ce qui change? ...L at Maison des Associations de 
Solidarity in Paris, May 27, 2008 (on Statement of Use of Funds)
6. Les 2emes Ateliers de la Philanthropic PhiTrust, at Paris office of Fondation 
Simone et Cino del Duca de L’Institut de France Paris office, June 28, 2007. 
Retrieved December 12, 2008, from
http://www.ethinvest.asso.fr/offres/gestion/actus all 80 1179-1/phitrust-ieudi- 
28-iuin-les-2emes-ateliers-de-la-philantropie.html.
7. One World Trust event for launch of 2007 Global Accountability Report, at 
House of Commons in London, December 4, 2007
8. SV2 group meetings and events, at private homes in Palo Alto, California, 2002- 
2004
9. World Economic Forum. Keynote Plenary Session, at World Economic Forum 
in Davos, Switzerland, January 24, 2008
VI. Press Articles 
French Press Articles
Coquide, P. (1996). "Scandale de 1'ARC: L'Etat justicier et complice." LExpansion 
(January 11, 1996). Retrieved October 23, 2008, from 
http://www.lexpansion.com/economie/scandale-de-l-arc-l-etat-iusticier-et- 
complice 4563.html.
Zoe's Ark Press536
*/**Agence France Presse. (2005). "The French do it in associations." (October 18, 
2005). Retrieved October 23, 2008, from http://afprc7.blogspot.eom/2005/10/french-do- 
it-in-associations-vahoo.html (abstract only).
Auriol, E. (2008). "L'arche qui cache la foret." L'Expansion (February 1st, 2008). 
Retrieved October 31, 2008, from http://www.lexpansion.com/economie/actualite- 
economique/l-arche-qui-cache-la-foret 141384.html.
536 The Zoe's Ark Press section  includes both articles that are d irectly  cited  in the th esis (indicated by a 
"*") and additional articles that w ere used for backup verification in light o f  the lim ited primary sources  
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VII. E-mails537 
To Susan Liautaud
1. Arrillaga, Laura (Co-Founder, SV2), April 16, 2008 (on Social Venture Partners 
International and SV2)
2. Berlincourt, Christine (Administrator, Comite de la Charte)
a. November 21, 2008 (on average gifts for Comite members)
b. December 15, 2008 (on founding members of the Comite)
3. Berthet, Eugenie (Avocate at Landwell & Associes)
a. February 15, 2008 (on wealth tax and various issues relating to foundations)
b. March 21, 2008 (on reviewing tax summary for accuracy)
c. April 30, 2008 (on reviewing tax exemption for donors)
d. August 19, 2008 (on accountability regulations for charities)
e. September 8,2008 (on law for foundations equivalent to the 1901 law for 
associations)
f. September 15, 2008 (on law for foundations equivalent to the 1901 law for 
associations)
4. Bradshaw, Patricia (Associate Professor,York University), June 4,2008 (on 
contingency theory and consulting)
5. Chartier, Francis (Senior Manager, PricewaterhouseCoopers Audit, Paris 
Office), September 2, 2008 (on legal texts relating to associations and 
foundations)
6. Clegg, Sally (Research Publications Officer, Charities Aid Foundation), May 23, 
2008 (on the definition of social security contribution as used in CAF 
documents)
7. Cohas-Bogey, Cyrille (Executive Director, Comite de la Charte)
a. March 25, 2008 (on comments on the Internal Revenue Service Form 990)
b. May 14, 2008 (on Conseil de Deontologie)
c. September 1, 2008 (on an organisation being expelled from the Comite)
537 This selection of e-mails was cited in the thesis and represents only a small number of the numerous e- 
mails used to confirm data.
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d. September 1, 2008 (on 4 organisations refused by Comite in 2007)
e. September 18, 2008 (on document retention policy, independent directors 
and difference between Comite de Surveillance and Commission 
d’Agrement de Controle)
f. December 8, 2008 (on Comite limitations on religious organisations)
8. Durand, Philippe (Tax Partner at Landwell & Associes/PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Paris), May 22, 2008 (on tax issues, FRUP status, and foundation boards)
9. Grant, Robert N., (US Attorney at Law specializing in estate planning and 
nonprofit institutions)
a. March 31, 2008 (regarding California state law on nonprofit organisations 
and director/officer insurance)
b. December 3, 2008 (on director duty of care and duty of loyalty)
10. Howell, Jude (Professor and Director of the Centre for Civil Society, London 
School of Economics)
a. June 25, 2008 (on comments on thesis)
b. September 17, 2008 (on Draft Chapter 1: Introduction)
c. September 27, 2008 (on Draft Chapter 7 (Conclusion))
d. March 24, 2009 (on final comments on thesis)
11. Jackson, Peggy (Co-Author, Sarbanes-Oxlev For Nonprofits and Sarbanes- 
Oxlev For Small Businesses). September 16, 2008 (regarding Sections 802 and 
806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and their application to nonprofits)
12. Joly, Caroline (Avocate, Landwell & Associes), September 5, 2008 (on actions 
regarding fraudulent acts of charities management)
13. Quenin, Marine (Former Executive Director Samusocial International), 
November 30, 2008 (confirming revenue level for appendices)
14. Soublin, Michel (President, Comite de la Charte)
a. January 6, 2007 (responding to Independent Sector Accountability Checklist 
and Comite de la Charte requirements)
b. February 10, 2007 (reconfirming board approval and attaching minutes of 
board meeting)
c. April 23, 2008 (on performance evaluation requirements)
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d. October 28, 2008 (on organisations that have left the Comite)
e. January 20, 2009 (on confirming the revenue threshold for market share)
From Susan Liautaud
1. Bradshaw, Patricia (Associate Professor, York University), June 4, 2008 (on 
contingency theory)
2. Cohas-Bogey, Cyrille (Executive Director, Comite de la Charte)
a. September 1, 2008 (on organisations expelled from the Comite)
b. September 16, 2008 (on California Nonprofit Integrity Act)
3. Hansmann, Henry (Augustus E. Lines Professor of Law, Yale Law School), 
August 13, 2008 (on scheduling a meeting to review my thesis)
4. Lottier, Marie (Chef du bureau des associations et fondations, Ministere de 
l'lnterieur, de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivites territoriales, Direction des Libertes 
Publiques et des Affaires Juridiques), January 9, 2009 (on ARUP statistics)
5. Soublin, Michel (President, Comite de la Charte)
a. January 5, 2006 (requesting confirmation of applicability of Independent 
Sector checklist to Comite de la Charte)
b. November 23, 2007 (research proposal for Comite de la Charte board of 
directors)
c. October 28, 2008 (on organisations that have left the Comite)
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APPENDIX I-A
Comite Group and Control Group Study Participants 
(in alphabetical order)'
Comite Group Members2 LegalForm
Interview
Date3
1. Action contre la Faim (www.actioncontrelafaim.ore)*4 ARUP5 16 Oct. 2007
2. Aide et Action (www.aide-et-action.ore) * ARUP 16 Oct. 2007
3. Amnestv International France (www.amnestv.fr)** ARUP 29 Nov. 2007
4. Association des Paralyses de France (www.apf.asso.fr) * ARUP 22 Oct. 2007
5. Association Petits Princes (www.DetitsDrinces.com) * 1901 Law 17 Oct. 2007
6. Association pour la Recherche sur le Cancer
(www.arc.asso.fr) *
ARUP 13 Sept. 2007
7. Association Valentin Haiiv (www.avh.asso.fr) * ARUP 28 Jan. 2008
8. Care France (www.carefrance.ore) * * 1901 Law 4 Oct. 2007
9. Cimade (www.cimade.ore) * 1901 Law 18 Sept. 2007
10. Comite Catholique contre la Faim et pour le 
Developpement (www.ccfd.asso.fr) * ARUP 3 Oct. 2007
11. Croix-Rouee Fran^aise (www.croix-rouee.fr) ** ARUP 29 Oct. 2007
12. Fondation d ’Auteuil (www.fondation-auteuil.ore) * FRUP 5 Dec. 2007
13. Fondation de France (www.fdf.ore) * FRUP 19 Sept. 2007
14. Fondation Hopitaux de Paris - Hopitaux de France
(www.fondationhopitaux.fr) *
FRUP 11 Sept. 2007
15. Fondation nour la Recherche Medicale (www.frm.ore) * FRUP 3 Oct. 2007
16. Gefluc (www.eefluc.ore) * ARUP 4 Sept. 2007
17. Handicap International (www.handicaD-international.ore) ** ARUP 10 Sept. 2007
18. Jeunesse au Plein Air (www.iDa.asso.fr) * 1901 Law 7 Nov. 2007
In order to protect confidentiality, the numbers and letters in the Comite Group and Control Group lists, 
respectively, do not correspond to the citations throughout the thesis but rather correspond to an alphabetised list.
2 Other Comite members not participating in the study are: A Chacun Son Everest, Action des Chrdtiens pour 
I’Abolition de la Torture, Agronomes et Vdtdrinaires sans Frontteres, Association Fran^aise des Scleroses en Plaques, 
Bureau International Catholique de l'Enfance (BICE), Centre Fran^ais de Protection de I’Enfance, Comitd Fran?ais 
pour la Solidarity Internationale, Delegation Catholique pour la Cooperation, Fondation Abbe Pierre pour le logement 
des defavorises, Fondation Aide k toute ddtresse, Foyer de Cachan, Freres des Hommes, Habitat et Humanisme, 
Institut Pasteur, Maisons d'accueil Pilot, Organisation pour la Prevention de la Cdcitd, Orpheopolis - Orphelinat 
Mutualiste de la Police Nationale, Partage, Secours Populaire Fran^ais, SOS Sahel International France and Terre des 
Hommes France.
1 All interviews were conducted by Susan Liautaud.
4* Organisation operates exclusively or almost exclusively in France.
** Organisation operates internationally and/or is linked to an international network.
5 ARUP is public utility association (association reconnue d ’utilite publique). FRUP is public utility foundation 
(fondation reconnue d'utilite publique).
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19. La Chaine de I’Espoir (www.chainedelesDoir.org) * 1901 Law 19 Nov. 2007
20. Les petits freres des Pauvres (www.Detitsfreres.asso.fr) * ARUP 10 Oct. 2007
21. Les Restos du Coeur (www.restosducoeur.ore) * ARUP 12 Sept. 2007
22. Lieue Nationale Contre le Cancer (www.lieue-cancer.net) * ARUP 2 Oct. 2007
23. M edecins du Monde (www.medecinsdumonde.ore) * ARUP 29 Oct. 2007
24. (Euvre des Pupilles Orphelins et Fonds d’Entraide des 
Sapeurs-Pompiers en France (www.DomDiers.fr) * ARUP 19 Nov. 2007
25. Ordre de Malte France (www.ordredemaltefrance.ore) ** ARUP 23 Oct. 2007
26. Perce-Neige (www.Derce-neiee.ore) * ARUP 29 Oct. 2007
27. Secours Catholique (www.secours-catholiaue.asso.fr) ** ARUP 11 Sept. 2007
28. Societe Nationale de Sauvetace en Mer (www.snsm.net) * ARUP 27 Sept. 2007
29. Sol En Si (www.solensi.ore) * ARUP 27 Sept. 2007
30. SOS Villages d'Fnfants (www.villaees-enfants.asso.fr) * ARUP 19 Sept. 2007
31. Un Enfant par la Main (www.unenfantparlamain.ore) * 1901 Law 13 Sept. 2007
32. Unicef France (w w w .unicef.fr)** ARUP 29 Nov. 2007
33. Vaincre la Mucoviscidose (www.vaincrelamuco.ore) * ARUP 2 Oct. 2007
C on trol G rou p  M em bers
A. Ashoka France (www.ashoka.asso.fr) ** 1901 Law 25 Sept. 2007
B. Association de la Fondation Etudiante pour la Ville
(www.afev.ore) *
1901 Law 27 Sept. 2007
C. Fidesco (www.fidesco-international.ore) ** 1901 Law 19 Sept. 2007
D. Fondation de la 2e Chance (www.deuxiemechance.ore) * FRUP 11 Sept. 2007
E. Fondation Nicolas Hulot pour la Nature et l'Homme
(w w w .fondation-nicolas-hulot.org) *
FRUP 20 Feb. 2008
F. Greenpeace France (www.ereenDeace.ore/france) ** 1901 Law 18 Sept. 2007
G. Institut Montaigne (www.institutmontaiene.ore) * 1901 Law 26 Sept. 2007
H. Les Arts Decoratifs (www.lesartsdecoratifs.fr) * ARUP 3 Oct. 2007
I. M edecins Sans Frontieres (www.msf.fr) * ARUP 13 Oct. 2007
J. Samusocial International (www.samu-social-international.com) * GIP6 22 Nov. 2007
K. Sidaction (www.sidaction.ore) * ARUP 12 Sept. 2007
L. W W F-France (www.wwf.fr) ** ARUP 3 Oct. 2007
6 GIP is a special status called public interest grouping (Groupement d'lnteret Public (GIP)) due to the unique
relationship to the City o f Paris.
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A P P E N D IX  1-B  
S ector o f  A c tiv ity 1
P rim ary S ector o f  A ctiv ity
Comitl Group Control Group Total Combined Groups
# Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs %
Medical Emergency 0 0 1 10 1 3
Health and Medical Research (e.g. cancer research) 5 17 1 10 6 15
Medical Care 2 7 1 10 3 8
Mental Health 0 0 0 0 0 0
Human Rights 2 7 0 0 2 5
Youth and Leisure 0 0 0 0 0 0
Culture (e.g. arts and literature) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sport 0 0 0 0 0 0
Education 2 7 1 10 3 8
Social Services 0 0 1 10 1 3
Children 1 3 0 0 1 3
Environment 0 0 1 10 1 3
Support for Handicapped Persons 3 10 0 0 3 8
Aid to Developing Countries/Development 5 17 0 0 5 13
Other2 9 31 4 40 13 33
TO TAL 29 100 10 100 39 100
Secondary S ector o f  A ctiv ity
Comit£ Group Control Group Total Combined Groups
# Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs %
Medical Emergency 0 0 0 0 0 0
Health and Medical Research (e.g. cancer research) 2 7 1 10 3 8
Medical Care 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mental Health 1 3 0 0 1 3
Human Rights 1 3 0 0 1 3
Youth and Leisure 1 3 0 0 1 0
Culture (e.g. arts and literature) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sport 0 0 0 0 0 0
Education 1 3 1 10 2 5
Social Services 0 0 2 20 2 5
Children 2 7 0 0 2 5
Environment 0 0 0 0 0 0
Support for Handicapped Persons 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aid to Developing Countries/Development 6 21 2 20 8 21
Other3 15 52 4 40 19 49
TO TAL 29 100 10 100 39 100
1 Figures are based on respondents participating in the written self-completion questionnaire.
2 The Comite Group "Other" responses, with two exceptions too specific to reveal for confidentiality reasons (each 
applying only to one organisation), all would have fit within the pre-set categories Health and Medical Research, 
Children, Support for Handicapped Persons, and Aid to Developing Countries/Development. The Control Group 
"Other" included two activities too specific to disclose for confidentiality reasons and two that would have fit within 
the pre-set categories Culture and Education.
3 The Comite Group "Other" included seven respondents with no secondary activity; one exceptional activity too 
unique to specify for confidentiality reasons; and seven others that would have fallen within one o f  six different pre-set 
categories. The Control Group "Other" included two activities that would have fallen within two pre-set categories and 
two activities unique to one respondent organisation.
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APPENDIX 1-C
L egal Form  o f O rgan isations  
P osition  o f  Interview ees in the O rgan isation
L egal Form  o f  O rgan isations
CC Group Control Group Combined Groups
FRUP GIP 
4 0
12% °*/o
1901 Law
ARUP
1901 Law
FRUP 8%
ARUP
FRIT
1901 Law
ARUP
Position  o f  Interview ees'
CC Group Control Group Combined Groups
Treasurer
2
6%
General 
Secretary 
4 
12%
Other
5
15% President
8
24%
Director
General
14
43%
Treasurer 
0
0
0%
Other
1
General 0% \  ^*° /
Secretary \  /it
President 
1
8%
f»
Director
General
10
84%
Other
P re s id e n t
1 Positions o f  interviewees within each organisation are not provided on an organisation by organisation basis in order 
to maintain the confidentiality o f  the individual participating.
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APPENDIX 1-D
Founding Comite de la Charte Members 
Participating in the Study
1. Action contre la Faim
2. Association des Paralyses de France
3. Association V alentin Hatty
4. Comite Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Developpement
5. Fondation de France
6. Fondation pour la Recherche Medicale
7. Les petits freres des Pauvres
8. Les Restos du Coeur
9. Ligue Nationale Contre le Cancer
10. Medecins du Monde
11. Secours Catholique
12. Unicef France
Other Founding Comite de la Charte Members
1. Institut Pasteur
2. Federation nationale des associations d’accueil et de readaptation sociale
3. Secours Populaire Fran9ais
4. Union Nationale des Associations de Parents d'Enfants Inadaptes
5. UNIOPSS
6. Association Fran9aise contre les Myopathies
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APPENDIX 1-E 
Total 2006 Annual Revenue'
T o t a l  2 0 0 6  
A n n u a l  R e v e n u e
C o m i t e  G r o u p C o n t r o l  G r o u p
T o t a l  
C o m b i n e d  G r o u p s
#  O r g s % #  O r g s % #  O r g s %
€ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  -  7 5 0 , 0 0 0 2 7 1 1 0 3 8
€ 1 - 2  million 3 1 0 2 2 0 5 1 3
€ 2 - 3  million 0 0 2 2 0 2 5
€ 3 - 4  million 0 0 0 0 0 0
€ 4 - 5  million 1 3 1 1 0 2 5
€ 5  -  1 0  million 2 7 1 1 0 3 8
€ 1 1  -  3 0  million 4 1 4 2 2 0 6 1 5
€ 3 1  -  5 0  million 8 2 8 0 0 8 2 0
€ 5 1  million or more 9 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 6
T O T A L 2 2 9 100 10 100 3 9 100
1 Figures are based on respondents participating in the written self-completion questionnaire.
2 16 (55%) Comitd Group respondents and nine (90%) Control Group respondents responding to the self­
completion questionnaire reported a significant variation in revenue during the preceding five years. Nine 
and zero respondents, respectively, connected this variation to the 2004 Asian tsunami.
APPENDIX 1-F
2006 Revenues by Category of Revenue Source1
Public Funding2 Commercial Activities Individual Donors
International Aid 
M ultilateral Agencies
EU
or Foreign Governm ents
Corporations or 
Private French Foundations
Comite
Group
Control
Group
Comite
Group
Control
Group
Comit6
Group
Control
Group
Comity
Group
Control
Group
Comity
Group
Control
Group
Comite
Group
Control
Group
# Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs % # Orgs %
0 6 2 1 3 3 0 1 4 4 8 8 8 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 7 2 8 8 0 1 8 6 2 7 70 1 0 3 4 1 1 0
1 - 1 0 % 6 2 1 2 2 0 11 3 8 I 1 0 5 1 7 4 4 0 7 2 4 1 1 0 6 2 1 2 2 0 1 6 5 5 4 4 0
1 1 - 2 0 % 2 7 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 4 1 4 0 0 1 3 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
2 1 - 3 0 % 1 3 2 2 0 1 3 0 0 6 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 2 7 0 0
3 1 - 4 0 % 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
4 1 - 6 0 % 5 1 7 1 1 0 2 7 0 0 7 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
6 1 - 8 0 % 6 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 3 2 2 0
8 1 - 9 5 % 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 6 - 1 0 0 % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TO TAL 2 9 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 2 9 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 9 1 0 0 1 0 too 2 9 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 9 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 9 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 Figures are based on respondents participating in the written self-completion questionnaire.
2 Public funding includes French state, departements, local collectivites, social security, ministries such as the Ministry o f  Foreign and European Affairs, etc.
3 Total percentages noted as 100 may reflect rounding o f  up to - 9 o f  individual percentage numbers.
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APPENDIX 1-G
Size of Organisations 
(Approximate 2006 Revenue Level)'
Comite Group Members
Total 2006 
Revenues 
(in euros)
1. Croix-Rouge Fransaise 910,190,000
2. Association des Paralyses de France 506,387,149
3. Fondation d’Auteuil 231,393,003
4. Fondation de France 153,348,660
5. Secours Catholique 130,000,000
6. Les Restos du Coeur 120,599,000
7. Ligue Nationale Contre le Cancer 98,600,000
8. Handicap International 77,554,000
9. Action contre la Faim 64,865,221
10. Unicef France 59,100,000
11. Medecins du Monde 55,444,653
12. Ordre de Malte France 45,996,651
13. SOS Villages d'Enfants 45,489,000
14. Association Valentin Haiiy 42,860,000
15. Association pour la Recherche sur le Cancer 40,673,000
16. Comitd Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Developpement 39,281,000
17. Perce-Neige 38,762,210
18. Fondation pour la Recherche Medicale 38,676,952
19. Les petits freres des Pauvres 38,165,384
20. Aide et Action 22,684,000
21. Jeunesse au Plein Air 20,778,971
22. Societe Nationale de Sauvetage en Mer 15,522,013
23. Care France 15,153,000
24. Amnesty International France 14,855,553
25. Fondation Hopitaux de Paris - Hopitaux de France 13,402,000
26. La Chaine de 1’Espoir 10,187,000
27. Vaincre la Mucoviscidose 9,601,552
28. Cimade 7,095,925
29. (Euvre des Pupilles Orphelins et Fonds d’Entraide des Sapeurs- 
Pompiers en France 3,245,625
30. Un Enfant par la Main 2,774,293
31. Association Petits Princes 2,248,000
32. Sol En Si 1,286,290
33. Gefluc 1,270,614
'in descending order by revenue level. Based on information published by the organisations on their website. (See 
Appendix 1-A.) Presentation o f results varied somewhat. Numbers do not correspond to confidential organisation 
codes used throughout the thesis.
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Control Group Members
Total 2006 
Revenues 
(in euros)
A. Medecins Sans Frontieres 147,200,000
B. Les Arts Ddcoratifs 33,478,636
C. Sidaction 23,756,661
D. WWF-France 10,502,000
E. Greenpeace France 7,765,000
F. Fondation Nicolas Hulot pour la Nature et 1'Homme 4,573,000
G. Institut Montaigne 2,701,745
H. Fondation de la 2e Chance 2,370,159
I. Fidesco 1,770,090
J. Samusocial International 1,400,0002
K. Ashoka France 566,000
L. Association de la Fondation Etudiante pour la Ville _ 3
2 Based on estimate o f former Executive Director (Quenin e-mail 2008).
3 On eight different calls to senior management representatives the data were not provided and is not publicly 
available.
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APPENDIX 1-H-1A
Self-completion Questionnaire -  Comite Group (original French)
Enquete du Comite de la Charte: ZOOMERANG QUESTIONNAIRE 
Enquete du Comite de la Charte: Projet de recherche de la London School of 
Economics sur la notion de responsabilite dans les associations/fondations
fra n Raises.
1. Association/fondation:
o A chacun son Everest
o ACAT
o Action contre la Faim 
o Agronomes et Veterinaires sans Frontieres 
o Aide et Action
o Amnesty International -  section fran9aise 
o Association des paralyses de France 
o Association fran^aise des scleroses en plaques 
o Association les petits freres des Pauvres 
o Association Petits princes 
o Association pour la recherche sur le cancer 
o Association V Haiiy pour le bien des aveugles 
o Care France 
o CCFD
o Centre fran9ais de protection de l’enfance 
o Chaine de l’espoir (la)
o Cimade Comite fran9ais pour la solidarity intemationale 
o Comite Perce-neige 
o Croix-rouge fran9aise 
o Delegation catholique pour la cooperation 
o Enfant par la main (un)
o Fondation Abbe Pierre 
o Fondation aide a toute detresse 
o Fondation d’Auteuil 
o Fondation de France 
o Fondation de L’avenir 
o Fondation des petits freres des Pauvres 
o Fondation hopitaux de Paris-hopitaux de France 
o Fondation pour la recherche medicale (FRM) 
o Foyer de Cachan 
o Freres des hommes 
o GEFLUC 
o Habitat et humanisme 
o Handicap international 
o Institut Pasteur 
o Jeunesse au plein air (JPA) 
o Ligue nationale contre le cancer (LNCC) 
o Maisons d’accueil L’ilot (MAI) 
o Medecins de Monde (MDM) 
o Oeuvre des pupilles orphelins de sapeurs-pompiers 
o Ordre de Malte
o Organisation pour la prevention de la cecite (OPC) 
o Orpheopolis -  (OMPN) 
o Partage
o Restaurants du coeur -  relais du coeur (les) 
o Secours catholique 
o Secours populaire franchise (SPF) 
o Societe nationale de sauvetage en mer
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o SOLenSI
o SOS Sahel international France 
o SOS villages d’enfants 
o Terre des hommes France (TDHF) 
o Unicef France
o Vaincre la mucoviscidose (VLM)
2. Veuillez saisir vos noms et adresses ci-dessous:
Votre Nom:
Addresse du siege social de l'association /fondation :
Ville :
Departement:
Code postal :
Pays :
Courriel:
3. Quel poste occupez-vous au sein de rassociation/fondation?
o President du Directoire ou directeur general
o President du Conseil d’administration 
o Administrates (membre du Bureau) 
o Directeur financier 
o Directeur general adjoint 
o Vice-president 
o Directeur de la collecte de fonds 
o Directeur des programmes 
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
4. Veuillez indiquer le type d ’association/fondation dont il s’agit:
o Association loi 1901 declaree
o Association loi 1901 Reconnue d’Utilite Publique 
o Fondation Reconnue d’Utilite Publique 
o Fondation arbitree
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o Autre (veuillez preciser)
5. Quel est le principal secteur d’activite de l’association/fondation?
o Secours medical (ex : services d’urgence)
o Sante et recherche medicale (ex : lutte contre le cancer) 
o Soins medicaux 
o Maladies mentales 
o Droits de l’homme 
o Jeunesse et loisirs 
o Culture (ex : arts et litterature) 
o Sport
o Education et enseignement 
o Services sociaux 
o Enfance
o Defense de l’environnement 
o Soutien aux handicapes 
o Aide au tiers-monde / aide au developpement 
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
6. Quel est le secteur d’activite secondaire de l’association/fondation?
o Secours medical (ex : services d’urgence)
o Sante et recherche medicale (ex : lutte contre le cancer) 
o Soins medicaux 
o Maladies mentales 
o Droits de l’homme 
o Jeunesse et loisirs 
o Culture (ex : arts et litterature) 
o Sport
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o Education et enseignement 
o Services sociaux 
o Enfance
o Defense de l’environnement 
o Soutien aux handicapes 
o Aide au tiers-monde / aide au developpement 
o Autre (veuillez preciser).
7. Dans quelles zones geographiques intervenez-vous? (Cochez toutes les reponses 
applicables.)
o En France uniquement
o En France ET en Grande-Bretagne 
o En France ET aux Etats-Unis 
o Dans l’Union europeenne 
o En Afrique 
o EnAsie
o Au Canada OU au Mexique 
o En Amerique du Sud 
o Moyen-Orient 
o Europe de l’Est 
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
8. Dans quelles zones geographiques disposez-vous de bureaux ou autres points de 
representation? (Cochez toutes les reponses applicables.)
o En France uniquement
o En France ET en Grande-Bretagne 
o En France ET aux Etats-Unis 
o Dans l’Union europeenne 
o En Afrique
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o En Asie
o Au Canada OU au Mexique 
o En Amerique du Sud 
o Moyen-Orient 
o Europe de l’Est 
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
9. A combien s’est eleve le total de vos ressources pour l’exercice 2006?
o De 500 000 a 1 million d’euros
o De 1 million a 2 millions d’euros 
o De 2 a 3 millions d’euros 
o De 3 a 4 millions d’euros 
o De 4 a 5 millions d’euros 
o De 5 a 10 millions d’euros 
o De 11 a 30 millions d’euros 
o De 31 a 50 millions d’euros 
o 51 millions d’euros ou plus
10. Au cours des cinq derniers exercices, le total de vos ressources annuel a-t-il 
varie de maniere importante? Si oui, veuillez expliquer pourquoi (ex : catastrophe 
naturelle de type tsunami ou tout autre evenement ayant engendre des dons 
exceptionnels ou difficultes rencontrees dans l’organisation interne ou au contraire 
amelioration de celle-ci) dans l'espace reserve a la question 11.
o Oui
o Non
11. Autres commentaires:
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12. Quel pourcentage representent des fonds publics (Etat, collectivites locales, 
securite sociale, etc.) dans le total de vos ressources annuel 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
13. Quel pourcentage represente le revenu des activites commerciales dans le total
de vos ressources annuel 2006?
o 0
o 1-10%
o 11-20%
o 21-30%
o 31-40%
o 41-60%
o 61-80%
o 81-95%
o 96-100%
14. Quel pourcentage representent les dons individuels dans le total de vos 
ressources annuel 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30%
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o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
15. Quel pourcentage representent les organisations internationales humanitaires 
(« international aid agencies » et « multilateral organisations ») dans le total de vos 
ressources annuel 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
16. Quel pourcentage representent l’Union Europeenne ou des Etats etrangers 
dans le total de vos ressources annuel 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
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17. Quel pourcentage representent les dons emanant d ’entreprises ou de 
fondations privees fran^aises dans le total de vos ressources 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
18. Quel est le pourcentage approximatif de donateurs individuels sur le nombre 
total de donateurs contribuant a hauteur d’un maximum de 100 euros?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
19. Combien de donateurs avez-vous approximativement comptabilise en 
moyenne au cours des trois derniers exercices?
o 0-500
o 501-1000
o 1001-2500
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o 2501-5000 
o 5001-10 000 
o 10 001-100,000 
o 100,001-250,000 
o 251,000-500,000 
o 500,000 ou plus
20. Assurez-vous un suivi des donateurs d’une annee sur l’autre?
o Oui
o Non
21. Si oui, quel est le pourcentage approximatif de donateurs ayant renouvele 
leurs dons en 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
22. Considerez-vous que la concurrence des autres associations/fondations soit un 
facteur important dans votre capacite a attirer des donateurs?
o Oui
o Non
23. Au cours de l’exercice 2006, quel pourcentage de vos ressources privees totales 
emanait de sources fran^aises?
o 0
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o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
24. Au cours de l’exercice 2006, quel pourcentage de dons emanait de la Grande- 
Bretagne ou des Etats-Unis?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
25. Combien de salaries en equivalent temps plein avez-vous en France?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o Plus de 5000
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26. Combien de salaries en equivalent temps plein avez-vous a Petranger (y 
compris volontaires remuneres)?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o Plus de 5000
27. Combien de benevoles a plein temps ou a temps partiel avez-vous en France?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o Plus de 5000
28. Combien de benevoles a plein temps ou a temps partiel avez-vous a Petranger?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o Plus de 5000
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29. Depuis combien de temps votre association/fondation fait-elle partie du Comite 
de la Charte?
o Moins d’ 1 an
o 1 -2 ans 
o 3-5 ans 
o 5-10 ans 
o 10-15 ans 
o 15-20 ans
30. En quoi la recherche d ’une plus grande confiance des donateurs a-t-elle joue 
dans votre decision de rejoindre le Comite de la Charte?
o Pas du tout
o Peu 
o Beaucoup
o La motivation essentielle 
o La seule motivation
31 . En dehors de la recherche d’une plus grande confiance de vos donateurs, 
quelle a ete la motivation principale de votre decision de rejoindre le Comite de la 
Charte?
32. Votre association/fondation a-t-elle du operer des changements importants 
dans ses politiques et pratiques en matiere de responsabilite en vue de rejoindre le 
Comite de la Charte? Si oui, veuillez expliquer brievement quels ont ete les divers 
types de changements dans respace reserve a la question 33.
o Oui
o Non
■■■
33. Autres commentaires:
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34. Votre association/fondation dispose-t-elle d’un comite specifique au sein du 
conseil d ’administration en charge des questions de responsabilite (notamment de 
la communication et de la transparence de l’information financiere); par exemple, 
un comite d’audit ou un comite executif ? Veuillez precisez dans Pespace reserve a 
la question 35. 
o Oui
o Non
35. Autres commentaires :
36. Par quels moyens diffusez-vous vos informations financieres auditees? (Cochez 
toutes les reponses applicables.)
o Via votre site Internet
o Par courrier electronique sur demande des donateurs
o Par courrier sur demande des donateurs
o Par courrier electronique a tous les donateurs
o Par courrier a tous les donateurs
o Par courrier electronique ou par courrier sur demande des non-donateurs 
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
37. Diffusez-vous des versions en anglais de vos rapports annuels et de vos 
rapports financiers?
o Oui
o Non
38. Dans la liste suivante, veuillez cocher les procedures actuellement mises en 
place au sein de votre association/fondation pour garantir sa responsabilite :
o Procedures sur les conflits d’interet
o Procedures sur la conservation des documents
o Procedures sur 1’evaluation des performances
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o Procedures sur la communication des informations/ Procedures sur la 
transparence
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
39. Veuillez ajouter ci-dessous tout commentaire que vous considerez important 
par rapport aux sujets abordes ci-dessus ou afin de clarifier vos differentes 
reponses ; veuillez apporter toute precision utile relative aux politiques et 
pratiques de votre association/fondation en matiere de responsabilite.
343
APPENDIX 1-H-1B
Self-completion Questionnaire -  Comite Group 
(English translation by author)
Comite de la Charte Questionnaire: ZOOMERANG QUESTIONNAIRE 
Comite de la Charte Questionnaire: Research project for the London School of 
Economics on accountability in French associations/foundations.
1. Nonprofit Organisation:
o A chacun son Everest
o ACAT
o Action contre la Faim 
o Agronomes et Veterinaires sans Frontieres 
o Aide et Action
o Amnesty International -  section fran9aise 
o Association des paralyses de France 
o Association fran^aise des scleroses en plaques 
o Association les petits freres des Pauvres 
o Association Petits princes 
o Association pour la recherche sur le cancer 
o Association V Haliy pour le bien des aveugles 
o Care France 
o CCFD
o Centre fran9 ais de protection de l’enfance 
o Chaine de l’espoir (la)
o Cimade Comite fran9ais pour la solidarity intemationale 
o Comite Perce-neige 
o Croix-rouge fran9 aise 
o Delegation catholique pour la cooperation 
o Enfant par la main (un)
o Fondation Abbe Pierre 
o Fondation aide a toute detresse 
o Fondation d’Auteuil 
o Fondation de France 
o Fondation de L’avenir 
o Fondation des petits freres des Pauvres 
o Fondation hopitaux de Paris-hopitaux de France 
o Fondation pour la recherche medicale (FRM) 
o Foyer de Cachan 
o Freres des hommes 
o GEFLUC 
o Habitat et humanisme 
o Handicap international 
o Institut Pasteur 
o Jeunesse au plein air (JPA) 
o Ligue nationale contre le cancer (LNCC) 
o Maisons d’accueil L’ilot (MAI) 
o Medecins de Monde (MDM) 
o Oeuvre des pupilles orphelins de sapeurs-pompiers 
o Ordre de Malte
o Organisation pour la prevention de la cecite (OPC) 
o Orpheopolis -  (OMPN) 
o Partage
o Restaurants du coeur -  relais du coeur (les) 
o Secours catholique 
o Secours populaire franchise (SPF) 
o Societe nationale de sauvetage en mer
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o SOL en SI
o SOS Sahel international France
o SOS villages d’enfants
o Terre des hommes France (TDHF)
o Unicef France
o Vaincre la mucoviscidose (VLM)
2. Please fill out your name and contact details below:
Your name:
Registered office of the organisation : 
Town :
Region : 
Postcode :
Country : 
E-m ail:
3. Which position do you hold within the organisation?
o President or Director General
o President of the conseil d'administration
o Administrates (or members of the bureau)
o Financial Director
o Deputy Director General
o Vice President
o Head of Fundrai sing
o Head of Programmes
o Other (please specify)
4. Please indicate which category your organisation belongs to:
o 1901 law association
o Public utility association (A.R.U.P.)
o Public utility foundation (F.R.U.P.) 
o Private foundation
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o Other (please specify)
5. What is the organisation’s principal sector of activity?
o Medical assistance (e.g. emergency services)
o Health and medical research (e.g. cancer) 
o Medical care 
o Mental illness 
o Human rights 
o Youth and leisure 
o Culture (e.g. arts and literature) 
o Sport
o Education and teaching 
o Social services 
o Children
o Protection of the environment 
o Support to the disabled
o Aid and development assistance to developing countries 
o Other (please specify)
6. What is the organisation’s secondary sector of activity?
o Medical assistance (e.g. emergency services)
o Health and medical research (e.g. cancer) 
o Medical care 
o Mental illness 
o Human rights 
o Youth and leisure 
o Culture (e.g. arts and literature) 
o Sport
347
o Education and teaching 
o Social services 
o Children
o Protection of the environment 
o Support to the disabled
o Aid and development assistance to developing countries 
o Other (please specify)
7. Which geographical areas do you work in? (Please tick all applicable answers.)
o France only
o France AND Great Britain 
o France AND the US
o EU 
o Africa 
o Asia
o Canada OR Mexico 
o South America 
o Middle East 
o Eastern Europe 
o Other (please specify)
8. In which geographical areas do you have offices or other representative 
agencies? (Please tick all applicable answers.)
o France only
o France AND Great Britain 
o France AND the US
o EU 
o Africa
o Asia
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o Canada OR Mexico 
o South America 
o Middle East 
o Eastern Europe 
o Other (please specify)
9. What was the total sum of your revenue for fiscal year 2006?
o 500 000 to 1 million euros
o 1 to 2 million euros 
o 2 to 3 million euros 
o 3 to 4 million euros 
o 4 to 5 million euros 
o 5 to 10 million euros 
o 11 to 30 million euros 
o 31 to 50 million euros 
o 51 million euros or more
10. Has the total sum of your revenue varied significantly over the past five years? 
If yes, please explain why under question 11 below (e.g. natural disasters such as 
the tsunami or any other event instigating exceptionally high levels of gifts, 
changes resulting from internal difficulties within the organisation, or, on the 
contrary, internal improvements).
o Yes
o No
11. Further comments:
12. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from 
public funds (the State, collectivites locales, social security, etc.)?
o 0
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o 1-10%
o 11-20%
o 21-30%
o 31-40%
o 41-60%
o 61-80%
o 81-95%
o 96-100%
13. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from
revenue raised from commercial activities?
o 0
o 1-10%
o 11-20%
o 21-30%
o 31-40%
o 41-60%
o 61-80%
o 81-95%
o 96-100%
14. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from 
individual donors?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60%
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o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
15. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from 
international humanitarian agencies (e.g. aid agencies or multilateral 
organisations)?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
16. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from 
the European Union or foreign governmental donors?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
4
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17. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from 
corporations, corporate foundations, or private foundations?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
18. What percentage of all individual donors donated sums up to a maximum of 
100 euros?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
19. Approximately how many donors have you had on average over the past three 
years?
o 0-500
o 501-1000 
o 1001-2500 
o 2501-5000
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o 5001-10 000 
o 10 001-100,000 
o 100,001-250,000 
o 251,000-500,000 
o 500,000 or more
20. Do you ensure regular follow-up/contact with donors from year to year?
o Yes
o No
21. If yes, approximately what percentage of donors renewed their donations in 
fiscal year 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
22. Do you feel that the competition from other organisations has a significant 
influence on your ability to attract donors?
o Yes
o No
23. In fiscal year 2006, what percentage of your total private revenue came from 
French sources?
o 0
o 1-10%
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o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
24. In fiscal year 2006, what percentage of donations came from Great Britain or 
the United States?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
25. How many full-time employees do you have in France?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o More than 5000
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26. How many full-time employees do you have overseas (including paid 
volontaires)?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o More than 5000
27. How many unpaid full- or part-time volunteers do you have in France?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o More than 5000
28. How many unpaid full- or part-time volunteers do you have overseas?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o More than 5000
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29. For how long has your organisation been a member of the Comite de la 
Charte?
o Less than 1 year
o 1 -2 years
o 3-5 years
o 5-10 years
o 10-15 years
o 15-20 years
30. How significant to your decision to join the Comite de la Charte was the goal 
of increasing donor trust?
o Not at all
o Somewhat 
o Very
o The principal motivating factor 
o The only motivating factor
31. Other than increasing donor trust, what was the principal motivating factor in 
your decision to join the Comite de la Charte?
32. Has it been necessary for your organisation to make significant changes to 
policy and practice as a result of joining the Comite de la Charte? If yes, please 
explain briefly the different types of changes required in the space provided at 
question 33 below.
o Yes
o No
33. Further comments:
356
34. Does your organisation have a specific committee within the conseil
d yadministration responsible for issues relating to accountability (notably in 
relation to communication and transparency of financial information); for 
example, an audit committee, investment committee, finance committee, or an 
executive committee? Please provide further details in the space provided at 
question 35 below, 
o Yes
o No
35. Further comments:
36. How do you publish your audited financial statements? (Please tick all 
applicable answers.)
o On your website
o By e-mail upon donors’ request 
o By mail upon donors’ request 
o By e-mail to all donors 
o By mail to all donors
o By e-mail or by mail to non-donors upon request 
o Other (please specify)
37. Do you produce English versions of your annual reports and financial reports?
o Yes
o No
38. From the following list, please tick all procedures which are currently in 
operation within your organisation to guarantee accountability:
o Conflict of interest procedures
o Document retention procedures 
o Performance evaluation procedures
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o Procedures relating to the communication and transparency of financial 
information
o Other (please specify)
39. Please add below any further comments that you consider important, either in 
relation to the subjects addressed above or to clarify your various answers. Please 
provide any specific information relating to the policies and practices of your 
organisation regarding accountability that may be of use.
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APPENDIX 1-H-1C
Self-completion Questionnaire -  Control Group (original French)
Enquete sur la notion de responsabilite dans les associations/fondations fran^aises:
ZOOMERANG QUESTIONNAIRE 
Projet de recherche de la London School of Economics: Enquete sur la notion de 
responsabilite dans les associations/fondations fran^aises.
1. Association/fondation:
o A chacun son Everest
o ACAT
o Action contre la Faim 
o Agronomes et Veterinaires sans Frontieres 
o Aide et Action
o Amnesty International -  section fran9aise 
o Association des paralyses de France 
o Association fran9 aise des scleroses en plaques 
o Association les petits freres des Pauvres 
o Association Petits princes 
o Association pour la recherche sur le cancer 
o Association V Haiiy pour le bien des aveugles 
o Care France 
o CCFD
o Centre fran9ais de protection de Fenfance 
o Chaine de Fespoir (la)
o Cimade Comite fran9ais pour la solidarity intemationale 
o Comite Perce-neige 
o Croix-rouge fran9aise 
o Delegation catholique pour la cooperation 
o Enfant par la main (un)
o Fondation Abbe Pierre 
o Fondation aide a toute detresse 
o Fondation d’Auteuil 
o Fondation de France 
o Fondation de L’avenir 
o Fondation des petits freres des Pauvres 
o Fondation hopitaux de Paris-hopitaux de France 
o Fondation pour la recherche medicale (FRM) 
o Foyer de Cachan 
o Freres des hommes 
o GEFLUC 
o Habitat et humanisme 
o Handicap international 
o Institut Pasteur 
o Jeunesse au plein air (JPA) 
o Ligue nationale contre le cancer (LNCC) 
o Maisons d’accueil L’ilot (MAI) 
o Medecins de Monde (MDM) 
o Oeuvre des pupilles orphelins de sapeurs-pompiers 
o Ordre de Malte
o Organisation pour la prevention de la cecite (OPC) 
o Orpheopolis -  (OMPN) 
o Partage
o Restaurants du coeur -  relais du coeur (les) 
o Secours catholique 
o Secours populaire fran9aise (SPF) 
o Societe nationale de sauvetage en mer
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o SO LenSI
o SOS Sahel international France 
o SOS villages d’enfants 
o Terre des hommes France (TDHF) 
o Unicef France
o Vaincre la mucoviscidose (VLM)
2. Veuillez saisir vos noms et adresses ci-dessous:
Votre Nom:
Addresse du siege social de l'association /fondation :
Ville :
Departement:
Code postal :
Pays :
Courriel :
3. Quel poste occupez-vous au sein de l’association/fondation?
o President du Directoire ou directeur general
o President du Conseil d’administration 
o Administrates (membre du Bureau) 
o Directeur financier 
o Directeur general adjoint 
o Vice-president 
o Directeur de la collecte de fonds 
o Directeur des programmes 
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
4. Veuillez indiquer le type d ’association/fondation dont il s’agit:
o Association loi 1901 declaree
o Association loi 1901 Reconnue d’Utilite Publique 
o Fondation Reconnue d’Utilite Publique 
o Fondation arbitree
361
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
5. Quel est le principal secteur d’activite de Passociation/fondation?
o Secours medical (ex : services d’urgence)
o Sante et recherche medicale (ex : lutte contre le cancer) 
o Soins medicaux 
o Maladies mentales 
o Droits de l’homme 
o Jeunesse et loisirs 
o Culture (ex : arts et litterature) 
o Sport
o Education et enseignement 
o Services sociaux 
o Enfance
o Defense de Penvironnement 
o Soutien aux handicapes 
o Aide au tiers-monde / aide au developpement 
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
6. Quel est le secteur d’activite secondaire de Passociation/fondation?
o Secours medical (ex : services d’urgence)
o Sante et recherche medicale (ex : lutte contre le cancer) 
o Soins medicaux 
o Maladies mentales 
o Droits de l’homme 
o Jeunesse et loisirs 
o Culture (ex : arts et litterature) 
o Sport
362
o Education et enseignement 
o Services sociaux 
o Enfance
o Defense de l’environnement 
o Soutien aux handicapes 
o Aide au tiers-monde / aide au developpement 
o Autre (veuillez preciser).
7. Dans quelles zones geographiques intervenez-vous? (Cochez toutes les reponses 
applicables.)
o En France uniquement
o En France ET en Grande-Bretagne 
o En France ET aux Etats-Unis 
o Dans F Union europeenne 
o En Afrique 
o EnAsie
o Au Canada OU au Mexique 
o En Amerique du Sud 
o Moyen-Orient 
o Europe de l’Est 
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
8. Dans quelles zones geographiques disposez-vous de bureaux ou autres points de 
representation? (Cochez toutes les reponses applicables.)
o En France uniquement
o En France ET en Grande-Bretagne 
o En France ET aux Etats-Unis 
o Dans V Union europeenne 
o En Afrique
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o En Asie
o Au Canada OU au Mexique 
o En Amerique du Sud 
o Moyen-Orient 
o Europe de l’Est 
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
9. A combien s’est eleve le total de vos ressources pour Pexercice 2006?
o De 500 000 a 1 million d’euros
o De 1 million a 2 millions d’euros 
o De 2 a 3 millions d’euros 
o De 3 a 4 millions d ’euros 
o De 4 a 5 millions d ’euros 
o De 5 a 10 millions d’euros 
o De 11 a 30 millions d’euros 
o De 31 a 50 millions d’euros 
o 51 millions d’euros ou plus
10. Au cours des cinq derniers exercices, le total de vos ressources annuel a-t-il 
varie de maniere importante? Si oui, veuillez expliquer pourquoi (ex : catastrophe 
naturelle de type tsunami ou tout autre evenement ayant engendre des dons 
exceptionnels ou difficultes rencontrees dans l’organisation interne ou au contraire 
amelioration de celle-ci) dans l'espace reserve a la question 11.
o Oui
o Non
11. Autres commentaires:
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12. Quel pourcentage representent des fonds publics (Etat, collectivites locales, 
securite sociale, etc.) dans le total de vos ressources annuel 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
13. Quel pourcentage represente le revenu des activites commerciales dans le total 
de vos ressources annuel 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
14. Quel pourcentage representent les dons individuels dans le total de vos 
ressources annuel 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30%
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o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
15. Quel pourcentage representent les organisations internationales humanitaires 
(« international aid agencies » et « multilateral organisations ») dans le total de vos 
ressources annuel 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
16. Quel pourcentage representent l’Union Europeenne ou des Etats etrangers 
dans le total de vos ressources annuel 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
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17. Quel pourcentage representent les dons emanant d ’entreprises ou de 
fondations privees franRaises dans le total de vos ressources 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
18. Quel est le pourcentage approximatif de donateurs individuels sur le nombre 
total de donateurs contribuant a hauteur d’un maximum de 100 euros?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
19. Combien de donateurs avez-vous approximativement comptabilise en 
moyenne au cours des trois derniers exercices?
o 0-500
o 501-1000 
o 1001-2500
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o 2501-5000 
o 5001-10 000 
o 10 001-100,000 
o 100,001-250,000 
o 251,000-500,000 
o 500,000 ou plus
20. Assurez-vous un suivi des donateurs d’une annee sur l’autre?
o Oui
o Non
21. Si oui, quel est le pourcentage approximatif de donateurs ayant renouvele 
leurs dons en 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
22. Considerez-vous que la concurrence des autres associations/fondations soit un 
facteur important dans votre capacite a attirer des donateurs?
o Oui
o Non
23. Au cours de l’exercice 2006, quel pourcentage de vos ressources privees totales 
emanait de sources fran^aises?
o 0
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o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
24. Au cours de l’exercice 2006, quel pourcentage de dons emanait de la Grande- 
Bretagne ou des Etats-Unis?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
25. Combien de salaries en equivalent temps plein avez-vous en France?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o Plus de 5000
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26. Combien de salaries en equivalent temps plein avez-vous a l’etranger (y 
compris volontaires remuneres)?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o Plus de 5000
27. Combien de benevoles a plein temps ou a temps partiel avez-vous en France?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o Plus de 5000
28. Combien de benevoles a plein temps ou a temps partiel avez-vous a l’etranger?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o Plus de 5000
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29. Votre association/fondation dispose-t-elle d’un comite specifique au sein du 
conseil d ’administration en charge des questions de responsabilite (notamment de 
la communication et de la transparence de l’information financiere); par exemple, 
un comite d’audit ou un comite executif? Veuillez precisez dans l'espace reserve a 
la question 30. 
o Oui
o Non
30. Autres commentaires:
31. Par quels moyens diffusez-vous vos informations financieres auditees? (Cochez 
toutes les reponses applicables.)
o Via votre site Internet
o Par courrier electronique sur demande des donateurs 
o Par courrier sur demande des donateurs
o Par courrier electronique a tous les donateurs
o Par courrier a tous les donateurs
o Par courrier electronique ou par courrier sur demande des non-donateurs
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
32. Diffusez-vous des versions en anglais de vos rapports annuels et de vos 
rapports financiers?
o Oui
o Non
33. Votre association a-t-elle deja envisage de devenir membre du Comite de la 
Charte ? Si oui, veuillez expliquer dans l’espace reserve a d’autres commentaires.
o Oui
o Non
Autres commentaires:
371
34. Votre association/fondation aurait-elle besoin de proceder a des ajustements 
importants en termes de transparence et de responsabilite pour devenir membre 
du Comite de la Charte ? Veuillez preciser dans l'espace reserve a d’autres 
commentaires.
o Oui
o Non 
Autres commentaires:
35. Dans la liste suivante, veuillez cocher les procedures actuellement mises en 
place au sein de votre association/fondation pour garantir sa responsabilite:
o Procedures sur les conflits d’interet
o Procedures sur la conservation des documents
o Procedures sur revaluation des performances
o Procedures sur la communication des informations/ Procedures sur la
transparence
o Autre (veuillez preciser)
36. Veuillez ajouter ci-dessous tout commentaire que vous considerez important 
par rapport aux sujets abordes ci-dessus ou afin de clarifier vos differentes 
reponses ; veuillez apporter toute precision utile relative aux politiques et 
pratiques de votre association/fondation en matiere de responsabilite.
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APPENDIX 1-H-1D
Self-completion Questionnaire -  Control Group 
(English translation by author)
Control Group Questionnaire: ZOOMERANG QUESTIONNAIRE 
Control Group Questionnaire: Research project for the London School of 
Economics on accountability in French associations/foundations.
1. Nonprofit Organisation:
o A chacun son Everest
o ACAT
o Action contre la Faim 
o Agronomes et Veterinaires sans Frontieres 
o Aide et Action
o Amnesty International -  section fran9 aise 
o Association des paralyses de France 
o Association fran9 aise des scleroses en plaques 
o Association les petits freres des Pauvres 
o Association Petits princes 
o Association pour la recherche sur le cancer 
o Association V Hauy pour le bien des aveugles 
o Care France 
o CCFD
o Centre fran9ais de protection de Fenfance 
o Chaine de l’espoir (la)
o Cimade Comite fran9ais pour la solidarity intemationale 
o Comite Perce-neige 
o Croix-rouge fran9 aise 
o Delegation catholique pour la cooperation 
o Enfant par la main (un)
Fondation Abbe Pierre
Fondation aide a toute detresse
Fondation d’Auteuil
Fondation de France
Fondation de L’avenir
Fondation des petits freres des Pauvres
Fondation hopitaux de Paris-hopitaux de France
Fondation pour la recherche medicale (FRM)
Foyer de Cachan 
Freres des hommes 
GEFLUC
Habitat et humanisme 
Handicap international 
Institut Pasteur 
Jeunesse au plein air (JPA)
Ligue nationale contre le cancer (LNCC)
Maisons d’accueil L’ilot (MAI)
Medecins de Monde (MDM)
Oeuvre des pupilles orphelins de sapeurs-pompiers 
Ordre de Malte
Organisation pour la prevention de la cecite (OPC) 
Orpheopolis -  (OMPN)
Partage
Restaurants du coeur -  relais du coeur (les)
Secours catholique
Secours populaire fran?aise (SPF)
Societe nationale de sauvetage en mer
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o SOL en SI
o SOS Sahel international France 
o SOS villages d’enfants 
o Terre des hommes France (TDHF) 
o Unicef France
o Vaincre la mucoviscidose (VLM)
2. Please fill out your name and contact details below:
Your name:
Registered office of the organisation :
Town :
Region :
Postcode :
Country :
E-mail :
3. Which position do you hold within the organisation?
o President or Director General
o President of the conseil d 'administration 
o Administrateur (or members of the bureau) 
o Financial Director 
o Deputy Director General 
o Vice President 
o Head of Fundraising 
o Head of Programmes 
o Other (please specify)
4. Please indicate which category your organisation belongs to:
o 1901 law association
o Public utility association (A.R.U.P.) 
o Public utility foundation (F.R.U.P.) 
o Private foundation
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o Other (please specify)
5. What is the organisation’s principal sector of activity?
o Medical assistance (e.g. emergency services)
o Health and medical research (e.g. cancer) 
o Medical care 
o Mental illness 
o Human rights 
o Youth and leisure 
o Culture (e.g. arts and literature) 
o Sport
o Education and teaching 
o Social services 
o Children
o Protection of the environment 
o Support to the disabled
o Aid and development assistance to developing countries 
o Other (please specify)
6. W hat is the organisation’s secondary sector of activity?
o Medical assistance (e.g. emergency services)
o Health and medical research (e.g. cancer) 
o Medical care 
o Mental illness 
o Human rights 
o Youth and leisure 
o Culture (e.g. arts and literature) 
o Sport
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o Education and teaching 
o Social services 
o Children
o Protection of the environment 
o Support to the disabled
o Aid and development assistance to developing countries 
o Other (please specify)
7. Which geographical areas do you work in? (Please tick all applicable answers.)
o France only
o France AND Great Britain 
o France AND the US
o EU 
o Africa 
o Asia
o Canada OR Mexico 
o South America 
o Middle East 
o Eastern Europe 
o Other (please specify)
8. In which geographical areas do you have offices or other representative 
agencies? (Please tick all applicable answers.)
o France only
o France AND Great Britain 
o France AND the US
o EU 
o Africa 
o Asia
377
o Canada OR Mexico 
o South America 
o Middle East 
o Eastern Europe 
o Other (please specify)
9. What was the total sum of your revenue for fiscal year 2006?
o 500 000 to 1 million euros
o 1 to 2 million euros 
o 2 to 3 million euros 
o 3 to 4 million euros 
o 4 to 5 million euros 
o 5 to 10 million euros 
o 11 to 30 million euros 
o 31 to 50 million euros 
o 51 million euros or more
10. Has the total sum of your revenue varied significantly over the past five years? 
If yes, please explain why under question 11 below (e.g. natural disasters such as 
the tsunami or any other event instigating exceptionally high levels of gifts, 
changes resulting from internal difficulties within the organisation, or, on the 
contrary, internal improvements).
o Yes
o No
11. Further comments:
12. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from 
public funds (the State, collectivites locales, social security, etc.)?
o 0
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o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
13. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from
revenue raised from commercial activities?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
14. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from 
individual donors?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60%
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o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
15. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from 
international humanitarian agencies (e.g. aid agencies or multilateral 
organisations)?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
16. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from 
the European Union or foreign governmental donors?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95%
o 96-100%
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17. What percentage of your total annual revenue for fiscal year 2006 came from 
corporations, corporate foundations, or private foundations?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
18. What percentage of all individual donors donated sums up to a maximum of 
100 euros?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
19. Approximately how many donors have you had on average over the past three 
years?
o 0-500
o 501-1000 
o 1001-2500 
o 2501-5000
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o 5001-10 000 
o 10 001-100,000 
o 100,001-250,000 
o 251,000-500,000 
o 500,000 or more
20. Do you ensure regular follow-up/contact with donors from year to year?
o Yes
o No
!■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■
21. If yes, approximately what percentage of donors renewed their donations in 
fiscal year 2006?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
22. Do you feel that the competition from other organisations has a significant 
influence on your ability to attract donors?
o Yes
o No
23. In fiscal year 2006, what percentage of your total private revenue came from 
French sources?
o 0
o 1-10%
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o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
24. In fiscal year 2006, what percentage of donations came from Great Britain or 
the United States?
o 0
o 1-10% 
o 11-20% 
o 21-30% 
o 31-40% 
o 41-60% 
o 61-80% 
o 81-95% 
o 96-100%
25. How many full-time employees do you have in France?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o More than 5000
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.
26. How many full-time employees do you have overseas (including paid 
volontaires)!
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o More than 5000
27. How many unpaid full- or part-time volunteers do you have in France?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o More than 5000
28. How many unpaid full- or part-time volunteers do you have overseas?
o 0
o 1-100 
o 101-250 
o 251-500 
o 501-1000 
o 1001-5000 
o More than 5000
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29. Does your organisation have a specific committee within the conseil 
d yadministration responsible for issues relating to accountability (notably in 
relation to communication and transparency of financial information); for 
example, an audit committee, investment committee, finance committee, or an 
executive committee? Please provide further details in the space provided at 
question 30 below, 
o Yes
o No
„  .    ^         =   —
30. Further comments:
31. How do you publish your audited financial statements? (Please tick all 
applicable answers.)
o On your website
o By e-mail upon donors’ request 
o By mail upon donors’ request 
o By e-mail to all donors 
o By mail to all donors
o By e-mail or by mail to non-donors upon request 
o Other (please specify)
32. Do you produce English versions of your annual reports and financial reports?
o Yes
o No
33. Has your organisation already considered becoming a member of the Comite 
de la Charte? If yes, please comment on the reasons you have not become a 
member to date and any other relevant issues.
o Yes
o No
Further comments:
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34. Would your organisation need to make any significant adjustments in terms of 
transparency and accountability in order to become a member of the Comite de la 
Charte? Please clarify your response in the space provided below.
o Yes
o No 
Further comments:
35. From the following list, please tick all procedures which are currently in 
operation within your organisation to guarantee accountability:
o Conflict of interest procedures
o Document retention procedures 
o Performance evaluation procedures
o Procedures relating to the communication and transparency of financial 
information
o Other (please specify)
36. Please add below any further comments that you consider important, either in 
relation to the subjects addressed above or to clarify your various answers. Please 
provide any specific information relating to the policies and practices of your 
organisation regarding accountability that may be of use.
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APPENDIX 1-H-2A 
Interview Questionnaire -  Comite Group (original French)
Fiche d’entretien -  Participants Groupe COMITE DE LA CHARTE 
INFORMATIONS DE BASE
ORGANISME: ____________________________________________________
FONDATION/ASSOCIATION/AUTRE _____________________________
NOM DU REPONDANT : __________________________________________
POSTE AU SEIN DE L’ORGANISME : _______________________________
TELEPHONE :_________________________ PORTABLE : ______________
COURRIEL : ______________________________________________________
ASSISTANT: ________________________ ____________________________
TELEPHONE DE L’ASSISTANT : ___________________________________
COURRIEL DE L’ ASSISTANT : _____________________________________
DATE : ___________________________________________________________
HEURE: _________________________________________________________
ADRESSE DE L’ENTRETIEN : ______________________________________
CASSETTE N°: ___________________________________________________
AUTRES PERSONNES PRESENTES LORS DE L’ENTRETIEN :
1.
2.
3.
LE REPONDANT A-T-IL COMPLETE LE QUESTIONNAIRE ZOOMERANG ? 
OUI / NON
SI NON, QUI AU SEIN DE L’ORGANISME A COMPLETE LE 
QUESTIONNAIRE ?
NOM:
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FONCTION :
LE REPONDANT A-T-IL VU LES RESULTATS DU QUESTIONNAIRE AVANT 
L’ENTRETIEN ?
OUI / NON
PRESENTATION DU PROCESSUS :
MERCI
CONFIDENTIEL
OBJECTIF
DUREE : environ une heure 
APPROCHE DES QUESTIONS
• Approfondie
• Aj outer tout commentaire qui semble approprie, meme si je ne le 
demande pas
• Aj outer tout contexte necessaire afin de comprendre et evaluer les 
reponses
• Importance des nuances 
RESULTATS ET PUBLICATION
COMMENTARIES SUR LE COMPORTEMENT :
AUTRES REMARQUES/ QUESTIONS PRELIMINAIRES : 
RAPPEL DE LA DEFINITION DE RESPONSABILITE :
CONFIANCE : Confiance qu’une institution ou un individu se comportera comme 
prevu [Describe Hansmann theory that nonprofits function on trust because 
unlike for-profit corporations they do not have the resources to provide the level of 
accountability. The point of this study is to investigate increasing accountability in 
the French nonprofit sector, including whether nonprofit organisations in France 
are in fact using accountability as a means to engender donor trust/mitigate 
mistrust and other possible explanations.]
RESPONSABILITE : « Repondre de son comportement»
[Raisonnement: eviter de limiter les parties prenantes et les types de 
responsabilite, notamment en dehors du territoire national et dans des contextes 
culturels et juridiques differents.] [Explain Comite working definition of 
accountability and offer US examples.]
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QUESTIONS : BASIC STRUCTURE [ELABORATED AND EXPLAINED 
“LIVE” DURING THE INTERVIEW USING SEMI-STRUCTURED METHOD -  
ALLOWING MANY NEW QUESTIONS. SOLICITING FURTHER DETAIL ON 
VARIOUS TOPICS DEPENDING ON RESPONDENT RESPONSES. NEED FOR 
CLARITY. ETC.l
INTRODUCTION: Les questions se repartissent en 5 categories majeures :
• responsabilite et confiance du donateur de maniere generale (de loin, la 
plus grande section),
• defis pour dynamiser le secteur a but non lucratif franqais,
• le Comite de la Charte,
• donateurs gouvernementaux/ institutionnels
• politique sociale.
Pour certaines questions, vous devrez repondre au nom de votre organisme, et pour 
d ’autres, vous devrez donner votre avis sur le secteur des [associations/fondations][a 
but non lucratif] dans son ensemble. Merci de preciser si votre avis personnel differe de 
Voptique que vous prenez au nom de votre organisme.
I. Responsabilite
INTRODUCTION: Les questions suivantes portent sur la responsabilite et la 
confiance des donateurs de maniere generale.
Definitions et confiance des donateurs
1. Augmentation d’interet en matiere de responsabilite. Dans quelle mesure 
l’interet/ les efforts de votre organisme en matiere de responsabilite se sont 
developpes/augmente ces 3 demieres annees ? ces 5 a 10 demieres annees ? 
La responsabilite est-elle importante pour votre organisme ? [Comment ? 
Pourquoi ?]
2. Confiance des Donateurs. Quelle importance accordez-vous a la 
responsabilite dans le cadre de l’entretien de la confiance des donateurs 
(pour remedier a la mefiance des donateurs) au sein de votre organisme ?
OR Dans quelle mesure le renforcement de la confiance des donateurs 
(remedier a la mefiance des donateurs) est la raison pour l’augmentation des 
efforts en matiere de responsabilite ?
a. Le developpement des efforts de responsabilite a-t-il favorise
1’amelioration de la confiance des donateurs ? Comment l’evaluez- 
vous ?
b. Quels sont les avantages escomptes de la confiance des donateurs ?
c. Quels sont, selon-vous, les autres facteurs les plus importants 
concemant l’entretien et le maintien de la confiance des donateurs ?
d. Votre organisme les applique-t-il tous ?
e. Considerez-vous que les donateurs s’interessent aux efforts de 
responsabilite ? Comment ? Pourquoi ?
f. Quels sont, selon-vous, les autres liens entre la responsabilite et la 
confiance des donateurs ?
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3. Explications. Outre la confiance, quelles autres explications s’appliquent a 
votre organisme pour 1’augmentation de la responsabilite : [or would these 
reasons push you to increase if you haven’t already]
i. Developpement et retombees des normes intemationales ?
ii. Pression des medias ?
iii. Pression des donateurs ?
iv. Privatisation du secteur ?
v. Repercussions des exigences de l’Etat fran?ais en matiere de 
responsabilite ?
vi. Autre ?
4. Definitions. Changeriez-vous la definition de la responsabilite des 
associations/fondations que je propose ? Votre organisme possede-t-il une 
definition standard avec laquelle vous travaillez ?)
a. La definition change-t-elle en fonction des beneficiaires de la 
responsabilite (ex : donateurs, benevoles, salaries, beneficiaires de 
services, le public), ou existe-t-il une definition qui s’applique a 
tous ?
b. Devrait-il exister des definitions differentes pour les associations et 
fondations ?
5. Standards Intemationaux. [Conclusion concemant le statut international du 
questionnaire] Considerez-vous les standards de responsabilite 
intemationaux (notamment aux Etats-Unis et au Royaume-Uni) comme des 
modeles importants pour votre organisme ? Pour le secteur a but non lucratif 
fran9ais en general ? Interessants en gendral ?
a. Pourquoi ?
b. Particularity ?
6. Address mistrust vs. Increase trust. Pensez-vous que la confiance des 
donateurs est davantage consideree comme un effort pour remedier a la 
mefiance des donateurs (ex : apres un scandale) ou comme un effort pour 
renforcer la confiance de maniere generale ? Est-ce une question
d’importance/de pertinence ?
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Votre organisme
7. Benevoles. Comment recourez-vous aux bene voles (ex : au niveau de la 
direction ? dans des postes a faible responsabilite ? sur le terrain ? avec une 
implication reguliere ou sur une base ponctuelle ?)
a. Pensez-vous que la responsabilite/ la transparence est importante 
pour attirer les benevoles ?
b. Votre recours aux benevoles reflete-t-il votre politique en matiere de 
responsabilite ?
c. Quelles sont les autres questions clefs concemant la relation entre vos 
avis sur la responsabilite et ceux des donateurs ?
8. Public, etc. Dans quelle mesure etes-vous porte sur la responsabilite envers 
le public ? envers les beneficiaires des services ? Comment vos pratiques en 
matiere de responsabilite le refletent-elles ? [Further question on 
relationship between cited rationale for increasing accountability and views 
on accountability to the public.]
Mecanismes de responsabilite volontaire
9. Je vais vous demander de bien vouloir commenter un certain nombre de 
mecanismes de responsabilite volontaire qui sont consideres comme les 
meilleures pratiques aux Etats-Unis. Merci d’indiquer si vous avez ou non 
mis en place chacun d’entre eux. [DEFINE EACH] [REFER TO SELF­
COMPLETION QUESTIONNAIRE] Si non, pourquoi ? [EXPLORE 
RANGE OF REASONS WHY OR WHY NOT IMPLEMENTED, 
CURRENT VIEWS, ETC.]
a. Comite d’audit
b. Politique de conservation des documents
c. Politique en matiere de conflit d’interet
d. Code de deontologie
e. Procedures d’audit/ relation avec les auditeurs
f. Supervision du Conseil en matiere de remuneration de l’equipe 
dirigeante (procedures)
g. Politique d’information (remuneration de la direction ?)
h. Whistleblower (denonciateur) (pratique illegale en France a 
proprement parler)
i. Efficacite de la performance
10. Quels sont, selon vous, les deux a trois plus importants mecanismes de 
responsabilite volontaire que vous avez mis en place ?
a. Pourquoi ces mecanismes-la ?
b. Quels resultats en avez-vous observe (en interne et en exteme) ?
c. Comment, le cas echeant, ces resultats sont-ils lies a la maniere de 
remedier a la mefiance des donateurs ?
d. Comment, le cas echeant, ces resultats sont-ils lies aux autres 
explications pour P augmentation des efforts en « accountabiltiy » en 
reponse aux questions precedentes?
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11. Quels sont les deux a trois plus importants mecanismes de responsabilite 
volontaire que vous souhaiteriez mettre en place ?
a. Pourquoi ne les avez-vous pas deja mis en place ?
b. Quels resultats esperez-vous en retirer (en interne et en exteme) ?
II. Defis pour dvnamiser le secteur a but non lucratif francais
INTRODUCTION: Les questions suivantes traitent du lien entre la
responsabilite et la reussite ou les defis du secteur a but non lucratif frangais.
1. Le secteur a but non lucratif fran9ais, malgre le talent et les efforts 
exceptionnels de ses participants, est en retard sur celui des Etats-Unis et du 
Royaume-Uni en termes de dons, de participation benevole, de niveau de 
professionnalisme en gouvemance. Comment classeriez-vous/ expliqueriez- 
vous les raisons les plus frequemment citees pour le retard du secteur :
a. Systeme fiscal (dons et contribution au titre de la securite sociale)
b. Etat providence [INCLUDE FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL SERVICE 
DELIVERY ISSUES, RELEVANCE TO OPERATIONS AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY] [RESPONSES TO KEY ELEMENTS IN 
THE LITERATURE] [TEST CONNECTION TO 
ACCOUNTABILITY]
c. Culture
d. Standards moins rigoureux en termes de responsabilite/ transparence
2. Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que 1’importance de la responsabilite dans le 
secteur a augmente dans les 3 demieres annees ? les 5 a 10 demieres annees ? 
[Comment ? Pourquoi ?]
3. Dans quelle mesure 1’augmentation de la confiance des donateurs (remedier a 
la mefiance des donateurs) en est la raison ? A-t-elle ete benefique ? Dans 
quelle mesure 1’augmentation de la responsabilite/ transparence permet-elle 
de remedier a la mefiance des donateurs ? (A votre avis est-ce que de la 
confiance des donateurs (remedier a la mefiance) est importante pour la 
reussite generale du secteur ?)
4. Outre la confiance, quelles autres explications s’appliquent au secteur pour 
l’augmentation de la responsabilite :
i. Developpement et retombees des normes intemationales ?
ii. Pression des medias ?
iii. Pression des donateurs ?
iv. Privatisation du secteur ?
V. Repercussions des exigences de l’Etat fran9ais en matiere de
responsabilite ?
vi. Autre ?
5. Dans quelle mesure considerez-vous la confiance du public, des benevoles, 
des salaries, des beneficiaires (en plus de celle des donateurs) importante pour 
la reussite du secteur ?
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6. Aurez-vous des commentaires concemant les differences eventuels entre vos 
reponses concemant la responsabilite / la confiance des donateurs (remedier a 
la mefiance) dans le cadre de votre organisme par rapport a vos reponses 
concemant le secteur ?
III. Adhesion au Comite de la Charte - Raisons pour devenir membre,
avantages/ inquietudes
INTRODUCTION: Ce groupe de questions s ’oriente sur le Comite de la Charte.
1. Depuis combien de temps etes-vous membre du Comite de la Charte ?
2. Quelle importance 1’augmentation de la confiance des donateurs (remedier a 
la mefiance des donateurs) a-t-elle revetue dans votre decision de rejoindre le 
Comite de la Charte ?
a. Quelles demarches avez-vous entreprises pour determiner les 
resultats (demander un feedback des donateurs, etc.) ?
b. Avez-vous observe des resultats ?
i. Si oui, lesquels ?
ii. Si non, pourquoi, selon vous ?
c. Quelles sont les exigences du Comite de la Charte les plus utiles en
termes de confiance des donateurs ?
3. D’ autres types de confiance (interne, bendvoles, reputation generale dans la 
societe) ont-ils ete importants dans votre decision de rejoindre le Comite de la 
Charte?
4. Quelles sont les autres principales raisons qui vous ont decides a rejoindre le 
Comite de la Charte ?
5. Quels changements/ ajouts significatifs, le cas echeant, de vos pratiques en 
matiere de responsabilite vous ont ete demandes pour rejoindre le Comite ?
6. Votre adhesion au Comite a-t-elle eu des consequences negatives ?
7. Comment vos salaries reagissent-ils par rapport au travail demande pour vous 
conformer a la Charte ?
8. Existe-t-il des aspects de la conformite avec la Charte que vous trouvez 
difficiles et/ ou inutiles ?
9. Existe-t-il des ameliorations aux processus et procedures du Comite de la 
Charte (processus de verification, marketing, texte de la charte, etc.) qui, 
selon vous, apporteraient des avantages plus importants aux associations/ 
fondations membres ?
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IV. Donateurs gouvernementaux et institutionnels
INTRODUCTION: Les questions suivantes traitent de la relation entre le
financement de I ’Etat et les donateurs institutionnels, les exigences des
gouvernements et donateurs institutionnels en matiere de responsabilite et vos
efforts en termes de responsabilite.
1. Quelle importance revet le financement de l’Etat dans votre organisme ? [A 
recuperer du questionnaire] A-t-elle toujours ete constante ou a-t-elle 
recemment evolue ?
2. Avez-vous des exigences de responsabilite/ transparence dans le cadre du 
financement de l’Etat qui different sensiblement des exigences du Comite ? 
Vos pratiques en matiere de responsabilite different-elles de celles des 
donateurs individuels en general ?
3. Quelle est la relation entre les repercussions des exigences de l’Etat en 
matiere de responsabilite et vos propres mesures visant a augmenter la 
responsabilite (ex : dans quelle mesure vos efforts en termes de responsabilite 
sont-ils lies aux exigences de l’Etat en matiere de financement et de 
responsabilite) ?
4. Quelle importance revet le financement de donateurs institutionnels (ffan9ais 
et intemationaux) (ex : fondations, gouvernements, organes de soutien 
multilateraux fran9ais et intemationaux) dans votre organisme ? [A recuperer 
Du self-completion questionnaire] A-t-elle toujours ete constante ou a-t-elle 
recemment evolue ?
5. Avez-vous des exigences de responsabilite/ transparence dans le cadre des 
donateurs institutionnels qui different sensiblement des exigences du 
Comite ? Vos pratiques different-elles de celles des donateurs individuels en 
general ?
6. Quelle est votre opinion sur la divergence entre les pratiques en termes de 
responsabilite des donateurs gouvernementaux/ institutionnels et des 
donateurs individuels ?
7. L’importance relative des sources de soutien non gouvemementales/ non 
institutionnelles impacte-t-elle vos decisions en matiere de responsabilite ?
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V. Politique sociale
INTRODUCTION: Ce dernier groupe de questions traite des recommandations
pour la politique gouvernementale en termes de responsabilite dans le secteur
des associations/ fondations et des recommandations pour les efforts d ’auto-
reglementation (y compris, notamment, le Comite de la Charte).
1. L’Etat doit-il etre plus strict en matiere de reglementation de la responsabilite 
des organismes a but non lucratif?
a. Comment ? [EXPLORE VARIOUS TYPES OF LAW POSSIBLE]
b. Qui devrait etre reglemente ? Par exemple, l’Etat doit-il differencier 
les organismes de differentes tailles (ex : California Nonprofit 
Integrity Act) ?
c. Pourquoi ?
d. Doit-il y avoir un formulaire d’information mandate par l’Etat (ex : 
Formulaire 990) ? [EXPLAIN IN DETAIL]
2. Existe-t-il des domaines ou l’Etat impose trop de reglementations en termes 
de responsabilite/ transparence ?
3. Quels avantages, le cas echeant, avez-vous identifies de 1’augmentation des 
avantages fiscaux pour les donateurs ? S’ils sont peu nombreux, quelle en est 
la raison selon vous ? [Note : charges sociales / dons deductibles des impots]
a. Quelles suggestions proposeriez-vous pour que l’Etat ameliore le 
systeme fiscal ?
b. A quel point les reglementations fiscales sont-elles pertinentes par 
rapport a vos avis sur la responsabilite ? [GIVE US EXAMPLES]
4. Pour quels aspects de la responsabilite/ transparence pensez-vous qu’un 
secteur auto-reglemente serait preferable ?
5. Quelles recommandations en matiere de politique feriez-vous dans le cadre 
d’un organisme auto-reglemente comme le Comite ?
6. Existe-t-il un besoin pour un type different d’organisme auto-reglemente ? Si 
oui, quel type ? Pourquoi ?
VI. Autre
a. Merci de faire tout autre commentaire ou de poser toute autre question 
relatif(ve) a ce sujet que vous auriez aime avoir entendu(e) dans cette 
enquete. Existe-t-il d’autres questions importantes a la comprehension de la 
responsabilite au sein du secteur que je n’ai pas posees ?
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FORMULE DE FIN :
MERCI
CARTE DE VISITE  POUR TOUT AUTRE COMMENTAIRE OU 
QUESTION
REPETER LE CARACTERE CONFIDENTIEL
REPETER QUE VOUS ESPEREZ QU’IL A ETE UTILE A _____, AU
COMITE DE LA CHARTE ET AU RAPPORT POUR LES PARTICIPANTS 
DE L’ETUDE.
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APPENDIX 1-H-2B
Interview Questionnaire -  Comite Group 
(English translation by author)
Interview Questionnaire - COMITE DE LA CHARTE GROUP
BASIC INFORMATION
DID THE RESPONDENTS SEE THE RESULTS OF THE SELF-COMPLETION 
QUESTIONNAIRE BEFORE THE INTERVIEW?
YES/NO
PRESENTATION OF THE PROCESS:
CONFIDENTIAL
OBJECTIVES
DURATION: 60-90 minutes 
APPROACH OF QUESTIONS:
• In-depth responses sought
• Add any commentary that seems appropriate, even if I do not specifically 
ask about the issue
• Add any necessary context that might be necessary to understand and 
evaluate the responses
• The importance of nuances 
RESULTS AND PUBLICATION
COMMENTARY ON RESPONDENT’S BEHAVIOUR:
OTHER REMARKS/PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS:
REMINDER OF THE DEFINITION OF ACCOUNTABILITY:
TRUST: “Trust that an institution or an individual will behave as expected.” 
[Describe Hansmann theory that nonprofits function on trust because unlike for- 
profit corporations they do not have the resources to provide the level of 
accountability. The point of this study is to investigate increasing accountability in 
the French nonprofit sector, including whether nonprofit organisations in France 
are in fact using accountability as a means to engender donor trust/mitigate donor 
mistrust and other possible explanations.]
ACCOUNTABILITY: “Responsibility for one’s behaviour” The reasoning behind 
this concept is to attempt to limit stakeholders and types of accountability, notably 
outside of the domestic territory and in different cultural and legal contexts.] 
[Explain Comite working definition of accountability and offer US 
examples.] [Explain different types of accountability.]
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QUESTIONS: BASIC STRUCTURE [ELABORATED AND EXPLAINED 
“LIVE” DURING THE INTERVIEW USING SEMI-STRUCTURED METHOD -  
ALLOWING MANY NEW QUESTIONS. SOLICITING FURTHER DETAIL ON 
VARIOUS TOPICS DEPENDING ON RESPONDENT RESPONSES. NEED FOR 
CLARITY. ETC.l
INTRODUCTION: The questions fa ll within five major categories:
• Accountability and donor trust in general (by far the biggest section).
• Challenges for dynamising the nonprofit sector in France
• The Comite de la Charte
• Governmental, institutional (and corporate) donors
• Social policy.
For certain questions, you should respond with respect to your organisation, and for  
others, you can give your opinion on how the question relates to the nonprofit sector 
more generally, including both foundations and associations. Thank you in advance for  
specifying differences between your personal opinion and the position that you take on 
behalf o f and in your role as leader o f  your organisation.
I. Accountability
INTRODUCTION: The following questions relate to accountability and donor
trust in general.
Definitions and Donor Trust
1. Increase in interest in accountability. To what extent has your organisation 
shown increased interest in accountability and/or efforts to increase 
accountability during the last three years? During the last five to ten years? 
How and why is this accountability important for your organisation? What 
would be examples of evidence of this increasing accountability?
2. Donor Trust. How important do you consider donor trust to be in relation to 
the increasing interest in and efforts with respect to accountability in your 
organisation? That is, to what extent is increasing accountability in order to 
engender donor trust? Or to what extent is the reinforcement of donor trust 
(or remedying donor mistrust) the reason for increase in efforts relating to 
accountability?
a. Has the development of accountability efforts improved donor 
trust? How do you evaluate this?
b. What are the advantages seen with respect to donor trust?
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c. In your opinion, what are the other most important factors 
regarding the maintenance of donor trust?
d. Does your organisation apply all of these?
e. Do you consider donors interested in accountability efforts? If 
so, how and why?
f. How else is accountability related to donor trust?
3. Explanations. Other than donor trust, what other explanations do you suggest 
there are for the increase in efforts with respect for accountability? [Or would 
these reasons push you to increase accountability if you had not done so 
already?] [push back on explanations to understand how, to what extent, 
interrelationships among explanations]
i. Development and spread of international standards of 
accountability?
ii. Media pressure?
iii. Donor pressure?
iv. Professionalisation and privatisation of the nonprofit 
sector?
v. Repercussions of demands of the French state with 
regards to accountability? (Either the French state in its 
capacity as donor, or regulation.)
vi. Other
4. Definitions. Would you change the definition of accountability of 
associations and foundations that I propose? Does your organisation have a 
standard definition of accountability that you work with?
a. Does the definition of accountability change according to the 
beneficiaries of accountability (e.g. donors, volunteers, 
employees, beneficiaries of services, the public), or is there a 
standard definition applicable to all by your organisation?
b. Should there be different definitions of accountability for 
associations and foundations?
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5. International Standards. Do you consider that international standards of 
accountability (in particular US and UK standards) are important models for 
your organisation? For the French nonprofit sector in general? Interesting as 
a matter of general interest?
a. Why?
b. Specifically, which examples would be compelling models?
6. Remedying mistrust vs. increasing trust. Do you think that donor trust is 
thought of in relation to an effort to remedy mistrust (for example, after a 
scandal), or increase trust? Can you please explain how this relates to your 
own views of accountability and the increasing interest and efforts with 
respect to accountability that your organisation has demonstrated? Is this a 
relevant/important question?
Your Organisation
7. Volunteers. How do you use volunteers? (For example, at headquarters? In 
positions of low-level responsibility? In the field? On an occasional 
commitment or on a regular basis?) [Refer to Self-Completion Questionnaire 
Results]
a. Do you think that accountability/transparency is important to 
attract volunteers?
b. Does your method of using volunteers reflect your policy on 
accountability?
c. What are the key issues relating to the relationship between your 
views on accountability and volunteers?
d. Have volunteers expressed any views relating to accountability 
generally or accountability mechanisms specifically?
8. Public, etc. To what extent are you concerned with accountability towards 
the general public? To beneficiaries of services? How do your policies and 
practices with respect to accountability reflect this? [Further question 
relationship between cited rationale for increasing accountability and views 
on accountability to the public.] [Suggest initial basis for the question is tax 
basis -  and probe tax relevance.]
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Voluntary Accountability Mechanisms
9. I am going to ask you to comment on a number of voluntary accountability 
mechanisms which are best practice in the US. Could you please indicate 
whether or not you have implemented each, and if not, why not? (e.g. 
resource limitations, policy of the Board of Directors, cultural sensitivity, 
time, inappropriate for your organisation, etc.) [DEFINE EACH]
[EXPLORE RANGE OF REASONS WHY OR WHY NOT 
IMPLEMENTED (RESOURCE LIMITATIONS, LACK OF INTEREST, 
LACK OF UTILITY/RELEVANCE, NO TIME, CULTURAL BARRIERS, 
RESISTANCE FROM EMPLOYEES, ETC.), CURRENT VIEWS, ETC.]
a. Audit Committee
b. Document retention policy
c. Conflict of interests policy
d. Code of Ethics
e. Audit Procedures/overseeing relationship with external auditors
f. Conseil d’Administration oversight of senior management 
compensation and evaluation
g. A policy on information distribution and transparency
h. Whistleblower mechanism ( a practice which is technically illegal 
in France, but is integrated into the corporate world with certain 
modifications)
i. Performance effectiveness.
10. In your opinion, what are the two most important voluntary accountability 
mechanisms that you have implemented?
a. Why did you choose these particular voluntary accountability 
mechanisms?
b. What results have you observed (internally and externally) from 
the implementation of these voluntary accountability 
mechanisms?
c. How have these results been linked to donor trust, if at all?
d. How have these results been linked to other rationales for 
increasing accountability you cited?
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11. What are the two or three most important voluntary accountability 
mechanisms that you wish to put into place that you have not yet had the 
time, resources, or opportunity to do?
a. Why have you not already implemented these voluntary 
accountability mechanisms?
b. What results do you expect to obtain (internally and externally) 
once these voluntary accountability mechanisms are 
implemented?
c. How do you expect to measure these results?
II. Challenges for dynamising the French nonprofit sector
INTRODUCTION: The following questions relate to the link between
accountability and the success or failure o f the French nonprofit sector.
1. Despite the exceptional talents and effort of many of its participants, the 
French nonprofit sector is lagging behind that of the US and the UK in 
terms of giving, volunteering, level of professionalism, and governance. 
[GIVE STATS] How do you classify/explain the reasons for this lag in the 
sector?
a. The tax system (deduction of gifts and social security contribution 
levels)
b. Welfare state [INCLUDE FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL 
SERVICE DELIVERY ISSUES, RELEVANCE TO 
OPERATIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY] [RESPONSES TO 
KEY ELEMENTS IN THE LITERATURE] [TEST 
CONNECTION TO ACCOUNTABILITY]
c. Culture
d. Lower standards in terms of accountability/transparency
2. To what extent do you think that accountability has increased in importance 
generally in the sector in the past three years? Five to ten years? (How? 
Why?)
3. To what extent is donor trust (or remedying mistrust of donors) the reason? 
Has it been effective? To what extent has an increase in 
accountability/transparency contributed to remedying donor mistrust? (In 
your opinion, is donor trust (remedying mistrust) important for the general 
success of the French nonprofit sector?)
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4. Other than trust, what other explanations apply to the sector for increasing 
responsibility?
i. Development and absorption of international standards of 
accountability?
ii. Media pressure?
iii. Volunteer pressure?
iv. Professionalisation and privatisation of the nonprofit sector?
v. Repercussions of demands of the French state with regards to
accountability? (Either the French state in its capacity as donor, 
or regulation.)
vi. Other
5. To what extent do you consider public trust, trust of volunteers, trust of 
employees, trust of beneficiaries of services important for the success of the 
French nonprofit sector?
6. Do you have any comments relating to possible differences between your 
answers with respect to accountability/donor trust (remedying donor 
mistrust) in the context of your organisation relative to your responses 
concerning the sector more generally?
III. Membership in the Comite de la Charte -  Reasons for becoming a
member, advantages, disadvantages, and criticisms
INTRODUCTION: This group o f questions is oriented around the Comite de la
Charte.
1. How long has your organisation been a member of the Comite de la Charte?
2. How important was increasing donor trust (remedying donor mistrust) to 
your decision to join the Comite de la Charte?
a. Which steps have you taken in order to determine the results (asking 
for feedback from donors, etc)?
b. Have you observed any results with respect to donor trust?
i. If yes, which?
ii. If no, why do you think that membership in the Comite de la 
Charte has not been effective in increasing donor trust?
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c. What are the requirements of the Comite de la Charte that are the most 
useful in terms of donor trust?
3. Were any other types of trust (internal, volunteers, general reputation in the 
sector, etc) important in your decision to join the Comite de la Charte?
4. What other primary reasons contributed to your decision to join the Comite 
de la Charte?
5. What significant changes/additions, as the case may be, in your 
accountability practices were required for you to join the Comite de la 
Charte?
6. Has your membership in the Comite de la Charte had negative consequences 
of any sort?
7. How did your employees react relative to the work required in order to 
comply with the on-going obligations of the Comite de la Charte?
8. Are there aspects of compliance with Comite de la Charte requirements that 
you find difficult and/or useless?
9. Do you have any recommendations for improvement in the policies, 
processes and procedures of the Comite de la Charte (verification processes, 
marketing, texts of the Charte de Deontologie, etc) that according to you 
would help bring greater advantages to the member associations and 
foundations?
IV. Governmental. Institutional, and Corporate Donors
INTRODUCTION: The following questions relate to the relationship between
accountability and state funding or funding from other institutional or corporate
donors, in particular with demands for accountability and your own efforts in
terms o f  accountability relating to this type offunding.
1. How important is French state funding to your organisation? (Also to cross­
check against self-completion questionnaire.) Has this been consistent or 
has this recently evolved?
2. Do you have requirements with respect to accountability/transparency in the 
context of French state financing which differ considerably from the 
requirements of the Comite de la Charte? Are these policies and practices 
different than those for individual donors in general?
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3. What is the relationship between the repercussions of French state 
requirements with respect to accountability and your own efforts targeting 
increased accountability (e.g. to what extent are your efforts in terms of 
accountability directly linked to French state requirements for funding or 
independently obtaining funding)?
4. What is the importance of institutional donors (French or international) (e.g. 
foundations, government entities, multilateral organisations)? (Also to 
cross-check against Self-Completion Questionnaire). Has this been 
consistent or has this recently evolved?
5. Do you have requirements with respect to accountability/transparency in the 
context of institutional donor funding which differ considerably from the 
requirements of the Comite de la Charte? Are these policies and practices 
different from those relating to individual donors more generally?
6. What is your opinion on the divergence between practices in terms of 
govemmental/institutional/corporate donors and those relating to individual 
donors?
7. What is the relevant importance of sources of funding other than 
govemmental/institutional/corporate in terms of the impact on your 
decisions relating to accountability?
V. Social Policy
INTRODUCTION: This last group o f questions relates to recommendations for
social policy in terms o f  accountability for the nonprofit sector relating to
associations andfoundations, and recommendations for self-regulatory efforts
(including the Comite de la Charte) and voluntary accountability efforts.
1. Should the French state be more strict with respect to regulations on 
accountability in nonprofit organisations?
a. How? [EXPLORE VARIOUS TYPES OF LAWS POSSIBLE]
b. What should be regulated? For example, should the French state 
distinguish between different sized organisations (e.g. the California 
Nonprofit Integrity Act)? Between fundraising and non-fundraising 
organisations?
c. Why?
d. Should there be a mandatory information disclosure form required by 
the French state? (e.g. Form 990) [EXPLAIN IN DETAIL]
2. Are there areas in which the French state imposes excessive regulation in 
terms of accountability/transparency? Please explain.
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3. What are the advantages with respect to recent changes in the tax law for 
donors? Do you consider the tax law adequate with respect to competition 
between other countries? (Note: the answer should include issues such as 
social charges, tax deductibility of gifts.)
a. What suggestions do you have for the French state to improve the tax 
system?
b. How relevant is tax regulation to your views on accountability?
[GIVE US EXAMPLES]
4. What aspects of accountability/transparency do you think would be better 
addressed by a self-regulatory organisation? Why? What sort of self- 
regulatory organisation do you think would be most appropriate? (Also to 
cross-check against self-completion questionnaire.)
5. What other recommendations in terms of social policy would you make in 
the context of a self-regulatory organisation such as the Comite de la 
Charte? How should the Comite de la Charte intervene in matters of 
Government policy?
6. Is there a need for a different type of self-regulatory organisation that the 
Comite de la Charte? What sort? Why?
VI. Other
1. Please make any other comments or ask any other questions relating to the 
subject that you would have liked to have heard in this interview. Are there 
questions that are important to the understanding of accountability in the 
French nonprofit sector that I did not ask? Are there any other areas that 
you feel require additional context or information?
2. Do you have any questions regarding international practices or your specific 
organisation that would contribute to the understanding of your perspective 
on accountability?
3. Do you feel that all relevant aspects of the subject were covered?
CLOSING OF THE INTERVIEW
THANK YOU.
BUSINESS CARD FOR ALL FURTHER QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS.
REPEAT THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF THE INTERVIEW.
REPEAT THAT THERE WILL BE A FRENCH LANGUAGE REPORT WITH 
DETAILED FINDINGS AND A SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 
COMITE DE LA CHARTE AS AN ORGANISATION, AND ALSO FOR 
INDIVIDUAL ORGANISATIONS.
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APPENDIX 1-H-2C 
Interview Questionnaire -  Control Group (original French)
Fiche d’entretien -  Participants Groupe CONTROL
[The following excerpt from  the Control Group interview questionnaire is the only sectionof 
the interview questionnaire that is different from the Comitd Group interview questionnaire (Appendix 
1-H-2A). This Section replaces Section III o f  the Comitd Group Interview Questionnaire.]
III. Adhesion au Comite de la Charte -  Raisons pour devenir membre.
avantages/ inquietudes
INTRODUCTION: Ce groupe de questions s ’oriente sur le Comite de la Charte
et votre opinion sur les raisons pour lesquelles il pourrait etre avantageux ou
non pour vous d ’adherer au Comite et I ’impact sur la responsabilite.
1. Avez-vous envisage de devenir membre du Comite de la Charte ?
a. Si oui, pourquoi n’avez-vous pas adhere ?
b. Si non, pourquoi ?
2. Repondriez-vous aux criteres pour adherer au Comite ? [Les criteres son t: 
 •]
3. Quelle importance Taugmentation de la confiance des donateurs (remedier a 
la mefiance des donateurs) a-t-elle revetue dans votre enquete sur le Comite 
[et votre decision de ne pas adherer] ?
4. D’autres types de confiance (interne, benevoles, reputation generate, public, 
beneficiaires) ont-ils ete impliques dans cette consideration du Comite ?
5. Y aurait-il eu des changements importants dans vos pratiques de 
responsabilite afin que vous puissiez rejoindre le Comite ?
6. Votre adhesion au Comite aurait-elle eu des consequences negatives ?
7. Existe-t-il des ameliorations aux processus et procedures du Comite 
(eligibility, processus de verification, texte de la charte, etc.) qui vous 
auraient fait changer d’avis ?
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APPENDIX 1-H-2D
Interview Questionnaire -  Control Group 
(English translation by author of sections different from Comite Group version)
[The following excerpt is a translation by the author o f the questions from the formal interview 
questionnaire that relate to the Control Group only. These questions replace Section III (questions on 
being a member o f the Comitd de la Charte fo r  the Comite Group) o f the Comitd Group interview 
questionnaire. The sections other than this Section III were identical to the Comitd Group 
questionnaire (translation in Appendix 1-H-2B).]
III. Membership in the Comite de la Charte -  Reasons for becoming a 
member, advantages, disadvantages, and criticisms
INTRODUCTION: This group o f questions is oriented around the Comite de la 
Charte and your opinion as to the reasons why it would be advantageous or not 
for you to become a member o f  the Comite de la Charte, and the implications o f  
membership on your accountability policies and practices.
1. Have you ever considered becoming a member of the Comite de la Charte?
a. If yes, why have you not become a member yet?
b. If not, why not?
2. Do you currently comply with the criteria for Comite de la Charte 
membership? [The criteria are: (list the main criteria).]
3. To what extent is increasing donor trust (or remedying donor mistrust) 
relevant to your investigation of the Comite de la Charte and possible 
decision to become a member or not?
4. Are other types of trust (internal, volunteer trust, general reputation, public 
trust, trust of beneficiaries of services) relevant to your consideration of 
membership in the Comite de la Charte?
5. Would there be significant changes in your accountability policies and 
practices necessary for you to become a member and/or remain a member 
on an on-going basis?
6. Would you expect your membership in the Comite de la Charte have 
negative consequences of any sort? If so, what would those be and could 
they be addressed?
7. Do you have any suggestions to improve the policies, requirements, 
processes, and/or procedures of the Comite de la Charte (e.g. eligibility 
procedures, verification processes, text of the Charte de Deontoglogie, etc.) 
which would make you change your mind one way or the other about 
membership in the Comite de la Charte?
408
8. Do you have any other comments about the efficacy of the Comite de la 
Charte and/or any aspects of why you would or would not become a 
member, in particular in relation to accountability and/or donor trust?
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APPENDIX 1-1 
Method of Data Analysis
I used a three-step iterative process involving “data reduction, data display, and 
conclusion drawing/verification” (Robson 2002, 475-6). Summaries, abstracts, tables, 
and comparative charts were prepared for sorting, analysing, and considering the 
qualitative data from several perspectives. This process included cross-comparing 
relationships among responses to different groupings of questions. This exercise was 
repeated multiple times for accuracy.
I built into the approach opportunities for clarification and testing the 
validity/reliability/plausibility of responses. In addition, I used respondent verification 
by feeding back at various stages my findings for reconfirmation to Soublin and Cyrille 
Cohas-Bogey, Executive Director of the Comite, and certain respondents on specific 
issues, as well as a version of “triangulation” by confirming my understanding of 
interviews and background data with Soublin and French nonprofit sector experts 
(Bryman 2004, 275; e.g. Berthet call 2008, Charhon meeting 2005, Binder meeting 
2007, Frotiee, Chartier, and Berthet teleconference 2008, and Frotiee and Chartier 
teleconference 2008)1. Multiple drafts of the Report to Respondents were reviewed with 
Soublin. Soublin and all respondents were invited to comment further on the Report to 
Respondents. There were separate meetings on implementation at the Comite level of 
various recommendations from the Report to Respondents (Soublin meeting February 
2008). Comite senior management follow-up verification through calls and e-mails 
continued throughout the thesis drafting process. In addition, the dual-phase of data 
collection with verification of certain data from publicly available sources adds 
reliability. Finally, sporadic feedback from respondents was used, for example 
comments from interviewees met at conferences subsequent to the interviews (Comite 
de la Charte Conference 2008; Leo Jegard & Associes Conference 2008).
!See References Section IV for references to these experts.
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APPENDIX 2
Theoretical Framework
How 
accountability 
decisions are 
made
Why DONOR TRUST ETHICAL, EFFECTIVE
accountability (HANSMANN) MANAGEMENT (EEM)
is increasing (irrespective of external
reaction -  donor trust or
otherwise)
--------------------- * ------------------ ------------------- + --------------------
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
of accountability matters 
(to “signal” trust 
ROSE-ACMERMAN)
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
of accountability matters 
(based on ROSE-ACKERMAN 
analysis but irrespective 
of external reaction)
Internal variables: size, level o f  international engagem ent, and initiative and profile
o f  leader
External variables: regulatory (accou ntability  regulation and ta|c system ) and non- 
regjulatory (w elfare state environm ent and scandal)
Media is a corollary to donor trust
M ost trust-related VjAMs independent o f  
internal and external variables
Donor pressure, CfomitS membership, 
and the media are potential driving  
factors to accountability  efforts in 
furtherance o f  donor trust.
Media not an issue (no  attention to  
external reaction)
M ost corporate and international VAMs 
m ore c lo se ly  tied  tc internal variables 
but not linked to  tx tem a l variables
Corporatisation 
international s 
compliance with fui 
requirements are
EE
, integration of 
tandards, and 
der accountability
driving factors to  
M.
A ccountab ility  dec ision s for all are inside out, organisation by crganisation-driven.
D onor trust matters for all -  irrespective o f  rationale for increa; ing accountability .
on driven (i.e ., 
ies o f  sp ec ific  U S
P o licy  im plications: accountability  c h o ice s  should  b e fu n c t 
m echanism s that ach ieve functional resu lts) not necessarily  cop
and/or corporate m odels.
A ccou ntab ility  (particularly 
perform ance evaluation) supplem ents 
the nondistribution constraint as the 
basis for trust in the increasingly  
com petitive, accountabi lity-focused  
en v iro n m en t^ v l LA MON).
E EM  respondents sep  
and donor trust, but d 
to  m a
irate accountability  
>nor trust continues  
ter.
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APPENDIX 4
Independently Adopted Voluntary Accountability Mechanisms 
(Above and Beyond the Law, Comite Requirements, 
and VAMs -by Category)
Comite Group and Control Group Combined
I. General Conseil d\'Administration Oversight and Financial Transparency
1. Formal evaluation of the General Director or Executive Director and 
the President by the conseil d ’administration (Organisation 17)
2. Publication of the salaries and non-salary compensation and benefits of 
the three to five most highly paid members of the management team 
publicly and individually (Organisation 18 and C)
3. Assurance of written policies for all best accountability practices -  to
ensure that these practices survive a change in leader and/or conseil 
d ’administration and are clearly communicated to all involved with the 
organisation (Organisation 17)
4. Adoption of a formal conflict of interest policy regarding beneficiaries of 
services (e.g. not accepting legacy gifts to the organisation from elderly 
patients cared for by the association) (Organisation 3 and 7)
5. Formal expert risk analysis (including financial, competition, political, 
sustainability of the organisation, and personnel security, as applicable) 
(Organisations 7 and C)
6. Income Statement published publicly along with Statement of Use of 
Funds (Organisation 26)
7. Rigorous re-evaluation of the respect of the statutory mission on a
regular basis and at the time of any unusual influx of gifts (e.g. the 2004 
Asian tsunami) to insure programs and use of funds stay strictly within 
mission boundaries (Organisations 25 and C)
8. Manual of internal procedures (outlining financial controls and other 
employee and operations procedures)
II. Donor Matters
1. Donor committee or donor representatives -  small group of donors 
representing the donor group with access to the management team on a 
regular basis (Organisations 4 and 3)
2. Response to every donor complaint -  whether written, telephonic, or 
internet-based (Organisations 4 and B)
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3. Buttress fund-raising practices (such as strict procedures to participate in 
national fund-raising events, reconsideration of stewardship expenses, 
scrutiny of media-driven fund-raising (Organisations 14,4, B, respectively)
III. Audit Committee
1. Implementation of a formal letter signed by the President and Conseil 
d\Administration treasurer to the commissaires aux comvtes and any 
other independent auditors and stating that the management team is 
available for any audit related questions (Organisation 18)
2. Whistleblower mechanism or functional alternative allowing confidential 
reporting of fraud, sexual harassment, and other such matters (Organisation 
C)
3. Formal approval by the Conseil d\Administration of all expenditures by 
the President (Organisation 17)
4. Internal audits (on general control systems and financial controls) -  by 
independent auditors
5. Policy of aggressive reaction in case of any problem (fraud, a difficult 
management issue, a legitimate financial downturn, closure of programs, 
etc.) (Organisation 7)
IV. Volunteers Matters
1. Volunteer Code of Conduct -  specifying expected ethical and 
organisational conduct standards required of volunteers and expectations 
volunteers should have regarding the functioning of the organisation and 
treatment of volunteers (including such issues as policies on evaluations and 
dismissal)
2. Efforts to professionalise volunteers through training, clear job 
descriptions, and annual evaluations
V. Beyond US Sector Best Practice Standards
1. “Dashboard” -  Succinct table prepared monthly for the conseil 
d ‘administration with key financial and other performance indicators most 
relevant to the organisation (Organisation 15)
2. Environmental audit (“footprint”) and list of 20 best practical tips or 
requirements for the organisation to apply in daily operations to improve 
environmental performance
3. Voluntary request for external audit from Ministry of the Interior
(Organisation B)
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APPENDIX 6-A
Average Number of Donors per Year 
In Three Fiscal Years Preceding Survey'
C o m i t e  G r o u p C o n t r o l  G r o u p 2 T o t a l  C o m b i n e d  G r o u p
#  O r g s % #  O r g s % #  O r g s %
0 - 5 0 0 1 3 % 5 5 0 % 6 1 5 %
5 0 1 - 1 , 0 0 0 2 7 % 1 10% 3 8%
1 , 0 0 1 - 2 , 5 0 0 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
2 , 5 0 1 - 5 , 0 0 0 2 7 % 0 0% 2 5 %
5 , 0 0 1 - 1 0 , 0 0 0 2 7 % 0 0% 2 5 %
10, 0 0 1 - 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 5 1 9 % 2 20% 7 1 8 %
1 0 0 , 0 0 1 - 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 6 21% 0 0% 6 1 5 %
2 5 1 , 0 0 1 - 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 6 21% 2 20% 8 21%
5 0 0 , 0 0 1  o r  m o r e 5 1 7 % 0 0% 5 1 3 %
T O T A L 29 100% 10 100% 39 100%
Approximate Percentage of Individual Donors 
Contributing a Maximum of €100 Annually (2006)
C o m i t e  G r o u p C o n t r o l  G r o u p T o t a l  C o m b i n e d  G r o u p s
#  O r g s % #  O r g s % # O r g s %
0 2 7 % 3 3 0 % 5 1 3 %
1- 1 0 % 4 1 4 % 0 0% 4 10%
11- 2 0 % 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
2 1 - 3 0 % 1 3 % 0 0% 1 3 %
3 1 - 4 0 % 0 0% 1 10% 1 3 %
4 1 - 6 0 % 3 10% 0 0% 3 8%
6 1 - 8 0 % 1 3% 2 20% 3 8%
8 1 - 9 5 % 1 5 52% 1 10% 1 6 4 1 %
9 6 - 1 0 0 % 3 10% 3 3 0 % 6 1 5 %
T O T A L 29 100% 10 100% 39 100%
1 Tables include the total number o f  respondents responding to the self-completion questionnaire.
2 Includes both Control Group A  and Control Group B organisations. Therefore, because six organisations are 
Control Group B organisations, the lower number o f donors is not surprising as that reflects the profile o f  the Control 
Group B respondents.
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APPENDIX 6-B
Number of Full-Time Equivalent Employees 
in and outside of France (2006)'
N u m b e r  o f  F u l l - T i m e  E q u i v a l e n t  
E m p l o y e e s  i n  F r a n c e
N u m b e r  o f  F u l l - T i m e  E q u i v a l e n t  
E m p l o y e e s  O u t s i d e  o f  F r a n c e  
(Including Paid Volontaires)2
C o m i t e  G r o u p C o n t r o l  G r o u p
T o t a l  C o m b i n e d  
G r o u p s C o m i t S  G r o u p C o n t r o l  G r o u p
T o t a l  C o m b i n e d  
G r o u p s
#  O r g s % # O r g s % #  O r g s % #  O r g s % #  O r g s % #  O r g s %
0 0 0 1 10 1 3 1 7 5 9 6 6 0 2 3 5 9
1-100 1 5 5 2 7 7 0 22 5 6 6 21 3 3 0 9 2 3
1 0 1 - 2 5 0 5 1 7 0 0 5 1 3 2 7 0 0 2 5
2 5 1 - 5 0 0 2 7 2 20 4 110 1 3 0 0 1 3
5 0 1 - 1 , 0 0 0 4 1 4 0 0 4 10 2 7 0 0 2 5
1 0 0 1 - 5 , 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 3 1 3 0 0 1 3
M o r e  t h a n  5 , 0 0 0 2 7 0 0 2 5 0 0 1 10 1 3
T O T A L 29 100 10 100 39 100 29 100 10 100 39 100
Number of Full- and Part-Time Volunteers 
in and outside of France (2006)
F u l l -  o r  P a r t - T i m e  V o l u n t e e r s  
i n  F r a n c e
F u l l -  o r  P a r t - T i m e  V o l u n t e e r s  
O u t s i d e  o f  F r a n c e  
(Excluding Paid Volontaires)3
C o m i t e  G r o u p C o n t r o l  G r o u p T o t a l  C o m b i n e d  G r o u p s C o m i t e  G r o u p
C o n t r o l  G r o u p T o t a l  C o m b i n e d  G r o u p s
#  O r g s % #  O r g s % U O r g s % #  O r g s % U O r g s % #  O r g s %
0 1 3 2 20 3 8 22 7 6 8 8 0 3 0 7 7
1-100 6 21 3 3 0 9 2 3 5 1 7 2 20 7 1 8
1 0 1 - 2 5 0 5 1 7 1 10 6 1 5 2 7 0 0 2 5
2 5 1 - 5 0 0 2 7 1 10 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 1 - 1 , 0 0 0 4 1 4 1 10 5 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 , 0 0 1 - 5 , 0 0 0 5 1 7 1 10 6 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
More than 5 , 0 0 0 6 21 1 10 7 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
T O T A L 29 100 10 10 39 100 29 100 10 100 39 100
1 Figures are based on respondents participating in the written self-completion questionnaire.
2 Volontaires are a modestly paid hybrid between paid employees and unpaid volunteers, most often sent overseas for 
a fixed period (e.g. a two-year term as medical aid workers).
3 Figures exclude paid volontaires.
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